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Proceedings of the 11th IADA Conference on 'Dialogue Analysis and Rhetoric', University of Münster, March 26-30, 2007

Edited by
Edda Weigand

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Introduction

The second volume of the iada.online.series contains the Proceedings of the 11th IADA Conference on Dialogue Analysis, held at the University of Münster in March 2007. I would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the University of Münster for the financial funding of the conference. The central topic of this conference was "Dialogue Analysis and Rhetoric". More than 100 papers were given by participants from all over the world. The conference languages were English, German, and French. The present volume therefore contains a few papers in German and French.

Various sessions were arranged in order to come to grips with the multiple issues and aspects dealt with. In this online volume the papers are assigned to chapters on the following topics:

- Rhetoric in Institutional Games
- Specific Media
- Various Aspects of the 'Mixed Game'
- Argumentation
- Culture
- Related Topics

The first chapter on '*rhetoric in institutional games*' includes a variety of papers which deal with the institutions of teaching, the law, the media and politics. The papers by Arikan, Dufour, Farini, and Myers cover the topic *teaching*. ARIKAN focuses on elementary level ELT coursebooks, FARINI on conflictual interactions in Italian classes, and MYERS on course reading in French. The general issue of the relationship between dialogue and didactics is addressed by DUFOUR.

Dubrovskaya, Nettel and Pinto describe aspects of *legal games*. DUBROVSKAYA compares Russian and English courtroom dialogue with respect to politeness, NETTEL deals with scientific expert opinions in court, and PINTO analyses how genre conditions influence the stylistic and textual organization of legal discourse and of party billboards.

Language games in *the media* are analysed in other papers: GUILBERT addresses the question of why the discourse of power needs to present itself as discourse of evidence. The texts he analyses are commentaries from the French written press. Code-switching and the many personalities of a TV presenter are

the topic of the paper by KAYSER. KUZNETSOVA deals with the manipulative aspect of communicative strategies. SIMON analyses discourses of young people and adults taken from a French newspaper for young people. Finally SIMPSON & WALTON ask whether televisual rhetoric can be considered as a fast forward device to cultural evolution.

In addition, there are two papers on the language of *politics*: HUANG focuses on hedge strategies in Taiwan political discourse, and MÜLLER analyses a TV debate between Jean Marie le Pen and Nicolas Sarkozy.

Chapter 2 focuses on the *specific media of computer, graffiti and phone*. ATIFI, MANDELCWAJG & MARCOCCIA apply Grice's maxim of quantity to computer-mediated communication. BASTHOMI describes truck graffiti as the rhetoric of emulation. BELDAD refers to problems of understanding which can arise in helpdesk encounters involving non-native speakers of English. MONZONI analyses calls to the ambulance emergency service in Italy and focuses on complaints.

Chapter 3 contains several papers which demonstrate the interplay of *various aspects of the 'mixed game'*. ALVAREZ & INIGO deal with the integration of verbal and non-verbal strategies in political discourse. CERNA addresses the role of power in dialogic interaction. DEM'JANKOV focuses on speech explicitness as it varies from culture to culture. Rhetorical strategies of specific inferences are analysed by POP. REILING gives a historic overview of how human beings express their emotions rhetorically in the interplay of emotions, rationality and aesthetics. RICCIONI, BERTHOLD & ZUCZKOWSKI analyse a passage of a literary text with respect to perlocutionary goals and rhetorical organization. SANDLER considers that structures of language emerge from dialogue and deals with various factors that play a role in this process by integrating findings from different models. THEODOROPOULOU focuses on style as a means of constructing social meaning with reference to the Northern suburban social class of Athens. Finally, YI considers thinking as a concept situated between passions and deliberation and traces the historical roots of this opposition.

Chapter 4 is devoted to issues of '*argumentation*'. DEBOWSKA deals with how we evaluate the reasonableness of argumentative moves in dialogues. SMIRNOVA compares the British and Russian press with regard to the question of how a quotation is made credible. VENTER considers the dialogic argument within a rhetoric of openness which allows the rhetor to either open or close down argumentative space.

Chapter 5 deals with rhetoric and '*culture*'. KOWALSKI discusses the question of language selection in student-teacher email communication at a Polish university. LUX & FRÖHLICH compare the nonverbal behaviour of Russian and German chatters. The question is whether the age, the nationality and the context of the communication influence the amount and the quality of the nonverbal signs. MAGDA talks about the rhetoric of European integration from the perspective of Romania by using examples from Romanian media texts. TSUTSUI

analyses a North Korean fourth-grade textbook on the basis of grounded theory and elaborates North Korean values communicated in the book.

There were a few papers which did not directly address rhetoric but dealt with dialogue analytical issues in general. GALANOVA investigates utterances of discontent by using the methodology of communicative genres. PULACZEWSKA critically reviews assumptions of neurolinguistic programming which is used as technique of manipulation in a free market economy. Finally, STEFANESCU analyses traditional rhetorical concepts such as tropes and rhetorical figures as collaborative pragmatic constructions which belong to the interlocutors and not to the text as such.

If we try to summarize the conclusions to be drawn from these papers on dialogue analysis and rhetoric, we can clearly observe that the traditional view of rhetoric as a separate discipline beside grammar can no longer be considered as a guideline of analysis. Rhetoric is embedded in the use of language. Its manifold aspects show up in the mixed game which is based on the integration and interaction of the components.

My main aim in publishing the many papers in this volume was to give as many scholars as possible the opportunity to have their say. I think this is especially important for young scholars. Time constraints however did not allow us to review every paper in detail. All non-native English speaking authors were asked to have their papers read by a competent native speaker. The papers are being published more or less in the form we received as revised versions from the authors. The responsibility for content, style, especially the use of English, and some formal peculiarities remains with the authors.

I am grateful to Oliver Richter who did the formatting and dealt with a large part of the correspondence. Additional help was provided by Sebastian Feller and Bérénice Walther who prepared the papers for the formatting process.

Münster, April 2009

Edda Weigand

IADA President

Chapter 1:

Rhetoric in Institutional Games

Teaching

Legal Games

The Media

Politics

Pragmatic Problems in Elementary Level ELT Coursebooks: Focus on dialogues

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The aim of this paper is to provide a working analysis of elementary level English language coursebooks from the perspective of pragmatics. One of the problems foreign language teachers have with the coursebooks is related to the dialogues in terms of their pragmatic value. Believing that teachers, researchers, teacher trainers, and coursebook writers should develop ways of assessing the value of dialogues from the perspective of pragmatics, a standardized tool attempting to measure dialogues' social usability is prepared and applied during a course titled "Coursebook Assessment and Evaluation". This checklist makes use of Gricean pragmatics, popularly known as 'maxims of conversation.' In this paper, four dialogues are analyzed to show their communicative and pragmatic value. Preliminary findings show that the dialogues in these coursebooks are not adequate to model the dialogues that happen in daily social exchanges. The discussion section suggests some directions for future research, as well as for material writing and classroom practices which can promote a more accurate understanding of the pragmatic value of the dialogues in elementary level coursebooks.

1. Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, language teaching, like linguistics, used the sentence as the basic unit of analysis (Olshtain & Celce-Murcia 2001). Such language teaching practice resulted in an approach to language which is characterized by teaching language uses in a decontextualized manner, often by giving sample sentences that are grammatically relevant but semantically detached. However, more recent approaches to language learning and teaching, among which communicative language teaching is the most influential, have picked up discourse or text as the basic unit of analysis, causing a shift of focus in the teaching of foreign languages. In such a shift, the nature of coursebooks has dramatically changed. Coursebooks, in Olshtain & Celce-Murcia's (2001:708) words, "present texts, short or long, as a basis for both understanding and practicing language use within larger meaningful contexts", because of which "learners need to focus, therefore, on various discourse features within any specified language activity".

In such a shift, both the features of language activities but also what is expected of the language and the language learner has changed. This resulted in the individual learner's exposure to numerous bits and pieces of grammar,

vocabulary, techniques, strategies, skills, and knowledge and usage pieces which are taken in via conscious or unconscious learning. Now, coursebooks guide and characterize classroom discourse as they inform the teacher what, how, and when the content knowledge is to be taught, and even how learning is to be directed, measured and evaluated. Hence, in such a realm, the quality of all aspects of the coursebooks we use is important in our search for quality in foreign language education.

Much research sheds light on the dissatisfaction with the content of the coursebooks used at all levels, specifically in the field of English language teaching (henceforth ELT). Practitioners are substantially dissatisfied with how spoken texts are presented in coursebooks as print materials. As the review of relevant research shows, ELT textbooks rarely include adequate or comprehensible explanations of how conversation works in English. For Vellenga (2004), speech acts (actions with functions) in the textbooks are, for the most part, pragmatically inadequate since students are only occasionally given models of the speech acts with very little contextual information or explicit metapragmatic discussion. As this review of literature shows, the language of English language coursebooks must vigorously be studied to unearth the nature and quality of these coursebooks in terms of their value from the perspectives of pragmatics, linguistics and pedagogy. In this research, the focus is on dialogues in elementary level ELT coursebooks from a pragmatic perspective.

1.1 Pragmatics

Behavioral learning theory has not been able to articulate numerous aspects of knowledge and functions of communication especially when it comes to the rules that govern a communicative exchange. Answers to these problems can be found in the pragmatics oriented works of Austin, Grice, and Searle (Altınörs 2003: 72). Pragmatics, as clearly described by Yule (2004:127), is the study of "intended speaker meaning". The American Speech-Language-Hearing Association[1] claims that a child may pronounce words clearly and may have a large vocabulary that she uses in long, grammatical sentences. Nevertheless, there might still arise communication problems, unless she has mastered the rules for appropriate social language known as pragmatics. Pragmatics involves three major communication skills:

- using language for different purposes such as greeting, informing, demanding, promising, and requesting,
- adapting or changing language according to the needs or expectations of a listener or situation - such as talking differently to a baby than to an adult, giving enough background information to an unfamiliar listener, talking differently in a classroom than on a playground,

[1] http://www.asha.org/public/speech/development/pragmatics.htm

– following rules for conversations and narrative (e.g., telling stories, giving book reports, recounting events of the day); there are rules for taking turns in conversation, introducing topics of conversation, staying on the topic, rephrasing when misunderstood, and telling a story. Rules may vary depending on language and culture.

Pragmatics concerns the semantic value of any message. More and more, English language teachers are asked to develop an awareness of cross-cultural issues in communication which can be attained only through understanding of pragmatics (Dash 2004). As such, while interpreting a message, as Yule (2004) suggests, the following are the most fundamental keywords to be employed to extract the accurate meaning:

– *context:* the context in which a communicative act takes place is necessary to understand the meaning of this act. This includes the physical context such as the bank or the school and the linguistic context like the sets of other words preceding and following the expression used (co-text).
– *presupposition:* speakers continually design their linguistic messages on the basis of assumptions about what their hearers already know. In short, a speaker assumes that what is told is true and known by the hearer.
– *speech act:* in short, these are actions with functions. A linguistic form may function as request, command, question, and information (pp. 129-133).

Why is the knowledge of pragmatics important in language teaching practices situated in elementary schools? In Turkey's case, as it is in the majority of contexts where English is taught as a foreign language, exposure to English almost always happens through the help of coursebooks, especially for elementary level students. Hence, in elementary education, coursebooks are valuable materials whose qualities are fundamental to educational practice and pedagogy. In terms of the specifics of elementary level English courses, as noted by Yüksel (2001: 62), the objectives include mastering the knowledge of the content learned. The students ought to be trained to use this content in real life contexts while being able to understand the dialogues that fit into this level. As such, it is clearly stated in the curriculum that the students are expected to use what they learn in the lessons in their everyday communication. This objective, then, increases the importance of the dialogues in the educational material such as the coursebooks, through which such usage is taught.

It has been argued in literature that elementary level coursebooks contain decontextualized sentences that are given in chunks rather than in meaningful situations. Furthermore, because these coursebooks must contain concrete knowledge that is meaningful to the learner of this specific age group, language used in these coursebooks diverts from the language of the adults. However, this does not entail that children or young learners are unable to follow true

interactions although many coursebooks contain inadequate turn takings which is revealed by notions that are specific to pragmatics.

Because English as a Foreign Language students do not have a chance to speak English in its actual socio-cultural environment, they should be exposed to materials that prepare them to authentic language use. I therefore hold that classroom materials must contain language pieces that are error free and should be written in accordance with the target language as used in naturally occurring discourse. Hence, because pragmatics involves language use as a social act, language uses in elementary level coursebooks become an important source of study from the perspective of pragmatics. However, because many coursebooks on the Turkish book-shelves are written by non-native speakers and without getting adequate professional and corporate help, a coursebook often contains many erroneous uses of the target language, a serious problem which, again, should be studied from such an important perspective like pragmatics.

Grice studied the nature and quality of conversations in a functional manner. In 1975, Grice[2] proposed his cooperative principles related to the nature of conversation. As Nunn (2006) explains, the emphasis on 'cooperation' clearly signals the relevance of Gricean pragmatics to classroom learning and classroom interaction which can easily be considered in terms of the maxims of quantity and manner. However, Gricean pragmatics can easily be applied to many other aspects of foreign language teaching among which how conversations run and model language interaction and communication is the most important since students are exposed to them and make use of them more than any other material in print. The following conversational maxims outline the quality of a natural conversation that is observable in any social speech based interaction:

Maxims of quality: A contribution should be true:
- Do not say what you believe to be false;
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxims of quantity: A contribution should be as informative as required for the current purposes of the exchange;
- Do not make your contribution more informative than it is required.

Maxim of relevance: A contribution should be relevant.

Maxims of manner: A contribution should be perspicuous (clearly expressed or presented):
- Avoid obscurity;
- Avoid ambiguity;

[2]http://www.uni-erfurt.de/sprachwissenschaft/personal/lehmann/Zitate/Grice_conversional_maxims.html

- Be brief;
- Be orderly.

2. Methods

First, the checklist adapted by the researcher in consideration of the subsegments of Grice's maxims is used by 90 pre-service English language teachers to get an opinion on the quality of the dialogues given in ELT coursebooks. Then, these teacher candidates are asked to select dialogues from coursebooks to provide the instructor/ researcher with detailed analysis of the dialogues. In the body of this paper, four sample dialogues are chosen randomly by the researcher from a pool of the most problematic dialogues analyzed by the candidates. The pragmatic analysis of the data is performed through reading of the candidates' reports to find the most problematic cases and close reading of the dialogues and constant questioning of the utterances given in relation to the aforementioned issues of co-text, speech acts, and presuppositions of these speakers.

Research Questions

The following questions guided this research on the dialogues published and taught in the coursebooks that are used in Elementary schools in Turkey:

1. What is the communicative value of the dialogues as communicative acts?
2. Do these dialogues have potential value in representing natural speech patterns as can be found in native speakers' real life dialogues?

Coursebooks

Enjoy English 5 (Sönmez & Yitim 2004) and Quick Step 6 (Genç, Oruç & Şeremet 2005) were accepted by the Ministry of Education on June 6, 2006, as coursebooks to be used in Turkish Elementary schools.[3] Although delivered to all students and teachers free of charge, the print quality of these coursebooks is debatable, and an impressionistic overview (Cunningsworth 1995) of them shows that there are many grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors that run throughout these coursebooks. Therefore, these coursebooks must be studied so as to inform the decision making processes that govern all phases of production and selection of these coursebooks as educational materials.

[3] http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/secmeler/2006_2007derskitaplari_prgdegismeyen.pdf

3. Findings

Problems with the dialogues

3.1 Quantitative Results

What follows is a checklist prepared by the researcher by using Grice's maxims. Dialogues are analyzed by fourth year pre-service English language teachers using this checklist and it is believed that this checklist should be used, along with the others, to assess the value of dialogues as communicative materials. As Table 1 shows, each proposal given in this checklist is prepared to answer one of the four sub-sections of Grice's maxims. The pre-service English language teachers read each of the thirty reading passages and assessed the value of it by filling in the checklist. The numbers given in Table 1 shows the number of passages found to be including the description given.

Table 1: *The checklist based on Grice's maxims (evaluation of 30 reading passages)*

No	Does the contribution…	Yes	Partly	No
1	give incorrect information?	17	9	4
2	put the reader/ hearer in doubt or confusion?	19	5	6
3	include incomplete or untrue information?	5	19	6
4	cause ambiguity in its message?	20	8	2
5	have geographical, historical, logical, cultural or scientific errors?	3	2	25
6	give too much information much more than it is expected?	25	3	2
7	have a verbose and wordy outlook?	24	2	4
8	give too little information much less than it is expected?	2	17	11
9	have missing words or phrases?	-	1	29
10	cause break in the meaning making expected of a natural conversation?	12	10	8
11	give irrelevant information?	21	5	4
12	use indirect statements?	7	11	12
13	have an accurate order?	23	2	5
14	possess correct grammatical usage of English?	26	-	4
15	voice the speech patterns of native speakers of English?	-	1	29
16	voice the speech patterns of non-native speakers of English?	30	-	-
17	sound like it happens in an everyday situation?	3	2	25
18	sound like it is superfluous?	22	4	4
19	sound difficult to understand at the first hearing?	26	1	3
20	carry an (unintended) message especially in terms of its tone?	11	5	14

As students' evaluation of the passages show, out of 30 passages, all of the passages voice the speech patterns of non-native speakers of English, 25 of them gave too much information, 24 of them had a verbouse and wordy outlook, 20 of them caused ambiguity in their message, and 22 of them sounded superfluous. Similarly, and 17 passages were found to give incorrect information. All these results signal the existence of pragmatic problems in the dialogues.

3.2 Qualitative Results

Dialogue 1

The dialogue by Sönmez and Yitim (2004: 16) is as follows:

(1) A: Where are you from?
B: I'm from Washington. There are skyscrapers in Washington.
A: Are there cowboys?
B: Yes, there are.

The analysis of this dialogue reveals that:

- The dialogue is given in a confusing context since the visual material in which the speech balloons and the action are placed shows two skyscrapers in the background- which may be understood by the learners as the speakers are already in 'Washington.'
- There is unnatural use of the spoken language which makes it sound non-authentic. 'I'm from Washington,' should not be followed by 'There are skyscrapers in Washington,' since these two sentences are irrelevant. Such a disconnected pair of sentences, in the authentic usage, is unacceptable and worse, unheard except for those uttered by those individuals suffering from schizophrenia. Thus, it may be claimed that maxims of both relevance and quantity are violated.
- There is a mismatch between the aims of the lesson and the content of the dialogue as shown by the dialogue's partial grammar coverage. The aims of the lesson are stated as the teaching of 'there is' and 'there are' but the dialogue does not contain the use of 'there is' but includes sample sentences with 'there are'.
- There are geographical and scientific errors that may result in building misconceptions as can be seen in the sentences 'There are skyscrapers/ cowboys in Washington.' Furthermore, it is not clear what the name of the place 'Washington' means since 'Washington' is a usage in Turkey meaning Washington D.C., the capital city of the U.S. However, in the rest of the world, 'D.C.' and 'Washington D.C.' are used to denote the capital whereas the single use of 'Washington' may as well mean Washington State. Surprisingly, neither of these states are full of skyscrapers or cowboys. Hence, this material causes ambiguity and if it means something to the students, must probably; this meaning is problematic and erroneous. Hence, it is obvious that in the construction of this dialogue, maxim of manner is violated.
- The dialogue, as a whole, is incoherent (semantically not meaningful, hence disturbing).

Dialogue 2

This dialogue by Sönmez and Yitim (2004:51) is given within a colored and drawn visual material that is happening in front of a 'Cafeteria.'

(2) A: I'm hungry. What is for lunch?
B: Salad, macaroni and apple.
A: Oh, really? I don't like macaroni.
B: I like macaroni.

- The dialogue is happening in front of a 'cafeteria' a word used in American English rather than in British. However, in the American usage, the word 'macaroni' should have been replaced by 'pasta' since Americans do not use the word 'macaroni' in this way. Hence, in this dialogue, a blend of American and British usage is in the background, causing a difficulty in understanding the real meaning of the words used since the context is not perspicuous. Hence, it can be claimed that maxim of manner is violated in this dialogue.
- The last contribution 'I like macaroni', when used as a respond to 'I don't like macaroni' translates into a confrontational meaning, suggesting that 'It is your problem. I like macaroni.' When used this way, speaker B sounds confrontational, worse, rude for the majority of native speakers of English. Thus, there either is a violation of maxim of relevance or quantity depending on the unknown and unrecognizable intent of speaker B.
- The most serious problem with this dialogue, however, is with its use of grammar. When speaker B names the food served at lunch, he says 'Salad, macaroni, and apple.' In such a dialogue in English, a count noun should either be preceded by the indefinite article 'an' or take the plural form. In this turn taking, contrary to the accepted grammar rules, 'apple' projects a grammatically incorrect usage, thus, modeling erroneous language use which will unfortunately be learned by students as it is. Because the contribution is not grammatically orderly, it can be claimed that the maxim of manner is violated in this dialogue.

Dialogue 3

This dialogue by Genç, Oruç & Şeremet (2005:30) happens in front of an advertisement placed on a wall in front of which Yiğit and Helen are standing. Yiğit is holding two 'tickets' in his hand:

(3) Yiğit: Helen, look! Are you free on Sunday?
Helen: Sunday? Hmmm… Yes, I am. Why?
Yiğit: I have got two tickets for Sertab Erener's concert.
Helen: She is the winner of the European Song Contest, isn't she?
Yiğit: Yes, she is. She is short and pretty. She has got curly hair. She has got green eyes. She has got a great voice. She is in Northwood now for her new album. Please come with me to the concert.
Helen: OK. It's fantastic!

- There is no such thing as 'European Song Contest.' There is, however, Eurovision Song Contest' which was won by Sertap Erener in the past. Clearly, the dialogue contains knowledge that is not correct and that can cause disturbance.
- Yiğit's description of Sertab Erener is also meaningless in terms of how a conversation should flow naturally since Helen has informed Yiğit that she actually knows who Sertap Erener is.
- The last turn taking by Yiğit, as is the case in the first dialogue, is not socially acceptable since he gives too much information contrary to the fact that Sertap Erener is known by Helen and her picture is already placed on the poster. While violating the maxim of quantity and relevance, the dialogue also contains a punctuation error since a comma is required after the expression 'OK,' in order not to cause erroneous learning of punctuation marks.
- It can also be claimed that the dialogue violates maxims of manner for not being orderly and brief.

Dialogue 4
The dialogue by Sönmez and Yitim (2004:56) is as follows:

(4) Kim: Do you like Superman?
Tommy: Yes, I do.
Kim: Do you like Fred Çakmaktaş?
Tommy: No, I don't.

- Kim and Tommy are sitting in front of the TV set. In the dialogue, from the two characters 'Superman' is mentioned correctly in English, but 'Fred Çakmaktaş' should be voiced and written as 'Fred Flintstone,' as his original name goes. 'Fred Çakmaktaş' is a combination of the English name and the Turkish last name, and the students will naturally adopt it as his original name. It is also self-evident that Kim and Tommy are native speakers, so a native speaker of English who mentions Fred Çakmaktaş is rather awkward. Here, in this dialogue, cultural and linguistic confusion is in the foreground and learning these 'assumed' popular images becomes a misconception formation of cultural images related to the target culture. I purposefully use the word 'assumed' popular image since Fred Flintstone was a popular cartoon character in the past but not today, especially for elementary school students who have their own popular cartoon characters at present. As such, maxim of manner is violated in this dialogue for presenting turn takings which cause obscurity and ambiguity, and also maxims of quality for presenting false information such as 'Çakmaktaş.'

4. Discussion and Conclusion

As the analyses of these sample dialogues show, maxims of conversation are violated in all of the dialogues studied. The findings related to these dialogues show that there also are many grammar based, logical, and scientific mistakes and errors in primary level ELT coursebooks that are currently used in Turkish elementary schools. These pragmatically faulty constructions may:

- make dialogues rather difficult to comprehend.
- cause creating or fostering misconceptions about the target culture.
- model turn takings which sound rude or may change the tone of the intended meaning?
- expose the students to erroneous use of lexis that is not used in the target language as it is modeled in these dialogues.
- decrease the overall quality of the coursebooks, resulting in the believability and validity of the knowledge and language transmitted in these coursebooks.

As this study suggests, these dialogues written by Turkish writers to be used at elementary schools are inadequate from the perspective of pragmatics and communicative language teaching. The overall evaluation of these dialogues suggests that these dialogues cannot prepare elementary students to real life usage of the language both linguistically as well as culturally since they lack authenticity. Alptekin (1993), on the other hand, argues that writers write materials in line with their own culture rather than that of the learners', which eventually leads to a break down in the materials' intelligibility. Hence, it is seen in this study that using a checklist helped pre-service English language teachers as well as the researcher to assess the value of dialogues given in coursebooks in terms of their pragmatic and communicative value. Future applications and research should also include other forms of items that can be given in the checklist ranging from social, cultural, political, or any other messages that may cause breaks in the communication.

Pre-service English language teachers who used the checklist reported that using the checklist

- was new to them since they had never been given assessment tools that focus on dialogues from the perspective of pragmatics,
- made them see the dialogues in a critical way,
- caused disturbance because they had taken the meaning resting in the dialogues for granted and they hadn't considered them as erroneous materials,
- should also be filled by learners of English so that they are sensitized towards authentic use of the language as well.

Fundamental to all educational sciences is the notion and practice that students should not be exposed to incorrect and erroneous classroom materials. Because, as the examples taken from these coursebooks suggest, the coursebooks studied in this research are found to be erroneous in their language use, these coursebooks should be re-evaluated and re-published having completed its error correction. Until then, it is the teachers' duty to manage the negative effects of such educational materials. In the case of elementary school English language teachers, providing accurate and meaningful dialogues to their students is very important since their students are learning the basics of this content area which whose knowledge will be developed throughout their future studies at all levels of their education.

McDonough and Shaw (2003:77) articulate that when classroom teaching materials such as passages and dialogues are inauthentic, inappropriate for learners' age and intellectual level, or too formal and not representative of everyday speech, materials adaptation is necessary. Hence, teachers using English language coursebooks should try new ways of adapting materials to minimize the negative consequences brought forward by these dialogues. The proposed checklist should only be a form of assessment after which corrections in the dialogues are made through constant analyses of these classroom materials.

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What is a Didactical Dialogue?

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Granting that there are specific kinds of dialogue is a didactical exchange one of them? To make this notion more precise, we first examine the dialectical moves which are typical of a didactical exchange. Then, we show that the case of didactical dialogues is not exactly covered by D. Walton's classification of dialectical arguments although it has strong connections with the inquiry and the information seeking dialogue. As the fact that didactical exchanges are genuine dialogues can be doubted because of the role played by epistemic authority in didactical contexts, we finally show that three conditions sometimes used to characterize free and open dialogues are satisfied at least by some forms of didactical dialogues.

1. Introduction

In spite of famous classical written dialogues held to be didactical (e.g., Plato, Galileo, Fontenelle, Voltaire) and recent developments in the theory of games devoted to asymmetric or incomplete informative situations (Rasmusen 1989:203-257), it seems that not much attention has been paid to a general theory of didactical dialogues. However, we claim that didactical dialogues are of a specific kind. A few issues connected with some of their specific features are discussed here to sketch out a model of this kind of dialogue.

Instead of clinging to a definition which could seem arbitrary, we adopt a constructive approach starting from typical differences between didactical and other kinds of dialogue. These differences rely on a few common sense expectations about a didactical exchange.

A minimal condition to call a verbal exchange a dialogue is that it must satisfy two requirements that we dub the "dialectical minimum": at least two participants are involved in a communicative interaction of at least two moves. We shall limit ourselves to verbal exchanges and leave aside the possibility of a non verbal didactical dialogue.

2. Three basic moves, and more

Two first moves are acceptable in a didactical dialogue: first, descriptive statements introducing, or reframing, a basic ontology; second, statements about relations between elements belonging to the shared ontology. Of course, these kinds of statements are not typical of didactical dialogues, except when the

provided information is unexpected or new for one of the participants. From a dialectical point of view, a typical feature of a didactical context is the fact that the introduction of a new entity or relation is granted, rather than negotiated, even if it relies on a background of shared knowledge.

A third typical basic move is the use of explanations to justify why things are the way they are. But the evaluation of the (logical) validity of an argumentative explanation (i.e. an explanation answering a "Why?" question) raises a specific pragmatic issue in this case. If validity is not reduced to formal validity, that is if validity is substantial and, therefore, depends on the meaning of words other than logical constants, a common agreement about it is fake since the truth of the statements of the explanation cannot be decided by the participant who is just learning them. "X is a mountain because it is surrounded by valleys" is not formally but substantially valid, but the validity of this explanation might be doubted or denied by a perfectly rational participant who does not know what a mountain or a valley is.

Descriptive and explanatory moves are not enough to account for a typical kind of didactical dialogue, namely a string of questions and answers. A situation as common as asking for the hour and getting an answer satisfies the dialectical minimum and can be seen as a (short) didactical dialogue. Other examples of dialogue using this question-answer structure in education are the celebrated school oral examination and the catechism, religious or not[1]. These examples show that a model for didactical dialogues should count interrogative moves among its basic moves, but they also suggest important distinctions depending on the epistemic status or intentions of the participants.

3. Didactical dialogue and inquiry

Douglas Walton's taxonomy of argumentative dialectical forms (Walton: 1998) is helpful to make important comparisons and distinctions between didactical and other types of dialogue. Two of his basic forms of argumentative discussions are germane to didactical exchanges: the inquiry and the information seeking dialogue.

According to Walton, the main difference between a persuasive dialogue and an inquiry is that a persuasive dialogue is "adversarial in nature". On the contrary, an inquiry "is a highly collaborative framework of argumentation, where a group of people get together to collect and organize all the relevant evidence, both for and against" (Walton 1998:69). For instance, when Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson argue about a problem raised by the information given by a suspect, they are involved in a waltonian inquiry. But when Holmes asks questions to the suspect and then draws deductive conclusions disclosing new information, he is

[1] Traditional religious catechisms have this typical form of alternating questions and answers. They even set a formal didactical model followed in a lot of areas, even in satirical writings.

not making an inquiry but has an information seeking dialogue with her. This last kind of dialogue is asymmetrical but collaborative since "the respondent appears to the proponent to be a repository of information that the proponent cannot get access to other than by questioning the respondent" (Walton 1998:126).

Walton's distinction between inquiry and information seeking dialogue is debatable, although he acknowledges that some of his distinctions are not always clear cut. A remarkable common point is that both dialogues are "collaborative" and a major difference is that the inquiry, unlike the information seeking dialogue, is symmetrical because both participants are aiming at the same cognitive goal and are allowed to use the same dialectical moves. Of course, this symmetry is compatible with actual practical asymmetries, for instance if of one the inquirers has the power to set tasks that the other has to execute.

We borrow from Hamblin and others (Hamblin 1970; Walton & Krabbe 1995) the notion of "commitment store" including a "light side" and a "dark side". Each participant is committed to some statements, but he may not have an immediate access to all the statements he is committed to: some of them are on the dark side of the store. In the context of an inquiry none of the inquirers has an enlightened commitment to the answer of the problem they try to solve. The answer is either out of the commitment store of each of them or, at most, on its dark side. Both are ignorant if the inquiry is genuine.

On the contrary, a didactical dialogue has a typical epistemic asymmetry: its official goal is to share some knowledge or information. At the beginning of the dialogue this knowledge belongs (or is supposed to belong) to the light side of the commitment store of only one of the participants. It is this feature which suggests calling the interlocutors "master" and "pupil" rather than "proponent" and "opponent", for the pupil is not an opponent but rather an adept or at most a sceptic. This asymmetry is certainly a constitutive feature of a didactical dialogue – although it is not sufficient to characterize it – and it allows distinguishing it from a waltonian inquiry.

Notice should be taken that some situations can be seen as sub-cases or degenerate cases of the ideal didactical situation where both participants agree about who is the master and who is the pupil. But the exchange may come close to an inquiry when the master is not the master he is supposed to be or when the pupil is educated. This happens, for instance, if the master is not sure he has the expected knowledge or if he has forgotten it: in this case the didactical dialogue may turn to a waltonian inquiry. Moreover, a misunderstanding about the kind of dialogue may be justified and maintained by an inappropriate behaviour of one – or both – of the participants, for instance by inappropriate dialectical moves.

A similar hybrid situation occurs if the master pretends to be ignorant and behaves as if the dialogue was the inquiry he claims it is. Plato's dialogues offer celebrated examples of such a structure. Someone comes to Socrates to take advantage of the knowledge of the famous master who claims he does not know anything but would like to make an inquiry with his friend/disciple. Is he really a

master? Who knows? But his behaviour blurs the distinction between inquiry and information seeking dialogue when he even claims that his fellow is a master who simply does not know that he already has the missing knowledge on the dark side of his commitment store.

What happens if the master is partly ignorant but hides his ignorance? Is the dialogue still collaborative? If not, this is an other hybrid case of a discussion which can be seen as a didactical dialogue but is certainly not a waltonian inquiry since Walton's classification rests on shared and presupposed intentions.

To sum up, a didactical discussion is not an inquiry in spite of occasional affinities depending on the intentions, beliefs and knowledge of the participants. And this is certainly why didactical discussions can be easily dressed up into inquiries, especially when masters pretend to be ignorant to play the egalitarian and symmetrical game of the inquiry.

4. Didactical and information seeking dialogue

The epistemic asymmetry allowing to make a distinction between the waltonian inquiry and the didactical dialogue seems to take the latter very close to the information seeking dialogue for "the information-seeking dialogue starts with an initial situation in which one participant has, or appears to have some information that the other party wants" (Walton 1998:126).

First, a mix-up has to be avoided since some authors, including Hintikka, use the word *inquiry* to mean a waltonian information seeking dialogue (Walton explicitly draws from Hintikka and Saarinen's works). Once this is made clear, we can go on with Walton who adds that "the goal [of an information seeking dialogue] is not to find out or to prove whether a proposition is true" but to get some information. The information seeker is basically someone who asks questions, when "the role of the other party is to give the relevant information to the questioner".

Here again, it is important to stress that Walton's definition does not rely on the structure of the discussion – for instance its formal structure or its rules – but on the intentions of *only one* of the participants – the information seeker – who *a priori* determines the type of the discussion. A consequence of this psychological *a priori* characterization is to limit the other participant's role and to make him passive since, as Walton says, he is only an information provider. This is also typical of Hintikka's simplest interrogative model: the information is provided by an "oracle", sometimes Mother Nature herself, who seems to be nothing more than an answer machine. But the intentions of the information seeker are obviously not sufficient to frame and rule the dialogue since they do not warrant anything about the quality of the answers: they may be irrelevant. Hence, there is no *a priori* reason to believe that the dialogue will be a successful information seeking dialogue. Of course, Walton and Hintikka do not claim to give a full descriptive account of the diversity and subtleties of actual informative dialogues

but rather try to elaborate normative models or taxonomies applying to dialogical informative or argumentative interactions.

Didactical and information seeking dialogues aim at a transfer of knowledge from one participant to the other. But since it is initiated by the seeker, at least one kind of didactical situation is not covered by Walton's information seeking dialogue, even if we accept a classification of dialogues based on the intentions of one of the participants.

In a first case, participant A asks B for some information he believes she has: this matches the condition for an information seeking dialogue. But there is an obvious second case: one participant may decide to provide some information that the other does not have and does not ask for.

Obviously these two situations are exclusive: A is either asking for information or giving some information. If B behaves as expected by A, the subtype of this didactical dialogue is determined by A: it is either an information seeking or what can be dubbed an "information providing dialogue". But if the information provider meets the expectation of the information seeker, these two forms of dialogue are compatible and the dialogue is, at the same time, an information seeking and an information providing dialogue. If the intentional attitudes of both participants are independent, the probability of such a situation seems very low.

Following Walton's definition of the information seeking dialogue, an information providing dialogue can be defined as a dialogue where the proponent appears to the respondent to be a repository of information that the respondent cannot get access to other than by listening to the proponent. If the respondent is just listening, you can say there is no dialogue at all. But the respondent may intervene to make some comments or make any move which can be seen as typical of other forms of dialogues (she can ask for more information, deny or doubt the proponent's saying, etc.)

The case of the information providing dialogue is obviously missing in Walton's classification and no other form of his argumentative dialogues seems to accommodate it unless you split it into short sequences belonging to another kind of dialogue. So, a very common form of didactical dialogue complies neither with the information seeking dialogue nor with the inquiry.

Keeping in mind that Walton is interested in argumentation, a reason for this absence could be that this didactical situation is not argumentative. However it does not seem less argumentative than information seeking dialogues where argumentative moves are not essential or more essential than in an information providing dialogue. In both cases arguments may or may not be needed to justify, clarify or explain the information.

Moreover, Walton claims that real dialogues usually do not belong to one single type but are rather a mixture of different types or a succession of segments belonging to one type or the other. If this is granted, the distinction between information seeking and information providing dialogues may be blurred or look arbitrary. As long as it is based on intentions rather than on manifest criteria – for

instance linguistics markers – the decision that one segment of a dialogue is information seeking or information providing may depend on the step you take to be the first one. For instance, imagine a dialogue including a question followed by an informative development which is not obviously relevant to the question. You may well decide that an information seeking dialogue begins with the question although it is followed by an awkward or uncooperative answer. But you may also decide that an information providing dialogue begins with the answer, the answerer taking advantage of the question to initiate an information providing segment. This kind of ambiguity is very common if you grant that actual dialogues are usually not typical but rather consist in a succession of typical segments. Calling to a switch from one type to the other is then an easy way to escape from difficulties of interpretation.

To sum up, the didactical dialogue, broadly defined as an asymmetrical dialogical exchange of information is a category broader than any of Walton's types of dialogue. It includes the information seeking dialogue. But since it can begin with the delivery of information that is not required, it does not necessarily begin with a question. From a pragmatical point of view, the important point rather seems the determination of the temporary leadership in the exchange.

5. A principle of authority

A typology of dialogues based on the *a priori* intentions of the participants raises serious problems of interpretation to an analyst who can only bet on these intentions unless she decides to limit and base her analysis on manifest observations. As a taxonomy based on the rules supposed to apply to the dialogue may not fair better if they are not claimed by the participants, a general typology of dialogue will be more secure if it takes into account explicit features, linguistics or behavioural.

First, the epistemic dependence, if any, has to be made clear, at least by one of the participants. This will set one participant in the role of master, the other in the role of pupil. As long as both parties agree about their mutual roles, the dialogue will be said fully didactical. Otherwise it is only partly didactical. It can be said to be "ideal" if the master believes he knows, if the pupil believes the master knows, if the master is ready to share his knowledge and if both behave in a way appropriate to their accepted roles.

A typical feature of a didactical dialogue is a consequence of the previous condition. Let us call it the principle of authority. It can be a criterion to identify this type of dialogue. First, it requires not only an asymmetry of knowledge but also that the master's word is regarded as true by the pupil whose trust shows through his behaviour and not only through the fact he asks questions. Second, it requires that the pupil has no independent way to check the truth of the master's

utterances[2]. The manifest behaviour of both parties matters, for the dialogue can be didactical even if the master lies or makes mistakes (identified or not) and even if the pupil temporarily does not believe what he hears and keeps silent about his disagreement or doubt. In other words, the principle of authority is at work as long as the pupil cannot publicly deny the propositions asserted by the master for whatever reason including moral obligation, professional duty, proprieties, politeness, shyness, calculated self-interest, and so forth.

Two kinds of authority can be distinguished. Full authority is when the master is looked upon as infallible, that is if the pupil cannot (publicly) deny any statement set forth by the master. Authority is only partial if the pupil can deny specific statements, for instance, pertaining to a particular field of knowledge or a domain of activity.

Note that informative dialogues are not didactical if no authority is involved between the participants. This is the case for Walton's inquiry but not for Hintikka's whose interrogative model of inquiry, at least in the version close to Walton's information seeking dialogue, claims that "Nature's answers are always true (and the inquirer knows they are)" (Hintikka 1987). But how come that Nature's answers are true? For Hintikka, Nature is obviously an authority, and since she has knowledge the inquirer has not, a dialogue with her is didactical as long as none of the participants behaves dialectically badly.

An advanced dialogical theory of didactical dialogues would need a more developed topology of authority for it is often limited, field dependent or a matter of degree. For instance, a weak authority model could have the single rule that only the master's atomic propositions cannot by denied by the pupil, insofar they are not inconsistent with previous statements. In a stronger version the pupil could not deny atomic and conditional propositions. And in a much stronger version he could not even contest inconsistencies in the master's words. In this last case the dialectical principle of authority would rule over the logical principle of non-contradiction, but it is well known that gurus' contradictions are sometimes a great source of inspiration for their disciples.

The model should also examine the case of field dependent authority and the consequences of the moves left to the pupil when he accepts one or the other of the various forms of authority.

6. What kind of dialogue?

The concept of dialogue is sometimes characterized as a situation where both parties can cooperate freely to reach, especially when they explicitly intend to

[2] He may have it later, in ten minutes, tomorrow or next year. Many "critical thinkers" explain that authoritative statements or arguments should not be always doubted but should be checked, for instance by looking at the status of the speaker among her pairs. My point is simply that a checked authority is like a married bachelor: it is not an authority anymore. It is at most what can be call a degenerate authority.

collaborate for a common goal. If this is true, we can wonder whether didactical dialogues are dialogues. For if a theory of dialogue postulates that free cooperation is a necessary condition to call a verbal exchange a dialogue, it may rule out didactical dialogues and the numerous human verbal interactions involving authority, epistemic or not. As far as epistemic authority is concerned, an asymmetry of knowledge can be seen as a severe limitation of freedom to cooperate. Of course, all this will depend on what is meant by free cooperation, what kind of freedom is concerned, about what, and so forth. This is why we shall examine three features that some authors (Vernant 1997:87-106, Jacques 1985:155-220) look upon as fundamental criteria to distinguish a genuine dialogue from discussions complying only with the dialectical minimum.

6.1 Co-constitution of the participants

A first criterion is that « a mutual relation of knowledge and recognition is set up between the interlocutors » by a mutual adaptation of their beliefs, desires, intentions, values and feelings (Vernant 1997:97).

Nothing is said about the scope and duration of this mutual relation. However, in the case of a didactical dialogue the situation seems clear, at least when it is fully didactical: by acknowledging their mutual status of master and pupil, the participants recognise themselves in roles that are specific to the interaction they have at that time. The exchange will be didactical as long as their manifest beliefs, desires, intentions, values and feelings are appropriate to the norms of this kind of dialogue. So, in a way, the participants are co-constituted. And as stressed before, this co-constitution should be manifest, even if this requirement makes possible to mimic this kind of dialogue or to shift to another dialogical game, for instance a waltonian inquiry.

6.2 Making worlds together

Another typical feature of a genuine dialogue is the way the participants refer to the world. “During the dialogue and by means of it, the interlocutors build their knowledge and confront their beliefs about the worlds they build together” (Vernant 1997:95). In other words, the making of a context allowing common references to objects is a by-product of dialogical conventions. Then, the notion of a single true picture of the world, independent from any dialogical process, is an illusion based on the monological cliché that the main use of language is to make a single picture of the world.

You may doubt that there is a co-construction of worlds when the principle of authority is at work, since the pupil cannot bring his own bricks to the building as far as the topic of the dialogue is concerned. This objection would be right if each party had to take a more or less equal part to the making of a new shared world. Moreover, it seems to presuppose that to be a dialogue a verbal interaction must be symmetrical at the level of the informative contributions of the participants, but no reason seems compelling enough to accept such a strong requirement.

The metaphor of a co-construction of world is misleading if it is interpreted as a demand for an active participation of both interlocutors. But the very case of a didactical dialogue suggests that the important point is not that the participants begin with a common world but strive for a world which looks common. Suffice it to say it *looks* common, for truth and sincerity are not necessary conditions to have a dialogue. Starting from an asymmetry of knowledge and a mutual epistemic dependence, a didactical dialogue aims at symmetry of knowledge.

6.3 An open but finalised interaction

Finally, a third criterion is that a genuine dialogue is both open and finalised, *open* since each party can choose his next move (including cheating or quitting) and *finalised* since both cooperate to reach goals, common or not.

We said that the principle of authority at work in didactical arguments may be a hindrance to the openness of the dialogue if one participant cannot use all the allowed moves. He is not only limited by his ignorance but also by the constraints ensuing from the other participant's authority and the scope of this authority.

It is certainly false to say that the development of a dialogue is strictly unpredictable, unless you allow the possibility of a break coming from outside. To say that a dialogue is *open* should be understood as meaning only that the nature and content of the future moves cannot be foreseen although some of them are more plausible than others. This is why a didactical dialogue is an open exchange unless all the possible moves of the pupil are blocked. This last case is the paradigmatic example used to deny that dialectical dialogues are open, but this extreme case is the exception. Accordingly, the third criterion is satisfied: as far as the informative goal is concerned, the interaction of the participants is finalised and (usually) open.

In conclusion, on the basis of the three previous criteria, nothing prevents a didactical dialogue to be a genuine dialogue although it has specific features which deserve a closer analysis, both empirical and normative.

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A Theoretically-empirically Grounded Model to Categorize Rhetorical Forms in Conflictual Interactions

The case of education

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This article presents the results of a field research focused on the analysis of rhetorical forms in educational communication. The data corpus discussed here consists of nearly one hundred hours of videotaped interactions that took place in the course of a project of conflict management educations that involved eleven primary school classes in Northern Italy. Special attention has been given to the effectiveness and the limits of rhetoric in education as observed with regard to two core dimensions of educational interaction, that is, turn taking and the design of questions. Our data show that rhetorical forms of argumentation have an important role in educational communication as they are systematically used by educators to sustain their pedagogical intentions. However, our data provides us with some insights on the limits of rhetoric in education which consists, according to Niklas Luhmann's theory of communication, in the impossibility for communication to control psychic system.

1. Introduction to the research and methodology

This paper analyzes the most common rhetorical forms observed in educational communication in some Northern Italy primary schools. As every form of observation, this paper has been based on some theoretical distinctions. Following the suggestions of Baraldi (1993), Pearce and Cronen (1980) and Schneider (2000), special attention has been given to social forms that function as structures selecting among possible communications and permitting connections among communications.

In a general sense, social forms are distinctions (Spencer-Brown 1969) available for an observer to mark both the meaning of information produced in prior communication, and the meaning of utterances, with regard to the person or role speaking.

Also in the educational communication social forms operate on the side of information and social forms operate on the side of utterance, the latter allowing the attribution of motives and responsibilities.

This paper aims at analyzing how social forms play a role in educational communication, with regard to their impact on the effectiveness of rhetorical forms systematically used by educators to attain educational goals. We have

observed that social forms of educational communication, especially the ones on the side of utterance (social roles) often neutralize the rhetoric of education, making it possible for pupils to resist to it. With 'rhetorical' we describe utterances and sequences addressed to attain specific goals in communication (Heritage 1990).

The theoretical frame we have described oriented our analysis of an extensive amount of data, collected from April to May 2005, for a research designed by the Department of Culture and Language Sciences at the University of Modena-Reggio Emilia. The research involved 250 children (ages 9-11) in eleven schools in Northern Italy.

We offer here a brief sketch of the research. The classes involved were split in six children-teams, each of them asked to create a fantasy story starting from four pictures chosen out of a set of seven. To accomplish their task, teams had to afford processes of decision-making (first of all, to select four pictures of a range of seven) that could engender conflicts. In this case, trained operators intervened to promote reflection on conflicts and their management.

The intervention of operators in the classrooms aimed at promoting an autonomous reflection on conflict management by pupils, rather than transmitting knowledge about the 'correct ways' to manage conflicts. To accomplish this goal educators were trained to sustain self-expression of pupils, through appreciation, perception checking, feedback on their and others' actions. In other words, the educators involved in the project were trained to mark a difference between their intervention and the ordinary form of educational communication, that relies on "grammar of education", that is, it is based on asymmetrical relationship (e.g., Tyack & Cuban 2000) where social roles are irreversible, for instance the educator instructs pupils but pupils do not instruct the educator.

We can say that 'grammar of education' is based on expectancies attached to social roles: they enable modes of support and cooperation, excluding others. The social structuring of educational interactions is likely to enhance particular types of experiences, at the expense of others.

Pedagogical means transform equality into inequality. They motivate and discourage, they link experiences of success to experiences of success and experiences of failure to experiences of failure, they open paths of marginalization of the ones who do not satisfy standardised cognitive performances, they maintain high levels of competitiveness among pupils (Luhmann 1990, Baraldi & Iervese 2004, Iervese 2006).

These effects can be described as 'secondary socialization', where 'secondary' refers to the unpredictable and often unseen consequences of education as an intentional form of socialization. Among secondary effects of education, we have the interpersonal conflicts that we observed arousing in communication among pupils, most times as consequence of acts of criticism. (Putnam 2001, Schneider 2000).

Nearly one hundred hours of interactions were videotaped to be analyzed: they represent the empirical basis for our analysis. This huge amount of data shows that the orientation to the avoidance of normative orientation of pupils' action had relevant consequences, for example in most cases turn taking system was not a speech-exchange system where the educator organises the participation of pupils, but a turn taking system similar to the one of ordinary conversation.

However, our data show that social forms of education, namely differentiated roles on which grammar of education relies, influenced the intervention both discouraging participation of pupils out of standardized role performances and driving educators to return to normativity, in the case of problems in reaching educational goals.

A relevant feature of this work (quite uncommon in the sociological field) is the use of some Conversation Analysis' concepts in the theoretical framework of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. We think that Luhmann's system theory converges with Conversation Analysis in his view of communication for several aspects: first of all, both approaches conceptualize communication as an autonomous level whose structural properties have to be analyzed without reducing them to mere manifestations of psychic processes.

We also think that Luhmann's systems theory is open and flexible enough to integrate empirical results of Conversation Analysis researches as distinctions to be used in analyzing social processes. We refer to Heritage's researches (2002) on the functions of negative-interrogative questions in conversation, that inspired us in recognizing them as a powerful rhetorical devices in educational communication used both by educators and pupils. We also refer to classic works by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson on turn taking systems (1978, Schegloff 1981) that suggested us to analyze how turn taking rules can be used as a rhetorical device.

2. A sociological perspective on communication

Modern system theories has been largely shaped by the work of von Bertalanffy (1968), whose General Systems Theory is still influent in a number of researches, especially with regard to the basic distinction between closed and open systems. Closed systems do not interact with their environment, while open systems depend upon the continuous exchange of elements with their environment.

Most of the researches based on Bertalanffy's General System Theory analyze the network of relations between an open system and its environment, using concepts as input, output, process. In fact, this approach accords the primacy to the environment: divergences between a system and its environment indicate a state of crisis of the system.

In the early 1960s the guiding principles of classic systems analysis were criticized in the field of cybernetics (Wiener 1948). Cybernetics focuses on purposeful behavior analyzing them with theoretical tools as the concepts of feedback and feedback control. Systems must be able to act purposefully within a

chaotic and threatening environment, processing information about the results of their own actions. In order to survive in a chaotic environment, systems have to be self-referential; further developments in the seventies made it possible to give to self-reference a more encompassing meaning. The crucial concept here is the one of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980).

Autopoietic systems are systems that produce the elements out of which they exist, by means of a network of these elements themselves. They do not import life from their environment: external factors do not directly interfere with the functioning of the system but have to be translated into internal elements; the environment resonates in the system by means of the elements that the system itself produces.

The application of the idea of autopoiesis to social reality is central in Luhmann's systems theory. Niklas Luhmann (1984) extended the concept of autopoiesis to the field of sociology, departing from the idea that autopoiesis regards a wide range of systems. Among them he distinguished organic, psychic and social systems, with a sharp distinction between organic systems and meaning-processing systems (psychic and social).

Social and psychic systems use different modes of self-production, namely communication (social systems) and thought (psychic systems) (Luhmann 1986).

The autopoietic operation social systems, communication, is defined as an event which consists of the synthesis of three different selections: information, utterance and understanding (Luhmann 1984, Baraldi 1993).

The first selection, information, concerns a selection from a repertoire of possibilities; as it is not possible to communicate the entire world in a single utterance, without this selectivity of information no communication would emerge. The second selection concerns the choice of a communicative behavior, that is to say an utterance, to express the information. The third selection, understanding, is crucial in Luhmann's concept of communication. Understanding implies a change in the state of the receiver: it happens when a distinction between an information and its utterance is made.

Understanding concludes the communicative act: however it needs to manifest itself. The receiver needs to show he understands the uttered information by addressing himself to the information or to the utterance (for example to question the way something is said). It is the receiver who concludes the unity of a communication. Understanding both concludes preceding communication and enables connecting another. In this way, communications realize their own autopoiesis.

This concept of communication brings about a theoretical problem: how can a social system connect one communication to another, so that its autopoiesis does not get broken down? Luhmann defines this process as "penetration", while "interpenetration" means that both of the systems penetrate; the event of communication requires that psychic system penetrate into communication and social system into thought.

This process is based on the happening of one communication and one thought at the same time; in this sense communication is an event of penetration, because utterance and understanding has always to coincide with thoughts; on the other hand, as thoughts coincide with understanding and utterance, psychic systems penetrate into communication.

Penetration depends upon the coincidence between a communication and a thought. Even though communication always happens in its environment, a psychic system cannot avoid considering communication in its autopoietic operations. We can describe the relationship between communication and thoughts as "perturbation" (Baraldi 1993).

Understanding concludes preceding communication and enables connecting another relying on forms, that is, distinctions, to mark the meaning of information and the meaning of utterance,

Operating as structures that enable the connectivity of communication in a systematic way, orienting the selection among possible communication, permitting connections among communication, these forms are social in their functions. Social forms perturb psychic systems in their operation of understanding information and utterance because they are the distinctions in the environment psychic systems rely on, to understanding communication.

A psychic system can coordinate with other psychic systems only through the perturbation of social forms. The simultaneity of a thought and a communication is an event that immediately vanishes; in the psychic system the thought simultaneous with understanding is connected with other thoughts. Individual thinking continues beyond the event of understanding,

Since the early eighties, in the meanwhile of Luhmann's autopoietic turn, Coordinated Management of Meaning theory empirically tested how utterances of information perturb psychic system, compelling them to activate cognitive structures in order to create a meaning of coordination (Pearce 1989, Pearce & Cronen 1980). The authors of Coordinated Management of Meaning theory do not distinguish between social and psychic forms. As sociologists, we think that a relevant topic of a theory interested in the relationship between individuals and communication would be how different psychic structures are coupled with perturbing social structures, combining Coordinated Management of Meaning theory with Luhmann's social systems theory to conceptualize the relationship between thought and communication (Baraldi 1993): according to Luhmann we define this relationship as "structural coupling".

Structural coupling is a necessary condition for systems to operate: systems presuppose specific forms in their environment, and relying on them to understand the world. Psychic systems, for instance, have to continuously penetrate into communication in order to give meaning to information's and utterances: to do so they need to rely on expectancies attached to social roles, that is to say social forms.

3. Is education possible? The lost art of making good social actors

Traditionally, commonly endorsed and commonly observed norms and values are considered a prerequisite for an integrated society (Heyting, Kruithof & Mulder 2002). In Parson's view (1970) normative orientations materialize as social roles and role expectations: the contribution of schooling and education to the integration of society consists in the furthering and strengthening of consensus on these basic values.

Habermas stresses the necessity of a discussion both on the quality of these values and on the conditions that determined this quality. In Habermas' view the most essential contribution of education and schooling lies in the development of the required communicative and self-reflective skills.

For Niklas Luhmann consensus can't be the *telos* of any communication process, because communication cannot control its consequences; as psychic systems and social system remain in their respective environment, the effects of socialisation are influenced by operations of psychic systems, which communication cannot control.

The operation of distinguishing between information and utterance imparts to the receiver of a communication the ability to assign scopes, motives and meanings to the communication, with reference to social forms available. The assignment of scopes and motives creates cognitive conditions to criticize or reject the uttered information (Vanderstraeten 2006). Communication, even the most rational one, does not necessarily lead to social consensus; on the contrary, it renews the possibility of resistance, as its meaning is constructed by psychic systems autonomous in their operation.

In every social setting the distinction between social and psychic systems creates the conditions for rejecting the instruction or information that is communicated. Socialization reiterates the option between conforming and deviant behavior: a norm or a rule cannot be an item for the socialization in itself, because it can only be presented together with its alternative. Socialization creates bifurcations (Vanderstraeten & Biesta 2000) enforcing a choice between conforming and deviant behavior, bringing about a continuous processing of options such as conformance versus deviance as so on.

Moreover, in late-modern society, non-conformance offers the best chance to present oneself as an individualized individual (Baraldi 2003). Many patterns of positive deviance have developed in modern society, as it emphasizes performance and competition, the exceeding of normal expectations, but also legitimizes subcultures and deviance. We come to a crucial issue, whether this possibility of resistance disappears, or increases, when education comes into play.

Luhmann defines education as an action that is intentionalized and attributable to intentions. Education is a systematized process, necessary in complex societies to reproduce knowledge and capabilities acquired in long sequences of coordinated individual steps.

However, education cannot eliminate the possibility of resistance to it. Participants in educational communication dispose of forms marking the meaning of utterances, these latter referred to specialised social roles, for instance the ones of educators and pupils.

In education, intentional action cannot control the differences it makes: when a pedagogically stylized act communicates its own intention, the psychic system who is expected to be educated acquires the freedom to travel some distance, for instance to avoid "being educated" as much as possible (Vanderstraeten 2000).

In systematized educational settings, where an apparatus of goals, tests, textbooks and intervention is put to use to attain a certain output, that is to say where communication displays its intentionality, those unintended, and mostly unforeseen, effects will probably be multiplied.

Education has unpredictable outcomes: it reaches psychic systems as a perturbation, but cannot control their autopoiesis. It is true that commonly observed norms and values always perturb psychic system, but it is also true that their meaning is different in each individual psychic system.

For human beings, participation in education as a communication process cannot result in the transmission of norms, rule, knowledge (that would be an oversocialized vision of them!) but in the construction of their meanings through the autopoiesis of thought. We can therefore say that socialization can only be self-socialization.

Following these premises, we have analyzed the impact of the coupling between social forms (norms, expectancies, social roles) and communication on the effectiveness of some rhetorical forms in education. We have empirically observed that social forms, specifically social roles that impart the ability to possible to attribute motives and responsibilities to every communication, often make it possible for pupils to resist to rhetoric of education.

4. On the rhetoric of education: The management of turn taking rules as a rhetorical device

Interactions that involve educators and pupils in institutionalized settings, for example classrooms, are usually organized as speech-exchange systems (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1978). When educational communication is organized as speech-exchange systems, turns are pre-allocated by the action of a social role, the educator, who organizes the participation of pupils, for instance selecting next speaker trough the addressing of questions.

Our research, however, did not take place in an ordinary educational setting. The intervention of operators when conflicts aroused, rather than transmitting knowledge about the 'correct ways' to manage conflicts, was designed to promote reflection on conflict management by pupils themselves. Educators, in order to promote active participation of pupils, were trained not to rely on social asymmetries of educational relationship. The promotion of active participation

involved the substitution of the speech-exchange system typical of institutionalized communication with pedagogical goals, with the one of ordinary conversation. We have observed that relevant rhetorical forms with educational purposes are located in the management of turn taking.

4.1 The call for intersubjectivity to violate turn taking rules

Some relevant researches in the field of conversation analysis show that problems of understanding of prior utterance allow to get the turn, even though at the transition-relevant space another speaker got the turn (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1978, Schegloff 1991).

Problems in understanding allow to suspend, even if not definitively but 'step by step', the efficacy of turn taking rules: we have observed that educators systematically exploit this opportunity to interfere with communications, if they seem to bring about meanings inconsistent with educational goals.

In excerpt (1), a child, Pazzini, rejects to fill in blue empty spaces in a drawing, asking to cooperate to write the story script instead. He is refusing to accomplish a task his teammates assigned him, by virtue of his low cognitive performances at school, that do not allow him to participate to higher-level operations, like the writing of a script. In his teammates' perspective Pazzini's action is a deviant behavior, and he's accountable to boycott their work.

The educator (Op in all sequences) gets the turn out of a transition-relevant place (lines 3 and 8), exploiting the possibility to do so, in case of problems in understanding, to interrupt pupil's utterance.

In line 8, the educator pretends to equivocate the meaning of the pronoun "noi"("us") (line 7) as it would involve him too, to obtain the opportunity to reiterate his disagreement with external imposition of roles and tasks.

(1)	1	Marco:	*se no Pazzini andava via dal gruppo, eh (0.7) Non era*
	2		*possibile, non voleva fare niente! (Lui vuo:le)*
	3	Op:	*(scusate) questa cosa qua mi interessa però: non ho capito il*
	4		*problema,*
	5	Lisa:	*lui deve colorare, però=*
	6	*Op:*	*=e chi l'ha detto?*
	7	*Lisa:*	*noi, già l'altra volta, abbiamo (de-)*
	8	Op:	*(noi?) scusate, non ho capito, io ho detto che lui deve*
	9		*colorare?*

	1	Marco:	Pazzini was about to leave the team, yeah? (0.7) he
	2		didn't want to do anything for the team!(He wa:nts)
	3	Op:	(excuse me) this issue does interest me but: I
	4		don't catch the problem,
	5	Lisa:	he has to draw, but=
	6	Op:	=who said that?
	7	Lisa:	us, last time we (sai-)
	8	Op:	(we?) excuse me, I don't understand, I said he had to draw?

4.2 The switch of speaker selection rules to sustain educational communication

All turn transfers are coordinated around transition-relevant places. With a "current speaker selects next" rule in action the party so selected has the right, and is obliged, to take next turn to speak. This rule is exploited by educators to avoid that communication gets frozen.

When lengthy gaps follow the completion of their turn, educators systematically utter a tag question selecting a next speaker, who cannot then avoid to speak, without questioning the legitimacy of educator's action.

In excerpt (2) the team allows a child only to draw, because his handwriting is recognized as very bad. The very first educator's utterance (lines 1-3) is addressed to promote pupil's reflection on the meaning of their actions.

After a first long pause (line 4) the educator explains to the pupils, in this way entering in a meta-communication dimension with rhetorical goals, that he is only seeking information, not asking for an account of deviant behavior they are accused of.

Another long pause (line 6) shows again that pupils understood the question at line 1-3 as rhetorically addressed to constrain them to acknowledge their accountability for the marginalization of their teammate. Here, silence is strategically addressed to escape from the educational communication. To avoid that communication freezes down, the educator switches the rule of turn taking to current speaker selects next (line 7), addressing specifically to one of the pupils, Michele.

After Michele's failure to offer an account of his behavior, and a third long pause, the educator (lines 10-11) starts a brainstorming session that suddenly fails because pupils again choose silence, to avoid the risk of negative evaluations.

For the second time, the educator switches the turn-taking rule to current speaker selects next (line 13) but, again, this rhetorical device appears to be quite ineffective.

(2)	1	Op:	*ah, siete d'accordo così (.) Lui dise:gna? Voi state*
	2		*obbligando qualcuno a fare qualcosa (.) hh Mettersi*
	3		*d'accordo (.) significa questo?*
	4		*(5)*
	5	Op:	*vi chiedo, eh?*
	6		*(7)*
	7	Op:	*dimmi tu, Michele*
	8	Michele:	*io:*
	9		*(5)*
	10	Op:	*va male? >Un'altra soluzione non si può trovare?< (0.5)*
	11		*un'altra soluzio:ne?*
	12		*(5)*
	13	Op:	*Tu hai un'altra proposta?*
	14		*(5)*
	15	Luca:	*bo:h*

1	Op:	so, you all agree (.)He dra:ws? You are forcing someone
2		to do something (.) hh find an agreement (.) that's what it
3		means?
4		(5)
5	Op:	I'm just asking, eh?
6		(7)
7	Op:	you answer now, Michele
8	Michele:	I:
9		(5)
10	Op:	is it bad? >Is another solution not possible?< (0.5)
11		another solutio:n?
12		(5)
13	Op:	Do you have another suggestion?
14		(5)
15	Luca:	bo:h

5. Once more on the rhetoric of education: Negative-interrogative-questions to promote reflection on the meaning of actions

In the case of deviant behavior, in conflict with expectations of the educational system, deviancy provokes no doubt about the actual validity of the criterion explanation, therefore pupils' deviance is understood as an ascribable action, stimulating the assumption that something is wrong with its performer (Schneider 2000). Because of its apparatus of standardized expectations attached to social roles, education tends to low-levels of reflexivity.

In educational system social roles, that is to say socials forms on the side of the utterance, function as structures that allow an educator to take his expectations as a valid criterion for judging the behavior of pupils.

We have observed that interrogative-negatives questions are often designed to favor a response from the pupils that contrasts with their earlier statements or actions, while not permitting them to do so without acknowledging inconsistency (Heritage 2002).

In excerpt (3) two teams are arguing because group 1 (G1) has asked a member of group 2 (G2) to perform as an actor in the representation of their fantasy story. In lines 1-3 the educator, with an interrogative-negative question, tries to lead pupils to acknowledge inconsistency of their behavior; that would be the first step of their reflection on an alternative way to manage the conflict.

Pupils understand the rhetorical valence of interrogative-negative and its hostile contest, and refuse to align with educator's utterances, that is to say they refuse the role of people in need of education (lines 4, 7, 9).

The educator (lines 10-14) surrogates the reflection of pupils he just failed to sustain, explicitly accounting them for lack of competence in relationships' management, with a harsh negative evaluation of their behavior.

By doing so, he gives himself the possibility to impose the ending of the argument, even if that does not come priceless. The expression of an evaluation of pupils' behavior reactivates asymmetries between social roles in education, that are inconsistent with the overall goals of his intervention, we have described in the introduction.

(3)

1	Op:	*scusate ma: (.) non facciamo confusione (0.7) la*
2		*decisione che Raggi partecipa ad uno e all'altro*
3		*gruppo è stata presa questa mattina in aula, no?*
4	Pia(G1):	*però noi:*
5	Op:	*se dovevate dire: (0.3) dovevate dirlo al mattino;*
6		*hh non vi siete sentiti prendere la decisione?*
7	Lucia(G1):	*°no è che:°*
8	Op:	*questo è un problema hh vostro, non credete?*
9	Raggi(G2):	*sì, >ma poi l'abbiamo detto (anche-)<*
10	op:	*(non) mi interessa, questo è un problema vostro,*
11		*che sta portando via 10 minuti (.) è inutile che*
12		*alzate la mano perchè in un quarto d'ora non siamo*
13		*riusciti a trovare una soluzione a un problema:*
14		*banale*

1	Op:	excuse me but: (.) to avoid misunderstandings (0.7)
2		the decision that Raggi wouldparticipate in both team
3		has been taken this morning,right?
4	Pia(G1):	but we:
5	Op:	If you had to tal:k (0.3) it was this morning; hh
6		did you listen to yourselves taking the decision?
7	Lucia(G1):	°no, it is tha:t°
8	Op:	this is your problem hh, don't you think?
9	Raggi(G2):	yes, >but then we said (also-)<
10	op:	(I don't) care, it is your problem,
11		that is taking away 10 minutes (.) stop raising your
12		hand in a quarter of hour we weren't able to find a
13		solution to a proble:m that seems to me very easy

5.1 Rhetorical counter-attacks to negative-interrogative questions

Even if our data suggest that negative-interrogative questions are sometimes an effective tool for educators to project expected answers by pupils, most times their rhetoric valence is understood and neutralized, with reference to social forms that mark the side of the utterance; in these cases pupils react in ways that educational communication cannot control.

The understanding of the true pragmatic function of educator's seek of information allows pupils to perform rhetorical counter-attacks, if they refuse the role of someone who needs to be educated. Among the rhetorical techniques used by pupils the most common is one that reminds the "negotiation jujitsu" technique

(Fisher, Ury & Patton 1991): pupils use the rhetorical form of the educator against him, rather than responding to it.

In excerpt (4) two children, Luca and Sara, are arguing about the script of their team's story; here, the educator's intervention follows a common rhetorical structure in the educational communication processes we have analyzed.

Educator's first utterance (line 1) aims to lead pupils to acknowledge the inconsistency among their goal to produce a good story and their actual behavior. Once he attains that objective, a first negative-interrogative (line 3) promotes the reflection on alternative ways of conflict management.

At this point, pupils have understood the pragmatic function of the interrogative-negative, with their definition as persons in need of education attached to it.

Their psychical refusal of the utterance is expressed in conversation as an acceptation of it (line 4), where Luca is able to reject the educational communication without becoming accountable of deviant behavior, as he gives to the educators the information he wanted.

The interrogative-negative question is repeated at line 5-6, and again Luca uses the jujitsu technique (line 7). As his rhetorical strategy shows to be ineffective, the educators leaves communication:

(4)	1	Op:	*ma: questo vostro modo di fare aiuta a fare il lavoro?*
	2	Sara:	*no*
	3	Op:	*e: non potete trovare una soluzione?*
	4	Luca:	*secondo il mio punto di vista no*
	5	Op:	*Mh? secondo te è impossibile trovare una soluzione? non è*
	6		*possibile per voi fare niente assieme?*
	7	Luca:	*è vero (.) non è possibile*
	8	Op:	*ah, o:k (.) passo dopo*
	1	Op:	but: your way of acting helps to do your work?
	2	Sara:	no
	3	Op:	so: can't you find a solution?
	4	Luca:	from my point of view, we don't
	5	Op:	Mh? you think it is not possible to find a solution?
	6		Isn't it not possible for you to do anything together?
	7	Luca:	that's right (.) it is not possible
	8	Op:	ah, we:ll (.) I'll be back later

5.2 How inconsistency with ordinary educational communication neutralizes rhetoric forms

In excerpt (5) Paola, a child who is not present at the moment, is not allowed to participate in the creation of the story's script because she is categorized as non competent. A first interrogative-negative uttered by the educator (lines 1-2) is

successful in leading Alice to admit the reason of that exclusion. The second interrogative-negative (lines 4-5) aims to promote a reflection on the consequences of the application of the distinction competence/incompetence.

As he observes, on the basis of Lina's alignment (line 6) the effectiveness of the second negative-interrogative question, the educators utters a third interrogative-negative (lines 7-9) to sustain further feedback on the consequences of their action by pupils: applying a distinction to itself, more precisely to one side of itself, what we called a 're-entry' is performed.

Re-entry is a basic process of the evolution both of social and psychic systems: it involves the forms structural coupling between thought and communication relies on. Re-entry is not common in educational system, where social forms are structured in a strong network of standardized and generalized expectancies. The education's low degree of reflexivity makes it difficult for interrogative-negative questions to be successful in promoting processes of re-entry.

In excerpt (5), line 10, the addressee of interrogative-negative observes inconsistency between the promotion of reflection on the consequences of her criticism, uttered by educator, and the ordinary educational communication where the distinction competence/incompetence is systematically applied to her performances, because it is a primary social form on the side of the information, that makes it possible for educators to evaluate pupil's cognitive evolution.

The inconsistency between pragmatic function of negative-interrogative questions and primary social forms of educational communication, neutralises the effectiveness of this rhetoric device. Our data confirm that communication cannot control its consequences, because of the autonomy of autopoiesis of thought from communication.

(5)	1	Op:	*perché non la fate incollare? Non è perché c'è solo una*
	2		*colla?*
	3	Alice:	*perché non si impegna! No:n ha colorato (.) ha rovinato=*
	4	Op:	*=ma: secondo te come si sente sentendo che dici queste*
	5		*cose? Non si sente male?*
	6	Lina:	*Forse si sente isolata e:=*
	7	Op:	*=e non è bello quando uno si sente isolato, no? oppure*
	8		*cosa fa? cosa sta facendo lei (.) di fatto, cosa sta*
	9		*facendo?*
	10	Alice:	*dovrebbe colorare ma: (.) ((indica il lavoro della*
	11		*compagna)) se sembra bello:*
	1	Op:	why don't you let her glue? Isn't it because you have
	2		just one stick?
	3	Alice:	because she doesn't try hard enough! She ha:sn't painted
	4		(.) she has ruined=
	5	Op:	=but: how do you think she feels hearing you talking in
	6		that way? Doesn't she feel bad?

7	Lina:	maybe she feels alone and:=
8	Op:	=and it is awful when one feels alone, isn't it? Or what is he
9		doing? What is she doing (.) actually, what is she doing?
10	Alice:	she should paint but: (.) ((point at the work of her
11		teammate)) it seems well done:

5.3 Lowering pupils' expectancies: the rhetorical function of post confirmation-confirmation

In a recent paper Jefferson (2007) defines a structure where someone asks a question, gets an affirmative answer and follows that with an utterance that conveys something like *ah, just as I thought*, as 'post confirmation-confirmation'.

On the basis of our data, we recognize this structure as a rhetorical strategy, used by educators to emphasize that their cognitive capacities are sufficient to compute the operations of psychic systems in their environment. By doing so, educators lower pupils' expectancies to succeed in selecting deviant or strategic behaviors. In excerpt (6), the educator asks a question (lines 2-3), gets an affirmative answer and follows that with a post-confirmation-confirmation (line 4), to show Nicole that he has fully understood the pragmatic function of her behavior. However, expectancies attached to the role of educator make Nicole able to understand the rhetoric value of educator's question as well. In line 3, she tries to resist, with an opposition tag ("però"/"but"), to education utterance.

Even if the educator, violating turn-taking rule to perform his post confirmation-confirmation, does not allow her to complete her turn, in line 5 Nicole expresses again her rejecting of education, charging educator of inconsistency in his behavior.

(6)

1	Op:	*a:h, ma: tu urlando cerchi di avere ragione così,*
2		*senza discutere?*
3	Nicole:	*e: °sì° (però-)*
4	Op:	*(inf):atti hh*
5	Nicole:	*infatti: se lo sapevi perché me lo chiedi?*

1	Op:	we:ll but: you scream to overcome the other,
2		avoiding to talk about issues??
3	Nicole:	well: °yeah° (but-)
4	Op:	(here we) are: hh
5	Nicole:	here we are: if you already knew it, why did you ask?

The suspension of a pedagogical stylized communication appears to be very improbable in an educational context, because of the persistence of social forms that leads pupils to look diffidently to the opportunity of autonomous participation, and educators to reactivate asymmetries attached to social forms to sustain education efforts, in the case pupils refuse the role of someone who needs to be educated.

We can therefore follow Luhmann's quite critical and pessimistic stance concerning education. The self-description of educational system as a differentiated input/output arrangement must then submit to correction a reality, its reality, it has itself-created, and direct its counterintuitive behavior back to the reality of a system that is structured too improbably and that tries to identify itself entirely with the transformation of input into output, ending up to deal with the problems resulting from its own increase-directed reductions (Luhmann 1990).

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Advances in the Complex of Competence-in-Performance

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In this study we analyse critical reactions to course readings in French, in a university course, in order to understand the construction of students' professional identity as teachers of French as a second-language. Findings show students' critical positioning in terms of personal factors and perspective taking. Regarding the former they generally respect the voice of the instructor, as for the latter it is generally concentrated around direct and meta-perspective taking with few students engaging in meta-meta-perspective taking. This could be explained by the fact that the students are using their second language or that they have not learned to adopt all levels of perspective taking or because they are not the type of person to usually function at that level. Questions to be asked, among others, are whether a certain communication style was used by people in this training course or whether the profession attracts a certain category of people.

1. Introduction

This research was carried out in the context of an English university programme in teacher education, with the intent to improve the course and identify the needs of students preparing to become teachers of French as a second language in Canada. Canada enjoys a bilingual status with French and English as the two official languages with every child in school having to learn the other second language. There are French minority groups in every province, in addition to Francophone Québec and the bilingual province of New Brunswick. Moreover Canada, a country of people of diverse origins starting with First Nations people, also increasingly welcomes immigrants from all over the world. This overview explains the various backgrounds of the students in our programme.

Canada is a very large country geographically speaking in which education is not overseen at the national level but rather is a provincial responsibility. Teacher education programmes are dispensed at universities and vary from one institution to the next even in the same province where the Ministry of Education only provides guidelines.

The selection process for entrance into teacher education programmes is becoming increasingly competitive and the goal is to recruit the best students so that they become the best possible teachers given their various abilities.

Needless to say university instructors are constantly analysing, revising and updating their courses in light of the latest research but also according to the level of training required by the diverse students in their courses in order for them to

become successful teachers. Inter-university competition as well as employment records of past graduates are used in evaluating programmes on a regular basis. It is therefore of paramount importance to fare well at all levels. A great amount of time and effort is put into providing the best possible programme for students in order to make them become reflective practitioners.

2. Rationale

As the instructor, I was looking for a better opportunity to reflect upon students' reactions to what I was trying to teach them and to enable them to transpose accumulated professional experiences through step by step adjustments to their learning needs.

As we increasingly use computer technology in our courses for improved effectiveness, it was important for me as the instructor to look what technology could facilitate the dialogue with students. It was felt that a discussion platform would allow for some sort of mediation, that is, an opportunity for students to react to the readings from their own standpoint before being confronted with the in-class discussion. This in turn allowed for some distance to be taken from the theoretical aspects of the texts to personal meaning-making and also provided students time to carry out the task on their own terms before class meetings. The e-mail reactions and questions enabled the instructor to focus more closely on needs in course preparation.

The collected data were subjected to the same questioning. The questions I asked myself were on the one hand relative to overall personal factors of students in the programme that transpired through their e-mails, although e-mails were anonymous, and on the other hand, provide the bridge to prepare classroom discussion and ensure that key questions were addressed and understood. The understanding of professional identity construction situated in socio-cultural contexts (Lave & Wenger 1991, Wenger 1998), in the construction of heritage, political aspects and establishing connections constituted aspects we were also interested in researching, in order to bring about more substantive information.

3. Description of the research

3.1 Context

The students were asked to carry out weekly reading assignments in preparation for in-class discussions and send in their critical review of the contents read in the form of questions, reactions, comments etc. to start the dialogue. The chapters assigned were from a text written by the instructor entitled "Modalities of second Language Learning", written in French and was thought to provide a good basis for the students.

The longitudinal study described below was carried out over two academic years in a course on second language teaching methodology, with students also

placed in the field for practical experience. The approach used was needs analysis through the analysis of the students' dialogues. The participants are French second language speakers training to become teachers of French as a second language at the secondary level in English speaking schools. This programme is normally delivered when students are in their fifth year at university. Dialogue data was collected and analysed first through Gee's (1999) discourse analysis model to discover personal factors and also in light of Laing, Phillipson and Lee's (1968) theoretical model of perspective taking in communication, in order to identify their critical positioning.

The content which was analysed consisted of the students' individual reactions via e-mails to the weekly assigned course readings in preparation for class discussion as a collective. In this English speaking university, French, the students' second language and the language of their teaching specialization, was the language to be used in their reactions and questions.

3.2 Participants

Students in the teacher education courses for this research were of mixed backgrounds. The participants all had an adequate level of French, some were French majors with French as their first teachable subject with fewer courses in a second subject. As secondary teachers in Ontario need two teachable subjects, some had majored in History, Science, Math, etc. with fewer university courses in French, usually only three. These students will become teachers of the language as a second language or teachers of content delivered in the second language in immersion schools. One advantage of students trained in another specialty besides French is to make them qualified as content teachers with a solid knowledge of their other subject, thus increasing their employment opportunities. This can also be a challenge as the different types of students are not necessarily the strongest speakers of the second language as they specialized more in their other teaching subject. Some of these students gain entry into the programme based more on their experience profile than their academic grades.

There are fluctuations between students' beliefs among those who feel they had sufficient preparation, those who feel very positive about the French 'fact' in Canada, and on the other hand, those who do not. These representations inevitably infiltrate their views of second language didactics and the didactic discourse.

The instructor is somewhat caught in the middle, juggling an understanding of the contexts the students come from, while trying to make them grasp and question the professional attributes and the content delivered that should lead them to become successful teachers in the second language.

Needless to say, the future teachers also have to be able to understand the theoretical context underlying the teaching of their subject as well as being critical and reflective.

It was necessary to also take into account the fact that the participants were of the internet generation, with gaps or differing views on academic discourse and

displayed different levels of ability in the negotiation of learning and of teaching styles.

4. Theoretical background

As ever-increasing degrees of complementarity have to guide our exploration and our teaching in order to achieve competence-in-performance (Weigand 2006) in the teacher preparation programme, we have to take heed of learners' needs at every step. There was a need to tally results and give exact reports knowing fully well that everything one does is influenced by the limits to one's capacity for meaning-making.

4.1 Analysis

Gee (1999:23) says our personal grid that constitutes the sum of our interactive capabilities establishes the limits to our understanding. This constitutes a mental planning ability that exists in each of us through which we comprehend our own thoughts, our use of language, plan our behaviours and interactions and through which we comprehend those of others. This represents a fluid non-stop planning in action to which we look for our interpretations. Gee adds that it is also at the origin and the end-product of discourses in the world, as this planning exists across people and social groups and is either synchronous or asynchronous and spans not only in the present time but also through history. Like traffic lights can cause chaos when the power is out, or traffic jams when lights are not well coordinated, comprehension can be affected by disruptions.

It is quite obvious that we use different forms of language depending on the context and the interlocutors.

The discussion is situated in practice, in contexts in which we want to listen to and hear the voices and the personal style of each of the student participants taking this course. Moreover the experience background acquired in prior classroom teaching by the students is expected to come into play (Lee 1986, Levine & Haus 1985).

4.2 Intercultural communication.

According to Borden (1991:35) we are all subjected to contextual, personal and cultural communication constraints. The immediate situational context of the communication event has an impact on us. Variables in our enunciations are based on personal choices we make at the specific instant we express ourselves in contrast to other possible choices. Non-conscious cultural ideological influences also affect our choices according to expectations of the culture we were brought up in (Wertsch 1991). Moreover in the training of specialist teachers in another language, factors having to do with one's openness on the other culture could play a crucial part according to Downs (1971). The author warns us against prejudging others' behaviours through our own cultural filters. It is a matter of individual

cybernetics (Harré & Gillett 1994). Life experiences should inform us and guide us in questioning our interlocutors' contributions. Hofstede (1980) believes that beyond questions about cross cultural communication, each person has the ability to anticipate and, as a follow-up, we are able to measure the gap between our actual perception of a speech event and our prior predictions. This shows a certain cognitive stability in that it permits to display a more or less similar behaviour in similar situations (Hofstede 1980:14).

5. Method

Auerbach (1992) suggests that it is through meaning-making that change can come about. Needs analysis (Long 2005) was used because it looks at sources, ways of operating and how the source, and the ways of operating interact thus providing the opportunity to better round up the relevant segments. We investigated students' dialogues as regards both personal factors and perspective taking.

Because of the difficulty involved in grasping contents of oral discourses within ever-changing contexts, it was felt best, in this education context, to check on learning dialogue through its crystallised forms, that is captured in written form. E-mail messages worked well as written forms of dialogue.

This was a longitudinal study of contributions spanning two academic years. We examined the dialogues of the 26 class participants during the academic year 2004/2005 and the 28 participants in 2005/2006. E-mails were collected, printed out without names to maintain anonymity. No connection was established to senders nor were any e-mails used for evaluation.

First, we analysed the dialogues looking at emerging aspects to be grouped under themes.

Elements of speech were grouped in order to uncover both characteristics having to do with participants' identities relative to their personality and their social identity on the one hand, and on the other hand relative to their attitude towards the instructor in their teacher education programme (Verity 2000). Contributions were analysed according to Gee's (1999) validity principles for discourse analysis, namely through convergence, agreement and coverage between elements of dialogue and the linguistic detail found in the elements of speech.

Second, to gain some distance from personal factors and get closer to participants' ability for critical reflection and a certain detachment, we used the theoretical framework on perspective taking developed by Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966). It helped shed light on the critical positioning of the participants as regards their cognition and their level of awareness.

The task was as follows: prior to by-weekly class meetings students were asked to react, ask questions, ask for clarifications, comment, etc. via e-mail, on an individual basis but anonymously, in order for the instructor to provide more

effective instruction along students' expressed needs during the following class meetings (Johnson 1982). Students were asked to dialogue in French, their second language, also the language of instruction and the language of their teaching specialty (Swaffar 1988).

The readings assigned in preparation for class discussion were chapters from a book written in French by the instructor on modalities in second language learning (Myers 2004), the contents of which were the topics for the on-going dialogue. Although this course is part of teacher preparation we feel that future teachers should not take everything they are taught for granted even in a professional training programme. We believe that even in such a context students should question the message and not just try to understand the words as Eco (1983:380) puts it. Even professional training books are meant to be questioned if we are to form reflective practitioners. I also believe that for future teachers to aim at developing a critical stance in their future learners, they have to become reflective teachers themselves.

6. Results

As we feel that it is important to develop a critical stance in future teachers, we were surprised by the relative homogeneity of the findings in this area. The framework we used to analyse the contents of the dialogues uncovered a number of strongly imprinted characteristics.

6.1 Findings relative to personal factors

As regards personality, emergent traits are assertiveness and self acceptance. These qualities, very useful for teaching appeared to be present in every case, which leads us to wonder whether in the selection process there is a favoring of this type of personal profile among candidates selected for the programme. This could be the case, because given satisfactory academic records, the choice of candidates is then made according to their statement of experiences, with the strongest being chosen. The question is whether or not this measure does not limit diversity in backgrounds.

In the case of the socially situated identity (Lave & Wenger, Wenger) of the teacher candidates, two essential aspects stand out.

First, they displayed a high level of respect for their teacher education course instructor. The question that comes to mind is whether this has to do with the excellent reputation of the university as well as the professional and personal qualities of the instructor, or whether the public image and the publicity around the university have been instrumental at 'moulding' this belief.

Second, it is very clear from their writing that they trust their 'trainer', they place themselves under the instructor's professional authority. This is apparent in most cases. This confidence placed in the instructor is remarkable yet begs for further comparative studies of instructors in similar positions but in other subject

teaching areas. Was this due to reading in the second language (Kern 1994) and not in their mothertongue and/or to sociocultural factors (Lantolf 2000)?

6.2 Findings around perspective taking

Perspective taking is directly tied to meaning-making. Laing et al. make a distinction between direct perspective, meta-perspective and meta-meta-perspective taking, with the latter two having to do with different degrees of personal detachment in communication.

Direct perspective is defined as a personal attitude to content perceived and in our case having to do with aspects dealing with teaching.

Meta-perspective would correspond to a positioning from fundamental theories in their relation to applications. This is highly desirable on the part of teachers. It provides a way to situate the other's attitude or understanding in relation to a given text.

Meta-meta-perspective takes additional distance from given words adding another level of questioning. This helps raise additional awareness. The stance-taking at this point would correspond to what one thinks the others' idea is of what one thinks about a question.

These positions in turn have an impact on one's contributions to the on-going dialogue. I provided the English translation for all of the examples given.

6.2.1 Findings relative to direct perspective taking.

As stated above, it has to do with personal attitude towards the information given and in this case, aspects related to teaching like for instance personal feelings or a search for practical recipes.

Examples of interactions:

(1) JS *Je ne comprends pas contexte et co-texte*
"I don't understand context and co-text."

This is a direct question, a request for clarification.

(2) JC *Le dictionnaire; Je pense que c'est nécessaire d'enseigner comment on utilise le dictionnaire/*
"Concerning the dictionary; I think it is necessary to teach how to use a dictionary."

In this statement, the student repeats words from the assigned text with what appears an intention to further validate what was read.

(3) JS *Est-ce qu'on devrait donner le texte écrit [correspondant à l'exercice d'écoute], avant, durant ou après qu'ils écoutent?*
"Should the written text (corresponding to the listening comprehension text) be given before, during or after the listening sequence?"

This student is directly reacting to the text and asks for further clarification.

(4) JC "switching to English text because brain is shutting down"

This is an expression of a student's feelings of frustration, also note that only the mother tongue is used, not the language of instruction.

(5) AW *Même si on enseigne comment se prendre en charge, les étudiants ne le feront probablement pas.*
"Even when one teaches students to take control of their learning, pupils will probably not do it."

This constitutes a personal reaction to a comment made in the text.

Comments on other students' reactions:
3mko in the direct perspective taking mode, always repeats what was not understood but never tries to interpret meanings by posing more questions. Perhaps this is a learning strategy and an economic way to let the instructor know what to revisit in class. However, there is also evidence that this student is able to take a meta-perspective and a meta-meta-perspective in different contexts.

- 9tlc4 answers in L1 only.
- 9nmo1 answers and asks direct questions in L1. This participant seems to only skim the text, yet shows an understanding of the problems.

6.2.2 Findings on meta-perspective taking

As stated earlier, this is connected with positioning oneself in relation to fundamental theories as regards their ties to practical applications and with determining the other's attitude in front of a given text.

Examples of interactions:

(6) JA *Si j'ai mal compris les définitions de contexte et co-texte (indique ce qui a été compris) pourriez-vous les revoir en classe et nous fournir quelques exemples aussi? Merci.*
"In case I did not understand context and co-text appropriately (saying what was understood) could you review them in class and also give us a few examples."

This student steps back from the text, in a self-evaluating-mode and looks at contents in a more holistic way and, as well, shows concern for classmates who might be in the same situation.

(7) MM *On dit de donner moins de contenu à traiter et d'approfondir. Comment peut-on faire cela quand le curriculum a un nombre d'attentes tellement grand.*
"It (the text) says to give less content to process and to dig deeper. How can that be done when there are already a great number of areas to be covered in the curriculum guidelines."

This student is weighing her responsibilities against the prescribed administrative contents, in order to be able to judge what has to take precedence.

(8) LM *Je trouve que c'est difficile d'analyser [un texte littéraire] quand la plupart du temps on ne sait pas vraiment ce que l'auteur voulait dire. (réaction sur un discours dans lequel il est question de l'enseignement de la littérature.)*
"I find it really difficult to analyse a literary text if most of the time one does not know what the author wanted to convey." (this was said in reaction to a segment on teaching literature)

Here we observe a certain distance taken with a reflection on the need to also teach about authors' backgrounds as it is necessary to fully understand a literary excerpt; students in the teacher education programme are often not familiar enough with the authors whose texts they are required to teach to their pupils.

(9) DH Pour lire un texte pour le comprendre il ne faut pas imposer un temps limite, alors pourquoi est-ce que l'on fait toujours des tests de compréhension de lecture [dans un temps donné].
"To read a text for reading comprehension, there should be no imposed time limit, then why are reading comprehension tests always timed?"

This student's thinking goes beyond the text, questioning a practice that does not make sense to her in teaching, as compared to the real situation in a classroom.

(10) GN *Mais est-ce que les romans [de la collection] Harlequin sont vraiment représentatifs de nos mœurs? J'espère que non!*
"Do 'Harlequin' romances really reflect our way of living? I hope not!"

This comment shows a student's reaction to a recommendation for easy readers but also an emphasis on the implications it has on the teaching of culture, thus going beyond direct perspective taking.

Comments on productions:

In these remarks one notices a critical stance taken showing distance from the text, stemming mostly here from life and professional experiences. These examples show in a way how the course the students are taking influenced their critical thinking as many of the other comments also mostly take a meta-perspective in reaction to course contents.

6.2.3 Findings having to do with meta-meta perspective taking.

Meta-meta perspective taking is explained above as implying a further distantiation like keeping in mind during interaction what members of another group imagine about one's attitude to a given question.

Examples of interactions at this level:

(11) MM *Quand vous décrivez une réalité métaphorique et la sociopragmatique est-ce que vous faites allusion à la notion que tout language est métaphorique comme le disent les théoristes (de Saussure, Derrida)?*
"When you describe a metaphorical reality and sociopragmatics are you implying that all language is metaphorical as some theorists say?"

This student seeks answers in connection with researchers like Derrida and Saussure, placing the contents of the text she read in parallel to what she understood these other researchers to have said and, in a way, is weighing her own understanding through the interpretation she thinks the other authors would have in this case, or rather interpreting her readings through the lenses of these other authors' ways of seeing.

(12) 2jes2 «*Tenir compte des différences sociales et contextuelles entre apprenants» (citation du texte), les profs peuvent-ils l'incorporer (dans leur façon d'enseigner) au secondaire ou seulement à l'université?*
"'Taking into consideration the social and contextual differences among learners' (quotation from the text) – can teachers integrate this (in their way of teaching) in secondary school or at the university?"

These comments show the student's interpretation of the text cited by seeking the instructor's reaction from her professional experience to the student's own questioning or opinion gleaned from professional experience at the secondary level only. One can identify an attempt at thinking what the other's reaction is to one's thinking.

(13) 3mko *Je pense que les pidgins sont très importants parce que c'est le point de rencontre pour des cultures différentes. C'est une sorte de négociation.*
"I think that pidgins are very important as they represent the cross-over point for different cultures. It is a sort of negotiation."

Here the student takes a leap from what the text says in the linguistic explanation of pidgings looking at it through a cultural studies lens from her understanding of what was gleaned from previous studies and going beyond. Although it is not quite clear what kind of negotiating is referred to, it is obvious that the student is trying to take on a meta-meta-perspective.

(14) DH *J'utilise l'infinitif plus souvent dans mes classes maintenant. Les étudiants au commencement le font aussi. Alors peut-être que je le fais parce qu'ils le font.*
"I use infinitive verb forms more often in my classes now. My pupils also do this at the beginning. So perhaps I do it because of their influence (they do it)."

This student transposed the reaction from the reading to classroom experiences. In doing so, we find not only reactions as to observations of the pupils' ways of using the language, but also an indication of what the influence of the pupils' behaviours could have had on DH.

(15) GN *Je pense qu'on doit être prudent en faisant des généralisations [en disant] qu'il y a* une *culture qui correspond à* une *langue. Il y en a plusieurs selon moi, une langue n'appartient pas strictement à un pays mais à tous les pays où on la parle*.
"I think one ought to be careful when making generalisations, when saying that there is *a culture* corresponding to *a language*. According to me a language does not strictly belong to a country but to the several countries in which it is spoken."

The cultural awareness evident in this comment points to advanced thinking way beyond what was implied by the comment in the text. Does this student have some familiarity with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or is the student thinking through a lens coloured by intercultural experiences? Given the distance taken from the text in this example, the perspective taking is situated beyond meta-perspective.

(16) 3mko *Le contexte dans lequel on va enseigner le français n'est pas un contexte où l'étudiant doit apprendre la langue pour survivre, donc c'est [les formes erronées qu'on n'essaie pas d'améliorer] plus un refus d'apprendre la langue qu'une négociation entre les deux langues [la L1 et la L2*].
"The context in which we will teach French is not one in which pupils have to learn the language to survive; so (by not trying to improve on errors made) it is more a refusal to learn the language than a negotiation between two languages." (L1, the first language and L2, the new language)

The student's comments indicate a reference to prior knowledge in linguistics and error correction and are filtered by 3mko's classroom experiences. In fact the student implies here how pupils' attitudes impact language learning, explicating what the thinking on pupils' attitudes is because of what local circumstances will do to 3mko and others' failure at being able to teach pupils correct forms of French. Here again, the reaction is situated beyond the level of meta-perspective taking. The student refers to the far reaching implications on the outcomes of professional practice through what the pupils being taught display as an attitude to the subject matter and dismisses the linguistic explanation, perhaps as a justification for failure or as an anticipation of possibly less positive teaching results.

Comments on productions at this level:

Only the few students' contributions above are situated at this level of perspective taking, that is five out of 54 participants. It is moreover interesting to note that it was always the same students who took this position. It was hoped that when the readings in the text required more advanced positioning in regards to some theoretical issues, a great number of the students would engage in meta-meta-perspective taking, perhaps even as a way of peeling the layers in order to get a better grasp of the intended meanings. This was not the case.

7. Discussion

It appears that one ought to be concerned by the meaning-making taking place by our students when faced with more theoretical contents. The results indicate the differing ways in which the majority of students in this teacher education specialization course in French, second language teaching, process the information from the readings in a text they had to prepare and react to, prior to their class meetings. It came as a surprise that the reactions to the readings and the instructor overall were positive because not only was it hoped that students in taking a strong critical stance would find areas to be questioned or improved upon, but also because the author, also the instructor, would have welcomed the feedback in order to provide amendments to better tune course readings and discussions in accordance with students' needs.

A rather even division in perspective taking was expected as, according to researchers, perspectives are more closely tied to the context to which to react, whereas in this study, perspective taking was instead more of an individual positioning, with, in general, people keeping within a given mode of perspective taking especially at the level of direct perspective taking. It is important to note that the few students who engaged in meta-meta-perspective taking also engaged in the direct and meta-perspective taking modes.

We do not know if the findings are indicative of the amount of attention given to the text by individual participants or lack thereof, however, they were assigned the same specific reading before each class and had to send their reactions by e-mail which would indicate that they complied with the assignment, especially given the fact that no two responses to a specific assigned reading were similar.

We also question the role the use of the second language played in the data. We question whether the results would have been similar had the reading assignments and the reactions been carried out in the participants' first language (L1) (Kern 1994, McQuillan & Rodrigo 1995). Does the facility in language use affect the level of perspective taking? Or is the level of perspective taking more connected to personal characteristics at a given time?

The first two levels of perspective taking, that is, Direct Perspective and Meta-Perspective, were observed most often, with spontaneous meta-meta-perspective taking only noted in the case of five of the 54 participants, namely MM, 2jes2, 3mko, DH and GN. It is interesting to see that all these participants also reacted at the other levels of perspective taking. However, most of the other participants stayed within Direct Perspective.

This shows how crucial it is to bring more students to that level of critical reflection. Our students however already showed a good level of meta-perspective taking and we can only hope that with increased training in continuing education they might be able to enhance their positioning as regards perspective taking.

Another question that arises is whether the level of French second language (L2) reached by our students was high enough to permit them to spontaneously use the different levels of perspective taking they usually access when using their

L1 (Kern). Perhaps their conversational skills are not adequate for the assimilation of the theoretical content they were expected to handle. So we may be able to say that the level of processing complexity reached in another language could be a determining factor in the level of perspective taking one is able to process.

There could be reason for concern relative to the ways of being of those students in our university courses who display limitations as regards perspective taking in communication.

Awareness raising around these concerns might have to be carried out. In teacher education courses, future teachers should be taught, for the purposes of listening comprehension in the second language, to model the different levels so as to better comprehend people who spontaneously use these different levels, and also to enable them to help their students in that endeavor.

A possible cause, for the low level of participants engaging in meta-meta perspective taking, could be insufficient mastery of the L2, especially given the fact that most participants gravitated around the first level, that is, Direct Perspective taking. One could also assume that perhaps this is the style of most students who choose teaching, and also wonder what might become of the ones who spontaneously engaged in meta-meta-perspective taking. Would these stand out in the profession or not? A follow-up study around this question should prove very informative.

Moreover the results of this study show that implicit aspects connected to our speaking behaviours in teaching/learning deserve the attention of researchers.

The most important finding centres around the fact that competence and performance could be competing in individual language productions where professional training is concerned. In this study, participants had to display competence in the performance of their tasks of reacting critically to theoretical writings in the professional field in which they are specialising, using the language of specialization, another language. Competence in the second language was expected through the display of accurate levels of language use. But this also entailed an understanding of the expected professional performance while using the other language with competence, otherwise the competence in language use would probably only be at a superficial level. In that light, performance would be seen as more important, even of people who could be less competent in language use but could be hiding this lack of competence as it appears in our participants who only engaged in dialogue at a level of direct perspective taking. Would it not be preferable to be able to fully engage in all levels of perspective taking while perhaps language use might appear less competent? Ideally, it would be desirable to possess advanced abilities in both competence and performance.

There are obvious limitations to this study. The findings are only relevant in the limited context of this research. Contextual limitations are due to the constraints imposed by the conditions due to the method that was used and the distinction between ‘low level’ and ‘high level’ communication (Hall 1988), with the choice of an emic approach starting from individuals and looking at the

meaning of their 'actions' or their contributions to the dialogue over an etic approach starting from scientific observations, although we tried to connect both.

Choosing to analyse the dialogue written up in anonymous e-mails, although it enabled us to protect participants' anonymity, did not permit further questioning participants on their contributions to see if any probing would push them into another level of perspective taking. We were also unable to assess if the use of L2 was impeding them in their expression, as with preserved anonymity we could not connect the e-mails to the students in the classes.

8. Conclusion

It was hoped that the analysis of students' dialogues would help the instructor improve course contents and also show students' level of perspective taking to see how to make them into more reflective teachers. The intention was to get students to acquire added efficacy in meaning-making. The question is relative to the difference it makes in interactional success depending on being able to identify that a person adopts a certain perspective and what the intentions for that perspective taking might be. For the purposes of generalization, it would be helpful to find out the usefulness of adopting one versus another perspective in communication and then teach the relevant behaviours so that it is possible for a person to also be able to identify the perspective taken by the interlocutor in another culture. This would shed light on the other's cultural orientation and could prevent failures in identification of a given perspective and in this way, hopefully avoid miscommunication. Some of the points discussed above are of crucial importance in the negotiation of meaning and intercultural communication. This thinking is in line with Wiseman and Abe's (1986) suggestion that a person who is cognitively more complex is able to better arrive at accurate representations of the interlocutor and to adapt better to the demands of a given situation. Increased difficulty has to be faced when communicating across languages which is more often the case nowadays.

In everyday life this can be seen as an ability to put yourself in the other person's place. Such qualities are highly desirable in future second language teachers. The acquisition of knowledge and transformation of learners through the different levels of perspective taking should be researched further with a look to the differences in the contents to be processed whether they are of a more physical or more conceptual nature.

I personally think that a person's flexibility and creativity also play an important part in the process, given the fact that what was needed was the ability to think outside the box and sort of rotate one's mind's eye and situate observed data on different levels.

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Politeness and Impoliteness in Russian and English Courtroom Dialogue

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In the present paper we consider Russian and English dialogic courtroom interaction in terms of politeness and impoliteness actualizations. The analysis starts with defining tactics and means of negative politeness which are used by trials participants to mitigate the belittling effect of their utterances. Although tactics of negative politeness demonstrate considerable parallelism in Russian and English courts, English interactants employ some additional politeness means. We also explore positive politeness which is mostly aimed at judges. We devote a separate section to implicit and explicit types of impoliteness, the latter being characteristic of judges whose status is dominant. The style of the Russian judge discloses more abruptness and harshness, which leads to greater asymmetry in dialogic interaction. Politeness and impoliteness demonstrations depend on the status of the speaker in the courtroom and have some national specifics.

1. Introduction

Dialogue as a type of discourse is the domineering and most crucial type of interaction in the courtroom since the result of the trial depends to a great extent on how the participants of the trial build their dialogue. Dialogic courtroom interaction presents a very thought-provoking and involving field of research, however, dialogic courtroom discourse has not been explored so far in Russian communication studies since the emphasis has been placed on separate longer speeches. The present paper focuses on one principal aspect of courtroom dialogue which is politeness. Politeness cannot be called an unexplored phenomenon in communication studies. A great number of works consider politeness and impoliteness in different situations and various types of discourse (Watts 2003, Locher 2004, Mills 2003, Scollon & Scollon 2005, Шамьенова 2000), languages and cultures (Beeching 2002, Placencia & García 2006, Hickey & Steward 2005). Russian scholars explore politeness as one of the principal communicative categories (Захарова 2000), as well as study particular language means of politeness (Прибыток 2005). Yet, the politeness principle and its application in practice is still attracting scholars of pragmatic, cultural and social studies who view this phenomenon of human communication from different perspectives.

Some observations on the etiquette and politeness aspects of courtroom were presented by the author in (Дубровская 2004, Дубровская 2006a, Дубровская 2006b), but the present work takes a deeper insight into politeness and impoliteness actualization in legal settings. Being an institutional type of discourse, courtroom dialogue is supposed to be characterized by some degree of politeness, and the present research is aimed at finding out how polite courtroom communication actually is and what language means politeness involves. The second target of the present study is discovering nationally specific features of politeness and impoliteness in Russian and English courtrooms. Considering the issue from the cross-cultural perspective can prove very demonstrative and add sufficiently to politeness analysis.

The analysis has been performed on the basis of Russian and English trials transcripts. The Russian transcripts present the trial against Jehovah's Witnesses congregation in Moscow (1999). The English transcripts present the trial of a notorious English writer and historian David Irving who was accused of being a Holocaust denier and appeared as a claimant in court (2000). The conclusions made in the paper are preliminary results rather than wide generalisations.

2. Types, tactics and means of politeness and impoliteness in the courtroom

2.1 Negative politeness

Alan Cruse states in his book "Meaning and Language" that "the purpose of politeness is the maintenance of harmonious and smooth social relations in the face of the necessity to convey belittling messages" (Cruse 2004:376). It is quite evident that though being an adversarial process, any trial should be harmonious and smooth to a considerable degree. The participants should demonstrate necessary respect and patience to each other and to the judge for the trial to be a socially consistent process and the court to maintain its status as an effectively functioning social institution. In order to maintain certain harmony during the trial both the parties and the judge use different types and tactics of politeness which find their expression in corresponding language means.

Most scholars distinguish between positive and negative politeness. Negative politeness is supposed to mitigate the effect of belittling expressions, while positive politeness emphasizes the hearer's positive status (Cruse 2004:377). We can find the examples of both in trial transcripts. However, I believe that negative politeness is more typical of speech communication between the parties (e.g. during cross-examination where confronting interests are most evident), and utterances employing positive politeness are very often aimed by the parties at the judge.

To mitigate the negative, unpleasant effect of their utterances participants of courtroom communication use a number of politeness tactics which are realised by lexical, grammatical and syntactic means. Most of these tactics are common for both Russian and English courtrooms. They are:

– *pointing to the subjectivity of one's own ideas and opinions* which presupposes that the speaker may be wrong. It employs meta-communicative structures, such as *I think*, *I do not think*, *I'm not sure*, *perhaps* and equivalent Russian expressions *на мой взгляд* ("in my view"), *пожалуй*, *возможно* ("maybe"), *я полагаю*, *я считаю* ("I believe"):

(1) Mr Irving: This is what I asked you not to do, not just to take individual phrases out of a sentence and say, look at this bit and look at that. You have to judge the whole.
Mr Rampton: *I do not think* that is very fair. I read the whole sentence.

As we see, the barrister for the defendants does not want to aggravate the conflict of opinions. Expressing his view he manages to mitigate the negative effect of the contradiction.

In the following Russian example the barrister protests against the form of the question asked using the tactic of subjectivity:

(2) Кондратьева Т.И.: Значит, *на мой взгляд*, вопрос поставлен не совсем корректно…поскольку…
Прохорычева Е.И.: Подождите, пожалуйста, пусть вопрос еще раз прозвучит.

"Kondratyeva: Well, *in my view*, the question has not been put quite correctly... since...
Prokhorycheva: Wait, please, let the question be pronounced one more time."

– *pointing to deliberate word usage/word avoidance for the sake of the interlocutor:*

(3) Mr Irving: I deny … *I use that word, it might be more proper to use the word "contest" or "question", but certainly for your purposes I will use the word "deny",* that it was possible to liquidate millions of people in the gas chambers that had been presented us by historians so far.

(4) Mr Rampton: Right now, will you please, just so that we can clear up *this, I will not use the word, just this little dispute*, please keep your finger where you are and turn to tab 11.

(5) Кондратьева Т.И.: Приведенная цитата, в основном именно этот абзац, приведенный в обоснование представления, на наш взгляд, служит прямым примером разжигания религиозной розни, поскольку идет ссылка на представителей других конфессий в, *мягко говоря*, неблагоприятном для них виде.
"Kondratyeva: The cited quotation, mostly this particular passage mentioned to prove the statement, in our view, is the direct example of inciting religious enmity, since there is a reference to other congregations presenting them, *mildly speaking*, unfavourably."

– *asking for permission or agreement.* In English communication most often such requests have the form of conditional clauses with 'if':

(6) Mr Rampton: Let us go back to your opening yesterday. You made noisy complaint, *if I may call it that*, about being branded a "holocaust denier", did you not?

(7) Mr Rampton: If you have answers to my questions rather than speeches to make by all means give them, but I really do prefer to proceed my own way, *if I am allowed*.

In Russian constatives or imperatives perform the same function:

(8) Леонтьев А.Е.: *Позвольте*, я еще раз зачитаю: "Христиане должны держаться отдельно от мира". И в скобках стоит Иакова 1:27. Я полагаю, что правильное понимание этого высказывания невозможно без Иакова 1:27, которое приведено здесь в качестве основания. Поэтому я хочу услышать ваш ответ.

"Leontyev: *Let me read* once again: 'Christians should keep away from the world'. And in brackets stands James 1:27. I believe, that correct understanding of this uttrance is impossible without James 1:27, which is cites here as a background. That is why I want to hear your answer."

– *pointing to some particular rather than absolute degree of the negative quality or action of the other party*, using *quite*, *somewhat*, *a kind of*. Among the Russian equivalents are *аспекты* ("aspects"), *моменты* ("elements"), *достаточно* ("rather"):

(9) Mr Rampton: Mr Irving, this is becoming *somewhat* comical.

(10) Mr Rampton: It is *a kind of* deliberate blindness to the evidence. What he does not like, he ignores.

(11) Кондратьева Т.И.: Нет, вы неправильно поняли и *достаточно* серьезно извратили смысл моего ответа.

"Kondratyeva: No, you misunderstood and *rather* seriously perverted the meaning of my answer."

– *formulas of etiquette* which are most popular and abundant, including *polite requests, gratitudes* and *apologies* especially when interfering with the speaker:

(12) Mr Rampton: I am paraphrasing the penultimate and the propenultimate lines of the previous …
Mr Irving: *I am sorry*, but that is not an accurate paraphrase.

(13) Mr Rampton: ...You told his Lordship this morning that, so far as you could tell, these were accurate transcripts of what you had said. I will read the sentence and you tell me whether you want to…
Mr Irving: *Excuse me*, you just said that I told his Lordship that these were accurate transcripts of what I have said.
Mr Rampton: So far as you could tell, I think, yes. He asked you that question.
Mr Irving: I said with reservation, with the reservation that some of them have been subjected to editing.

(14) Леонтьев А.Е.: Следующее высказывание, которое вы здесь приводите из «Сторожевой башни»…
Кондратьева Т.И.: *Будьте добры*, номер журнала;

"Leontyev: The following quotation that you are citing from 'Watch Tower'..."
"Kondratyeva: *Be so kind*, the number of the journal."

(15) Прохорычева Е.И.: *Пожалуйста*, более конкретный вопрос задайте.

"Prokhorycheva: *Please,* ask a more concrete question."

(16) Прохорычева Е.И.: *Вы извините*, я вас немного перебью.

"Prokhorycheva: *I am sorry*, I shall interrupt you a little bit."

At the same time there are tactics of negative politeness which are characteristic of English courtroom only. They have not been met in the Russian transcripts analysed. These are:

– *expressing sympathy* for the hearer by means of *assessment markers*:

(17) Mr Irving: It would be far more useful if we could have document before the court.
Mr Rampton: *Unfortunately* I do not have it here. So we will have to come back to it. We will come back to it in detail *I am afraid*. There is no way round it;

– *explicit expression of respect for the hearer:*

(18) Mr Rampton: Mr Irving, we will get nowhere if we argue about trivia of that kind. What you had believed in…
A. It is not trivia, Mr Rampton, *with respect*, because a few days down the line you will read back to me the transcript and say, "But you agreed on January 12th that this was what you were referring to", and that is why I am going to be sticking on each one of these points, Mr Rampton.

These ways of mitigating a negative effect are rather often combined within one utterance or dialogic exchange:

(19) Mr Rampton: ...*I do not think* you are *perhaps quite* answering my question.
Mr Irving: *I thought* that was a very comprehensive one, Sir.

In the first statement made by the barrister meta-communicative structures expressing subjectivity are combined with *quite* which expresses the degree of the delict. The claimant, in his turn, resorts to the tactic of subjectivity, too.

The ways of mitigating the negative effect of face-threatening utterances in English and Russian courtroom dialogue are presented in a table:

Table 1: *Tactics of Negative Politeness*

№	Tactics of negative politeness	Language means	
		English	Russian
1	Subjectivity of one's own opinion	*I think, I do not think, I am not sure, perhaps*	*На мой взгляд, на наш взгляд, я полагаю, по-моему, пожалуй, возможно*
2	Deliberate word usage/ avoidance	*I use that word, I will not use the word*	*Мягко говоря*
3	Asking for permission/ agreement	*If I may call it that, if I am allowed, if I may, May I?* tag questions	*Я позволю себе, позвольте*
4	Pointing to the degree of a negative quality	*Quite, somewhat, a kind of*	*Моменты, аспекты, достаточно, немножко*
5	Requests, gratitude, apologies	*Will you please, thank you, excuse me, sorry, I am (so) sorry*	*Пожалуйста, будьте добры, простите, я прошу прощения*
6	Expressing sympathy	Assessment markers: *I am afraid, unfortu-nately*	-
7	Expressing respect	*With respect*	-

2.2 Positive politeness and the judge as its target

While negative politeness is more characteristic of the dialogic exchanges between the parties, utterances employing positive politeness are very often addressed to the judge. The simplest way to emphasize the hearer's positive status is to address him respectfully. The parties of the English trial keep addressing the judge using *My Lord*, *Your Lordship* all the time, while in the Russian transcripts analysed there have been met only two utterances including forms of addressing *Ваша честь* ("Your Honour") and *Уважаемый суд* ("Dear Court").

The participants of the English trial also resort to some other ways to show their respect for the judge. In the following example answering a very common question of the judge the claimant manages to do it complimenting on the judge's professional qualities:

(20) Mr Justice Gray: Is there anything you wish to add?
Mr Irving: Not to that, my Lord, no, and in any other respect I think you have drawn the essentials out of me admirably as was only to be expected.

The usage *have drawn out* shows that it is not an easy job that the judge performs. At the same time his admirable professional qualities are taken by the claimant as something *expected*.

In another situation the barrister for the defendants demonstrates his respect for the court and the judge, although his speech is actually addressed to the claimant:

(21) Mr Rampton: We do not play tricks like that in this court, Mr Irving. If we do the judges get very cross with us. There is no point to it.

In such cases, I suppose, it is expedient to speak of implicit politeness which is not expressed by particular language means, rather is it in the implicature.

Enhancing the hearer's positive status can be performed at the expense of reducing the own status by the speaker. Speaker-related politeness involving self-belittlement is not often observed in the courtroom, therefore, the rare examples of it in the English transcripts attract immediate attention and help to discover cross-cultural differences. The distinguishing feature in the speech of the English judge is occasional self-deprecation which is not typical of the Russian judge. In the following examples the English judge claims to himself the responsibility for inconvenience to the addressee:

(22) Mr Justice Gray: I am not sure I am making my point clear to you that…;

(23) Mr Rampton: Had I known that I would not have worked to 6 o'clock this morning preparing bundles.
Mr Justice Gray: You can blame me for that.

Thus, positive politeness, though being exploited less frequently in the courtroom than negative politeness, is connected with the figure of the judge and has specific language means of its expression including certain types of addressing the judge, demonstrating respect for him in implicit form and occasional self-deprecations made by the English judge himself.

2.3 Impoliteness: Implicit and explicit types

Alan Cruse writes: "Politeness is, first and foremost, a matter of what is said, and not a matter of what is thought or believed" (Cruse 2004:376). I think this statement can be questioned. In some situations behind the extremely polite facade one can find poignant irony which is not at all aiming at harmonizing communication. In the following example we can observe verbal exchanges of a very acid character:

(24) Mr Irving: …I would also draw attention to two or three details, if I may, since we are looking at the document now.
Mr Rampton: I would rather we left it but you can if you want.
Mr Justice Gray: I personally think I would leave it.
Mr Irving: I do not want to upset Mr Rampton by drawing attention to inconsistencies.
Mr Rampton: You will have an opportunity later.
Mr Irving: I am not questioning the authenticity, my Lord, just aspects of it. Right.
Mr Rampton: I do not mind at all, Mr Irving, if that is what you would like to.
Mr Irving: No, you have your own way.
Mr Rampton: I look at it, I see it describes itself, its subject matter…
Mr Irving: Now you are looking at details and I am not allowed to!
Mr Justice Gray: I think we will leave it to Mr Rampton. I think he can ask you more questions if he wants to.

Though being polite on the surface these exchanges lead to an open conflict and the outrageous exclamation of the claimant: "Now you are looking at details and I am not allowed to!", and at this moment the judge has to intercept the verbal initiative and perform his regulating function to settle the situation.

Open impoliteness in court is rather seldom. Nevertheless a few examples can be found. The last utterance in example (25) sounds rather rude:

(25) Mr Rampton: What you do you say about Sobibor, Treblinka, Belzec and Chelmno?
Mr Irving: Nothing at all. I am not an expert.
Mr Rampton: Do you deny that they were killed in gas chambers in those places?
Mr Irving: *You did not hear what I said*, Mr Rampton. I am not an expert.

This kind of impoliteness should be differentiated from the other type of impoliteness which can be characterized as institutionally sanctioned impoliteness and which is typical of judges' speech. In defining certain types of impoliteness as institutionally sanctioned I follow Sara Mills who discusses it in her work *Gender and Impoliteness* and presents this type of impoliteness as that performed by a person with a higher social status in institutional settings (Mills 2005). The scholar pays attention to the reaction of the addressee who faces institutionally sanctioned impoliteness: "…The individual assesses the behaviour as impolite, but decides that it is not interactionally expedient for them to act in relation to this

perception of impoliteness or to call attention to the fact that they do indeed classify it as impolite (Mills 2005:267).

Demonstrative examples of institutionally sanctioned impoliteness are the judges' interruptions of other speakers in the courtroom. Being placed within a metacommunicative frame and preceded by apologies, the interruptions may sound very polite. However, the judges do not always resort to apologies when interfering with utterances of other trial participants:

(26) Mr Irving: …As for the National Alliance, an organisation of which the Defence makes much, once again, as an Englishman…
Mr Justice Gray: *You have dealt with that already*.
Mr Irving: We have had it, but I am back again, my Lord. It must have been quite late at night when I wrote this part. As an Englishman I am completely unfamiliar with the nature the National Alliance, its logo and its name;

(27) Кондратьева Т.И.: Мы в своем представлении ссылались исключительно на тексты, распространяемые…
Прохорычева Е.И.: *Вы это уже сказали*, не надо об этом говорить;

"Kondratyeva: In our statement we were referring only to the texts distributed..."
"Prokhorycheva: *You have already said this*, do not talk about it."

It is quite evident that judges' interruptions, being anti-dialogic by nature, are at the same time an inseparable part of courtroom communication where the judge's social status is dominant and unquestionable.

Norman Fairclough, when discussing the properties of a dialogue, states that "…even informal conversation shows inequalities which can be attributed to social relations between participants" (Fairclough 2003:78). These inequalities get deeper and more crucial in institutional settings. Fairclough presents a list of rights which equal participants of the dialogue possess. These rights are to:

- take turns
- use turns to act in various ways – asking questions, making requests, complaining, etc.
- speak without interruption
- select and change topic
- offer interpretations or summaries of what has been said (Fairclough 2003:79).

Analysis of courtroom communication from the perspective of these rights shows that most of them are actualized in the speech of the judge only who takes turns but does not generally let other speakers take them, who interrupts other speakers but insists on speaking without interruptions. The transcripts reveal the asymmetry of the courtroom dialogue: while the judge has a full right to interfere with other speakers and they cannot and do not show any displeasure with this, the

judge demonstrates his/her power and gives strict instructions to the interfering person:

(28) Mr Justice Gray: Let us deal with it slightly more evidentially. You are being asked for the evidence you rely on apart from the eyewitnesses.
Mr Irving: My Lord …
Mr Justice Gray: *Just pause*. You have your shout and *I am going to have mine*.

The Russian judge does not tolerate any interruptions even if these interruptions are not directed at her personally. Moreover, she openly points several times to her dominant status in the courtroom:

(29) Леонтьев А.Е.: ...Скажите, как Свидетели Иеговы извращают следующее высказывание, на которое они ссылаются здесь из Иакова 1:27: "Чистое и непорочное благочестие перед отцом есть то..."
Кондратьева Т.И.: Пожалуйста, ссылка на брошюру? Страница?
Прохорычева Е.И.: *Пожалуйста, прекратите прерывать. Слушайте внимательно*.
Кондратьева Т.И.: Трудно воспринимать текст, когда не знаешь, откуда он.
Прохорычева Е.И.: *Я очень вас прошу, не прерывайте*. Во-первых, вы нам не даете дослушать. *Нет у вас такого права. Я прерву, тогда пожалуйста*. Это ссылка из книги?

"Leontyev: Say how Jehovah's Witnesses pervert the following passage which they make a reference to from James 1:7: 'Clean and innocent piety for Father is that...'"
"Kondratyeva: Please, the reference to the leaflet? Page?"
"Prokhorycheva: *Please, stop interrupting. Listen attentively.*"
"Kondratyeva: It is difficult to perceive the text when you do not know where it is from."
"Prokhorycheva: *I ask you, do not interrupt.* Firstly, you do not let us listen up to the end. *You do not have this right. When I interrupt, then, please*. Is it a reference to the book?"

(30) Кондратьева Т.И.: Простите, вы взяли это из тех ссылок, которые...
Леонтьев А.Е.: Позвольте мне задать вопрос.
Прохорычева Е.И.: *Прерывать могу здесь только я, ладно?* Сейчас вам зачитают, и все будет понятно.

"Kondratyeva: Excuse me, you have taken this from the references that…"
"Leontyev: Let me ask a question."
"Prokhorycheva: *It is only me who can interrupt here, ok?* It will be read andeverything will become clear."

(31) From the cross-cultural perspective the style of the Russian judge can be characterised as more abrupt and harsh as compared to the style of the English judge. The English judge uses indirect speech acts, i.e. interrogatives functioning as imperatives, to urge the trial participants to say something:

(32) Mr Rampton: Yes, I mean, I do not say I have covered everything either.
Mr Justice Gray: *Can I invite to do that*? Not at enormous length, but I think it would be helpful.

The Russian judge gives her instructions in a very straightforward way using imperatives predominantly:

(33) Прохорычева Е.И.: *Ответьте на вопрос,* у вас никто никакой трактовки не просит.

"Prokhorycheva: *Answer the question*. Nobody asks for your interpretation."

(34) Прохорычева Е.И.: Время *побеpегите*. *Отвечайте* коротко.

"Prokhorycheva: *Save* time. *Answer* briefly."

Also, the Russian judge often starts her interruptions with negative forms such as *нет* ("no"), *не надо* ("do not") and conjunction *но* ("but") which presupposes contradiction. In the following example two forms are combined:

(35) Прохорычева Е.И.: *Нет, но* вы читаете верх, который вы вообще не заявляли.

"Prokhorycheva: *No, but* you are reading the top which you have not announced at all."

3. Conclusions

The comparative analysis of Russian and English trial transcripts proves that:

- A certain degree of politeness in the courtroom is essential for the trial process to be consistent and efficient.
- Both positive and negative types of politeness are characteristic of Russian and English courtroom dialogue. The type of politeness exploited is very often determined by the relations between the speaker and the addressee. Means of negative politeness are mostly employed in communication between the parties, while utterances involving positive politeness are often characteristic of the communication with the judge.
- Though the means of negative politeness show considerable parallelism in English and Russian courtrooms, English speakers make use of a few additional devices.
- It is sometimes expedient to distinguish implicit politeness as well as implicit impoliteness, the latter being able to lead to a conflict.
- Open impoliteness is rather seldom.
- Institutionally sanctioned impoliteness is an inseparable part of both Russian and English courtroom dialogue. However, the utterances of the judge employing institutionally sanctioned impoliteness are more numerous and

demonstrative in the Russian courtroom. They involve corresponding language forms, including imperatives and abundant negative forms.

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The Rhetorical Use of Scientific Discourse in Legal Argumentation

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The topic of this paper is the use of scientific expert opinions at trials. However its scope is limited to some particular features of expert opinion, i.e., when experts are called on to provide knowledge on a special scientific field relevant to a particular case. Analyzing the intertwined relation between law and science requires first understanding the general background of both law and science. The second step is to examine the different kinds of dialogue in both fields in order to analyze what happens when a scientific expert is called to give an opinion at a trial. My aim is to distinguish the features of different kinds of dialogues along the path to a judicial decision. I conclude by suggesting some rules to avoid the misuse of expert opinion.

1. Introduction

It is nothing new to note that opinions of scientific experts are often used rhetorically[1]; this occurs when opinions are used not for their own merit but only for the prestige of science in order to obtain deference. In such cases they become a means for fallacious argument (*ad verecundiam*). Nor is it new to observe that experts are sometimes bribed by lawyers. Nevertheless, the use of scientific expert opinion in trials continues to increase. Since members of a jury and even judges are not and indeed cannot be specialists in all domains, expert opinions are unquestionably necessary at trials. Each different type of expert opinions should be analyzed in detail in accordance with its specific characteristics. This paper does not examine all kinds of expert opinions that can play a role in court. Rather, it will solely underline some particular features of expert opinions, i.e., when experts are called for their knowledge in a special scientific field relevant to a specific case; hence, I will leave aside, for example, forensic techniques, in particular those mainly based on abilities or experience, like car crash experts.

When lawyers introduce scientific opinions at trial as a means to support their claim, we can identify several stages where different kinds of dialogue take place. Each context of dialogue has its framework and goal and hence what is permitted in one might not be acceptable in another (cf. Walton 1998:*passim*). The role scientific discourse plays at a trial depends on the chain of steps it follows through

[1] On the rhetoric of scientific discourse, see Prelli (1989); Gross (1990). For a critical review of the topic, see Halsall (2002:7-26).

those different stages.[2] It is useful to recall the background of these two fields in order to see how law and science interact in the courtroom.

2. Law's general background

In spite of the many theories about what law is and in spite of the differences among all legal systems, it is important for further purposes to bear in mind that, whatever the legal system and the type of trial, there is a general background for any legal decision. This is the principle of certainty.

Let us recall that the claim to legitimacy of all modern states lies in the doctrine of the "rule of law." The regulation of conduct and prevention and resolution of conflicts are among the main functions of law ; in the background of law's authority two features are always interlinked: the acceptance of coercion and the expectation of "correct" and therefore what is considered the just application of law's commands and decisions.

Trials, whether they take place in a Commonwealth or a Continental legal tradition and whether they are adversarial or inquisitorial, are about a conflict between two parties that has to be settled by determining if the claim is well-founded. A judge's responsibility in handing down legal decisions is purported to generally respond to the overwhelming justification of Law, i.e., legal certainty. Legal certainty is two-folded: it means that what the law says is to be applied, and for this reason much attention has been paid to the interpretative task; on the other hand, questions of proof are crucial to serve legal certainty (cf. Gaskins 1992:15-37).

Officials specifically resolve single disputes; in so doing they are committed to find out questions of truth, i.e., if what the claimant is asserting is true. This is why questions of proof are central to Law enterprise and cannot be treated as a merely formalistic matter (see Laudan 2007:329-354). The question of variability of the degree of certainty attainable in the framework of a legal trial cannot be used as an excuse to leave aside an epistemic concern about it.

Therefore, a general assumption that guides this paper is that Law is concerned with finding the truth of particular propositions that will be stated as premises for arriving at the final decision, because broad deference to the authority of Law is related to the general accomplishment of correctness in conflict resolution. Though this contention might seem obvious, it is not, since in some legal milieus there is the belief that what is at stake in legal trials is not to find the truth[3] but only the "legal truth," i.e., only the truth that has been proven at the trial through formal means.

Let us now briefly recall the general scientific background.

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[2] For a general review of the epistemological problems posed by scientific testimonies in trials, see Brewer (1998:1538-1681).

[3] What some lawyers call "historical truth."

3. Science general background[4]

Scientific enterprise has a long history. Here I am interested only in the Western and recent versions. The scientific field is generally composed of ideas and conceptions about nature expressed in a structured discourse and open to public criticism.

Science is of course also about finding the truth, but the truth concerning our understanding of the world by general propositions that are situated in a assembled structure of other propositions considered provisionally true. Its contentions are not independent of the theory to which they pertain. Its most outstanding features are critical attitudes about its findings and a request for explaining the way towards them. Scientific discourse is essentially made of propositions that are abstract, general, and have a status of provisional truth dependant on their relation to a systematic body of ideas, which are purported to give an accurate account of the world and accepted procedures for criticizing and improving those accounts.

4. Types of dialogue in legal trials

Both law and science are dialogical, but in different ways. Hence, for analyzing the role of scientific experts at trials, we need to first examine the general requirements for dialogues.

Turning to Douglas Walton's work, we should recall that: every dialogue[5] is characterized by a normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between partners, in order to reach a collective and specific goal. Participants have the obligation to fulfill the goal of the dialogue by working to accomplish their individual goal and at the same time to cooperate with the one of their participant (cf. Walton 1998:30 and Walton 1989:3). Participants have some basic obligations, which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Obligation of relevance, according to which an argument or another type of move is relevant to the extent that it is appropriate to contribute to the goal and to the stage of the dialogue.[6]
(2) Obligation to act in accordance with the set of the participants' commitments, i.e., the array of propositions that each participant has accepted. It can change

[4] Although many of my ideas about scientific enterprise in general are based on Toulmin, I disagree with some of his views on the difference between Science and Law. Cf. Toulmin (1960), and Toulmin (1978:313-348).

[5] Walton (1998: 31) distinguishes six basic kinds of dialogue: persuasion dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, negotiation dialogue, inquiry dialogue, eristic dialogue and deliberation dialogue.

[6] Walton (1998:30). This topic of relevance has been further developed by the same author in Walton (2004); see in particular Chapter five on the dialectical nature of relevance (Walton 2004: 125 ff).

by adding or deleting propositions [from the set of commitments] as the dialogue goes on. For example, when a participant asserts a proposition, it goes into its commitment set.

(3) Obligation of goal-directed moves. Since a dialogue is a sequence of moves, each one must be directed to the goal of the dialogue. "The goal of a dialogue is defined by its originating issue, which is the problem, question, or conflict the dialogue is to solve, answer or resolve." (Walton 1998:34)

As Walton's analysis posits, most dialogues are mixed, which is also the case of legal trials. Nevertheless, according to my account of dialogues in legal trials, not only there are different kinds of dialogue but they take place simultaneously.

Before analyzing the role of expert opinion at a trial, we must first identify different kinds of dialogue present at a trial and how they are interrelated.

Legal trials, as noted above, arise because two parties have conflicting points of view, which they each would like to see prevail in the final resolution. Therefore, at its origin there is an **eristic** type of dialogue: the argumentation produced by the parties strives indeed to win the counterpart; lawyers keep responding to each other's statements guided in principle by rules of procedure where the burden-of-proof principle is central.

In some legal systems, before the criminal trial, there is "plea bargaining," which is a sort of negotiation.[7] This negotiation is intended to have self-interest as its primal goal and bargaining as its method. Between the prosecutor and the defendant's lawyer a dialogue takes place that seeks an arrangement that suits both parties, by which the defendant pleas either guilty or not guilty. Nevertheless, the general view that considers plea bargaining as merely a negotiation dialogue in which **"**the aim for both parties is to 'make a deal' while bargaining over some goods or interests by conceding some things and insisting on other" (Walton 1998:32) is not, in my opinion, accurate, for the dialogue in plea bargaining is not sheerly negotiation. Indeed, before reaching an agreement, the parties analyze all the evidence at hand to determine what the outcome of a possible trial would be. Based on this conclusion the prosecutor might decide not to bring the defendant to trial or the defendant will decide to plead guilty or not guilty; hence, the goal of the dialogue is not only negotiation. Furthermore, some legal systems have a "discovery rule" that requires the parties to present to each others all the evidence of which they are aware, whether in favor or against their case. Concealing any evidence can result in harsh sanctions. This is why the nature of this dialogue is also mixed: it has a negotiation component but the development of the exchange – particularly in the case of the requirements of the

[7] In a *negotiation dialogue*, the primal goal is self-interest and the method is to bargain. It does not have pretensions of being an objective inquiry into a truth of a matter. The concession in bargaining are trade-offs that can be sacrifice for gains elsewhere. This type of dialogue is completely adversarial. Cf. Walton (1998:32).

"discovery rule" – is an *inquiry dialogue*, in which the goal for the participants is to "collectively prove some particular proposition, according to a given standard of proof, or to show that the proposition cannot be proved at the present stage of knowledge" (Walton 1998:32), which is merely Walton's definition of an inquiry dialogue.

It is commonly held that during the trial, the dialogue between lawyers of the two parties is eristic since, according to Walton (1989:5),

> the basic purpose of the forensic debate is to win a verbal victory against your opponent by impressing the audience (or referee) of the debate [and that] this means that fallacious arguments and personal attacks are good idea if they help to win the argument.

If lawyers indeed intend to "win", this does not accurately account for what takes place in the courtroom. The issue is more complex; since the judge or even the jury do not simply choose a winner but are purported to decide based on sufficient grounds and solid arguments that should be in principle sound for the greater part of the community. This is the social regulatory role law is meant to accomplish; Dialogues between lawyers certainly have an important eristic component; however, we must take into account that lawyers in their winning enterprise have limits, not only those established by the rules of procedure but also those that are in accordance with the general purposes of Law, as stressed above. Furthermore, lawyers can lose prestige – and even their licence, in some legal systems – if their conduct fails to conform to certain principles; hence, they are required not simply to defeat their opponent but also to contribute to the attainment of "justice" what ever this means.

Thus, during a trial the main dynamics take place between each lawyer and whoever makes the decision – the judge or jury, depending on the legal system and type of trial. This is why legal trials basically belong to persuasion dialogue, in that a trial is mainly about determining if it is the case that X – i.e. what the plaintiff (or claimant) asserts – is true or not, hence certain legal consequences will ensue.

Walton holds that one characteristic of a judicial context is that at some stage arguments traditionally considered fallacious are welcome, up to a certain point. For Walton, one of these cases would be, for example, that of the *ad hominen* argument, particularly in cross-examination. Another case is the use of an *ad misericordiam* argument at the end of a trial, when a defendant has pleaded guilty.[8] As Hamblin (1998:*passim*) put forward, the evaluation of an argument as fallacious is context-dependant; hence, during cross-examination, the lawyer must show the degree of the witness' credibility. Consequently, an argument on his or her character is perfectly relevant. In the same way, an appeal to compassion is also relevant when a defendant has accepted responsibility, since that is one of the

[8] Walton (1998: 232- 234). In most legal systems, when a defendant pleads guilty, the trial is cancelled, which is the purpose of plea bargaining. What follows is an administrative procedure in which the defendant appears before a judge for a sanction to be determined.

purposes of pleading guilty. What is interesting about these examples is that they show not an idiosyncratic functioning of legal trials, or a result of the stage of the trial but, I would like to insist, the outcome of the insight of Hamblin's work i.e. the goal- and context-dependency of correctness in argumentation. These two examples account for the importance of shifts produced in the goal of a dialogue. Therefore, we shall attempt to identify the shifts that take place during the intervention of scientific discourse at a trial.

It might be useful to once again remind that the overriding purpose of each enterprise at stake in this paper: – law and science – must be present in any argumentative task. I shall now try to analyze the overlapping of both enterprises while scientific discourse comes to trial.

5. The path of scientific discourse at a trial

As noted, the use of scientific expert opinion is increasingly common.[9] In spite of the frequent, and various types of, misuse of science by lawyers, it is simply impossible to do without science, because of the abundant subject matters regarding which scientific knowledge is crucial. Though judges and juries are not specialists in scientific domains, they often are called on to decide issues on the basis of scientific knowledge[10]. The question is how judges and juries are to scrutinize scientists' testimony, or what is even more difficult, how they are to decide when scientists disagree.

When a lawyer consults a scientific expert there is a first shift from a scientific-inquiry dialogue to an information-seeking dialogue. This dialogue is basically information-seeking, since the goal is to obtain information that can be useful to support the lawyer's claim. Lawyers turn to science to support their cases with factual statements. But when scientific discourse is produced, the goal is to make general assertions about the world. So, even when lawyers are acting in the most honest manner, there is what I would call an "epistemological shift" between what the scientist can say about the world and the manner in which a lawyer may use the information.

Hence there are major differences between a scientific inquiry and an expert consultation. I would like to illustrate these differences by means of a joke: A rich businessman who needs to fly frequently for business purposes is afraid to get on planes because of the risk a that terrorists bomb being placed on board. So he goes to see an expert in probability and asks him to calculate what the risk is of getting on a plane on which a bomb has been planted. The mathematician at first refuses, saying that it would be a very long and complicated calculation, but as the

[9] For a critique of their political uses, see Levy-Leblond, (1984: 263-27)1.
[10] For a general framework, see Walton (1997: 167 ff).

businessman insists and offers a large sum of money, he accepts. Two weeks later he gives the businessman a 30 page report that ends with a complex equation, which he tries to explain to the businessman. "I cannot do anything with your report," says the disappointed businessman. "What I need is concrete advice in order to avoid bombs when I travel." "I cannot help you avoid bombs," replies the mathematician, "but I can give you a piece of advice that would reduce to nearly zero the probability of getting on a plane with a bomb. But this will cost you much more." "It doesn't matter," says the businessman, "my life has no price." So, after two weeks the mathematician gives him the advice: "I found the solution: each time you travel, take a bomb on board, because the risk of there being two bombs on board is almost nil."

What is interesting in this joke is the shift from science to advice. The scientific inquiry is about general knowledge and deals with large numbers. The misunderstanding is that the businessman cannot do anything concrete with general statistics about the risks of plane travel. What he seeks is concrete advice, not general knowledge. The wit in this joke is that the concrete advice might be statistically perfect, but it is not at all practical since it gives the businessman no advantage. This illustrates the main differences between the purpose of science and that of expertise advice: the same occurs with the shift from abstract to concrete matters, and also from propositions of science to affirmation of so-called "scientific facts" that would have a probative value (cf. Fleck 1929, 1935 and 1936). The shift from science to expertise also raises the complex issue of deductive inferences, since expert consultation is usually concerned not with general laws but with the applicability of general laws to a concrete case, which sometimes is quite problematic.

Another shift occurs when a lawyer brings the expert to the trial. Here, the lawyer will question the expert witness in a sort of information-seeking dialogue, generally not to obtain information but to elicit the statements the lawyer requires to support certain assertions. This is very important because questions are usually biased; for example, the lawyer will ask questions that elicit a partial answer, an answer that provides information up to the point that benefits the lawyer's case. So the dialogue between lawyer and the scientific expert is not a real information-seeking dialogue. The tricky thing is that at trials the collective goal is different from the lawyer's individual goal, which is not merely to obtain information but to put forward *ad hoc* information.

Can we envisage a dialogue between the expert and the judge or jury? Judges and juries must take into account what witnesses state but in some systems they are not allowed to ask questions or look forward to get further information; nevertheless they can compare witnesses' statements with the answers given to the counterpart's questions during cross-examination.

After this analysis of the path of scientific discourse in a trial, my conclusion is that Science and Law enterprises have more in common than we usually believe. First of all, they are both interested in truth and are both authoritative;

both have an institutional role to play in society, accomplished, among other ways, by the prestige or recognized importance of their overwhelming goal. The difference is that the goal of science is the search for knowledge and the goal of judicial decisions is the search for the truth of a particular claim.

The idea of shift gives account of what happens while scientific discourse changes its context, an epistemological shift from the goals of one enterprise to the goals of another. It is worth noting that most of the fallacious uses of scientific discourse in the domain of law arise mainly from a lack of awareness of such an epistemological shift, as I have noted in my analysis of the shifts from science to expertise, and then the role of expertise at trials.

From this point of view, the illicit role scientific discourse can play at trials depends on a fallacious use due to a lack of qualification of the contribution that scientific knowledge can bring as evidence to support premises of fact for the decision. It is indeed a fallacious use of scientific discourse to introduce it as an *ad verecundiam* argument (Walton 1997:72ff.). However, it plays a persuasive or useful rhetorical role when the expert is able to explain the exact relevance and limits of expert knowledge for the question at hand, so that its weight for the decision can be qualified.

In sum, the support science can give is always of a very different degree than the support required to prove a particular state of affairs. In order to make a legitimate use of scientific research at trials it would be necessary to make many qualifications to the scientific information presented as evidence in a case.

Since appeals to scientific experts' opinions are inevitable in the courtroom, and judges and juries - laymen in a scientific field - are frequently called on to decide on the basis of so-called "scientific facts", some rules are necessary to avoid their misuse. The following list is tentative:

Judges would be expected to:

- strive to get more than one expert opinion;
- confront experts and make them dialogue;
- be able to understand and explain the line of arguments on which the expert opinion is based by, among other means, getting information about the subject matter and asking questions about how experts have arrived at their conclusions;
- not rely merely on an argument of quantity, i.e., considering as conclusive the fact that there are two or more coinciding opinions against a differing one;
- explain why they accept a given expert opinion and why they give a certain weight to it.

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La rhétorique dans les documents institutionnels

La construction textuelle de l'*ethos* et du *pathos*

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This paper, based on the research in Theory of Text from the perspective of Linguistics of Genres, intends to analyze how stylistic and textual organization aspects can be influenced by the coercions imposed by genre and contribute to the plurality of the *ethos* and *pathos* textual construction. Considering that the party billboards and the initial legal proceedings constitute persuasive textual genres with different levels of institutionalization, we will try to establish a *continuum* that correlates the enunciation heterogeneity of the genres and the degree of institutionalization in the genres studied. More institutionalized genres such as the initial legal proceedings present less enunciation heterogeneity than the party billboards.

1. Introduction

Cet article a pour but de montrer que le choix de quelques aspects *organisationnels* et *stylistiques* d'un texte de la part de l'agent producteur, est contraint par le genre dans lequel il se situe et contribue à la construction textuelle d'une pluralité d'*ethos* et de *pathos*. Mais encore nous allons prouver que l'hétérogénéité énonciative (directement liée à l'effet persuasif) a un rapport avec le degré d'institutionnalisation[1] des genres en étude. Les genres plus institutionnalisés comme la requête s'approchent d'un *pôle énonciatif moins hétérogène*, par contre l'affiche politique s'approche d'un *pôle énonciatif plus hétérogène*

Cette étude sera réalisée dans des exemplaires de deux genres de texte: une requête et une affiche politique[2] qui sont sorties en 2002, à l'époque des élections pour le Premier Ministre portugais.

De manière à atteindre notre objectif, ce travail sera divisé en trois parties: D'abord, pour éclaircir quelques questions théoriques, nous définirons les notions de 'texte' et de 'genre de texte' utilisées dans cette étude qui suit l'approche d'une 'linguistique des genres'[3].

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[1] L'institutionnalité des genres est travaillée chez Maingueneau (2004:111).

[2] Les textes 1 et 2 qui correspondent à l'affiche politique et à l'extrait de la requête conjointe sont à la fin de cet article. Ces textes sont des *exemplaires représentatifs* des genres auxquels ils appartiennent et pour ce motif ils ont été choisis pour les analyses.

Ensuite, nous intégrerons quelques approches théoriques qui ont étudié les composantes du genre – Adam (2001); Maingueneau (1996 et 2004); Bronckart (1997) – et plus exactement les composantes des *genres persuasifs*[4] – Pinto (2006) – et nous proposerons un tableau d'analyse pour cette problématique. Ainsi, le *genre de texte persuasif* pourra être étudié dans deux plans[5]: *externe* (niveau contextuel) et *interne* (niveau linguistico-textuel). Dans le premier, nous trouverons les composantes *architextuelle*, *péritextuelle*, *situationnelle* et *métatextuelle*. Dans le deuxième, les aspects *organisationnels* (*compositionnels et sémantiques*), *stylistiques* et *énonciatifs*.

En plus, nous montrerons les concepts d'*ethos* et de *pathos* utilisés dans cet article, à partir des études de Grize (1990) dans la Logique Naturelle et de Adam (1999, 2001), dans la Linguistique Textuelle.

Pour conclure, parmi les questions *énonciatives*, qui nous intéressent plus vivement dans ce travail, nous définirons quelques images des interlocuteurs construites textuellement (*ethos* et *pathos*), à partir du relevé de quelques catégories textuelles (verbales ou non-verbales) – *composante stylistique* – et de quelques aspects organisationnels – *composante organisationnelle*. En outre, nous observerons le rapport entre ces constructions et les genres persuasifs étudiés.

Pour la caractérisation des *ethè* et des *pathè* présents dans l'univers textuel, nous utiliserons surtout les contributions théoriques de l'actuelle version de l'Argumentation dans la Langue (Carel 2001).

2. Quelques aspects théoriques

2.1 Genres de texte et Texte

Nous connaissons déjà plusieurs approches théoriques qui étudient depuis des années la problématique des genres[6]. Ce qui est important, dans ce travail, c'est de souligner que les genres sont des pratiques se situant au niveau du socio-discursif et que ceux-ci ont un certain degré de *stabilité* et de *flexibilité*. Certainement, ce ne sont pas des modèles statiques, mais ce sont des dispositifs dynamiques, historiquement définis. Et, en plus, ils ne peuvent être étudiés qu'à partir des *textes* qui les matérialisent. Comme l'affirme Rastier (2001:299):

> Tout texte relève d'un genre et tout genre, d'un discours. Les genres n'appartiennent pas au système de la langue au sens strict, mais à d'autres normes sociales.

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[3] Cette expression a été adoptée par Bouquet (2004), dans l'article de l'introduction de la revue *Langages* 153, nommé "Linguistique générale et linguistique des genres".

[4] Le genre persuasif peut être défini comme un genre qui a pour but d'obtenir l'adhésion d'un interlocuteur à une idée.

[5] Cette division correspond, pour nous, à un procédé méthodologique puisque les deux dimensions sont toujours reliées d'une forme bien dynamique.

[6] Parmi les divers auteurs, nous pouvons citer Maingueneau (1996, 2004), Coutinho (2005). Il est important de souligner que la revue *Langages* 153 présente plusieurs articles sur ce thème.

Et aussi, comme le disait déjà Bakhtine (1984), ce serait impossible, pour un individu, de créer un texte complètement nouveau une fois qu'il dispose, déjà dans sa mémoire, d'un répertoire de modèles de textes qui peuvent être accédés selon la situation vécue. En réalité, il ne faut pas oublier que lorsqu'un texte est produit l'agent producteur sélectionne[7], dans une *action langagière*[8] déterminée, un certain modèle de texte en fonction de l'*activité de langage* où il se situe, du statut social des interlocuteurs, de la finalité de l'interlocution, de sa connaissance préalable sur les genres élaborés par les générations antérieures. Ainsi, lors d'une certaine production, un des modèles de texte pré-établi dans la mémoire à long-terme de l'agent, existant dans l'*arquitexte*[9], est *adopté* et *adapté*, selon les conditions de production.

En considérant que le genre est une catégorie abstraite, il ne pourra être analysé qu'à partir des textes qui le matérialisent. Ainsi, nous insistons sur le fait que notre objet d'analyse sera le *texte empirique* tel qu'il circule en société. Ce texte présente sûrement des aspects linguistico-textuels (verbaux et non-verbaux), mais il sera subi à des contraintes situationnelles imposées par le genre dans lequel il se situe. Comme affirme Bronckart (2004:103):

> Les textes constituent les correspondants empiriques des activités langagières, réalisés avec les ressources d'une langue naturelle. Ce sont des unités communicatives globales, dont les caractéristiques compositionnelles [et énonciatives][10] dépendent des propriétés des situations d'interaction et de celles des activités générales qu'elles commentent, ainsi que des conditions historico-sociales de leur propre élaboration**.**

Par conséquent, nous considérerons, à la suite des travaux de Maingueneau (1996), Bronckart (1997, 2004) et Adam (2001) que, pour l'analyse d'un texte qui appartient forcément à un genre, nous devrons intégrer deux dimensions complémentaires: une dimension *situationnelle* et une autre *linguistico-textuelle*. De cette manière, la catégorie *texte*, dans la *linguistique des genres de texte*, assume un sens bien plus complexe que celui connu dans les études plus traditionnelles[11].

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[7] Nous soulignons ici le processus de production, mais le même se passe dans le processus d'interprétation avec quelques modifications. Évidemment, ce serait très difficile pour l'interprétant de saisir sans distorsion les intentions du producteur du texte.

[8] Bronckart (1997) fait la distinction entre l'*action langagière* et l'*activité de langage*. La première intègre les paramètres du contexte de production et du contenu thématique mobilisés par un seul individu, par contre la deuxième correspond aux discours qui circulent dans les formations sociales. Ici, nous utiliserons indifféremment les termes *discours* ou *activité de langage*.

[9] Bronckart (1997) utilisait le terme *intertexte* pour nommer cette mémoire textuelle. Dans des publications plus récentes, il considère comme *intertexte* les différents moyens utilisés afin de faire appel à d'autres textes (p.ex: citations, pastiches et d'autres) et désigne l'*arquitexte* cette mémoire textuelle. (Cf. Bronckart 2004:105)

[10] Insertion de notre responsabilité.

[11] L'étude des textes a eu, tout au long de son histoire, plusieurs évolutions. Au début, c'était le temps des Grammaires Textuelles où le texte était considéré comme une entité stable et abstraite. Actuellement, la Linguistique Textuelle se propose d'étudier la constitution, le fonctionnement, la production et la compréhension du texte, dans un contexte.

2.2 Composantes du genre

Il y a plusieurs auteurs[12] qui ont étudié les composantes du genre. De manière à élaborer notre tableau d'analyse, nous nous sommes servis des classifications proposées par Maingueneau (1996), Adam (2001) et Bronckart (2004) pour la *dimension contextuelle* et de Adam (2001) pour la *dimension linguistico-textuelle*.

Ce choix est dû à un parcours réalisé par maintes contributions théoriques, d'un côté des auteurs qui ayant comme fil conducteur l'Analyse du Discours, s´appuient surtout sur le contexte, comme Maingueneau ; d'un autre côté d'autres théoriciens qui essaient d'intégrer le niveau contextuel et textuel, comme Bronckart et Adam. Le premier attaché à l`Interactionnisme Sociodiscursif[13] et le deuxième à la Linguistique Textuelle. Nous allons résumer, dans le schéma qui suit[14], notre tableau d'analyse des composantes des *genres de texte* à partir des approches mentionnées.

Cependant il est important de faire une remarque. Comme nous travaillons avec des textes attachés à des *genres* qui ont pour but d'obtenir une adhésion d'un interlocuteur à une idée – *genres persuasifs* –, nous considérons que la *composante compositionnelle* sera reliée à la *composante sémantique*. Et nous passerons dorénavant à avoir une seule composante: la *composante organisationnelle*[15]. En suivant comme fil conducteur *l'actuelle version de l'argumentation dans la langue* (Carel 1994, 2001) nous pensons que les unités lexicales/les énoncés/les paragraphes peuvent être sémantiquement "paraphrasables" (Carel 1994) par des enchaînements argumentatifs en *donc* (DC) et *pourtant* (PT).

[12] À partir des travaux fondateurs de Bakhtin et de Voloshinov d'autres auteurs comme Maingueneau, Adam et Bronckart se sont aussi préoccupés à décrire les composantes du genre.

[13] Dans cette approche, le comportement humain est analysé par des actions signifiantes ou par des actions sociales dont les produits structuraux et fonctionnels sont eux-mêmes un produit de la socialisation.

[14] Ce schéma est plutôt d'ordre méthodologique. Comme le texte est un objet complexe et dynamique, quelquefois il est bien difficile de séparer ces composantes puisqu'il y a un lien très fort entre elles.

[15] Composante déjà mentionnée dans l'introduction.

Table 1: *Texte appartenant à un genre persuasif* [16]

Dimension contextuelle	
Composantes[17]	Définition
– Architextuelle	– Organisation des textes qui existent dans une espèce de mémoire textuelle.
– - Situationnelle – Lieu/Époque de production et de circulation – Instances interlocutives/statut des interlocuteurs – Finalité – Support Matériel	– Lieu de production et de circulation. Époque où les textes sont produits ou période où ils circulent. – Les personnes responsables de la production/interprétation/ Rôle social et institutionnel des interlocuteurs. – Objectif de l'acte communicationnel – Support utilisé, mise-en-page, choix typographique
- Peritextuelle	Frontières du texte
- Métatextuelle	Discours sur le genre caractéristique de la formation socio-discursive et aussi les théories développées sur le genre

Dimension linguistico-textuelle	
Composantes	Definition
– Composante organisationnelle	– plans de texte, séquences, rapport entre la partie verbale et non-verbale du texte dans les textes plurisémiotiques. Choix sémantique et thématique
– Composante stylistique	– texture micro-linguistique
– Composante énonciative	– degré de responsabilité des énoncés, identité et implications des énonciateurs (*ethos* et *pathos*).

[16] Adapté à partir de Adam (2001), Bronckart (2004), Maingueneau (2002) et Pinto (2006)

[17] Bien que nous ayons présenté toutes les composantes, pour les analyses, nous travaillerons seulement quelques éléments importants pour l'étude des *ethè* et des *pathè* construits dans nos textes. Un travail plus complet d'analyse peut être trouvé dans ma thèse de Doctorat, *L'Argumentation dans les genres persuasifs: une étude contrastive*, soutenue en Octobre/2006.

2.3 Méthodologie d'analyse

Comme le texte est notre objet d'analyse et, comme nous l'avons déjà cité, le texte appartient forcément à un genre, nous utiliserons les composantes du genre pour l'étude des textes choisis. De cette manière, pour atteindre notre but, nous procéderons à une méthode descendante d'analyse comme l'avait proposé Bronckart (1997), à partir de l'étude fondatrice de Voloshinov (1977). D'abord, nous commencerons par décrire le *niveau contextuel*, lié à l'*activité discursive* où se situe le texte, ensuite, nous passerons à l'analyse de sa dimension *linguistico-textuelle*.

En somme, nous pouvons affirmer que la *dimension interne* d'un texte ne peut être décrite que si l'on considère les *aspects contextuels* qui y sont intrinsèquement liés.

Face à la dynamicité de l'objet *texte* avec lequel nous travaillons, cette dernière dimension réfléchit des aspects contextuels, mais aussi présente des composantes qui sont 'inter-liées'. Cela veut dire que pour identifier les *ethé* et les *pathè* construits textuellement, nous aurons besoin de travailler aussi avec des composantes compositionnelles, stylistiques qui vont influencer cette construction.

2.4 Les images des interlocuteurs: l'*ethos* et le *pathos*

Evidemment, Aristote a été l'un des premiers à avoir souligné l'importance de l'*image*[18] de l'orateur construite discursivement (l'*ethos*) et aussi des *émotions* provoquées chez l'auditeur par le discours (le *pathos*) dans la systématisation des études de la rhétorique, définie comme "la faculté de considérer, pour chaque question, ce qui peut être propre à persuader" (Aristote, *Rhétorique* I, 2, 1356a).

Cependant, ce n'est pas l'intérêt de ce travail de faire un parcours historique des divers auteurs qui ont exploité ces notions[19]. Notre but sera de définir comment cette problématique sera développée dans ce travail.

En suivant la perspective de la logique naturelle (Grize 1990), nous préconisons que toute activité discursive renvoie à une *schématisation* ou à une représentation partielle et/ou sélective d'une certaine réalité. Et lorqu'un *schématiseur* construit une *schématisation* d'un fait déterminé, il la conçoit toujours en fonction du *co-schématiseur* à qui il s'adresse. De la même manière, nous pensons – à la suite des réflexions théoriques d'Adam (1999) – que ce *schématiseur*, lors d'une *schématisation*, se construit textuellement une image de

[18] Dans ce travail, le terme 'image' est employé d'une manière hétérogène: D'abord, il peut signifier une 'représentation mentale', comme dans le cas de la définition d'*ethos* par Aristote ou d'*ethos* ou de *pathos* par Adam. Ou encore, il peut signifier l'ensemble des signes iconiques ou plastiques utilisés dans les affiches.

[19] Pour des études plus récentes sur l'*ethos*, voir Amossy (1999), Charaudeau (2005) et sur le *pathos*, voir Plantin (2004).

soi (*ethos*) et de l'autre (*pathos*[20]), selon ses préconstruits, l'objet du discours et la finalité.

Le schéma, sur l'autre page reproduit à partir d'Adam (1999), essaie d'établir un lien entre les notions aristotéliciennes d'*ethos* et de *pathos* et celles proposées par la logique naturelle.



Figure 1: *Adam (1999:116)*

Et en plus, il est important de souligner que classer les types d'images construites textuellement est une affaire délicate, cependant nous suivrons les considérations de Charaudeau (2005:105):

> Toute construction d'*ethos* se fait dans un rapport triangulaire entre soi, l'autre et un tiers absent (porteur d'une image idéale de référence): le soi cherche à endosser cette image idéale, l'autre se laisse emporter par un mouvement d'adhésion à la personne qui s'adresse à lui par l'intermédiaire de cette image de référence.

3. L'analyse des composantes externes et internes des textes

Comme exemple, nous passerons à quelques *ethè* et *pathè* identifiés dans les exemplaires des deux genres persuasifs[21] choisis: l'*affiche politique* et la *requête conjointe*[22]. De manière à atteindre notre but, nous étudierons d'abord les

[20] A partir de là, on constate que Grize reprend l'idée aristotélicienne de l'importance de la construction d'un discours persuasif à partir de l'auditeur à qui on s'adresse. Par contre, la question des émotions n'y est pas analysée.

[21] L'affiche politique correspond à l'annexe 1. Par contre, comme la requête est longue nous avons mis en annexe seulement quelques extraits importants pour l'analyse.

[22] La requête est un acte motivé écrit par un avocat à un magistrat pour lui faire une demande judiciaire.

composantes externes (surtout *situationnelle* et *métatextuelle)* des textes et nous vérifierons comment ces aspects contextuels influencent la construction linguistico-textuelle. Ensuite, nous constaterons que les composantes internes *organisationnelles* et *stylistiques* vont aussi intervenir pour reconnaître les 'images' des interlocuteurs construites textuellement.

3.1 Composantes externes

Nous présenterons, dans la grille qui suit, les composantes externes et internes sous forme de schéma et ensuite nous détacherons seulement celles qui seront plus importantes pour le classement des images des interlocuteurs.

Table 2: *Grille d´analyse des genres persuasifs*

Dimension contextuelle et linguistico-textuelle		
Composantes	Texte 1	Texte 2
Architextuelle	Autres types d'affiches pour la vente des produits	Requêtes antérieures
Situationnelle		
Lieu/Époque de production et de circulation	– L'agence de marketing politique/ronds-points	– Bureau de l'avocat/ Tribunal
	– 6 mois avant les élections	– début 2002
	– époque de circulation éphémère.	– début 2002
Instances interlocutives/ statut des interlocuteurs	– complexité des judiciaires instances de production/parti politique	– personne qui fait une judiciaire/avocat
	– peuple en général/électeurs du parti	– quelqu'un qui peut agir juridiquement/juge ou même la Justice (surdestinataire)
Finalité	– faire voter au parti social démocrate	– faire accepter une demande judiciaire
Support Matériel	– *outdoor*	– support papier ou électronique
Péritextuelle	---	– les autres documents qui font partie de la procédure

Voir suite à la page suivante

Métatextuelle	– Loi Electorale de l'Assemblée de la République (LEAR) – Code de la Publicité	– Code Civil
Organisationnelle	– enchaînements – argumentatifs variés	– enchaînements – argumentatifs répétitifs
Stylistique	– aspects graphiques/ cromatiques/iconiques/ marques linguistiques d'auto-implication/ d'interpellation	– organisateurs textuels avec des fonctions anaphoriques
Énonciative	– *ethos* dynamique/critique/ agressif/patriotique – *pathos* qui a de l'espoir/ *pathos* dynamique	– *ethos* répétitif /impartiel/ – *pathos* rationnel

A partir du tableau ci-dessus, nous pouvons détacher deux composantes qui ont un rôle fondamental pour le relevé des composantes *organisationnelle*, *stylistique* et pour la compréhension du degré d'hétérogénéité énonciative des textes: la composante *situationnelle* et *métatextuelle*.

3.2 Texte 1

Pour l'affiche nous remarquons qu'elle est normalement exposée dans les ronds-points et les voies de grande circulation (*lieu de circulation*)[23]. Conséquemment, les personnes qui y passent n'ont pas beaucoup de temps pour lire ce qui est écrit et doivent être capables de comprendre rapidement le message. De cette façon, le message verbal est réduit: les énoncés qui apparaissent sont courts et le message non-verbal, le message iconique et le graphisme joueront un rôle très important. Pour cette raison, l'utilisation d'une photographie – normalement du candidat du parti politique–, d'une typographie bien variée et visible à de longues distances sera une constante dans ce genre.

Dans cette affiche, nous remarquons qu'un des énoncés avec la fonction d´argument *(Mãe, porque é que a avó precisa de cunhas para ser operada?)* est bien présent dans l´affiche et a une forme typographique différente: les lettres sont raides et se situent dans la partie 'rouge' de l'affiche. Ainsi, cet énoncé confirme

[23] Même le LEAR (Loi électorale de l'Assemblée de la République) établit des critères bien rigides pour l'affichage de ces *outdoors* et de Code de la Publicité au Portugal détermine que les espaces de distribution des affiches doivent être également partagés entre les partis politiques.

la tristesse de cet enfant devant la situation du pays puisqu'il faut avoir des pistons pour être opéré dans un hôpital.

Dans le reste de l'affiche (partie 'verte') nous trouvons une écriture en italique qui adoucit le graphisme et laisse à penser que la solution pour le problème est avec le PSD (parti social démocrate) puisqu'il peut changer cette situation (*Temos de mudar*). Et le parti engage tous à l'action en ovationnant le patriotisme du peuple (*Somos todos Portugal*).

Il va sans dire que ce graphisme construit une subjectivité particulière dans cette affiche et contribue à dessiner un *ethos critique* (partie 'rouge'); *ethos patriotique et dynamique* (partie 'verte'). De même un *pathos* qui a de l'espoir (traduit par la photo d'un enfant qui représente l'avenir du pays) et un pathos *dynamique* (capable de changer la situation) y sont travaillés.

Mais, le sens de cette affiche se construit, évidemment, par des messages de codes sémiologiques différents. Le message linguistique de cette affiche, présent dans la composante *organisationnelle* et *stylistique*, est l'un des lieux privilégiés où les rapports interactifs entre l'énonciateur et le destinataire sont nécessairement marqués. Par exemple, dans le texte choisi, nous avons des marques explicites d'interpellation: comme le signe de ponctuation '?' qui accentue l'*ethos* critique cité ci-dessus. Et même l'utilisation de quelques marques linguistiques qui traduisent l'auto-implication et l'interpellation – 'nous' dans les assertions *Temos de mudar* et *Somos todos Portugal* semblent accentuer l'*ethos* patriotique et le *pathos* dynamique déjà montrés. Tous sont impliqués dans le processus de transformation: le parti politique et le peuple.

3.3 Texte 2

Quand on analyse une *demande juridique*, on doit se rendre compte qu'elle est subie à des contraintes bien rigides établies par le Code de Procédure Civil (*composante métatextuelle*) qui détermine des règles bien rigides pour sa réalisation. Par exemple, si ce qui est demandé n'est pas compatible avec les causes exposées, la demande n'est pas acceptée par le juge.

Ces restrictions *métatextuelles* reliées à l'existence d'un surdestinataire *La Justice* contraint, évidemment, la construction linguistico-textuelle. Par exemple, l'extrait de la requête présente les articles de 5 à 8. Si l'on traduit tous ces paragraphes par des enchaînements argumentatifs, comme préconise la Théorie des Blocs Sémantiques[24], on peut penser qu'ils peuvent être "paraphrasables" par deux aspects qui correspondent aux points de vue de deux énonciateurs différents.

[24] Selon Carel (1994:75): "argumenter consiste à convoquer des blocs sémantiques et c'est en ce sens que les enchaînements en *donc* sont des énoncés argumentatifs [...] les enchaînements en pourtant sont eux aussi argumentatifs". Et encore pour l'auteure dans chaque bloc sémantique il y a deux types de discours: les discours normatifs ou transgressifs. Les premiers sont traduits par des aspects en *donc* – DC et les transgressifs, par *pourtant*, représenté par PT.

Le premier point de vue (*énonciateur* 1) correspondrait à l'enchaînement argumentatif [Le coupable n'habite pas dans l'endroit DC il n'a pas de vie sociale] ou à l'aspect normatif *NEG résidence DC NEG vie sociale*.

Le deuxième point de vue (*énonciateur* 2) serait l'enchaînement [Le coupable n'habite pas dans l'endroit PT il n'a pas de vie sociale] ou à l'aspect transgressif: le Locuteur refuse *résidence PT NEG vie sociale*.

Dans cette analyse, on constate que le deuxième point de vue est refusé par le Locuteur. Ce dernier adhère au premier point de vue.

Ce qui est important dans cette étude de la composante organisationnelle de l'exemplaire de ce genre, c'est de montrer la répétition existante des enchaînements argumentatifs dans le document. Cela est dû exactement aux contraintes *métatextuelles* et *situationnelles* de ce genre. Les documents juridiques doivent être rédigés de manière claire, sans ambiguïté. Le juge (ou d'autres gens qui travaillent dans cette pratique sociale) ne peut pas avoir de doutes lors de la lecture d'un document juridique.

A partir de ce qui a été expliqué, nous pouvons penser que textuellement l'avocat responsable pour l'écriture de la requête crée un *ethos* rationnel et répétitif. Il ne faut pas, comme nous l'avons déjà souligné, laisser des ambiguïtés dans le texte. Et, en plus, un *pathos* rationnel et impartiel est créé. C'est exactement parce que le juriste a une représentation bien claire de la rationalité et de l'impartialité du surdestinataire de ce document qu'il est capable de le rédiger d'une manière si formelle.

A nouveau, si nous continuons à regarder le document nous constatons une grande quantité d'organisateurs textuels (*composante stylistique*) qui ont un comportement anaphorique: *o acima exposto*; *os factos supra referidos*; *isso*; *estes termos*. Ce qui est intéressant c'est que ces expressions reprennent le contenu sémantique présent dans les articles intérieurs. Par conséquent, la construction d'un *ethos* rationnel et répétitif est renforcée.

4. Conclusion

Le but de ce travail, qui suit l'approche de la Théorie du Texte à partir d'une perspective d'une Linguistique des genres, est d'étudier comment les aspects contextuels et linguistico-textuels – deux plans qui constituent forcément un genre – interagissent et influencent la construction textuelle de l'*ethos* et du *pathos*, contribuant pour l'effet persuasif en quelques genres.

De manière à reconstruire l'*ethos* et le *pathos* textuels, nous avons choisi quelques aspects d'ordre contextuel et d'autres indices linguistico-textuels qui peuvent les matérialiser. A partir de là nous sommes arrivés à un *continuum* qui établit un rapport entre l'*hétérogénéité énonciative* et le *degré d'institutionnalisation* des genres étudiés. La *demande judiciaire* (un genre plus institutionnalisé) s'approche plutôt d'un pôle d'hétérogénéité énonciative plus figé. Par contre, l'*affiche politique* (un genre moins institutionnalisé) s'approche d'un

pôle d'hétérogénéité plus varié. Evidemment, les exemples qui ont été présentés ne sont pas assez suffisants pour que nous puissions faire ces affirmations. Dans la thèse, nous présentons presqu'une centaine d'exemples qui confirment l'existence de ce *continuum*.

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Annexe 1



Annexe 2

5o.
Com efeito, o R. deixou de aí pernoitar

6o.
E, nunca mais foi visto no andar qualquer roupa estendida no respectivo estendal.

7o.
Igualmente, nunca mais o R. foi visto a depositar o lixo no respectivo contentor do prédio em questão.

8o.
Deixou de receber no andar em causa quaisquer visitas

17º
Pelo acima exposto, conclui-se que o R. não reside com permanência e habitualidade no andar locado, pois, os factos decorrentes de uma vida social e doméstica centrada no arrendamento não se verificam

[...]

NESTES TERMOS E NOS MELHORES DE DIREITO
Deve a presente acção ser julgada procedente por provada e o R. condenado no pedido, nas custas e procuradoria condigna.

[...]

Rhétorique du pouvoir, rhétorique de l'évidence

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Cette présentation prend comme point de départ la remarque empirique selon laquelle le discours néolibéral, défini comme un ensemble d'énoncés considérant toutes les actions humaines à l'aune de critères uniquement économiques, se présente sous une forme de rhétorique évidente. Il s'agit plus généralement de montrer comment l'idéologie fonctionne à l'évidence, c'est-à-dire de comprendre les processus généraux qui lient évidence et idéologie et d'étudier les procédés discursifs qui permettent de présenter un discours idéologique sur le mode du cela-va-de-soi. Le corpus composé d'articles de commentaire (éditoriaux et chroniques) prélevés lors de deux crises sociales comparables, est analysé par les approches énonciatives, pragmatiques et communicationnelles de l'Analyse des discours. Ces analyses montrent le rôle de la doxa et de l'opinion en tant que voix collectives utilisées dans l'imposition des (nouvelles) croyances et connaissances partagées.

1. Introduction

Cette communication se situe clairement dans l'axe 'rhétorique de la rationalité et de la raison, rhétorique de la persuasion, rhétorique du pouvoir' de la conférence qui nous réunit. En effet, notre travail considère l'aspect discursif des relations triangulaires complexes qu'entretiennent trois instances: le pouvoir, les médias et l'opinion.

Notre hypothèse est qu'il existe un type de discours persuasif particulier, celui du pouvoir politique et économique, qui, à travers les médias, utilise la rhétorique de la rationalité et la force de l'opinion pour produire un effet d'évidence, nous proposons de l'appeler "discours d'évidence". Cette hypothèse peut paraître problématique: pourquoi, en démocratie, les discours institutionnels et idéologiques que sont les discours de pouvoir auraient-ils besoin de se présenter comme évidents? Et comment y parviendraient-ils?

Le discours étudié est le discours néolibéral, défini comme un discours légitimant l'institution de l'économie ; le discours néolibéral "tend à subordonner toute activité à ses dimensions économiques", selon l'expression de Julien Duval (2000). L'étude du champ institutionnel du discours néolibéral montre que ce discours a pour prémisse principale que l'Etat joue un rôle néfaste sur l'économie et qu'il faut le réduire à ses dimensions régaliennes; le discours néolibéral vise, depuis les années 70, depuis l'école de Chicago (Dezalay & Garth 1998 et

Bourdieu & Wacquant 1998), à s'universaliser en utilisant la force de diffusion des médias.

L'analyse proposée ici porte sur des articles de commentaire: 184 éditoriaux et chroniques de la presse écrite française prélevés dans dix titres représentatifs sur deux périodes comparables choisies pour le rapport rejet/adhésion qu'elles impliquent vis-à-vis des "réformes sociales" proposées: novembre-décembre 1995 et mai-juin 2003.

Un mot sur les médias en tant que structure sociale influant sur le genre article de commentaire et sur la situation de communication: on assiste aujourd'hui à une concentration journalistique sans précédent d'où, selon Duval (2000), l'apparition de deux pôles dans la presse écrite française: un pôle dominant symboliquement mais dominé économiquement et sujet à une certaine homogénéité éditoriale, et un pôle alternatif dominé symboliquement mais plus indépendant. Les éditorialistes et chroniqueurs doivent composer aujourd'hui avec leur habitus, les contraintes économiques externes et internes de l'espace journalistique et le cadre normatif du genre article de commentaire, tout en revendiquant dans un même temps un style propre et le respect des règles déontologiques de leur métier. Le choix du genre 'articles de commentaire' est donc doublement justifié: l'éditorialiste/chroniqueur occupe une place en surplomb vis-à-vis de l'ensemble du journal et peut être considéré comme un locuteur autorisé: ses commentaires ont une influence sur l'ensemble des médias (Champagne 1990 et 2000, Duval et al. 1998, Duval 2000). D'un point de vue méthodologique, l'article de commentaire représente l'invariant de l'étude tout en permettant des comparaisons entre les deux périodes.

Avant de présenter les principaux procédés discursifs relevés, il est nécessaire de revenir sur les notions d'idéologie et d'évidence afin de déterminer une caractéristique fonctionnelle intrinsèque aux discours idéologiques: un principe de double dissimulation.

2. Définitions de concepts, définition de l'objet, la question du pourquoi

La notion d'idéologie de Destutt de Tracy, on le sait, était une théorie des idées à mettre en relation avec un système de signes. Depuis Marx, elle a pris une signification connotée et péjorative que l'on peut définir très brièvement comme une sorte d'illusion, un système de représentation imposé par un pouvoir socio-économique. Sans récuser totalement les analyses marxistes, notamment celle d'Althusser (1976), il s'agit ici de s'écarter de la philosophie politique pour considérer cette notion d'idéologie de façon fonctionnelle, c'est-à-dire du point de vue de sa matérialité linguistique.

Une lecture attentive et comparative d'auteurs rarement rapprochés, mais qui tous ont réfléchi à cette notion d'idéologie, permet de proposer une synthèse. Sans entrer ici dans le détail et à grands traits, on peut estimer que, pour Mikhaïl Bakhtine (1981), Pierre Bourdieu (1982) et Olivier Reboul (1980), la langue

s'inscrit dans le monde signifié, qu'elle est sociale par nature donc remplie d'idéologie, qu'elle est à la fois le *siège* de l'idéologie et l'*enjeu* de luttes sociales pour l'attribution du sens. La langue par son dialogisme intrinsèque est imprégnée du discours d'autrui, selon la formule de Bakhtine, et produit ce que l'on pourrait appeler un consensus social. Nous baignons donc dans "un dialogisme généralisé", pour reprendre le mot de George-Elia Sarfati (1997). Ainsi la langue, objet social, est idéologique. Et parce qu'elle est le siège de l'idéologie, parce qu'elle transmet des normes et des valeurs sociales, elle exerce une "violence symbolique", selon l'expression de Bourdieu (1982). D'où le paradoxe apparent qui est au point de départ de ce questionnement: comment un discours idéologique, produit de luttes sociales intenses pour l'imposition d'une vision à l'ensemble de la collectivité, peut-il se présenter comme évident?

L'un des mérites de Louis Althusser (1976) est d'insister sur le rôle prééminent de l'évidence dans l'imposition de l'idéologie, notamment par le processus de la double interpellation du sujet: l'idéologie *fonctionne à l'évidence*. Mais c'est Reboul (1980) qui, le premier, prend en compte le rôle de l'évidence de l'idéologie dans sa dimension linguistique. Selon lui, les idéologies dissimulent dans et par leur discours, leur motivation réelle. La recherche du pouvoir est le *sacré* des idéologies, celui-ci doit être protégé en tant que tel: toucher au sacré est interdit, sacrilège. Il définit donc l'idéologie de la façon suivante: "L'idéologie est la dissimulation du sacré" et montre le fonctionnement de cette dissimulation: le pouvoir "dénie [le sacré] par un discours rationnel dont le rôle est de le légitimer autrement". En d'autres termes, la rhétorique du pouvoir utilise la rhétorique de la rationalité. Cette rationalité n'est qu'apparente, mais c'est cette apparence de rationalité qui lui donne sa force persuasive: "le discours du pouvoir […] a pour lui la force de l'évidence".

Voyons maintenant les relations qu'entretiennent rationalité et évidence. La notion d'évidence a été peu étudiée par les Sciences du langage, elle est pourtant une notion intéressante car polysémique et paradoxale. Polysémique car, si l'évidence signifie communément "ce qui ne mérite pas d'être questionné", au contraire, d'un point de vue philosophique, l'évidence est le résultat d'un questionnement. La première acception correspond à ce que François Jacques appelle l'"utilisation fallacieuse du sens commun". C'est bien sûr cette utilisation fallacieuse du sens commun, c'est-à-dire de l'opinion et de la *doxa*, par les discours d'évidence qui nous intéresse ici. L'évidence-*doxa*, en tant que discours, se pare des mêmes traits de la certitude que l'évidence-epistêmê. C'est le paradoxe de la notion d'évidence: l'évidence doit être vue en tant qu'évidence *sans* faire remarquer son caractère d'évidence: elle recherche l'effet d'évidence, c'est-à-dire l'aspect attendu, socialement partagé.

Ainsi les articles de commentaire, comme le montreront nos exemples, valident leur propre position sémiotique vis-à-vis de l'événement, notamment par la désubjectivisation de l'énonciation et l'utilisation de la voix collective. Ce sont des "discours-limites de transmission des connaissances" (Beacco & Moirand

1995) qui possèdent une véritable “visée argumentative” (Amossy 2000). L’effet d’évidence, comme moyen de persuasion par l’utilisation des connaissances et croyances partagées, est l’un des objectifs recherchés, consciemment ou non, par ces énonciateurs. Les discours idéologiques trouvent donc ici un medium (au sens de McLuhan 1968) particulièrement adéquat.

3. Procédés et exemples, la question du comment

L’évidence des discours doit donc être perçue sans être remarquée. La question de l’évidence reste entière: comment, en effet, un discours institutionnel parvient-il à prendre cet aspect attendu et partagé? L’objet de notre recherche exige une approche multiple à l’intérieur même de l’analyse des discours: une conception du langage qui associe une pragmatique élargie, une approche communicationnelle et une approche rhétorique et argumentative.

Le principal procédé discursif dont découlent tous les autres et que nous préférons, pour cette raison, nommer principe, est le “principe de la double dissimulation”. Nous avons vu avec Reboul que l’idéologie est la dissimulation d’un sacré, le pouvoir, sous un discours d’apparence rationnel. Nous prolongeons cette hypothèse: les idéologies comporteraient non pas un mais deux sacrés: l’un réel et constitutif, l’autre idéologique et montré. Le ‘sacré constitutif’ est le pouvoir, le ‘sacré montré’ est une valeur partagée à laquelle l’idéologie dit se soumettre: la Démocratie, la Raison, la Réalité, la Science, Dieu, l’Economie, la Liberté, etc. Prenons un premier exemple:

(1) Alors, risquons une explication: il n'y a pas de pensée unique, il n'y a qu'une réalité commune. (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 02/11/95 Chronique)

La forme générique *présente* de façon ostentatoire (*obs-tendere*: tendre en avant) un sacré montré, la réalité, comme seule explication du monde et comme unique preuve véridictoire. Il s’agit d’un retournement: la réalité fait figure de motif de crédibilité à cette pensée. Le chroniqueur présente son opinion de façon métalinguistique comme une explication générale. La généralisation est claire: le double *il* impersonnel marque une ‘désubjectivisation’, le présent est générique. Une forme de rationalité est également clairement revendiquée: elle exprime l’implication logique “si non P alors Q”; sa forme syntaxique et rhétorique est la dénégation: *il n’y a pas de X, il n’y a que Y*. Il y a donc l’ostentation à la fois d’un sacré montré et d’une certaine forme rationalité.

Cet exemple nous permet d’introduire la définition du principe discursif de la double dissimulation:

– dissimulation des motivations réelles de l’idéologie, le sacré constitutif, par l’ostentation d’une valeur suprême et partagée, le sacré montré,

– dissimulation du *caractère idéologique* de ce sacré montré sous l'apparence rationnelle du discours.

Ainsi le discours idéologique est doublement légitimé: d'une part, la constitution d'un *ethos* et/ou l'utilisation du *pathos* s'approprie la valeur suprême, et d'autre part, le *logos*, la rationalité du discours, s'institue comme critère véridictoire d'évidence.

La réalité, présentée comme 'commune', dans cet exemple, donc revendiquée comme partagée, est légitimée par l'apparence rationnelle de l'énoncé qui sous-entend une modalité aléthique, celle de l'impossibilité d'une autre réalité. Il n'y a plus alors qu'à se rendre à l'évidence. Ce principe général de la double dissimulation est une caractéristique générale des discours idéologiques qui se combine avec des procédés discursifs dont nous allons voir quelques exemples maintenant.

L'implicite regroupe des procédés énonciatifs et pragmatiques, tels que la nomination et la présupposition, les sous-entendus et les tropes pragmatiques, et est un moyen de dire sans dire, c'est-à-dire de dissimuler l'aspect idéologique du discours.

L'énoncé tautologique est un sous-entendu pragmatique: sa signification s'actualise en contexte. Il a pour fonction d'activer les connaissances partagées ou les stéréotypes; Robrieux (1993) ajoute qu'il s'agit "d'asséner aux lecteurs des vérités premières dont le caractère d'évidence a pour fonction d'endormir tout esprit critique".

(2) L'égalité fait partie de la devise de la République.
(*Le Figaro*, 30/11/95 Editorial)

Cet énoncé tautologique permet de rappeler la valeur sacrée de l'égalité: chacun sait, en France, que l'égalité est l'une des devises de la République, *c'est une évidence*. La valeur pragmatique de cet énoncé est exprimée deux phrases plus loin: "Au fond de lui-même, comment un fonctionnaire peut-il justifier d'être en retraite plus tôt que son voisin, salarié dans le privé? "

Autrement dit, le fonctionnaire ne respecte pas les valeurs de la République. À la suite de l'ostentation de ce sacré montré, la question rhétorique donne la forme rationnelle de l'argument. L'utilisation de la doxa active les connaissances partagées en tant que conduite aux actions, en tant que normes prescriptives et excommunie les opposants hors des valeurs républicaines sacrées.

La naturalisation, procédé communicationnel, s'analyse en convoquant d'une part la généricité du langage et, d'autre part, la notion de 'cadre naturel' chez E. Goffman (1974) que l'on peut présenter rapidement comme un cadre de perception qui définit telle situation particulière de façon non pilotée, c'est-à-dire sans cause ni intention humaine. L'effet de naturalisation confère à l'énonciation la forme persuasive de la fatalité et de l'inévitabilité. L'exemple 3 est une présentation naturelle de dogmes idéologiques:

(3) Surtout, le phénomène de la mondialisation a magnifié l'hyper-puissance américaine et libéré l'essor de la Chine. Il n'a pas déclassé l'Europe, dont le poids économique reste globalement considérable, mais il a ôté à chacune de ses nations toute espérance de peser à elle seule sur le monde. (*Le Point*, 02/05/03 Editorial)

Phénomène est l'actant des deux phrases, il réfère à un processus naturel, à un cadre naturel présenté comme non piloté. Cet actant naturel est connoté positivement puisqu'il *magnifie* et *libère*. La fin de l'extrait contient la valeur modale du devoir et de la nécessité: *on doit accepter le phénomène de la mondialisation parce qu'on n'a pas le choix*. La présentation désubjectivisée et naturelle de la généralisation produit la forme constative et factuelle de l'énoncé: elle définit la réalité comme preuve à la fois véridictoire et sacrée, renforce les connaissances et croyances partagées et permet de masquer le positionnement idéologique de l'éditorialiste.

Les discours institutionnels, en effet, s'appuient sur la *doxa*, définie comme l'ensemble des connaissances et croyances partagées, ensemble non figé, c'est-à-dire susceptible d'évolution. Cependant, une autre institution entre ici dans ce jeu de miroirs qu'est l'effet d'évidence: l'opinion publique. Nous considérons que l'opinion publique est distincte de la *doxa* mais en perpétuelle relation avec elle, et que son existence est uniquement *discursive*. Elle est une croyance partagée.

Les discours d'évidence misent alors sur un double principe dialectique: utiliser l'opinion publique qu'ils contribuent à constituer de façon discursive tout en *constituant* réellement la *doxa*. Ce double principe d'"utilisation/constitution de la *doxa*" produit l'effet d'évidence partagée et vise en dernière analyse l'imposition du consensus:

(4) En s'y opposant, les Français ont découvert l'ampleur des réformes à réaliser d'urgence. (*Paris-Normandie*, 19/12/95 Editorial)

L'énonciateur se fait porte-parole de l'opinion publique et tente ici d'augmenter la *doxa* d'une topique néolibérale. On voit bien ici la volonté d'utiliser l'opinion publique pour constituer la *doxa*; cette énonciation a une visée performative: créer une nouvelle croyance partagée.

D'autres types de cadrages, *les cadrages rhétoriques argumentatifs et manipulatoires* servent la visée persuasive et argumentative de l'effet d'évidence.

(5) La France est-elle tombée en dépression nerveuse? De temps en temps dans son histoire, en 1789, en 1830, en 1848 ou même en 1968, elle s'est jetée par-dessus bord avec l'eau du bain. C'était sa façon de *fuir les réformes et les réalités*. On appelle ça une révolution. (*Le Figaro*, 1er/12/95 Editorial)

Selon la classification de P. Breton (1999), l'éditorialiste procède à un cadrage qui associe des évènements historiques à l'événement contemporain. Il explicite cette

association en tentant de (re)définir la notion de "révolution" de façon opératoire, c'est-à-dire selon les symptômes observés. L'extrait en italique est une autre forme d'association enchâssée dans la première et qui marque l'équivalence suivante: *fuir les réformes c'est fuir les réalités*. Cette association n'étant pas explicitée mais suggérée, il s'agit d'un cadrage manipulatoire par amalgame. Là encore, la réalité est constituée comme sacré montré et comme preuve véridictoire. Le verbe *fuir* comporte de plus une connotation péjorative qui agit comme une disqualification: les opposants considérés comme irrationnels, inconséquents et lâches ne veulent pas regarder la réalité en face.

Comme on aura pu le remarquer dans les exemples précédents, les procédés utilisés sont concomitants et agissent à plusieurs niveaux à la fois. L'exemple suivant est édifiant à cet égard:

(6) Partout en Europe, pour des raisons évidentes de démographie, il a fallu réformer le système des retraites. La France est un des derniers pays à le faire, et le processus y est particulièrement chahuté. (*Le Monde* 07/06/03 Chronique)

Des valeurs d'identification et de compétition doxales entremêlées se superposent à quatre autres procédés:

– le cadre européen non piloté s'imposant à tous,
– la désubjectivisation de l'énoncé dans chaque phrase,
– la modalité déontique "a fallu" induisant l'inévitabilité de l'action et
– la justification démographique rationnelle ("raisons") renforcée par l'adjectif "évidentes" qui renvoie en les activant à des savoirs considérés comme partagés.

Ces procédés impliquent le sous-entendu suivant en fin d'extrait: *le mouvement d'opposition lutte contre l'évidence*. La disqualification masque l'aspect idéologique du discours néolibéral tout en le naturalisant.

4. Conclusion

Une analyse quantitative et lexico-sémantique des 184 articles permet de vérifier la thèse de Duval (2000), à savoir qu'il existe bien deux pôles dans la presse écrite généraliste française. Un pôle indépendant tant d'un point de vue éditorial qu'économique, mais sans grands moyens financiers, et un pôle dépendant du pouvoir économique qui impose une vision néolibérale de l'événement à l'ensemble de la collectivité. Dans notre corpus, cette bipolarisation est plus nette encore en 2003 qu'en 1995. Certaines formes se naturalisent par leur fréquence, par une répétition constitutive, c'est le cas du mot *réforme* et de ses dérivés à la fois plus présents en valeur relative et absolue, et plus riches d'un point de vue lexical.

Ainsi, on peut éclairer quelque peu cette relation triangulaire dont nous parlions au début de cette présentation: l'idéologie, que nous définissons sommairement comme un système d'idées à vocation prosélyte, se dissimule sous cet aspect attendu et partagé qu'est l'effet d'évidence. Les discours de pouvoir sont repris par les médias qui recherchent cet effet d'évidence à des fins persuasives: il s'agit, nous semble-t-il, de *constituer de nouvelles représentations partagées*. Si les éditorialistes participent à ce qu'on a pu appeler "la fabrique du sens commun", leur relation avec l'opinion publique est plus complexe puisqu'ils valident de nouvelles croyances doxales en utilisant la voix collective de l'opinion dont ils se font les porte-parole.

En 1909, Karl Kraus, dans "La Découverte du pôle Nord", rendait compte, avec son humour caustique, du rôle de la presse:

> La nature ne lit pas les éditoriaux, aussi ne sait-elle pas aujourd'hui encore qu'on s'attache précisément à "transformer l'univers des puissances élémentaires en un royaume de la raison (cité *in* Bouveresse 2007:74).

En effet selon Bouveresse, "l'information a désormais pris nettement le pas sur la réalité et a fini par devenir plus réelle qu'elle" (2007:74). Un siècle plus tard cependant, pour rendre compte du rôle des médias, il nous semble nécessaire de renverser le propos de K. Kraus: "la nature ne lit (toujours) pas les éditoriaux aussi ne sait-elle pas qu'on s'attache précisément à transformer le royaume de la raison politique en un univers des puissances élémentaires".

Cependant, si le type de preuve a changé, le mode véridictoire et discursif est resté le même: la rhétorique de l'évidence.

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The Many Personalities of a TV Presenter

Code-switching as a reflection of role choice and role conflict

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The present article examines the function and structure of code-switching between dialect and the standard language in entertainment programmes on Austrian television. The language employed by TV hosts in these shows both reflects everyday language use and displays its own regularities. In particular, the role that the presenter chooses to play at a certain point in the show is reflected by his/her choice of language variety. Specific roles, such as 'the guests' friend' or 'a source of information' are linked up with a specific variety. Code-switching can thus be considered an 'Act of Role' (paralleling LePage and Tabouret-Keller's concept of 'Act of Identity').

1. Introduction

Previous research has provided us with rich insights into the nature and the usage of the vernacular in everyday communication. However, researchers have only recently begun to analyse the dynamics of the so-called 'dialect/standard-continuum', with its wide range of possibilities of usage and linguistic variation. The present paper[1] aims to further fill this gap by focusing on the question how dialect, the standard language, and the plenty forms in between interact in Austrian TV shows. To this end, we will combine the discourse analytic approach with dialectological, media analytic, and sociolinguistic theory. We will consider the language of television as reflecting everyday language usage and as having developed its own linguistic mechanisms, both at the same time. The particularities of this medium seem to be encapsulated in the show host figure, whom we will concentrate on in the following analyses.

2. The sociolinguistic situation in Austria

In most parts of Austria, Bavarian dialects are spoken. Only the westernmost part, the state of Vorarlberg, belongs to the Alemannic dialect region. In Austria and Southern Germany, we are faced with a sociolinguistic situation which has been

[1] Some of the ideas for this paper were developed through extended discussions with Anne Betten. The author also wishes to thank Raphael Berthele for his comments and suggestions on some of the ideas in this paper.

described as a 'dialect/standard-continuum'. This term refers to the fact that one can hear a great number of intermediate varieties between dialect and standard German, which form the somewhat undefined 'Umgangssprache'. In this region, dialects are well and alive but the boundaries between standard German and the so-called 'Umgangssprache' on the one hand, and between the 'Umgangssprache' and dialects on the other, are somewhat fuzzy, both in terms of linguistic definition and of pragmatic usage (cf. Ammon 1995; 2003:164ff.).

Linguistic variation in Austria depends on social and situational/pragmatic factors, such as the social status of the speaker, age, gender, interlocutors and (in)formality of the situation. We must keep in mind, however, that, according to a survey by Wiesinger and Patocka (1984/85), 78 % of all Austrians consider themselves capable of speaking dialect. Only 2 % stated that their everyday speech was standard German, whereas 49 % said they spoke 'Umgangssprache' in everyday situations, and another 49 % indicated that they spoke dialect (cited in Wiesinger 1992:290f.)

3. Language varieties on Austrian TV

Repeatedly, Austria has been deemed a 'special case' as far as the employment of regional varieties on television is concerned – a status which it supposedly shares with Switzerland (cf. Brandt 2000). The language of television in these two countries obviously differs from that in Germany. Burger (1990:213f., 240ff.) states that in Austria and in the south of the German speaking area in general, the entire range from extreme dialect to (regional) standard German has found its way into television.

Despite these rather partial statements, we must not fail to acknowledge the linguistic realities on Austrian television: the predominant variety to be heard on Austrian TV is standard German – either in its German or Austrian version. Due to the limits of the Austrian television market, a great deal of German productions or dubbed programmes are broadcast, which employ Germany Standard German. In productions by Austrian TV channels, however, there is a wide range of varieties to be heard. In information programmes (news, documentaries), (Austrian) standard German is used, while entertainment programmes also employ dialect and 'Umgangssprache'. It is this section of the Austrian TV programme that this article focuses on.

4. Code-switching on Austrian TV[2]

Code-switching in dialogues can serve different functions – many of which have been described by scholars such as Gumperz (Gumperz 1982, Blom & Gumperz 1972), Auer (1984, 1986), etc.: switches can mark changes in situation (e.g., change of addressee) or in the communicative status of turns (e.g., explaining vs. narrating). On Austrian TV, code-switching between dialect and standard German can of course also take on these functions[3]. In this paper, however, we are going to concentrate on those functions that are specific and perhaps unique to television – functions related to the role(s) of the TV host.

4.1 The guests' 'friend' or a source of information?

The following extract was taken from an Austrian adventure show which was broadcast in summer 2004 and featured a group of young people on a hike across Austria. Every Monday, there was a live TV-show, in which one of the candidates dropped out on the basis of an audience vote. Part of the show was set in a broadcasting studio in Vienna, the other part was sent from the route. The show was hosted by Christian Clerici in the studio and Mirjam Weichselbraun, who stayed on the route with the candidates. The extract was taken from the very beginning of one of these Monday evening shows:

speaker: Mirjam Weichselbraun

1 W: und damit halLO und HERZlich willkomm bei der expedition österreich (.) wir sind in

2 oberösterreich angelangt (--) hinter uns der attersee (--) is des net schee (-) eigentlich? (-)

i:s d̊e:s ne:t ʃẽ: aɪg̊entliç

3 supa (.) oder? (-) und auch in dieser woche sind die kandidaten wieder (--)

supɐ o:d̊ɐ

4 <<len> marschiert (-) un marschiert (-) marschiert (--)>

5 <<acc>marschiert sans a (.) die gonze zeit nua unterwegs gwesn> (-)

maʃiɐt sans a: d̊i g̊antsə tsaɪt nu:ɐ ʊntɐveks g̊ve:sn

<<Erschöpfung andeutend, ironisch?> >

((Blickkontakt zu den Kandidaten))

6 und gestern hams dann awa auch (-) so:: am a bisl was anderes ghabt (-)

ʊŋg̊ɛstɐn hams d̊an avɐ aɔx so: ɐm a b̊isl vas and̊ɐʀəs khab̊t

---

[2] For simplicity's sake the label ‚code-switching' will be used here as a general term comprising both sudden and more gradual changes (sometimes referred to as 'code-shifting') of varieties. Due to the limitations of this paper, we cannot discuss the definitions of these terms in more detail; the reader is referred to the works of Auer (1984; 1986), Heller & Pfaff (1996), Heller (1988), and Thelander (1976), among others.

[3] Research on code-switching has shown that very similar mechanisms are at work in bilingual and in dialect/standard contexts (cf. e.g. Rein 1983:1449).

7 und zwa:: (--) kiloMETer über den attersee gepaddelt (.) und damit könnts auch ihr hallo

8 sagen (-) hallo an die kandidaten (---) die sind auch wieder da (-) des is sehr schön
<<applaudiert> >
((Applaus aus dem Studio))

9 und am: i muss zu euch sagn (--) applaus von meiner Seite (-) HALBzeit (-) sechs wochen

10 unterwegs (--) bravourös geschafft alles und i bin sehr stolz (-) wir haben drei bundesländer

11 jetzt übrigens hinter uns (.) möcht ich kurz sagn (-) wir haben (---) tirOL

12 (-) do homma ongfongen (.) gö? (-)SOIZbuag (-) hobts IA gschofft (.)
ɑ̊ɔ hɔmɐ ɔŋkfɔŋən gœ sɔɪtsbuɐk haɓts iːɐ kʃɔft

13 und jetzt samma in obaöstarreich (-) und jetzt sehnen wir uns nach wien (--)
ʊnjɛts samɐ ɪn oßeøːstɐʀaɪç

14 wir sehnen uns nach wien (-) und (--) ja okay (-) auch nach dem christian clerici (-) hallo ins

15 studio

---

1 W: and so helLO and WELcome to ‚expedition austria' (.) we have arrived in upper austria

2 behind us the 'attersee' [a lake] (--) isn't that beautiful (-) after all? (-)

3 super (.) right?(-) and also this week the candidates have been (--)

4 <<len> walking (-) and walking (-) walking (--)>

5 <<acc> walking they have been too (.) on tour all the time> (-)
<insinuating exhaustion, ironically? >
((eye-contact with the candidates))

6 and yesterday they also had something (-) quite different (-)

7 namely (--) canoeing for kiLOmetres across the 'attersee' (.) and now you can say hello too

8 (-) hello to the candidates (---) they are here again too (-) this is very nice
<<applaudes >
((applause from studio audience))

9 and I have to tell you (--) applause from my part (-) HALF time (-) six weeks

10 on tour (--) excellently done everything and I am very proud (-) we have left behind

11 three states now by the way (.) I would like to say briefly (-) we have got (---) the tyROL (-)

12 that's where we started (.) right? (-) SALZburg (-) that's what YOU managed (.)

13 and now we are in upper austria (-) and we are craving for vienna (--)

14 we are craving for vienna (-) and (--) yes okay (-) also for christian clerici (-) hello into the

15 studio

From line 4 to line 5 we witness a code switch from standard(-like) language to dialect. This switch is in line with a plethora of additional markings: W varies her speed of delivery (first she gets slower, then faster) and sets up eye contact with the candidates. The overall effect of paraverbal signals, of gestures and facial

expression, and of the verbal expression is one of (ironically) insinuated exhaustion. By acting exhausted, W shows her 'solidarity' with the candidates, who are in her field of vision for the first time at that moment. Showing 'solidarity' also affects her choice of language: she switches to dialect, the register preferred by most of the candidates.

After that (from line 6 on), W shifts back into standard(-like) speech, giving factual information (canoeing across the lake, half time, on tour for six weeks, three federal states passed).

The enumeration of the route already passed so far is particularly interesting: W starts out in standard German (lines 9-11), which is in line with the objective-informative, monological mode she is employing. She then starts to integrate 'pseudo-dialogic' parts, which are in thick dialect, (seemingly) addressing the candidates.

After this enumeration (line 13), W switches back to standard German, addressing the studio audience and Christian Clerici, who himself never strays from standard German.

W's code-switching and shifting reflects the different roles she adopts: the role of the 'deliverer of information' (marked by standard language) and the role of the candidates' friend, companion (marked by the vernacular). Code-switching in this example thus represents what Gumperz termed 'metaphorical' code-switching – a change of codes that is not constrained by 'outside factors' such as change of situation or speakers but which happens apparently without a reason, within an interactive episode (Gumperz 1972:425). The change of code, or rather the code per se, sets off associations with specific conversational contexts and so assigns additional meaning to the verbal utterance.

Gumperz explicitly called this phenomenon 'contextualisation' because by way of the codes' meaning potentials (through associations with certain situations/groups/topics, etc.), certain aspects of the current conversational context are being activated and/or brought to bear on the interactional situation[4]. Switching to dialect in this case triggers the association with an everyday conversation among young people.

The function of this kind of code switch or code choice therefore is a sociosymbolic one – it contextualises the utterance and it conveys meaning that exceeds that of the verbal information. Code switches become 'Acts of Identity' (in the words of LePage & Tabouret-Keller 1985), or rather 'Acts of Role': LePage and Tabouret-Keller's concept refers to the act of bringing to bear one's ethnical and/or social identity on the conversation whereas what we are dealing with here is the (temporary) role in the conversation which may be chosen more or less freely by the speaker.

We can assume that this kind of role switch and role conflict does not develop just by chance. After all, the change of perspectives and language varieties makes

[4] Cf. Gumperz (1982, 98); Li Wei (1999, 156f.); Heller (1988, 5f.); Heller/Pfaff (1996, 595ff.).

a show more vivid. Moreover, W does not only accommodate linguistically to the candidates but also to the home audience.

4.2 A panellist or the presenter?

The second excerpt is taken from the ‚Barbara Karlich Show' – a typical chat show, which has been showing for several years. The programme deals with a wide range of topics – most of them rather entertaining, though. The following extract is taken from a show called "Schatzi, überlass das Denken mir" ("Sweetie, let me do the thinking!").

speakers:
K: Barbara Karlich (presenter)
guests (couple): I: Irene
F: Franz
both of them are continuously shifting between Carinthian dialect and ‚Umgangssprache'

1 K: ((lacht)) sag amal (--) was ich lache jetzt (--) ich lach über dich aba des is doch ein (-) du
ɑβɐ ɑ̊des is ɑ̊dox æn ɑ̊du
<<in Richtung F, der gerade über die Fahrkünste von Frauen gelästert hat>>
2 konst net ole fraun in einen topf schmeißn
kʰɔ:nsɑ̊ neɑ̊ ɔ:lə frɔ:n in aɪnən ɑ̊ɔpf ʃmaɪsn
<<entrüstet> >
3 ((...))
4 K: dir vertraut [man.]
((zu I))
5 I: [wenn] ICH fahre (-) jo?
6 F: [wenn du mi=]wenn du mit turnpotschn [foast (-) a wahnsinn] oiso mit turnschuhe
7 I: [owa mit meine] [jo (--) donn geht]
8 F: autofoan (--) des komma [net oda
9 I: [des geht sowieso net guat owa dos:: is koa problem=
10 K: =wieso komma mit tuanschuh net AUtofoan?=
viso kʰɔma mi:ɑ̊uɐnʃu: neɑ̊ ɔ:tofɔɐn
<<leicht aufgebracht> >
11 F: =mit turnschuhn hot ma kein gefühl=
12 K: =no SICHER=
nɔ si:çɐ
<<bestimmt>>
13 F: =na=
14 K: =na (-) komma mit turnschuhn autofahrn? (---) naja naTÜRlich (---) also [jo E:Ben
na kʰɔma mi:ɑ̊uɐnʃu:n aʊtofa:n
<<Frage ans Publikum> > ((Gemurmel im Publikum))
15 I: [i ko imma foan

16 ((lacht))

17 K: ma ho=[ma hot
18 F: [mit turnschuhe kommt ma nicht auf TOUREN (--) [oiso des:: kein gefühl
19 I: [schlecht auf touren
20 K: du manst wei ma liawa laufm [würd wolln oda was (-) nö bei die turnschuhe (---)
ðu ma:nst vœ ma ließe la:fm vyeð vɔln oðe vas nœ ßæ ði ðuɐnʃuə
21 I: [jo (---) jo]

22 K: DU (---) IHR ZWEI [habts] euch ja kennen gelernt glaub ich im zweiten: (-) bildungsweg
23 I: jo [jo]

24 K: unter anführungszeichen nö [oiso] (--) beide wart ihr schon einmal verheiratet=
25 I: [jo]
26 I: =jo=jo [beide scho mmh jo
27 K: [und donn hobts eich (--) wia woa des domois (.) irene.
ʊntɔn hɔpts aɪç vie vɔe ðes ðɔmɔɪs ieɐrenə

---

1 K: ((laughs)) tell me (--) what I'm laughing now I'm laughing at you but that is a (-) you
<<addressing F, who has just made fun of woman drivers>>

2 cannot lump all women together
<<indignated> >

3 ((...))

4 K: people trust [you.]
<<addressing I> >
5 I: [when] I am driving (-) right?

6 F: [when you=] when you are driving with sneakers [on (-) crazy] driving with sneakers (--)
7 I: [but with my] [yes (--) then]

8 F: that you can[not do]
9 I: [that doesn't work well but that's no problem

10 K: =why can't you drive with sneakers?=
<<slightly indignated> >

11 F: =you don't have the feel with sneakers=

12 K: =of COURse you have=
<<decidedly> >

13 F: =no=

14 K: =well (-) can you drive with sneakers? (---) well of COURse (---) so [you see
<<asking the audience> > ((audience murmuring))
15 I: [I can always drive
16 ((laughs))

17 K: you have=[you have
18 F: [with sneakers you don't get into TOP GEAR (--) [so that:: no feel
19 I: [hardly into top gear

20 K: you mean because you would [rather run or what (-) with the sneakers (---)
21 I: [yes (---) yes]

22 K: [YOU] (---) THE TWO OF YOU [met] I think at the second (-) try
23 I: yes [yes]

24 K: in inverted commas right [so] (--) both of you had been married before=
25 I: [yes]

26 I: =yes=yes [both of us yes
27 K: and then [you (--) how did that happen at the time (.) irene.

After F has expressed his opinion about woman drivers, K is slightly indignant: she first starts speaking in standard German and then switches to deep (Bavarian) dialect. The accompanying intonation emphasises the verbal protest. This passage can be seen as a foreshadowing of the role conflict K finds herself in and which will come to the fore even more saliently later on: the conflict between the role of the (neutral) show host and presenter and the role of a panellist with her own personal opinion.

From lines 6 to 20 we witness a battle of words between K and F (with I participating only marginally), with K's (presumably) personal opinion showing through rather clearly.

Her role of the panellist is linguistically marked by the vernacular.

Code-switching again is an 'Act of Role' performed by K: When she takes on the role of the presenter and host (line 22), she switches back to standard German. This passage forms the transition to a new sub-topic and is presented monologically by K even though she seems to be talking to I. The explanatory-descriptive introduction, which is intended as a form of information for the audience, ends with a dialogic turn (line 27) – a question which is linguistically marked by dialect. The choice of the vernacular and the address with I's first name give the impression of an intimate, friendly conversation, fit for complete frankness. K again switches from the role of the source of information to that of the 'friend' or at least the friendly hostess.

5. Conclusion

We have seen that the choice of role that the show presenter takes on is reflected by their choice of language variety. Specific roles are linked up with a specific variety. The code switch may be considered an 'Act of Role', thus paralleling LePage and Tabouret-Keller's concept of 'Act of Identity': The presenter highlights her role as the guests' friend, as a neutral source of information or as a panellist voicing her own personal opinion, respectively, by her choice of language variety. Thus, code-switching can act both as a means of structuring dialogue and of expressing one's role in the conversation. These mechanisms can contribute considerably to a show's liveliness and attractiveness for certain target groups.

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Appendix

Transcription Conventions:

[	
[	beginning of overlap or simultaneous utterance
=	contiguous turn

(.)	micropause
(-), (--), (---)	short, medium, long pause (up to a second)
:, ::	stretching
ACcent	strong stress
!AC!cent	extra strong stress
?	intonation indicating question (rising)
.	falling intonation
((laughs))	para- und nonverbal actions and events
<<laughing> >	para- and nonverbal actions and events simultaneous to speech OR interpreting commentary with indication of duration
( )	incomprehensible passage
((...))	left out in transcript
<<f> >	forte, increased volume
<<p> >	piano, decreased volume
<<all> >	allegro, fast
<<len> >	lento, slowly
<<acc> >	accelerando, getting faster
<<rall> >	rallentando, getting more slowly

Communicative Strategies in Mass Media Discourse
The manipulative aspect

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The paper presents the study on communicative strategies in news media discourse: theoretical approaches and peculiar types of mass media strategies. The choice of the strategy depends on the general aim of the discourse under study – that is to inform and its particular aims – to persuade, to evade and others. Central to the analysis are three strategies: presentation, informative and manipulative. The first strategy has introduction of a problem in focus, thus getting in touch with the addressee. Informative strategy focuses on factual presentation of information, free of opinions and evaluation. Manipulative strategy outnumbers the ones mentioned above in types and tactics used. These types let us single out techniques used to create particular communicative structures which replace structures of actual reality and manipulate mass audience. The present study also focuses on lingual rhetoric strategies of mass media discourse and their types - distortion strategy, evasion, and eloquent suppression of information.

1. Approaches to communicative strategies

Communicative strategies evoke social interaction between agents and clients of communication; they are singled out on sentence level and can be distinguished as a result of speech act analysis. Communicative strategies are either the result of communicative scenario of the speaker, his pragmatic aim or the result of his using patterns, peculiar to the news content.

Several approaches to communicative strategies studies can be singled out: *cognitive, semantic and social*. T. van Dijk defines strategy from a cognitive point of view as a process of mental information processing (Dijk 1989:277). According to R. Wodak, strategy is "the doer's idea to perform the action in the best way" (Wodak 1997:53). Consequently, *strategy* from this point of view reflects an ideal way of text understanding by the audience and possible obstacles of the interaction speaker – text – audience.

The social point of view presents the strategy as a "separate and specifically solved issue of any social action" (Datsyuk 2000:3). This is true of strategies in news media discourse as reading, watching or listening to news are social processes.

According to Issers, semantic strategy is a way of "inducing desirable semantics, implemented in its turn by using various language means" (Issers

1997:52). Such a definition is close to the definition of tactics which is, in its turn, a combination of practical steps.

Summing up these three approaches to strategy we introduce the process of communicative strategy production in the following way:

Aim → communicative intention → strategy → tactics

A journalist in the process of mass communication puts forward the aim (general or particular) and, following his communicative intention, produces a communicative strategy, which later turns into tactics. It can be stated that lexical, grammatical and linguo-rhetorical means constitute a tactics.

2. Presentation, informative and manipulative strategies

News media discourse encompasses a number of communicative strategies and tactics. The choice of the strategy depends on the general (to inform) or particular (to convince, evade etc.) aims of news media discourse. As news media discourse is represented by several discursive dimensions it includes particular strategies of political, advertising or military discourse. Linguistic means of expressing the above mentioned intentions vary from the channel of communication, type of the communicated message (special or ordinary edition) and peculiarities of the text content. It is necessary to say that communicative strategies in media discourse have rhetorical characteristics as they are connected with persuasion or drawing attention.

We consider presentation, informative and manipulative strategies to be the key types of communicative strategies in news media discourse. Each of the types mentioned above is varied depending on the aim and intentions of the speaker.

Presentation strategy includes presentation of the message or problem and getting into contact with the addressee via heading or announcement. Structurally the news message is organized in such a way that the climax is placed at the beginning unlike other genres, allowing the speaker to reach his aim in the shortest period of time.

Informative strategy aims at increasing informative level and is a factual presentation of events, void of evaluation, comments and hidden analysis. Direct speech tactics with distinct communicative aim characterize this type of strategy.

Manipulative strategy is the most varied type; its types allow us to find out techniques used to replace structures of actual reality and make mass consciousness manipulation possible. Manipulative strategy aims at imposing one's communicative strategy to mass audience, which in most cases has not got its own strategy thus letting the speaker take the leading position.

3. Manipulation strategy and its lingual rhetoric types

Among manipulative strategies *the strategy of forming attitudes* is singled out. It focuses on non-verifiable facts which are presented to the audience as verifiable. To make this process possible structures identifying the audience with the information contained in the message are used, for instance possessive pronouns.

Appealing to the image of the anchor or host is another effective strategy of manipulating mass audience. There are anchors, for example who report about special events as they are trusted by the majority of people.

Distortion strategy is also frequently used in news media texts to distract attention from one group of facts to other ones. This strategy varies from lie to partial deformations. The tactics which can put this strategy into practice is popularizing gossip (for example, the news of the coming resignation of some authority, which is later denied).

Concealing strategy aims at concealing definite facts or events. To make this strategy effective evasion, announced evasion or eloquent suppression is used.

Announced evasion is an example of honest, open tactics which informs the audience of the next step – using evasion, as in the example

(1) I will not describe the horror of this event or It is not PC to say this but….

Evasion is a figure of speech meant to break the message or to soften it. For example in the statement

(2) Diplomats talk of an event in Baghdad at around lunchtime, Prime Ministers are scheduled to do a joint press conference this afternoon. It is not hard therefore to work out how the day was meant to go (6/06/05 BBC news).

It is not hard therefore to work out how the day was meant to go imitates the unspeakable leaving the audience a chance to understand the unsaid.

Eloquent suppression, making concealing strategy possible, camouflages the un-said with the help of eloquence. It is necessary to draw a line between two tactics mentioned: eloquent suppression and evasion. Eloquent suppression is a kind of extended text aimed at distracting mass audience's attention from the main points. Evasion unlike eloquent suppression does not contain any markers of concealing. That is to say in case of eloquent suppression audience's attention is transferred from the content to its form thus attracting attention but not giving necessary information about the object.

The aim of the speaker in the case of eloquent suppression can be one of the following:

– Changing perception of real events as in the example

(3) During the last month export taxes did not decrease, that is why their influence on recent crisis is impossible ("Vesti").

This message hides the information on tax increase as not only decrease influences the crisis. The speaker in this case changes the addressee's idea of the event. Providing partial facts for the audience is either the result of journalist's unwillingness to ruin the stability of society or the result of mass consciousness manipulation.

– Changing the scope of the phenomenon described:

(4) "Is pollution really a cause (of asthma) or is it merely a trigger?"

the structure of the question makes us sure the speaker tends to the second option, thus diminishing the influence of environment as a cause of asthma. This aim is a particular manifestation of the first one;
- Softening the information or making it more appealing. News messages can be destructive that is why the journalist should be concerned with delicate presentation of events. In one of the TV interviews the interior minister of RF was asked:

(5) Journalist: It's important to control expenditure and income of state budget. This money should not be simply stolen. Can you stand up against this?
Minister: You know, theoretically, there are no problems with money stealing from the budget… ("Vesti")

In this case "theoretically" is a marker of concealing information: we see a problem described but the solution to the problem is concealed: what is this phenomenon in practice?

– Relieving oneself of the responsibility with the help of indefinite reference structures: *as our sour source in the Ministry reported, according to some politicians…*In statements of this kind the source remains anonymous thus helping the speaker avoid any conflict situation.
– Hiding unawareness on some points or reluctance to communicate on the given problem:

(6) Journalist: During negotiations you probably discussed the problem of energy supply…
Politician: We discussed all problems. There are economic organizations and they will continue the talks. There are arrangements, contracts, and papers.
(16/07/06"Vesti")

This example illustrates that a politician jumps to generalization saying that "they discussed *all* problems" and this is a sign of evading the answer. One of the

reasons why politician is using this tactics is the fact that this information is not favorable for him, does not come to his social expectations. 'Manipulative convenience' of the technique described is that you can give an answer to any question without providing an irrefragable answer.

4. Informing or suppressing information?

Eloquent suppression tactics discussed above can be characteristic of informative or manipulative strategies. It is viewed as informative method if we rely on a highly competent addressee who is able to decode such a message. This method can also be considered as non-informative from the point of view of lexical means of expression. From a logical point of view speaking itself and eloquent suppression are mutually exclusive phenomena with the first aims at informing and the second – at keeping information in secret. But as we have mentioned above it is considered to be an informative method with meaningful lacunae. In case this method is manipulative (in 90 % cases it is) it is considered as negative by the audience. Negative attitude to speaking a lot without saying anything has been reflected in some set expressions: *to talk without saying anything; to beat around (about) the bush, to waffle about, empty talk,* and typical of media discourse *screen smoke and red herring.*

We call eloquent suppression "passive lying" during which X informs Y about Z, though A took place. The speaker intends to manipulate the addressee, but, unlike lying (X informs Y that A did not take place but in fact it did – Panchenko (Panchenko 1999), this type of manipulation does not distort reality, but hides it.

The choice of lexical means in all the above discussed strategies is in accord with the necessary prerequisites of manipulation. Manipulating factual news parameters – substituting or omitting them, creates false reality. While classifying ways of manipulating we took the above mentioned into account and got the following list: equivocation, generalization, ambiguity, shifting the accent, disguised performatives, evasion and allegory help to produce false reality in news media discourse.

Equivocation in general implies reference to the class of similar phenomena. It is a pragmatic category linked to the speaker's idea to cover the meaning of the statement. In mass media discourse equivocation is deliberate. Equivocation of a subject, for instance, makes stable news discourse components manipulative: lack of one news item chain makes the whole news item misplaced. To illustrate this point the following example can be offered:

(7) Bird flu is spreading to Europe where it is expected to harm thousands of lives (23/08/05, Channel 1).

The omitted data as to whose lives will be damaged – the people's or the animals'- makes the message sound vague. This tactics is aimed at distracting attention from some points and drawing it to other ones. Equivocation in mass media discourse is of complex nature, it usually combines several types of manipulation such as ambiguity and uncertainty thus increasing the perlocution effect on the audience.

Ambiguity lets the speaker avoid unpleasant collisions without explicit lying. Ambiguous statements involving different aspects represent the roundabout way of communication. The most typical means of such type of communication is doublespeak. The way the message is represented is of more vital importance than what is communicated. According to W. Lutz, euphemisms, obscure long terms, gobbledygook and inflated language belong to doublespeak (1996). All these methods are aimed at effective representation of reality. Gobbledygook, excessive in terms, gives the impression of a fully worded statement thus obscuring the real meaning. For example, answering the question on collaboration with Turkey on energy points Russian Minister answered the following:

(8) "There is nothing to be added, everybody understands that the diversity of transport flow while exporting our energy resources is of vital importance" (14/11/05, "Vesti")

The term 'diversity of transport flow' throws the audience into confusion distracting their attention from the statement which in itself is of little message comprehension. Using terms is an ideal way of shifting attention from the meaning onto the image. Ambiguity turns out to be manipulative as it breaks one of the most important principles of news making – univocacy.

Allegory hides stylistic moves and implied cultural contexts. In mass media discourse it serves the function of transmitting some facts with the help of the other facts. Following manipulative goals, allegory can be used to hide objective reality. Filtering information is its highest priority. Not only verbal but also non-verbal clues are typical of allegory. Covering elections in the Ukraine some Russian journalists appeared in the news rooms wearing orange ties to support the candidate. These ways of presenting news are very exquisite and make it possible to draw the audience's attention in any direction. And if necessity arises they can always object by saying that there was something different behind their statement.

Generalizing is another way of distracting attention via combination of particular and general phenomena:

(9) The candidate is getting ready for the elections and according to the poll, is heading forward. In case of victory he, for sure, promises to change a lot in the life of his people (12/06/06 Channel 1).

In the example given the speaker estimates the performance by saying that *he, for sure, promises to help*. This is the "bandwagon strategy" causing the audience to believe that the majority of people share the same opinion.

As any kind of performative text, mass media text implies influence. Performative acts are not connected with equivocation, but in mass media texts they are more often disguised. By disguised performatives we understand such statements where the verb with illocutory power is deliberately hidden. According to the results we got, there are two kinds of disguised performatives used to manipulate mass consciousness: implicit expression of will and estimation. Implicit expression of will is most usually introduced by elliptic sentences. Unlike performative statements, disguised performatives employ a wide variety of modal verbs which allow to implicitly estimate the things going on. Among linguistic means of disguised performatives, passive voice, modal words, introductory phrases and logical fallacies are singled out.

Shifting the accent is the last way of manipulating the facts, which we single out. There are two directions in changing the news scenario: narrowing and broadening the focus of attention. Broadening the focus of attention is a process of introducing an irrelevant object. Thus, the answer to the question

(10) "Why does not this person study Ukrainian language while being the ambassador in the Ukraine" is "He is not that good at linguistics but he has some other outstanding qualities as well" (5/07/05 "Vesti").

In this case the accent is shifted from a narrower description of 'foreign language level' to a broader one – 'other outstanding qualities'.

The number of ways used for manipulating mass audience is not limited, they are growing daily. Media people choose such methods which are most suitable to the desired stereotype. Having analyzed some of the strategies and tactics in mass media discourse it can be stated that factual presentation of events is not very popular with media people. And this results in rhetorical characteristics of this type of discourse. General and specific aims of media discourse provide us with a variety of communicative strategies. We hope the strategies singled out will not only characterize mass media discourse in general, but also prompt further research on working out counter strategies, which in their turn will allow the audience to be protected from manipulation.

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Entre paroles d'adultes et paroles de jeunes

Le dialogisme dans la presse d'actualité adressée aux jeunes

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This article analyses the discourses of young people and adults given in a newspaper for young people called *L'Actu*. Moreover, it shows how the media play with these discourses from several points of view (political, journalistic or from a citizen authority) during the French presidential election campaign of 2007. At first, the text explains some theoretical notions like *dialogisme* (Bakhtine 1977) or *argumentative dimension* (Amossy 2000). Then, it develops a methodological point in order to underline the proceedings of *dialogisation* and of dialogical presentation of the others' discourses.

1. Introduction

L'univers dialogique, décrit par Mikhaïl Bakhtine, instauré par le discours aussi bien oral qu'écrit, constitue un des objets d'étude privilégiés de disciplines des sciences du langage distinctes telles que l'analyse des interactions conversationnelles, l'analyse du discours, ou encore l'argumentation dans le discours. Le rapport de dialogue[1] ou *dialogisme* se manifeste par l'entrelacement de voix diverses au sein d'un même discours. Dans le dictionnaire de Charaudeau et Maingueneau, Sophie Moirand précise les deux orientations que peut avoir le dialogisme en distinguant le "dialogisme interactionnel" (interactivité constitutive du discours où l'on anticipe la réponse de l'allocutaire) du "dialogisme intertextuel" (rapport à d'autres discours produits antérieurement) (2002:177). Il existe ainsi deux sortes de traces, dans le discours, marquant l'imprégnation de la voix de l'autre. Etudier l'univers dialogique, c'est prendre en compte cet entremêlement des voix dans chaque discours prononcé ou rédigé dans son rapport au public visé ainsi que dans son rapport à la multiplicité des discours le traversant nécessairement.

Les médias de presse, qui fonctionnent sur une communication différée, éprouvent le besoin de créer un semblant d'échange en face à face avec leur lecteur en jouant avec le dialogisme interactionnel. Ils mettent ainsi souvent à leur

[1] Précisons que le discours "qui ne se déroule pas sous forme de dialogue effectif est néanmoins toujours *dialogique*" (Amossy 2002:162). La parole de l'autre se fait entendre aussi bien dans un véritable échange entre partenaires que dans une situation de communication différée; la prise en considération de la réception étant constitutive du discours.

disposition des procédés rhétoriques d'artificialisation qui simulent des situations de communication authentiques à des fins persuasives. Feindre le dialogue est pour eux le moyen de rapprocher le lecteur et ainsi rendre le discours plus vivant. Cette *dialogisation interactionnelle* permet ainsi au journal de donner un rôle supposé plus actif au lecteur. Pour répondre à ce souci d'interactivité, les médias doivent se faire une idée précise de leur récepteur afin de construire, dans le discours, une image du jeune ciblé pouvant se refléter dans l'imaginaire du lecteur.

Nous proposons ici une description du fonctionnement de ces deux procédés rhétoriques de mise en abyme du discours de l'autre (jouant sur le dialogisme interactionnel d'un côté et intertextuel d'un autre côté) à partir de l'étude d'un journal quotidien adressé aux jeunes de 14 à 18 ans s'intitulant *L'Actu*. Précisément, nous analysons comment et pourquoi le journal entremêle voix d'adultes et voix de jeunes dans le cas de la pré-campagne présidentielle de 2007. Ceci permet d'introduire le fait que ces paroles d'adultes émanent de trois instances différentes: instance politique (locuteurs représentés: candidats, porte-parole, etc.), instance médiatique (journalistes, dessinateurs, etc.) et instance citoyenne[2] (sondages, paroles d'acteurs de cinéma, etc.) alors que les paroles des jeunes sont, elles, en rapport à l'instance citoyenne dite *en herbe* (jeunes locuteurs représentés).

Nous souhaitons montrer par cette étude comment se manifeste le dialogisme dans les discours sélectionnés et dans quelle mesure il participe à la dimension argumentative de ceux-ci, notamment à une dimension argumentative de didacticité. Ce travail a pour objectif second de réfléchir à la représentation du jeune construite médiatiquement: jeune qui n'est pas encore en droit de voter, mais qui est un futur citoyen. Nous tenons particulièrement à être attentifs à la manière dont le discours de l'autre participe à la socialisation et la moralisation des jeunes ciblés. Enfin, nous essayerons de répondre à la question de savoir si cette rhétorique contribue à l'apprentissage du débat argumentatif.

2. Arrière-plan conceptuel

Avant de procéder à une étude de cas, quelques remarques s'imposent sur le cadre théorique adopté ainsi que les notions utilisées. Il nous semble important de partir d'un éclaircissement de la notion de *discours*, puis du concept de modèle de communication *dialogal* pour introduire la théorie sur laquelle nous nous appuyons: la théorie de l'argumentation dans le discours, formulée par Ruth Amossy (2000).

[2] Tripartition des instances selon Patrick Charaudeau (2005)

2.1 Le discours

"Toute interaction sociale est fondée en discours", c'est-à-dire que le discours est, comme le pense Mikhaïl Bakthine (1977), une activité d'ordre sociale qui a une fonction régulatrice et identificatrice. Il concerne des acteurs en un temps et en un lieu donnés. Ces acteurs ont des positions idéologiques particulières que leur discours manifeste. Il existe ainsi une multitude de situations de communication qui ont jusqu'à présent existé, ou, qui n'ont pas encore eu lieu. Le discours va pouvoir s'identifier selon la sphère discursive à laquelle il appartient. Etant donné qu'il est difficile de définir les représentations définissant chaque sphère discursive, Bakhtine propose de les approcher en termes d'opposition. Ces sphères entrent en conflit les unes avec les autres par un principe de différenciation. Les interférences croisées dans le discours constituent alors une trace du conflit interdiscursif entre deux sphères. L'interaction discursive est de nature dialogique dans le sens où il existe des interférences entre plusieurs sphères. Dans le passage suivant, Bakhtine développe cette idée de dialogisme inhérent au discours:

> […] toute énonciation, même sous forme écrite figée, est une réponse à quelque chose et est construite comme telle. Elle n'est qu'un maillon de la chaîne des actes de parole. Toute inscription prolonge celles qui l'ont précédée, engage une polémique avec elle, s'attend à des réactions actives de compréhension, anticipe sur celles-ci, etc. (Bakhtine 1977:105)

Souvent, lorsqu'il s'agit d'un discours visant à défendre un point de vue particulier, on a une confrontation explicite ou implicite entre un discours de proposition (tenu par un acteur proposant) et un contre-discours (défendu par son opposant). D'un point de vue argumentatif, l'opposition se trouve de la sorte définitoire du discours – ci-dessous en termes de proposition et de contre-proposition:

> Une proposition porte toujours sur une question litigieuse: le point de vue qu'elle met de l'avant est relatif à un point de discorde. La proposition, et par extension l'opinion comme argument, exigent le débat: ils ne se déploient que sur une matière à controverse. Ce cadre éristique fait en sorte qu'une proposition n'est toujours qu'une contre-proposition: elle ne se définit comme telle que dans une confrontation avec au moins une proposition opposée. (Gauthier 2005:135)

2.2 Monologal et dialogal

Le discours, qu'il s'agisse d'un échange en face à face ou différé, est toujours dialogique mais est-il toujours *dialogal*? En effet, qu'en est-il de la différence entre *monologal* et *dialogal*? Guy Lochard et Henri Boyer introduisent la distinction suivante:

> On dit d'une communication qu'elle est d'ordre monologal lorsque le destinataire n'est pas présent sur le lieu et dans le moment de la production du message par un destinataire. Elle est d'ordre dialogal si destinateur et destinataire sont en situation

> d'échange immédiat (conversation face à face ou au téléphone) ou différé (correspondance épistolaire). (Lochard & Boyer 1998:19)

La question est pour nous importante à poser car elle introduit la différence que l'on peut faire entre contexte de communication *concret* où les participants se trouvent réellement en situation, et le contexte de communication *implicite* qui définit la relation entre les participants même si ceux-ci ne sont pas présents matériellement. Le cas de notre journal est censé être un échange *monologal* étant donné que le destinataire n'est que virtuel cependant on pourrait aussi parler d'échange *dialogal* dans le sens où on cible un lecteur particulier qui va être en présence du discours d'une manière différée. Le média insistant sur une négociation du discours tentant de rapprocher l'instance réceptrice, nous parlerons de communication différée artificiellement *dialogale* dans le sens où l'espace interpersonnel est inventé pour représenter au mieux la cible visée. Dans le cas de la presse adressée aux jeunes en général, on retrouve souvent cette feinte de face à face – ou *stratégie de dialogisation*.

2.3 La dimension argumentative

Selon la théorie de l'argumentation dans le discours, tout discours est argumentatif[3]. Dans la mesure où tout discours surgit d'un conflit interdiscursif pré-existant, tout discours a une visée argumentative car il défend un point de vue qui se différencie d'au moins un autre point de vue distinct.

> Toute parole est nécessairement argumentative. C'est un résultat concret de l'énonciation en situation. Tout énoncé vise à agir sur son destinataire, sur autrui, et à transformer son système de pensée. Tout énoncé oblige ou incite autrui à croire, à voir, à faire autrement. (Plantin 1996:18)

L'argumentativité est, selon cette vision des choses, coextensive à tout discours. Le discours de presse adressé aux jeunes est donc nécessairement perçu comme ayant une dimension argumentative. Nous devons préciser que Ruth Amossy introduit une échelle d'argumentativité permettant de distinguer: au plus haut de cette échelle, les discours ayant une forte *visée* argumentative, c'est-à-dire cherchant expressément à convaincre quelque soient les stratégies utilisées et au plus bas de cette échelle, les discours quasi laconiques, soi-disant neutres, ne visant pas à intervenir sur les opinions, on parle dans ce cas de 'dimension' argumentative (Amossy 2000:24sqq.). Dans notre cas, il s'agit d'analyser la dimension argumentative du discours de presse adressé aux jeunes. En effet, on ne peut pas dire que cette presse d'actualité cherche expressément à convaincre son jeune public.

Pour l'analyse argumentative, il est indispensable de parler de situation de communication car "Le discours argumentatif vise un auditoire et son

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[3] Ou *rhétorique* car "Dans le discours à visée ou à dimension persuasive, rhétorique et argumentation ne font qu'un". (Amossy 2000:29)

déploiement ne peut se comprendre en dehors d'un rapport d'interlocution" (Amossy 2000:23). L'activité argumentative est toujours attachée à un type d'interaction particulier.

Ruth Amossy met aussi l'accent sur l'adaptation de l'orateur à l'auditoire, on parlera plutôt, dans notre cas, de l'adaptation des créateurs des journaux au lecteur cible. Comme le dit l'auteur (2000:23sq.):

> Le discours argumentatif veut agir sur un auditoire et doit de ce fait s'adapter à lui. Il participe [à] l'échange entre partenaires même lorsqu'il s'agit d'une interaction virtuelle où il n'y a pas de dialogue effectif.

Plus précisément, nous considérons qu'argumenter, c'est tenter de réduire une distance entre les partenaires. Qu'il y ait ou non, au départ, un désaccord, le discours argumentatif est une négociation. La négociation est un processus qui cherche à réduire une divergence entre les personnes. Comme le dit Meyer (2004:10): "La rhétorique est la négociation de la différence entre des individus sur une question donnée". On tente toujours, avec plus ou moins de résultats, de créer une convergence entre soi et autrui. Parler de négociation argumentative pour le discours de la presse adressé aux jeunes rappelle qu'il tente de transformer l'univers de croyance du récepteur, voire d'intervenir sur son comportement sans être sûr d'y parvenir. Cette idée de 'tentative de convergence' précise le fait qu'argumenter, c'est négocier, que ce soit pour résoudre un conflit ou simplement pour avancer des réflexions nouvelles.

Le discours de presse n'agit pas directement sur son lecteur, il s'agit d'un processus plus subtil où les deux instances jouent un rôle. Les deux parties contractantes se rapprochent, en quelque sorte, en co-construisant le discours. Ce processus de négociation fait que la distance entre les communicants se réduit et ceci se traduit par l'inscription, dans le discours de la représentation de l'instance productrice et de l'instance réceptrice. Gwenole Fortin (2005:11) nous dit que "L'activité d'argumentation […] relève d'une co-négociation des identités en jeu". Le créateur du discours s'identifie au lecteur pour le faire adhérer à ce qui est dit. Il s'agit dans ce cas, d'une négociation d'identités où l'on nous dit implicitement "Je suis un peu comme toi!". L'image du lecteur est construite dans le discours. Il existe un façonnage idéologique du lecteur potentiel. Pour le dire autrement, le journal construit l'image de son auditoire virtuel. Précisons que le créateur d'un discours se fait toujours une représentation[4] de l'auditoire virtuel.

[4] Voir pour ce concept, le chapitre "La logique naturelle de J.-B. Grize" (Amossy 2000:12f.).

3. Analyse

3.1 Présentation des données-construites[5] et méthodologie

Notre corpus est une double sélection du traitement médiatique fait par le journal quotidien *L'Actu* de la pré-campagne présidentielle 2007[6]. Nous avons tout d'abord répertorié les traces de *dialogisation* du discours appelé "pseudo-dialogal" (exemples *a* à *h*) en proposant des hypothèses sur l'effet visé par l'instance médiatique (3.2). De plus, à l'intérieur de cet ensemble, nous avons relevé toutes les traces du discours de l'autre, qu'il s'agisse de la parole d'adultes ou de la parole de jeunes (3.3). Notre corpus se compose de 53 énoncés. Nous avons classé ces fragments de discours selon leur appartenance à l'instance politique, médiatique ou citoyenne. Dans le cas de la parole des jeunes, nous les avons classées dans un ensemble relevant de l'instance citoyenne dite "en herbe". Tous ces fragments du discours relèvent globalement de l'instance à nouveau médiatique car nous sommes face à un discours journalistique. Ceci peut être représenté de la manière suivante:

Figure 1: *Médiatisation de la parole de l'autre*



Cette présentation est discutable car ces quatre instances sont étroitement liées mais elle est pour nous opératoire dans le sens où nous voulons discerner le rôle de l'instance médiatique vis-à-vis des paroles relevant des quatre autres instances.

Nous proposons d'analyser le dialogisme intertextuel (exemples 1 à 53[7]) en étudiant la parole de l'autre d'une manière isolée d'une part (*La parole de l'autre*) et d'autre part en l'intégrant dans le discours médiatique plus large (*La parole de l'autre médiatisée*). A ces deux niveaux, nous étudions ces propos en définissant

[5] J'emploie ici intentionnellement cette expression pesante pour insister sur le fait que les données ne sont pas données mais construites par l'analyste: extraction, thématisation, etc.
[6] Période allant du 1er janvier au 20 mars, jour de la publication officielle des candidats.
[7] Ces énoncés numérotés de 1 à 53 sont présentés et référenciés à la fin de cet article.

de quel 'lieu de fabrication' ceux-ci relèvent. Nous nous fondons sur la définition des trois "lieux de fabrication du discours politique" de Patrick Charaudeau "qui correspondent chacun à un enjeu d'échange particulier". Pour résumer, voici, selon ce mode de pensée, les trois types de discours politique (Charaudeau 2005 :30):

– le discours politique comme *système de pensée*

> cherche à fonder une idéalité politique en fonction de certains principes qui doivent servir de référence à la construction des opinions et des positionnements. C'est au nom des systèmes de pensée que se repèrent les appartenances idéologiques […].
>
> […] le discours politique comme *acte de communication*, lui, concerne plus directement les acteurs qui participent à la scène de la communication politique dont l'enjeu consiste à influencer les opinions afin d'obtenir des adhésions, des rejets ou des consensus. […] Ici, le discours politique s'attache à construire des images d'acteurs et à user de stratégies de persuasion et de séduction en usant de divers procédés rhétoriques,

– enfin, le discours politique comme *commentaire* correspond au fait que

> le propos porte sur du politique, mais il s'inscrit dans un situation dont la finalité se situe hors du champ de l'action politique: c'est un discours à propos du politique, sans enjeu politique.

Cette tripartition du discours est pour nous utile car elle va permettre de décrire la parole de l'autre en fonction de l'enjeu visé: les dires correspondent-ils à des opinions que l'on cherche à défendre en les justifiant, la parole est-elle prise afin de chercher à séduire et à persuader dans une mise en scène du discours, ou enfin les propos servent-ils simplement de commentaire sur la politique?

Dernier point, selon la description du "modèle dialogal" par Christian Plantin, "la situation argumentative typique se définit par le développement et la confrontation de deux points de vue en contradiction en réponse à une même question" (Plantin 2005:53). Il nous semble en ce sens important de repérer dans le discours le développement d'une confrontation de points de vue (discours et contre-discours). Cette analyse se situe dans le premier lieu de fabrication du discours politique: le discours politique comme *système de pensée*. La parole de l'autre présentant un système de pensée est aussi interrogée selon qu'elle présente ou non une justification de l'opinion défendue. Argumenter, dans un sens ici restreint, c'est chercher à faire partager un point de vue en présentant une justification de ce point de vue (ou en critiquant un point de vue tout en le justifiant). Nous nous basons ici sur la conception défendue par Gilles Gauthier (2005) définissant l'argumentation comme la juxtaposition d'un point de vue et de sa justification.

3.2 Procédés de dialogisation

Afin d'intéresser sa cible, le média de presse feint le dialogue à l'aide de stratégies diverses telles que:

– une adresse directe à l'aide de la deuxième personne du singulier ou du pluriel:

(1) Si *j'étais* président… *L'actu t'invite* à proposer les 10 mesures que *tu prendrais* si *tu étais* élu(e) président(e) de la République, p.2-3.
(N°2256, le 17 mars 2007, p.1)

(2) Présidentielle J-100. […] *Testez* vos connaissances sur l'élection la plus cruciale de la Ve République française, p.2-3.
(N°2209, le 12 janvier 2007, p.1)

– la création d'une rubrique avec une adresse directe:

(3) *Le saviez-vous?*

– la création d'une rubrique spéciale visant à faire participer le lecteur:

(4) Présidentielle 2007: *Votre avis sur… Donne ton avis sur le blog du rédacteur en chef.*

– la mise en abyme du point de vue de certains lecteurs dans la rubrique spéciale sur la présidentielle:

(5) Présidentielle 2007: Votre avis sur… Nicolas Sarkozy "*Je ne partage pas ses idées sur l'immigration*" Camille. (E44)

– la *dialogisation* en "question/réponse": question du jeune et réponse du journal:

(6) *Question/Réponse***.** Alice, 14 ans, 3ème, Paris (75).
Alice**:** *Comment font-ils des marionnettes si ressemblantes?*
L'actu**:** *Elles sont fabriquées […].*
(N°2223, le 1er février 2007, p.3)

– la création de tests permettant de proposer au lecteur de vérifier ses connaissances. On imagine que ce procédé peut par ailleurs créer un véritable dialogue à sa réception, les parents pouvant poser les questions et le jeunes s'amusant à y répondre.

(7) *Quiz*: J-100 avant l'élection présidentielle.
(N°2209, le 12 janvier 2007, p.2)

Le journal s'amuse de plus à donner artificiellement au discours *monologal* une dimension ressemblant au dialogue réel en créant des bulles de paroles dans la rubrique intitulée "C'est dit" où on représente l'énonciateur grâce à une photographie. L'adresse paraît de cette manière plus directe, plus vraie.

Enfin, le journal inscrit l'image de son lecteur potentiel en mettant en valeur des pratiques concernant plus particulièrement les jeunes. Les renvois aux blogs et sites Internet en font partie mais cette technique peut être d'autant plus caractéristique comme dans l'exemple suivant où on propose de télécharger des paroles de politiciens sur son téléphone portable:

(8) Des 'petites phrases' célèbres. Le site de l'INA propose de télécharger des "*phrases cultes*" d'hommes politiques pour en faire sa sonnerie de portable (3 euros, plus le prix d'un SMS). […] (E22, 23, 24, 25)

Toutes ces techniques d'inscription de l'autre dans le discours participent à la dimension argumentative du discours dans le sens où on réduit au maximum la distance qui sépare l'instance productrice du discours de l'instance réceptrice, ici les jeunes de 14 à 18 ans.

3.3 Présentation dialogique des paroles de l'autre

Il existe deux moyens de présenter la parole de l'autre dans les énoncés que nous avons étudiés: soit on cite l'autre, soit on reformule ses dires au discours indirect. Pour ces deux techniques relevant d'un dialogisme intertextuel, on prend toujours le soin de préciser l'auteur des paroles. L'instance médiatique qui cite ou reformule les dires de l'autre prend généralement le soin de se détacher des points de vue défendus ou de la visée persuasive du discours. Cependant, considérant la dimension argumentative comme coextensive à n'importe quel discours, nous sommes attentifs au degré de prise en charge du discours cité.

3.3.1 La parole de l'autre

Si l'on considère le discours cité ou reformulé indépendamment de l'appropriation qui en est faite par l'instance médiatique, voici les tendances que nous avons évaluées:

Table 1: *La parole de l'autre*

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Systèmes de pensée</th><th>Actes de communication</th><th>Commentaires</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Points de vue sans justification</td><td>Déclarations</td><td rowspan="8"></td></tr>
<tr><td>Discours</td><td>Contre-Discours</td><td>E1, E2, E3, E5, E6, E32, E33, E10, E11, E13, E15, E16, E17, E19, E21, E22, E23, E24, E25, E26, E27</td></tr>
<tr><td>E8, E12</td><td>E4, E20, E18, E50</td><td>Slogans</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Points de vue avec justification</td><td>E7</td></tr>
<tr><td>Discours</td><td>Contre-Discours</td><td>Anecdotes liées à la scène politique</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">E37, E38, E41, E42, E45, E46, E49</td><td rowspan="3">E9, E14, E39, E40, E43, E44, E47, E48</td><td>E28, E29, E30, E31</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sondages</td></tr>
<tr><td>E34, E35, E36, E51, E52, E53</td></tr>
</table>

La parole de l'autre constitue dans 60% des énoncés un *acte de communication*. Pour la plupart des cas recensés, il s'agit de déclarations faites sur la scène politique qui participent plus fortement au façonnage d'une figure des acteurs politiques qu'à la présentation d'un véritable système de pensée. Ces sélections de paroles constituent une véritable rhétorique du discours politique qui jouent plus sur la forme qu'a prise la pré-campagne que le fond des idées proposées. On retrouve bien évidemment le célèbre hapax de Ségolène Royal sur la "bravitude" (E2), la formule d'Arnaud Montebourg "Ségolène Royal n'a qu'un seul défaut, c'est son compagnon" (E5), qui lui a valu d'être suspendu pendant un mois. On trouve des propos issu de l'instance citoyenne tel que celui du travesti Vincent McDoom censé être connu, cherchant à valoriser la personne de Nicolas Sarkozy: "Je me retrouve en Sarkozy, […]" (E32). On retrouve aussi sans surprise le slogan du parti de Nicolas Sarkozy "Tout devient possible avec Nicolas Sarkozy" (E7). On a plusieurs énoncés de Jean-Marie Le Pen qui pronostique son arrivée au second tour (E10 et E11). Jacques Chirac prononce des conseils quant à la posture à adopter dans une campagne présidentielle: "Dans une campagne, il faut aller chercher les électeurs avec les dents" (E16). Pour créer un arrière-plan historique, on fait appel à d'anciens discours politiques connus pour leur formulation recherchée ou leur aspect choc. On pourrait les assimiler aujourd'hui à des sortes de slogan. L'accent est mis sur le style comme pour la citation de Charles de

Gaulle en 1944 "Paris outragé, Paris brisé, Paris martyrisé mais Paris libéré!" (E22). On répète certaines formules qui font aujourd'hui partie de la mémoire collective, comme pour le propos de Balladur: "Je vous demande de vous arrêter!" (E24).

Dans le reste des cas, la parole de l'autre présente une opinion justifiée ou non. Généralement, lorsqu'il s'agit d'un discours de soutien, on retrouve des verbes introducteurs tels que "propose" (E8), "a pronostiqué" (E12) mais lorsqu'on avance un contre-discours (s'opposant indirectement à son discours), on utilise des verbes tels que *dénoncer* (E4), *ironiser* (E9)[8], etc.

Ce qui est remarquable, c'est que les paroles des jeunes constituent pratiquement les seuls discours avec justification du point de vue défendu. Aussi, les seuls exemples de juxtaposition de proximité d'un discours et de son contre-discours ont-ils été relevés à propos de la parole des jeunes, encore une fois. Voici ci-dessous un exemple concret:

– Présidentielle 2007: Votre avis sur … François Bayrou:

– Il ferait un bon Président puisqu'il dit ne pas appartenir à un parti. Camille (E46)

– Présider avec la gauche et la droite, c'est impossible. Carpillon (E48)

3.3.2 La parole de l'autre médiatisée

En ce qui concerne l'analyse des paroles dites *médiatisées*, voici les résultats obtenus:

Table 2 : *La parole de l'autre médiatisée*

Systèmes de pensée		Actes de communication	Commentaires
Points de vue *sans* justification		'Les phrases clés'	Neutralisation forte
Discours	Contre-Discours	E16, E17, E26, E27	E1, E2, E3, E4, E8, E9, E10, E11, E12, E14, E15, E18, E20, E21, E28, E30, E31, E32, E34, E35, E36, E51, E52
E5, E6, E7, E13	E5, E6, E7, E13	"Les petites phrases célèbres"	Neutralisation plus faible

Voir suite à la page suivante

[8] Petite parenthèse: tout discours s'oppose implicitement à un contre-discours mais nous avons ici seulement relevé les propositions explicites dans le texte.

Points de vue avec justification		E22, E23, E24, E25	E19, E29, E33, E53
Discours	Contre-Discours	"Donne ton avis"	
		E37, E38, E39, E40, E41, E42, E43, E44, E45, E46, E47, E48, E49, E50	

Les discours de presse se caractérisent par la volonté de neutraliser leur point de vue, c'est pourquoi il n'est pas étonnant de voir que dans 50% des cas, il s'agit d'un *commentaire*. Au niveau rhétorique, le média cherche aussi à inscrire la parole de l'autre dans un dispositif de communication, ceci dans 40% des cas: soit en mettant en scène des paroles politiques inscrites dans la mémoire collective, c'est le cas des "phrases clés" (E1, 17, 26 et 27) ou des "petites phrases célèbres" (E22 à 25), soit en construisant l'image de sa cible s'investissant dans le débat politique, c'est le cas du discours des jeunes *dialogisé* "Election présidentielle 2007… Votre avis sur…" (E37 à 50).

Le discours de presse présente aussi dans quatre cas des systèmes de pensée. Il ne s'agit pas là simplement d'un commentaire car le journal éprouve le besoin de mettre en contraste un point de vue avec son contre-discours. L'exemple le plus frappant est celui de l'énoncé 13, le discours étant celui de Jean-Marie Le Pen repris dans la rubrique "C'est dit": *Dans le Marais, on peut chasser à toute heure du jour et de la nuit, sans qu'il y ait ni heure ni jour d'ouverture ou de fermeture de la chasse.* Jean-Marie Le Pen, devant des chasseurs, à propos du quartier gay de Paris. Cette prise de position est immédiatement mise dans un rapport de contradiction, le contre-discours étant: *Ses propos ont été condamnés lundi par l'association SOS Homophobie*. Dans ces quatre cas, le discours ainsi que leur contre-discours sont juxtaposés dans le même énoncé.

Pour revenir rapidement aux énoncés se rapprochant du commentaire, il s'agit de préciser que dans certains cas, le point de vue de l'instance médiatique se fait entendre. La neutralisation est plus faible. C'est le cas du dessin du jour représentant une image négative et bouffonne de Ségolène Royal présentant son programme devant un public plutôt mécontent: *Et pour commencer, je vous propose un petit sketch de mes meilleures blagues* (E29). Pour ce qui est de l'énoncé 53, on a aussi une faible neutralisation, voire un positionnement en faveur de Jacques Chirac. On nous dit: *65% des 15-17 ans jugent que Jacques Chirac a* "*plutôt été un bon Président pour la France*" […] et on représente graphiquement cette information à l'aide d'une flèche verte allant vers le haut. L'instance médiatique prend ici en charge l'énoncé en valorisant l'image du président Jacques Chirac.

4. Conclusion

En conclusion, on peut dire, d'après toutes ces remarques, que la *dialogisation interactionnelle* ainsi que le dialogisme intertextuel participent à une mise en scène argumentative ayant pour principale conséquence d'influencer le public destinataire. Le discours est non seulement le moyen de faire savoir mais aussi de faire adhérer, ceci dans un rapport majoritaire de persuasion (importance des actes de communication).

De plus, ces deux procédés rhétoriques dialogiques constituent des arguments dans le sens où ils produisent des effets de didacticité. Bien que ceci n'apparaisse que pour la parole des jeunes, on peut dire que l'on apprend implicitement aux jeunes à présenter un point de vue et à le justifier. La parole des autres jeunes présente des enjeux argumentatifs dans le sens où elle met en relation un discours et son contre-discours. Dans le débat politique et social inhérent à la campagne présidentielle, il est nécessaire de souligner l'importance de la dimension argumentative où une proposition est toujours évaluée en fonction d'une contre-proposition. Cette manière de présenter les choses participe à la socialisation des jeunes ainsi qu'à l'apprentissage de la citoyenneté. La parole argumentative joue un rôle très important dans l'émergence de la citoyenneté. Le citoyen est celui qui parle, qui discute, qui entre en débat contradictoire, bref qui argumente (Breton 2000:6). Cette rhétorique contribue donc en partie à l'apprentissage du débat argumentatif. Par ailleurs, l'inscription du jeune ciblé dans un 'pseudo-dialogue' donne du dynamisme et des effets de réel au discours.

Cependant, majoritairement, la parole de l'autre a pour effet principal d'interpeller d'une manière ludique et théâtrale. Les énoncés 'chocs' ne présentent pas de points de vue, seulement des affirmations captivantes, facilement mémorisables. Cette analyse nous montre que la parole des adultes joue en grande partie sur l'argumentation dite "rhétorique", c'est-à-dire mettant en valeur d'une manière privilégiée l'image, les sentiments, les techniques au service de la campagne. La faible réfutation des arguments d'autrui (le cas exceptionnel étant lié aux arguments avancés par Le Pen) a pour conséquence l'affaiblissement de la position argumentative. On évite le conflit pour moraliser[9] une manière de bien penser où le caractère conflictuel du débat politique est atténué au profit du façonnage d'une simple image publique des politiciens. En dehors de la parole des jeunes, il semble que l'on cherche à mettre sur la même ligne d'entente la représentation du débat, qui lui devrait se définir par la discorde. De cette manière, globalement, on peut dire que le discours de l'autre

[9] La commission de contrôle et de surveillance des publications destinées à la jeunesse (loi promulguée le 16 juillet 49) se donne pour rôle de proposer des lectures saines aux jeunes dans une atmosphère hautement morale. Le discours semble répondre de cette manière à une doctrine "moralisatrice centrée sur le respect de la dignité humaine et soucieuse de la protection de l'enfance et de préservation de la morale sociale" (Analyse de la dimension moralisatrice de la presse jeune de Thierry Crépin (p.31) dans le *MédiaMorphoses* n°10 publié en 2004 sous la direction de Divina Frau-Meigs).

n'amène pas, comme on pourrait le croire, à une opposition de points de vue mais plutôt à une homogénéisation de la pensée.

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Corpus étudié

1. Mise en scène du discours relevant de l'instance politique:

La parole de Ségolène Royal:

E1: N°2205 (Le 6 janvier 2007), p.6: "France. Royal *promet* de l'argent aux jeunes. Ségolène Royal, la candidate socialiste à l'élection présidentielle, *a promis* jeudi que, si elle venait à être élue, "*chaque jeune, à sa majorité, disposera d'un prêt gratuit de 10 000 euros garantis par l'Etat pour lui permettre de construire son premier projet de vie*"."

E2: N°2206 (Le 9 janvier 2007), p.5: "Chine. "Bravitude", mot créé par Ségolène Royal. En visite en Chine le week-end dernier, Ségolène Royal *a déclaré*: "*Comme le disent les Chinois, qui n'est pas venu sur la Grande Muraille n'est pas un brave. Qui va sur la Grande Muraille conquiert la "bravitude"*." Or, ce mot n'existe pas dans la langue française. La candidate socialiste à la présidence de la République *l'a certainement employé à la place de "bravoure"."*

E3: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.2: "La première candidate femme ayant une vraie chance d'atteindre l'Elysée anticipe d'un jour la Journée de la femme: lors d'un rassemblement à Dijon

(Côte-d'Or), elle *martèle* qu'elle est une femme incarnant le changement: *"Avec moi, la politique ne sera plus jamais comme avant..."*."
E4: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.3: "Elle y *dénonce "l'ignoble"* idée lancée l'avant-veille par Nicolas Sarkozy".

La parole de ceux qui soutiennent Ségolène Royale:

E5: N°2215 (Le 20 janvier 2007), p.7: "C'est dit: "*Ségolène Royal n'a qu'un seul défaut, c'est son compagnon.*" Arnaud Montebourg, porte-parole de Ségolène Royal (mercredi soir, sur Canal+). Il a été suspendu de ses fonctions pour un mois après *ce bon mot* sur François Hollande, compagnon de la candidate socialiste."

La parole de Nicolas Sarkozy / et slogan du parti:

E6: N°2229 (Le 9 février 2007), p.6: "France. TF1 censure Sarko? Lundi, Nicolas Sarkozy a participé à *J'ai une question à vous poser*, sur TF1. L'émission a été mise en ligne dans la nuit sur les sites de LCI et TF1. *Mais* mardi, des internautes ont découvert qu'un passage sur l'immigration ("*Quand on aime la France, on la respecte, on n'égorge pas le mouton dans son appartement"*) avait été coupé. La chaîne a évoqué un "*incident technique*" et a remis en ligne, mercredi, l'intégralité de l'émission".
E7: N°2208 (Le 11 janvier 2007), p.6: ""*Tout devient possible avec Nicolas Sarkozy*"**?** Le slogan du candidat UMP à la présidentielle serait "*Tout devient possible avec Nicolas Sarkozy*", a indiqué lundi l'entourage du président du parti. Il devrait être décliné en une série de produits dérivés: sacoches à bandoulière, sacs féminins, petites trousses, sweat-shirts, tee-shirts…"
E8: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.3: "Il *propose* sur France 2 un ministère de l'Immigration et de l'Identité nationale, qui crée la polémique".
E9: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.3: "[…] Sur Canal +, *il ironise* sur François Bayrou, dont la stratégie finit par "*mettre tout le monde dans le même faitout*"."

La parole de Jean-Marie Le Pen:

E10: N°2201 (Le 2 janvier 2007), p.7: "[…] Le candidat d'extrême droite *se dit certain* d'être au second tour. […]"
E11: N°2207 (Le 10 janvier 2007), p.6: "France. Le Pen *se voit* Président cette année. Jean-Marie Le Pen *a pronostiqué* lundi qu'il serait au 2nd tour de la présidentielle face à la socialiste Ségolène Royal. *"Mais à la différence de 2002, je peux gagner"*, *a précisé* le leader du FN. Il y a cinq ans, il avait recueilli près de 17% des voix au 1er tour et 18% au 2nd".
E12: N°2233 (Le 14 février 2007), p.7: "C'est dit. "*Le programme est clair: il faut arrêter l'immigration*" Le leader du front national, Jean-Marie Le Pen, candidat à la présidentielle (lundi, dans *J'ai une question à vous poser*, sur TF1)".
E13: N°2243 (Le 28 février 2007), p.7: "C'est dit. "*Dans le Marais, on peut chasser à toute heure du jour et de la nuit, sans qu'il y ait ni heure ni jour d'ouverture ou de fermeture de la chasse.*" Jean-Marie Le Pen, devant des chasseurs, à propos du quartier gay de Paris. *Ses propos ont été condamnés* lundi par l'association SOS Homophobie".

La parole de Jacques Chirac:

E14: N°2233 (Le 14 février 2007), p.7: “Le livre L’inconnu de l’Elysée sort aujourd’hui. Le président Chirac se confie dans un livre. […] Le Pen. “*Il faut encore et toujours* combattre *M. Le Pen et ses réincarnations. Il y a là un profond danger* car *on joue avec les instincts humains les plus bas*”.
E15: N°2233 (Le 14 février 2007), p.7: „Sarkozy. “*Je le connais bien, avec, comme tout le monde, ses qualités et ses défauts. (…) J’ai moi aussi des qualités et des défauts*”.”
E16: N°2237 (Le 20 février 2007), p.IV: “Les phrases-clés. “*Dans une campagne, il faut aller chercher les électeurs avec les dents*”. Jacques Chirac, cité dans Le Dauphin et le Régent, de Catherine Nay.
E17: “*Il faut voter avec son intelligence et non avec ses tripes*”. Jacques Chirac, dans le quotidien Le Monde, le 20 mai 1984”.
E18: N°2252 (Le 13 mars 2007), p.6: “Le président de la République *a appelé les Français* à ne “*jamais composer avec l'extrémisme, le racisme (...) ou le rejet de l'autre*”.”

La parole de François Bayrou:

E19: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.2: “*Dur d'être toujours original*: celui qui fut cultivateur avant de faire de la politique répète passionnément à chaque stand du Salon de l'agriculture: “*C'est une championne, votre vache*!”.”
E20: N°2254 (Le 15 mars 2007), p.3: “A la radio, *il ouvre le feu des critiques* sur la proposition de la veille de Nicolas Sarkozy”.

La parole d’autres hommes politiques:

E21: N°2217 (Le 24 janvier 2007), p.7: “L'animateur télé a fait une annonce lundi à Paris. Présidentielle: pourquoi Nicolas Hulot n'ira pas. […]“*J'ai décidé de ne pas être candidat à l'élection présidentielle et de suspendre mon ingérence politique*”, a déclaré l'animateur écolo devant une foule de journalistes. […] Il souhaite “*faire confiance à la parole et à l'engagement des candidats“* qui ont signé son pacte écologique *(lire encadré)* et aussi respecter la sienne. […] Enfin, l'animateur est “*convaincu qu'en restant à l'écart du jeu du pouvoir, l'élan du pacte écologique va s'amplifier et se transformer en véritable lobby des consciences*”.”
N°2227 (Le 7 février 2007), p.7: “Des “petites phrases” célèbres. Le site de l’INA propose de télécharger des “*phrases cultes*” d’hommes politiques pour en faire sa sonnerie de portable (3 euros, plus le prix d’un SMS). En voici quelques-unes.
E22: “*Paris outragé, Paris brisé, Paris martyrisé mais Paris libéré !*” (Charles de Gaulle, 1944),
E23: “*La réforme, oui. La chienlit, non*” (Georges Pompidou 1968),
E24: “*Je vous demande de vous arrêter!*” (Edouard Balladur 1995),
E25: “*Notre route est droite mais la pente est forte*” (Jean-Pierre Raffarin, 2002).“
N°2237 (Le 20 février 2007), p.IV: “Les phrases-clés”.
E26: “*On ne guérit pas les plaies en les léchant avec une langue de bois*”. Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, dans le quotidien Libération, le 10 *décembre 1990***.**
E27: “*Dans la vie politique on ne se fait pas, on ne se crée pas de véritables amitiés. On a quelques bons compagnons*”. François Mitterrand, dans la revue Autrement, en juin 1982”.

2. Mise en scène du discours relevant de l'instance médiatique:

La parole caricaturée de Ségolène Royal par les dessinateurs de presse:

E28: N°2221 (Le 30 janvier 2007), p.7: "Le dessin du jour. Retour des Antilles de Ségolène Royal.
"- *Tu rapportes beaucoup de bananes non?*
- C'est pour Nicolas Sarkozy, il aime beaucoup me lancer des peaux de bananes sous les pieds ces temps-ci…""
E29: N°2229 (Le 9 février 2007), p.7: "Le dessin du jour. Dimanche, Ségolène Royal présente son programme pour la présidentielle 2007: "*Et pour commencer, je vous propose un petit sketch de mes meilleures blagues*"."

La parole caricaturée de Nicolas Sarkozy par les dessinateurs de presse:

E30: N°2210 (Le 13 janvier 2007), p.7: "Le dessin du jour. Sarkozy officiellement candidat UMP à la présidentielle ce week-end.
"*Et maintenant tous unis derrière moi. Volons vers la vict…aïe! Dominique, je t'ai vu!* ""

La parole caricaturée de Ségolène Royal et de Nicolas Sarkozy par les dessinateurs de presse:

E31: N°2237 (Le 20 février 2007), p.III: "- *Allez, dehors Jacques! C'est moi Nigolène Royalzy, qui prends les commandes en 2007-2012.*
- Quel horrible cauchemar!!" Yacine"

3. Mise en scène du discours relevant de l'instance citoyenne:

La parole de ceux qui soutiennent Nicolas Sarkozy:

E32: N°2241 (Le 24 février 2007), p.7: "C'est dit. "*Je me retrouve en Sarkozy, car c'est une personne qui est souvent caricaturée, comme moi, et qui dérange beaucoup par son atypisme.* "Le travesti Vincent McDoom, dans le magazine Le Point".

La parole de ceux qui ne soutiennent pas Nicolas Sarkozy:

E33: N°2248 (Le 7 mars 2007), p.7: "C'est dit: "*Nicolas Sarkozy m'appelle régulièrement pour que je vienne dîner chez lui. En vain. J'ai tout ce qu'il faut dans mon frigo.* " Le comédien Jamel Debbouze (dans le magazine Première)".

Les sondages / L'audience:

E34: N°2201 (Le 2 janvier 2007), p.7: "[…] L'image du leader du FN semble s'être améliorée dans l'opinion depuis cinq ans. Selon une enquête, les Français sont 26 % à se dire "plutôt" ou "*tout à fait*" d'accord avec ses idées. Ce niveau n'a été atteint qu'à trois reprises en 20 ans (32 % en 1991, 28 % en 1996 et 2002). […]"
E35: N°2239 (Le 22 février 2007), p.6: "L'émission *J'ai une question à vous poser* avec Ségolène Royal a attiré 8,9 millions de téléspectateurs lundi sur TF1, contre 8,2 millions pour celle avec Nicolas Sarkozy, 15 jours plus tôt".

E36: N°2251 (Le 10 mars), p.6: "Nicolas Sarkozy est en tête des intentions de vote des 18-24 ans pour le premier tour de la présidentielle avec 32 %, contre 30 % pour Ségolène Royal, selon un sondage publié mercredi".

4. Mise en scène du discours des jeunes de l'instance citoyenne *en herbe*:

La parole des jeunes qui soutiennent Ségolène Royal:

E37: N°2251 (Le 10 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Pour une fois, un personnage politique écoute le peuple.* "Quentin"
E38: N°2256 (Le 17 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Elle est socialiste, un mouvement plus juste que les autres.*" Martin"

La parole des jeunes qui ne soutiennent pas Ségolène Royal:

E39: N°2251 (Le 10 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Il faudrait un magicien pour réaliser toutes ses idées sans ruiner la France!*" Juju"
E40: N°2256 (Le 17 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Elle a fait passer le PS de Jaurès et Blum de la gauche au centre-droit.*" Mickaël"

La parole des jeunes qui soutiennent Nicolas Sarkozy:

E41: N°2250 (Le 9 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Il présente son programme énergiquement et il a de bons arguments.* "Ghab"
E42: N°2255 (Le 16 mars 2007), p.7: ""Il s'exprime clairement. C'est le seul dont je comprends les discours de A à Z." Cochemar"

La parole des jeunes qui ne soutiennent pas Nicolas Sarkozy:

E43: N°2250 (Le 9 mars 2007), p.7: ""*S'il peut régler le problème des banlieues, pourquoi ne l'a-t-il pas fait? Il est ministre.* " Louise"
E44: N°2255 (Le 16 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Je ne partage pas ses idées sur l'immigration*" Camille"

La parole des jeunes qui soutiennent François Bayrou:

E45: N°2252 (Le 13 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Au moins il est bon pour l'Europe, qui est notre avenir. Et il n'est pas bien dangereux.* " Thomas"
E46: N°2258 (Le 20 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Il ferait un bon Président puisqu'il dit ne pas appartenir à un parti.*" Camille"

La parole des jeunes qui ne soutiennent pas François Bayrou:

E47: N°2252 (Le 13 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Il n'a pas de véritable conviction.*" Lyric"
E48: N°2258 (Le 20 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Présider avec la gauche et la droite, c'est impossible*". Carpillon"

La parole des jeunes qui soutiennent Jean-Marie Le Pen:

E49: N°2253 (Le 14 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Pour sa vision de l'immigration: ne pas* "*jeter*" *les clandestins mais stopper leur arrivée*". 007 Mariov"

La parole des jeunes qui ne soutiennent pas Jean-Marie Le Pen:

E50: N°2253 (Le 14 mars 2007), p.7: ""*Le Pen? Je n'oserais plus me regarder dans un miroir*". Vich"

Les sondages:

E51: N°2215 (Le 20 janvier 2007), p.6: "France. Sondage: les jeunes opposés au droit de vote à 16 ans. Et si on abaissait l'âge du droit de vote à 16 ans? C'est la question posée par le mensuel *Phosphore* aux 16-25 ans, dans un sondage dont les résultats sont publiés dans son numéro de février. Les jeunes sont très majoritairement contre: 63% des 16-17 ans et 69% des 18-25 ans. "*Les jeunes prennent la politique au sérieux*, décrypte David Groison, responsable de la rubrique actualité du magazine. *Ils sont contre le droit de vote à 16 ans car, à cet âge, ils estiment qu'ils ne sont pas assez formés ni informés pour faire un choix.*" On pourrait croire que les jeunes ne veulent pas voter à 16 ans parce qu'ils sont apolitiques. "*C'est faux*, explique le journaliste. *Interrogés sur leurs intentions de vote s'ils pouvaient s'exprimer, ils placent Ségolène Royal et Nicolas Sarkozy en tête loin devant les autres candidats, comme les adultes*.""
E52: N°2224 (Le 2 février 2007), p.6: „France. Le Pen au second tour: jeunes dans la rue. Les jeunes de 15-25 ans seraient 44% à manifester contre Jean-Marie Le Pen s'il parvenait au second tour de la présidentielle, selon un sondage publié samedi. 73% estiment que la présence du leader du Fn au second tour serait "*une mauvaise chose pour la France*." 50% pensent qu'il faudrait "*l'empêcher de se présenter*"."
E53: N°2244 (Le 1er mars), p.6: "65% des 15-17 ans jugent que Jacques Chirac a "plutôt été un bon Président pour la France", selon un sondage BVA-*Citato*-Le Mouv'."

Televisual Rhetoric

A fast forward device to cultural evolution?

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Inspired by the emerging democracy of fourth and fifth century (BCE) in Greece, this paper introduces and examines the five canons of classical rhetoric and reveals their continuing and significant function in one of today's principle communication mediums. It will be demonstrated that, although first devised for vocal delivery, these five canons continue to provide the fundamental structure to a new and powerful televisual expression of the rhetorical message. By deconstructing two from a series of four television commercials it will be shown how, through comedy or irony, such rhetoric impacts on how we view science and scientists. It will also reveal how, in a social context, despite an increasing sensitivity to issues of gender awareness in recent years, stereotypical roles for men and women are still perpetuated often in implicit or subliminal ways. Finally it will be suggested that there may be ramifications for children in secondary education that, in the wider context, implicate televisual rhetoric as a key component in maintaining, reinforcing or modifying our cultural behaviour.

1. Introduction

The physical sciences have, historically, been heavily populated by men in varying degrees around the world with all but two of the Nobel prizes for physics, since the awards commenced in 1901, going to men.

In July 2004 a report, *Science in My Future,* (Haste 2004) expressed concern at the attitudes to science in 11 to 21-year-olds in England, Wales and Scotland. It voiced continuing concern about women's under-representation.

Last year the British Government's *Women and Work Commission* called for the *Department of Culture, Media & Sport* to set up two high-level groups of advertisers and key players in television drama to encourage non-stereotypical portrayals of women and men at work' (Owen 2006). Our Government''s concern, therefore, has provided the impetus for this research.

Once devised for vocal and written delivery, there is evidence that the five canons of classical rhetoric are now wittingly or unwittingly employed in television advertising and we shall look at two ostensibly amusing television advertisements from 2005 in order to illustrate how such rhetoric might be targeting and acting on its audiences today.

2. Origins of rhetoric - The sophist legacy

So first, what *is* rhetoric? To find the answer to this question we turn to Athens of the 5th century, BCE. Most authors attribute the rise of rhetoric to the Sophists who were originally itinerant teachers and who taught many different subjects of which rhetoric was but one. Engendered by the newly emerging democracies, however, rhetoric became a "must-have'' skill for the Greeks of that period who seemed just as eager to engage in litigation as Americans are to-day. If one were not rich enough to pay for lessons or lacked the skill to master rhetoric, then one hired a Sophist to represent one.

Aristophanes (448-380 BCE) in his comedy of the period, *The Clouds*, (Sommerstein [trans], 2002) has Strepsiades, a moderately wealthy citizen of 5th century BCE Athens, saying of them "and if you pay them well, they can teach you how to win a case whether you are in the right or not."

This claim by the Sophists was, indeed, a financially rewarding boast but their 'relativistic view of the truth' brought them little credit and eventually led them into disrepute. Socrates and his pupil Plato claimed that 'the Sophists were immoral both because they charged for their services and because they did not instruct their clients and students on the *ethical* use of their newly acquired skills' (Collier & Toomey, 1997). Indeed Plato (428-348 BCE), in his dialogue entitled *Sophist*, describes them as 'manipulators or jugglers of the truth.' This was, however, a somewhat, cynical view and the following seems to give a more balanced opinion:

> The Sophists set up small schools and charged their pupils a fee for what amounted in many cases to tutoring. These schools eventually proved to be so lucrative that they attracted a number of charlatans into the teaching profession and it was men like these who eventually gave sophists an unsavoury reputation and made "sophistry" a synonym for deceitful reasoning. (Corbett, 1990:541)

The legacy of the Sophists and their unprincipled rhetoric clearly lives on for the association has become well established in England in our common usage of the word *rhetoric* as a term that is all but synonymous with empty words or implying insincerity. We may recognise such phrases as "being economical with the truth" as relating to that same dubious rhetoric and the Sophists of ancient Greece have become the "spin-doctors" of to-day who, like their counterparts, have also fallen into disrepute in England.

3. Origins of rhetoric - Aristotle's legacy

Rhetoric, however, has a second interpretation, which *we* shall now pursue, and which one acclaimed English dictionary describes as 'speech or writing which is intended to be effective and persuasive.' Employed essentially in academic circles, this definition probably owes much to Aristotle (384-322 BCE) who, in describing it said, "*Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular]*

case, to see the available means of persuasion" (Kennedy 1991:36). Aristotle (384-322 BCE), a pupil of Plato and equally aware of disreputable practice among the Sophists, shared his master's ethical concerns and began the formalisation of rhetoric.

4. The five canons

Covino & Jolliffe from the University of Chicargo, in their publication of 1995 describe how Aristotle laid the foundation for what, during the time of the Roman rhetoricians, Cicero (106-43 BCE) and Quintillion (35-95 CE), eventually emerged as the five canons of rhetoric. These were *Invention*, *Arrangement*, *Style*, *Memory* and *Delivery* and they continue to uphold rhetoric in all its forms. Let us now look at the *visual* expression but, since it is not immediately clear what these canons represent, we will first examine them in more detail.

5. The first canon: Invention (knowing the audience)

The first canon, *Invention***,** which we can sub-title 'knowing the audience' was a key and prior requisite to the following four canons. Thus *invention* consisted of assessing the audience in terms of what they already 'knew' and were prepared to believe whilst generating effective material for that particular rhetorical situation. In view of its importance we shall pursue this canon somewhat further than the others because it is routinely and extensively employed by the media to-day. As an example we will see how one English national daily newspaper identified and targeted its readership in order to persuade them to take a particular view of a breaking science story during 2002. In doing so it employed two techniques known as phonology and intertextuality.

Phonology requires the rhetor to construct a new phrase representing the substance of his or her thesis whilst closely resembling, the sound, of another text that is well known to the audience. Intertextuality, however, is more complex and, in addition, requires the rhetor to show a relationship between two different texts.

An illustration and headline taken from an English mid-tabloid newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, refers to a family who have decided to have a second child (from a genetically selected embryo) so that stem cells can be removed from the umbilical cord in order to treat a sibling which has an otherwise incurable condition. The story prompted much repetition in the press of the phrase "designer baby."

The headline, "Depraved New World?" employs *phonology* to parody the title of the English novel, 'Brave New World' by Aldous Huxley**,** anticipating that its audience will be acquainted with classical English literature. But much more than this it also expects that its audience, coming from a higher-middle grade on the

socio-economic scale (JICNARS 'C1'), will have some knowledge of the work *itself*. *Intertextuality* is, therefore, invoked in sharing the *subject matter* of the novel with that of the news story - in this case - scientific interference with natural biological processes. The rhetoric operates on the expectation that most of this particular audience will recall the ethical concern or abhorrence they felt in reading the novel and will be equally persuaded that this new scientific advance *also* has serious consequences and is a subject to be wary of. The diagram is emotive in its realistic depiction of a production line of human babies that are clearly being 'developed' outside of the womb.

Bearing in mind that the *Daily Mail* claims to have a "strong female readership" it is not difficult to estimate how successful this visual rhetoric would be, when combined with the text, in delivering its message. The scientist in this illustration is hard to spot but is a shadowy background figure (to the right of the baby) who shuns the limelight and thus maintains that stereotypical remoteness from ordinary people. The illustration which vilifies science, therefore, conspires with the headline to create the message that this practice is unnatural - scientists playing god - and that it could be our future!

So already we can see that *before* readers have even engaged with the text they are being prepared by *visual* rhetoric.

This example shows us, therefore, how the audience were *assessed* with regard to what they already knew, which provided "knowledge of what they were prepared to believe" leading to the "generation of appropriate material." In short the canon of *Invention***.** Incidentally, in using phonology and intertextuality, presence has also been added to their ideas which in a moment we shall see satisfies the third canon of rhetoric which is 'style'.

Now we shall look quickly at the remaining canons.

6. The second canon: Arrangement (structured presentation)

Arrangement comprises the ordering of material within a 'text' thus giving it a structure. Classical origins suggest that an effective argument is ordered thus:

1. Capture the audience's attention.
2. Provide the necessary background information.
3. State and prove the text's thesis.
4. Anticipate and address possible counter-theses.
5. Conclude by appealing to the audience's emotions.

This is a well tried and successful recipe that is still employed to-day by skilled orators from priests delivering their church sermons to politicians giving party political speeches.

7. The third canon: Style (giving presence to ideas)

Style, the third canon, involves the use of language index, tropes, simile, metaphor, metonymy, phonology, intertextuality, and schemes to generate the required impressions. Under 'schemes' rhetorical theorists have catalogued such devices as parallelism (creating a similarity of structure in a set of related words, phrases or clause). Most modern rhetorical theorists see style as the process of 'giving presence' to ideas that rhetors want their audiences to attend to.

For example, at the English Conservative Party Conference in 1980 the Prime Minister at that time, Margaret Thatcher, made a defiant speech to her party in which she stressed her determination to stick to tough economic policies despite doubts expressed among her supporters. Expecting her to back down on counter-inflationary policies, her critics were surprised to hear her say:

> "To those waiting with bated breath for that favourite media catchphrase, the U-turn, I have only one thing to say: 'You turn' if you want to. The lady's not for turning!"

In this we find two examples of phonology in two short sentences. First the play on words in which the invitation "you turn if you want to" mimics the sound in the expression 'U turn' which is a change of direction shaped like a letter 'U'. The second example, followed immediately. Margaret Thatcher, a natural and talented rhetor, knew that members of her party were drawn largely from the higher socio-economic classes and were thus likely to possess knowledge of English literature. In this she fulfilled the first canon of rhetoric *invention* - assessing the audience in terms of what they knew and were prepared to believe and generating effective material for that situation. Armed with this, she had no hesitation in declaring "The lady's not for turning," and parodying the title of a play "The Lady's not for Burning" by the English playwright Christopher Fry. It not only wrote the headlines in the next day's newspapers but guaranteed her a place in history and provides us today with a powerful and practical demonstration of the third canon of rhetoric - style - 'giving presence' to ideas that rhetors want their audiences to attend to.

8. The fourth canon: Memory

The fourth canon, *Memory***,** was very important in classical periods, because rhetors were required to commit their speeches to memory – unlike many to-day. Mnemonics were frequently employed whereby, for example, rhetors may, in their minds, associate the parts of their speeches with various rooms in a house. The *introduction* might be associated with the porch, the *background narration* with the foyer, the *thesis* and *proof* with the arch and grand ballroom and the *conclusion* with the antechamber.

In current rhetorical theory we find that computers are being used to store huge data bases and rhetors are devising increasingly inventive ways to manipulate these data so, in a way, memory remains a vital canon.

9. The fifth canon: Delivery

Demosthenes an early Greek orator and famous for practicing speeches while holding pebbles in his mouth, to improve his pronunciation—was once asked, "*What is the most important part of rhetoric?"* He replied: "*Delivery, delivery, delivery*."

Delivery is the fifth and final canon. It was the art of using one's voice and body effectively when speaking. In both classical periods and later, elaborate theory was developed to teach rhetors how to pronounce words and project their voices whilst using facial expression, gesture and stance - sometimes referred to as body language. Varying the volume, or pitch of one's voice and the timing of one's delivery were also powerful rhetorical devices.

So much for the five canons, Aristotle also identified three *species* of rhetoric which he termed *deliberative, judicial* and *epideictic* accompanied by three types of appeal, namely *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos,* but we shall not explore those today. Instead we are now going to examine two of a series of five English television advertisements from 2005.

10. The big picture

In the two television advertisements, commissioned by Egg Banking plc., for a UK audience, we will see how the use of bank cards is promoted with mildly amusing scenes in which guinea pigs, are apparently being used in a scientific experiment.

The prime and explicit message promoting the Egg card, rests on a sub-matrix of inter-dependent vocal and visual scenarios that employ *implicit* rhetorical messages about English culture, some of which are clearly intended and others that are probably not.

11. Features and rhetoric common to both advertisements

So let us now look at the features and rhetoric common to both of these advertisements.



The introduction is clearly very important to EGG since it is used, unmodified in any way, in all of a series of five advertisements from which these two have be drawn. It is logical to assume, therefore, that it must carry an equally important message.

The opening scene patently employs the rhetoric of scale and leaves few options as to its implicit meaning. The two scientists, seen approaching the *huge* Egg Research Lab at the opening of each advertisement, are *deliberately* dwarfed by its immense size and contrasted with its tiny inhabitants to leave its audience with an unmistakable visual metaphor of EGG's power and ability to control.

Once inside, the *vastness* of the laboratory is again stressed by use of a high camera angle and the white coated scientists who are miniaturized in a landscape of scientific equipment that completely surrounds and, at times, overarches a scale-model township.

The guinea pigs, which are shown to behave as people in a scientific experiment, create an obvious yet powerful vocal and visual metaphor; for to say to someone, "I was a human *guinea pig*", is to imply that one was in the control of others - usually possessing more knowledge of one's situation than oneself. The use of such a metaphor, therefore, accords with the third canon of rhetoric, *style,*



which, with other figures of speech, gives presence to ideas that rhetors want their audiences to attend to. In this instance, that, as with the guinea pigs, the English public may have their financial problems solved by EGG.

The use of *high* camera angle emphasises the scientists' superior viewpoint and by inference greater physical size. Berger (2005) regards the use of a high camera angle ('pan down') as signifying power and authority.

Conversely the use of a low camera angle places the television audience at the same level as the guinea pigs. The grounded position of the guinea pigs (and TV audience) is, therefore, contrasted with the scientists' who, in their elevated observation points, are both physically and metaphorically in a superior position. Berger (ibid) considers the use of low camera angle ('pan up') to be indicative of smallness and weakness.

In both these advertisements the 'EGG scientists,' four male Caucasian actors and one Oriental female actor, adopt familiar data-gathering behaviour within an 'experimental' setting. All are dressed in white lab coats and three a carry clip board which firmly identifies them as scientists. Often required in everyday life to give expert testimony, they are perceived by most to be different to 'ordinary

people'. Established cultural representations of scientists are simultaneously re-inforced, therefore, as we are persuaded that scientists are powerful, fair skinned and almost exclusively male.



Seen conferring only occasionally with each other they are, nevertheless, unheard and *never* speak to camera (their audience) rendering them mysterious and remote. Such behaviour, therefore, serves only to maintain that distancing from 'ordinary people' and to reinforce their 'special' status. Thus these scenes construct an implicit statement of scientific authority.

Note that the *only* female scientist has been marginalised. Partially hidden at the very back of the group and lacking a clip board she goes almost unnoticed. By contrast a stereotypical male scientist, complete with beard, glasses and clipboard, occupies the most prominent position - the centre foreground. Nelkin identifies media images such as these in observing that:

> The scientist, at least the male scientist, is portrayed in popular newspapers and magazines as socially removed, apart from, and above most human preoccupations. (Nelkin 1999:229).

The decision by EGG's advertising agency to invent a narrative of scientific research, however, turns out to be doubly rewarding for EGG. For the white coat and clip board are also related to doctors and the medical profession. In addition, therefore the strategy promises to secure viewers' trust by arousing memories of their doctor / patient relationship. Such trust would be seen to be well earned, moreover, since the EGG scientists are portrayed as (financial) problem solvers seeking to benefit 'ordinary *family* people.' Here we witness rhetoric by association, a visual parallelism of the third canon. EGG's text is paralleled, therefore, with that of scientific and medical trustworthiness. All of this occurs as a result of invoking the 1st canon of *invention* (relating to what an audience already 'knows') and employing the type of rhetorical appeal, which was briefly alluded to earlier, known as *ethos* which seeks to establish credibility.

The voice-over, purports to be that of a scientist. Attributing a foreign accent to representations of scientists is not uncommon in England and it is most likely to be interpreted by English audiences as being reminiscent of the most universally recognised of scientists, Albert Einstein. The English, you will have observed, tend to speak *only* their own language and are, therefore, not *too* discerning when it comes to identifying national accents. Used as a vocal rhetoric to reinforce the visual scientific authority, it is a ploy that might, once again, be

doubly rewarding for EGG since it also promises to enhance the perceived quality of the EGG card by kindling a memory of Germany's reputation for technological excellence in much the same way as the series of Audi advertisements does with the slogan "Vorsprung durch Technik". There! Who says the English only speak English?

Although the risk that such an accent might conjure up an image of Frankenstein *is* also possible it is unlikely in the light of the scientists' portrayal as problem-solving benefactors.

Finally the music track is a theme that is common to all advertisements in the series from which these two have been taken and operates in tandem with the visual rhetoric. As an introduction it alerts the viewer that another of those "funny guinea pig advertisements" is about to commence. It then engages with the viewer's emotions by encouraging action and optimism with its upbeat bright and 'busy' tempo. These appeals are consistent with the second canon, *Arrangement*, which deals with securing the attention of the audience.

Now let us look at each of the two advertisements. The overriding intent is to persuade viewers to identify themselves with the 'guinea pigs' situations and accept the authority of EGG in the shape of the scientists. To *aid* self-identification therefore EGG present easily recognisable *cultural* scenes.

12. Concerning advertisement 1: 'Testing'

The first advertisement mimics a scientific field trial to test two particular benefits of owning an EGG bank card: (i) "cash back" (discount) on purchases made, (ii) interest gained on remaining balance.

English cultural (domestic) norms are being reinforced in a typical weekend shopping scenario. The two advantages of EGG card ownership are *explicitly* stated but create *implicit* cultural roles for men and women by a co-ordinated visual and vocal rhetoric. Women are implicitly cast as *spenders*, in scenarios where only *women* are seen to shop backed by a vocal score announcing "cash back." Their movement is rapid and body language active. Conversely, men are implicitly portrayed as *investors* by settings that spare no effort to emphasise that they are definitely *not* shopping accompanied by a vocal score that promises "interest on remaining balance." Their body language

is flagrantly lethargic. *They* are seen seated at café tables or lounging on benches as, with apparent boredom, they await either their wives' decision on which dress to buy or their return from the shops. The scene delivers, therefore, a sharp gender division of 'spenders' and 'investors'.

The woman seen with a pushchair and women at the supermarket, purchasing groceries, also reinforce women's traditional domestic roles of child minding and shopping, underlining the dated attitude that 'a woman's place is in the home.'

EGG's power to provide financial benefit
(Possession of knowledge inherent in scientific authority.)

Men, by their semi-recumbent attitudes, prompt a match for their relaxed attitude to their wives' spending (with an EGG card of course). The wolf whistle, heard as one of the women emerges from a changing booth, is habitual male behaviour associated with English 'working-class' men (traditionally builders) and reveals EGG's target audience whilst satisfying the first canon of rhetoric *Invention* or "know your audience." The number of men present, who are clearly not at work, implies that it is a weekend. Characteristically, at this time, these men would be acting as 'chauffeurs' to their wives who are shopping. So recognisable is this behaviour that it becomes unnecessary to show the cars. As *investors* and *drivers*, therefore, men's traditional cultural rôle as the family 'breadwinner' or provider is strengthened.

Finally the momentary appearance of the scientist's face, huge by comparison with the guinea pigs, is a firm reminder of EGG's possession of knowledge, inherent in scientific authority, and its power to deliver financial benefit.

13. Concerning advertisement 2: 'Hiding'

The second advertisement promotes the EGG card as a means of solving overspending problems as a couple confront the camera which acts as the implied interviewer.

A four-bedroom bungalow and outdated furnishings together with the guinea pigs' vocal accents, choice of words and behaviour betray an English upper working-class status which, again, seems to provide a rhetoric for the type of audience that EGG are targeting. The absence of a television set is, nevertheless,

atypical, since even in the most impoverished of English households, television is frequently afforded 'life-support system' status.

The 'guinea pigs' confessional voice tones mimic those of subjects frequently heard in 'human interest' documentaries, often dealing with very sensitive and personal problems, and enhance the doctor patient relationship with EGG whilst inviting trust.

The storyline, showing the husband destroying bills and financial statements, will easily be recognised by psychologists as an expression of 'denial.' It is, almost certainly, *not* fabricated and is likely to have been based on real life accounts. The wife, speaking to camera, informs on her husband and prompts him to admit, in a low-key, conciliatory voice, his previous mismanagement of financial matters.

The wife, adopts a dominant, standing position, as her husband seats himself at the computer ostentatiously donated by an EGG scientist. EGG's power to provide the means of solving financial problems is highlighted *but* the rhetoric that men are more competent in *information technology* is also perpetuated. Internet access, moreover, indicates that this problem is part of a wider social 'ill' that can be 'cured' by the advice and assistance of (EGG) 'doctors.' Thus It confers on EGG an ethos of trust whilst diminishing *personal* responsibility for debt among working class families.

Women's domestic function is also rigorously reinforced. The reference to the sock as being "hidden" implies her responsibility for washing whilst the teapot she is holding is almost an *icon* of English domesticity. When a child rolls across the floor we are firmly reminded that she is a mother as well as a housewife.

Extracting the man's sock from the teapot the wife's 'dead-pan' voice engages humour and signals her forgiveness. Thus ownership of an EGG card, frees her husband of guilt and his failure, as a man, to provide for his family whilst restoring marital unity. A fairytale ending!

The rhetoric here conspires, therefore, both visually and vocally to reinforce traditional behavioural roles to the man as 'provider' and the woman as 'housewife' to enable this advertisement to resonate with the type of audience that EGG are seeking and by its comic portrayal project a message that this is not a serious problem *when* EGG are consulted.

(First canon, again - know your audience)

14. Summary

To summarise, television advertising is all about persuasion and so we can *expect* to find rhetoric.

These advertisements demonstrated knowledge of a certain socio-economic group and what they were likely to believe evidenced by material that had been specially generated to mimic its behaviour and lifestyle characteristics. Thus that same audience was then able to *identify* itself and take part in its *own* persuasion thereby satisfying the first canon of *Invention*

The novelty of "talking guinea pigs" and musical score secured the attention of that audience invoking the second canon of *Arrangemen***t** whilst the visual enactment of the metaphor "I was a human guinea pig" added presence to the message in compliance with the third canon of *Style.*

The fourth canon of *Memory,* although not *observed*, was by no means absent. Be it stage, film or television, actors despite auto-cues and similar devices, still employ memory techniques.

Finally, with a voice-over that conspired with the body language and visual authority of the scientists to enhance the power and ethos of EGG, the fifth canon of *Delivery* was powerfully exploited.

So we have seen that EGG, quite wittingly, set out to enhance their image to a specific audience in order to sell their product by employing techniques that can be seen to accord with the five ancient canons of Rhetoric,

Our presentation has sought to reveal something about the way in which science is perceived and exploited by media outlets and the resulting cultural stereotypes and gender roles that are *unwittingly* being reinforced and perpetuated. Perceptions such as:

- Scientists are mainly men.
- Scientists and doctors are trustworthy
- Women are shoppers (spenders)
- A woman's place is in the home.
- Men are providers (money earners).
- Men are investors and financial decision makers.
- Men are more powerful than women.

You may have observed others.

Importantly, as the study continues, it will be suggested that further research might examine the possibility that adolescents in secondary education, and girls in particular, might be vulnerable. At a time when they are seeking to determine what it means to be a woman in 2007, televisual rhetoric, which has the potential to *fast-forward* our cultural development, might, with such representations, be

posing an insidious constraint to their selection of higher education subjects and career choices.

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A Study of Hedge Strategies in Taiwan Political Discourse

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Based on four interviews with politicians from February to October in 2006, this paper attempts to provide a closer look at hedge strategies. In order to save face, evade responsibilities and avoid answering questions directly, political figures will beat around the bush. Consequently, face-threatening acts (FTA) (Brown & Levinson 1987), Grice's Maxims (1975), and repair are accounted for the relationship between hedge and politicians themselves. In this paper, hedge strategies will be divided into three main types, including giving approximate direct answers, half answers, and ignoring questions, and several subtypes follow. From the categorization of the hedge strategies, we realize that the type of giving half answers occurs most in political discourse analysis, which reveals that aiming to win people's support and avoid sensitive questions, political figures usually give only half answers, with which they can not only show their respect to the hosts but also evade the parts they refuse to answer.

1. Introduction

In recent years, attending interview programs is taken as a self-promotion opportunity for politicians. Through interviews on TV, politicians' ideas are publicized to hundreds of thousands of people. Especially during electoral time, politician's attending interviews may deepen an impression on the electorate, brainwash their thinking, win more support from them, and hopefully get final victory. According to previous studies, the pattern of turn taking is manifested in interviews: the interviewer is supposed to raise questions, and the interviewee is supposed to answer them (e.g., Clayman 1989, Greatatch 1988, Heritage Clayman & Zimmerman 1988). However, politicians usually violate the talking procedure and change the topic of questions once in a while, which is regarded as hedge or evasion.

In previous researches, this evasion phenomenon has been studied and different scholars have divided hedging responses into several subtypes. For example, Montero and Rodriguez-Mora (1998) list ten methods of avoiding answering questions, Bull and Mayer (1993) characterize thirty methods, Jucker (1986) presents thirteen evasive strategies, Hu (1999) discovers eight kinds, and Harris (1991) also distinguishes three categories of responses. Nevertheless, they classify the hedging responses merely on a linear level, which seems to be too disorganized to distinguish exactly how politicians avoid responsibilities. As a result, in this paper, the layered level of hedge classification will be examined and

the classification will be presented explicitly instead of abstract concepts such as attribution of passivity to the other (Montero & Rodriguez-Mora 1998).

2. Literature review

2.1 Reply and hedge

Politicians are inclined to manipulate language in order to achieve political purposes, either winning the electorate's supports or showing their advantages over their political opponents (Kuo 2003). From previous researches, the phenomenon of politicians' equivocation is shown clearly. For example, the result of the study conducted by Bull, Elliott, Palmer, and Walker in 1996 is similar to that of Harris' discovery in 1991, of the exaggeratedly high utility rate of evasive responses politicians give when faced with questions. It shows that the politicians answer 63.8% of Bavelas-type questions evasively with a non-reply, only half answer, or irrelevant response based on the eighteen interviews from the British General Election in 1991. As to non-replies, Bull (1994) elucidates that the term and evasion or equivocation are interchangeable, while equivocation is defined as describing a true but unrevealed message by Robinson, Shepherd, and Heywood (1998). Another definition is determined by Bavelas, Black, Chovil and Mullett (1990); according to them, equivocation is non-straightforward communication which is dubious, reverse or evasive. Recently, Hamilton and Mineo (1998) regard it as the "intentional use of imprecise language". In addition, Harris (1991) finds out that only 39% of the questions are given direct answers in the political interviews whose interviewees are mainly Thatcher and Kinnock. Likewise, in Harris' study (1991), two conclusions are made: one is that politicians indeed exert more hedge strategies than other people do when answering questions. The other is that it is the natural quality of questions to lead to not only complete but also indirect replies. The above studies strongly support the popular view that politicians always attempt to avoid providing direct answers in political interviews.

2.2 Mitigating devices

In order to analyze how politicians hedge questions, mitigating devices have already been analyzed in empirical findings by several scholars. For instance, Obeng (1997) finds out that politicians when confronted with arguable issues and topics tend to exert hedge approaches such as evasion, circumlocution, innuendo and metaphor to save their own faces and to reveal their superiority over their opponents. Galasinski (1996) further indicates that although speakers hide evasive actions with semantic or pragmatic performances, they are still considered cooperative. Another study analyzed by Montero and Rodriguez-Mora (1998) based on the presidential addresses between 1990 and 1996 delivered by the leaders of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela is also an attempt to present

politicians' evasive behavior. In this study, the three presidents, to avoid losing face, perform evasive strategies, which include labeling, depersonalizing the other, juxtaposition, attribution of passivity to the other, self-references in the discourse, depoliticization in terms used, deixis and referentialization, depopulation, and predominance of the perceptive and cognitive levels of action. Furthermore, Bull and Mayer (1993) characterize thirty different methods to avoid giving direct answers. Jucker (1986), in the study of BBC radio news interviews, presents thirteen strategies politicians are prone to use when they are in the danger of losing face. When they are confronted with sensitive questions, the politicians are inclined to exert hedge strategies to lessen the threatening level. Hu (1999) discovers eight evasive strategies with the highest frequency of use: declining to reply, challenging the question, equivocal answers, incomplete answers, attending to presuppositions, distancing, aggression, and topic transitions. Harris (1991) also distinguishes the three categories of responses: direct answers, indirect answers, and challenges; Philips (1984) substitutes direct answers with copy types and challenges with non-copy types.

2.3 The reasons of hedges

Many studies have been done to explain why political figures use evasive tactics instead of speaking directly in speeches. Gastil (1992) finds four stances. First, hedge strategies serve as reminders of the common language and interlocutors' ideology. Second, they could calm, inspire or stimulate the electorate. Third, repeated evasive language can brainwash the audience' thoughts. Fourth, evasive devices can create an issue. From the conclusion of previous researches, Lin (2003) summarizes three features; one is to achieve their purposes, another is to exclude themselves from face-threatening situations, and the other is to show political correctness. Harris (1991) provides the explanations as follows: politicians attempt to cause contradictions, make people notice conflicts within the party or disclose the disadvantages of unpopular policies. Disagreeing with the concept that evasion is one of politicians' personalities, Bavelas et al. (1988, 1990) propose that it is the interview situation that makes politicians equivocate. They conclude the reasons of evasion as follows. First of all, that politicians keep their statements in low-key instead of supporting either position can be a face-saving measure for themselves and the electorate, a vast majority of whom might keep opposite perspectives. Next, it is a matter of time pressure. If politicians are required to respond to a perplexing question within a brief time, s/he might have simplified the question before giving responses and such behavior assists the construction of equivocation. Finally, Bavelas et al. point out that politicians perform this action due to the fact that they lack background knowledge of the mentioned topic. With evasion, they either exempt themselves from the predictament of having no answers or win undecided voters over. From Bull's perspective, politicians will not take the risk of offending the source of power, the electorate, subgroups in their party, colleagues, political allies or sponsors.

Meanwhile, they are prone not to approve or praise their political opponents (Bull 2000).

2.4 Turn taking in interviews

Schegloff (1989) suggests that the pattern of question and answer is the critical characteristic in an interview, while Heritage and Greatbatch (1991) argue that interviewers occasionally take no questioned actions to open and close the conversation. As a result, it can be extended that interviewees do this for the same purpose.

Politicians once in a while change the topic of questions before or after giving a response, ignoring the topic or proceeding agenda by providing their own replies irrelevant to the questions. This is what Greatbatch (1986) calls agenda shifting procedures. Harris (1991) also thinks that although it is a norm for politicians to give complete responses, the tendency of shifting agenda is also common and accepted.

In addition, Bavelas, Black, Bryson, and Mullett (1988) and Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett (1990) propose that politicians frequently engage in avoidance-avoidance situations, in which a reply will turn up eventually though all possible responses have negative effects.

Bavelas et al.'s theory also argues that avoidance-avoidance conflicts are well-known in political interviews.

When mentioning turn taking, people are prone to associate it with the 'adjacency pair' which is the first part given by the notion of *conditional relevance* proposed by Schegloff (1972) and the second part of the notion is that the hearer will notice the nonoccurrence. The other notion is *situational appropriacy* which can apply to political interviews. He thinks that the conditionally relevant response may not be situationally appropriate.

2.5 FTA

Jucker (1986) states that the interviewee's positive face is the critical topic in interviews. According to Brown and Levinson (1987), positive face is the eagerness to win others' support; however, negative face is the eagerness to dominate actions. They propose that in all cultures face is an important factor which can be lost, maintained, or enhanced. From their perspective, face is threatened by some behavior from time to time; hence, it is necessary to soften it. Jacker further argues that it is essential for politicians to maintain positive face in interviews for their political career is under the control of a majority of people in their constituency. Likewise, Bull (2000) maintains that politicians will protect their face from being threatened in any case to prevent their look from turning bad in the future.

In the theory of Goffman's "On Face-Work", he suggests that people should not only defend their own face but also the face of others in all social activities.

2.6 Interviews

Clayman and Whalen (1989) indicate that interviews on television have become important tactics to spread news and public affairs information in recent years. Robin Day has maintained that in the 1980s there has been a further change in the character of the British political interview. He suggests that interviews have tended to become a source of 'propaganda' for politicians, not because interviewers are deferential and fail to challenge them on major issues, but because in a much more obvious way they are not answering interviewers' questions, a technique by which the answers are made longer and longer so that the question is forgotten.

2.7 Grice's maxims

According to Grice (1975), the maxims provided are concordant with the Cooperative Principle:

- Maxim of Quality: make sure the statement provided is true.
- Maxim of Quantity: do not speak more or less than required.
- Maxim of Relevance: be relevant.
- Maxim of Manner: keep statements brief and orderly instead of ambiguous or obscure.

If politicians skirt around the questions, they might avoid taking responsibilities but the electorate might regard them as sly and tricky. As a result, to hedge or not to hedge, that is a serious question for politicians.

3. Method

3.1 Subjects

Four televised interviews from February to October in 2006 were analyzed. The first interviewee is Yu Shyi-kun, chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, on Boss Talk on February fourteenth; the interview duration is 49 minutes and 52 seconds. The second interviewee is Frank Hsieh, former Premier of Taiwan, on Taiwan Decode on September nineteenth; the interview duration is 46 minutes and 46 seconds. The third interviewee is Chen Shui-bian, President of Taiwan, on Dahwa News on October seventeenth; the interview duration is 49 minutes and 27 seconds. The fourth interviewee is still Frank Hsieh on Boss Talk on October twenty-fourth; the interview duration is 48 minutes and 48 seconds.

3.2 Instrument

All four interviews were downloaded from the website, www.Taiwanus.net, where televised interviews were uploaded.

4. Results and analysis

In this paper, hedge strategies are my main concern. After analyzing an empirical corpus, I find out that they form a continuum from approximate direct answers, half answers, to ignoring questions, among which the categorization of half answers earn the highest utility rate. It indicates that political figures in Taiwan are inclined to give vague replies to save both interviewers' and their face to achieve either verbal or political purposes.

4.1 Approximating direct answers

4.1.1 The interviewee gives answers in another way

(1) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 那這個軍購案有可能通過嗎?
A: **沒通過也要通過**, 不然台灣不需要國防嗎?
Q: "Well, is it possible for the armament purchase proposal to be passed?"
A: "Needless to say, or doesn't Taiwan need national defense?"

(2) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 所以總統到現在沒有要換人選?
A: **怎麼可以換**? 那是我們的事情要去爭取, 所以我也拜託馬主---
Q: "So, you don't think of changing the candidate, do you?"
A: "How can I change that? That is our thing, which needs to be struggled for; as a result, I also appeal to Chairman Ma for…"

(3) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 那這樣是民進黨立法院黨團是硬要打, 打到流血也不讓他過就是了?
A: **打也要打了**, 這我才說是台灣生死戰---
Q: "So, in this situation, the caucus of the Democratic Progressive Party in the Legislative Yuan is going to fight a hard battle and would rather fight to death than let the proposal pass, isn't it? "
A: "Needless to say, this is what I called 'a Life or Death War for Taiwan'."

(4) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 總統有沒有信心一定要過?
A: **沒過也不行**, 所以我是要求年底之前---
Q: "Do you have confidence in the passing of the proposal?"
A: "Needless to say, so I ask before the end of the year …"

Harris (1991) proposes that politicians' responding to questions with direct answers or not reflects a more or less evasive political style, and she finds out that the utility rate of direct answers is under 40% which indicates that politicians rarely give direct answers. As for the corpus I collected, the directness decreases from examples (1) to (5). If example (1) consisting of a null phrase "沒通過" and

a true phrase "也要通過" is on the extreme side of the continuum with ninety percent directness, then example (2) using a rhetorical question to represent the absolutely positive reply is eighty percent directness with an aggressive attitude, example (3) repeating the word in the question, "打", twice is about seventy percent, and the fourth example utilizing double negation to express the positive information is sixty percent directness. It seems that both examples (3) and (4) sound a bit daunting and the interviewees cannot but make these decisions.

As to the notion of double negation, Wolff (1913) views it as "a logical inaccuracy", while van Ginneken (1907) thinks that double negation would reinforce rather than cancel each other. In addition, in Wustmann's (1966) study, two negatives are not viewed as a positive and they are performed to stress a negation in older languages. Jespersen (1917) provides the different perspective that to use two negatives is the same as to add something to the information conveyed to make it more clear to hearers. However, as far as the corpus is concerned, the Taiwanese tend to exert double negation to convey the positive message shown as example (4), the pattern of "沒~不~" equals to "一定".

4.1.2 The interviewee answers the question based on their own stance but it is not one hundred percent sure

(5) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 宋是玩真的還是假的?
A: **我想**是玩真的---
Q: "Is Soong serious or doing it just for fun?"
A: "I think he is serious …"

The strategy of saying 'think' is correlated to Brown and Levinson's (1987) categorization of quality hedges under negative politeness, which indicates that the speaker violates the maxim of quality which is supposed to be one hundred percent honest and avoids taking responsibility for the whole truthfulness of his/her utterances. Hence, the interviewee only shows his own stance and does not guarantee the reality of the statement.

4.2 Half answers: The interviewee only gives half answers by using some hedge strategies

The interviewee avoids giving a whole answer by using certain hedge words or involving other people in the answer, hedges part of the questions by answering the other part of the questions explicitly, gives examples to let the audience judge instead of giving exact answers, and avoids answering questions by giving neutral answers which leave room for imagination.

4.2.1 Certain words are used for hedge

4.2.1.1 "可能"

(6) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 宋動作大, 他掌握郝的內幕比你多?
A: 那也**可能**, ---
Q: "Is Soong acting aggressively because he knows more Hao's secrets than you do?"
A: "That is possible, …"

4.2.1.2 "原則上"

(7) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 這小組什麼人參加?
A: **原則上**當然是中常委---
Q: "What kinds of people can join this group?"
A: "Generally speaking, of course they would be standing committee members."

(8) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 那日期?
A: 日期**原則上**是三月下旬
Q: "What is the date?"
A: "The date, generally speaking, is in late March."

4.2.1.3 "越來越"

(9) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 美國了解這件事嗎?
A: **越來越**了解了,---
Q: "Does the American government know about this?"
A: "They realize the situation more and more…"

In this categorization, interviewees exert certain words or phrases to create the vagueness of the statements such as "可能", "原則上", and "越來越". According to Brown and Levinson's analysis, "可能" is similar to the dubitative particle "mak" in Tzeltal, which functions as the suspension of the assertions in which only speakers can distinguish the truth from lies. Like "可能", in examples (7) and (8) "原則上" is also a vague phrase which describes what people would behave under normal circumstances while "越來越" in example (9), a neutral phrase, only represents a tendency towards understanding. As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to doubt the truthfulness of the replies. That is to say, when interviewees respond with this hedge strategy, they may not know the exact answers themselves. Therefore, they answer with these words or phrases to distance the

focus of the following responses and avoid taking responsibility for the correctness of their statements.

4.2.2 The interviewee avoids giving a whole answer by involving other people in the answer to lessen the interviewee's responsibility

(10) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 你認爲宋和郝的趨勢如何?
A: **當事人**去評論,大家都說陰謀論,不過就從---
Q: "How do you think of Soong and Hao's chances of winning the race?"
A: "If I, also a candidate, comment on this, everyone would say it is a conspiracy; however, from …"

(11) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 馬把市政府廳改成"劉銘傳廳",代表他挺宋嗎?
A: 宋有出過一本書---要問**馬**
Q: "Ma changes the name of the city government hall to "Liu Ming-chuan Hall", which means that he supports Soong?"
A: "Soong once published a book … you need to ask Ma."

(12) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 他最關心弱勢,他應該是道德標準很高的人,(水電)爲什麼會這樣用?
A: 我看**立法院**也質詢過拉---那今天我們不去談這個問題---
Q: "He cares about the disadvantaged most, so he should be a person of high moral standard. Why does he do this?"
A: "As far as I am concerned, because this issue has been questioned in the Legislative Yuan … so today we won't talk about this question again …"

(13) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 周玉蔻繼續下去,你對泛綠的整合有信心嗎?
A: 我可以包容她拉---她到我辦公室去抗議, 附近的安寧拉, 住民不堪其擾, 這應該能夠體諒**小市民**的生活---
Q: "If Zhou Yu-kou keeps doing this, do you still have confidence in the coalition of Pan-Green?"
A: "I can tolerate her behavior … she came to my office to protest, and as to the tranquility of the environment, the disturbance she created for the inhabitants, she should have considered the inhabitants' life …"

(14) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 那如果他們硬要審?
A: 我覺得**台灣人民**絕對要阻擋---
Q: "And, what if they plan to find a hard battle over this issue?"
A: "I think that people in Taiwan definitely have to block the proposal …"

In this categorization, other people or institutions are involved in the replies to exempt the interviewees from being responsible for the truth of the assertions. If things do not go as smoothly as they have been expected, politicians are usually the last ones that will have to take the onus. For instance, in example (10), the interviewer asks about Soong's and Hao's chances of winning, and the interviewee uses the noun "當事人" to dilute the involvement of the interviewee. "馬" in example (11), "立法院" in example (12), "小市民" in example (13) and "台灣人民" in example (14) have the same effects with "當事人" and they are hedge tactics which are proposed as conversational shields to lessen the interviewees' duty. Moreover, from examples (13) and (14), the use of "小市民" and "台灣人民" demonstrates the interviewees' generosity and implies that their decisions hinge on the interest of citizens and people in Taiwan, rather than on their personal benefit.

4.2.3 The interviewee hedges part of the questions by answering the other part of the questions explicitly

4.2.3.1 Focus only on one opponent and ignore the others

(15) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 大家都當過黨主席?(**宋, 郝, 謝**)
A: **郝**當過新黨黨主席,要看經營過剩幾個人---
Q: "Has everyone been a chairman? (Soong, Hao, Hsieh)"
A: "Hao has been Chairman of the New Party, and how many people have left after his management is the issue …"

4.2.3.2 Only mention the opponent's incident

(16) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 比較一下**你**和**馬**的特支費有何不同?
A: ---這個特支費是檢驗政治人物的人格拉, 沒有收據的部分就算放到口袋, 以前也都沒事, 是**他(馬)**自己對外說他都用於公益---
Q: "Compare the differences between your special allowance fund and Ma's."
A: "… the special allowance fund can be used to examine the politicians' characters. It would be fine if you put part of the money with no receipts into your own pocket before. It is Ma who says to the public that he spends that money on public welfare …"

4.2.3.3 Avoid answering the comparison of each other's achievements

(17) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 他說馬在**基隆河**做的不錯, 你還**輸他的基隆河**?
A: ---**基隆河**是有進步拉, 我們要憑良心講, 但接管率太低---

Q: "He said that Ma has done a great job in renovating the Jilong River, and your achievement in the Love River lags behind."
A: "…the Jilong River is improving, to be honest, but the aqueduct connection rate is too low…"

4.2.3.4 Focus on the person, not the question

(18) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: **周玉蔻**繼續下去, 你對**泛綠的整合有信心**嗎?
A: 我可以包容她拉,---她到我辦公室去抗議, 附近的安寧拉---
Q: "If Zhou Yu-kou keeps doing this, do you still have confidence in the coalition of Pan-Green?"
A: "I can tolerate her behavior … she came to my office to protest, and as to the tranquility of the environment, the disturbance she created for the inhabitants, she should have considered the inhabitants' life …"

4.2.3.5 The interviewee does not clarify for others

(19) Taiwan Decode (Sep. 19)
Q: 但你個人認爲無此事?(紅衫軍說扁下台, **呂當總統, 你當副總統**)
A: 沒有拉, **我的(部分)(我當副總統)**絕對不相信, 但是澄清不完---
Q: "But do you personally think the statement is a rumor? (The Red Shirt Army said that if the President resigns, Lu would be the new President and you become the Vice President.)"
A: "Oh, no, as far as I am concerned, I would never believe the part of the statement about me, but I don't have time to clarify all the rumors …"

4.2.3.6 Only answer the part of Taiwan, not that of democracy

(20) Taiwan Decode (Sep. 19)
Q: 你認爲倒扁傷**民主**, 傷**台灣**嗎?
A: ---但現在一直拖, **台灣**會垮掉---
Q: "Do you think that the activity against A-Bian is harmful to democracy and the image of Taiwan?"
A: "…but if it keeps on going, Taiwan would be doomed…"

4.2.3.7 Ignore the KMT part and answer the latter part of the question

(21) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 會根據**國民黨**所提名的人選來決定**民進黨**的人選嗎?
A: 所以說, 明天會有輔選策略小組來決定快提或晚提**(民進黨)**人選---

Q: "Will you decide on the candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) according to the nominees of the Kuomintang?"
A: "Let me put it in this way, tomorrow the Election Assistance Strategy Team will make a decision about the time to nominate the candidates of the DPP…"

4.2.3.8 Avoid a sensitive subject and focus on a general one

(22) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: **總統加入辯論**的話, 其結果可以**幫他解套**嗎?
A: 我看輿論界有這種說法, 不過若要求總統要參加的話, 因爲總統還有很多比辯論還要重要的事情, 所以我覺得總統可以**不用參加辯論**---
Q: "Can the results of the debate help the President get away from the political crossfire if he joins the debate?"
A: "I know that such a statement comes from the public opinion, but if the President is asked to join it, many things more important than that still need to be done; as a result, I think the President doesn't have to attend it …"

4.2.3.9 Hold the optimistic attitude to avoid answering the worst hypothetical question

(23) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 兩岸和平促進法, 我們政府的看法是如何? 若過了, 對台灣影響如何?
A: 喔! 阿這是台灣的生死戰, 這個和促法. 絕對不能讓他過--- 現在台灣版的怎麼可以通過, 這是很嚴重---
Q: "How does our government regard the Cross-Strait Peace Promotion Law? If it is passed, how will it affect Taiwan?"
A: "Oh! This is the so called "a Life or Death War for Taiwan". As to the law, we should never let it pass… now how can the law of Taiwan-version be passed? This is really serious…"

After examining the corpus, six explanations are offered to expound this half answer strategy. First, respondents choose the topic which is easier or more salient to comment on such as examples (15), (18) and (22). In example (15), under Hao's management, the number of New Party members decreases intensively whereas when "周玉蔻" and "總統加入辯論" in example (18) and "泛綠的整合" and "能否解套" in example (22) are compared, the former issues are simpler and the latter ones are involved with complicated elements which cannot be solved or decided merely by the respondents. Second, interviewees may seem to gain more attention if they provide their perspectives of the hottest news then, as demonstrated in example (16). The time when politicians are interviewed is exactly the moment when the special allowance expenditure case generates a heated debate. Hence, his analyzing the case will catch more voters' attention. Third, ignoring facts that are known to all and taking the risk of criticizing political opponents is a time-saving and effective strategy, as illustrated in example (17).

As far as most voters are concerned, the success of dredging the Love River is well known, and it is valueless discussing the issue repeatedly. Fourth, in examples (19) and (21), politicians are attempting to save their faces by giving comments only on issues they are certain about. Generally speaking, mentioning the part of the questions related to the politicians' background knowledge is intelligible for no other people realize the agents than themselves and it is difficult for others to challenge the sayings. The issues like "你當副總統", and "民進黨" are interpreted not because politicians have casual characters but because "你" refers to the interviewee himself and the respondent is the Chairman of "民進黨", the one who should grasp the policies of the party best. Fifth, they might view the two main ideas in the questions as one; hence, only one reply is given, e.g. example (20). Here, the politician regards "民主" and "台灣" as a unity and both topics lead to the same answer. Sixth, after distinguishing the more important issue from the two, they only extend the chief one, as exemplified in (23). Compared with "我們政府的看法" and "對台灣影響如何", the latter seems the more essential issue.

4.2.4 The interviewee gives examples to let the audience judge instead of giving exact answers

The effect of giving examples is similar to that of citing someone's words, both of which create fact-oriented evasion. The former is a lawyer-like strategy which lists all proofs about the case (question) before the jury (television viewers) and requires the jury's (television viewers) judgment to make an adjudication (to believe or not to believe). The latter associates other information recourses with the speaker's utterance to increase the credibility of the announcement.

4.2.4.1 The interviewee does not give answers to the questions at last.

4.2.4.1.1 The interviewee avoids answering the questions directly by listing all proofs and letting the hearers decide on the answer to the question themselves.

(24) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 郝拿出單據就想告你, 這有道理嗎?
A: 第一個他已經承認---第二個, 剩下三支電話, 他都沒有講, 你注意喔---
Q: "Does it make sense that Hao wants to sue you with the receipt?"
A: "First, he has already confessed… Second, he never mentions about three other telephones. Please pay attention to this…"

(25) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 有人說他們都是從三百一十五號出入, 但水管是打通的, 那現在他說三百一十七號, 你覺得有道理嗎?
A: 這水管打通, 這我沒有講拉. 但是他有用三百十五號這才是重點拉, 因 爲 三百十五號的水費喔, 公家出錢的喔---

Q: "Someone said that they live at No. 315, but the water pipes between No.315 and 317 are connected. And, he said he lives at No. 317. Do you think it makes sense?"
A: "I didn't say anything about the connection of water pipes. However, his living at No. 315 is the point because the government pays for the water fee of No. 315."

(26) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 郝說辦奧運不可能, 我們對城市應不應該有希望?
A: 對, 就是一個首都的市長, 有責任提高台灣的能見度, 首都是對世界的窗口, 第二要給市民一個希望, 未來. 第三, 加速建設, 凝聚共識, 有策略性, 大家有共同話題, 有奮鬥的價值---
Q: "Hao said that it is impossible to hold the Olympics. Shouldn't we hold hopes for the city?"
A: "Right, as mayor of the capital, I have the responsibility to promote the visibility of Taiwan in the world because the capital is a window to the world. Second, a capital mayor should bring hope and future to the citizens. Third, to accelerate the construction, reach a consensus strategically will provide common topics for the public and values worth fighting for… "

(27) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 他怎麼變來變去?
A: 我跟你說, 松山機場的事, 教科書, 基測---
Q: "How can he change his stances so often?"
A: "Let me tell you about his decision on Songshan Airport, textbooks, the Basic Competence Test…"

4.2.4.1.2 The interviewee avoids answering the questions directly by listing personal experience and letting the hearers decide on the answer to the question themselves

(28) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 他真的用於公益嗎?
A: ---我有一個帳戶也撥到那個帳戶, 我有拿出來用---
Q: "Does he really contribute his money to public welfare?"
A: "…I have an account which the special allowance fund is transferred to and I would withdraw money from that account and donate it…"

The above five examples offer empirical facts and personal experience as hedge tactics to confirm the question indirectly or the electorate's attaining the answer is like resolving an enigma. Listing examples one by one with "第一", "第二", and "第三"seems to be the interviewees' favorite mitigating device under this categorization as illustrated in example (24) and (26). As for the three other examples, the politician acts like a suspense storyteller leaking out clues step by

step. Not until the ending of a story or the conclusion of a statement given by an interviewee can the audience unveil the plot or the whole reply.

One extinguishing feature of this category is that no exact "yes" or "no" appears in the answer; nevertheless, the hearers can infer the respondents' inclination from the information provided by them. In addition, the function of listing examples is similar to that of citing quotations. According to Kuo (2001), the effects of direct quotation are promoting the speakers themselves and denigrating their opponents, which is a branch of indirect strategies. Both of them function as enhancing the credibility of the contents.

4.2.4.2 The interviewee delays the answers by giving explanations first.

(29) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 對於前進印度的台商, **有何建議**?
A: 因爲印度有十億人口, 他是個民主體制國家,---**他和歐洲關係很好,所以可以銷往歐洲, 可佈局全球.**
Q: "For the Taiwanese businessmen who would like to invest in India, do you have any suggestions?"
A: "There are a billion people in India, and it is a democratic country… it has the good relationship with Europe, so its products can be sent to Europe, which is helpful for our reaching out to the world."

(30) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 有何**項目**投資比較適合?
A: 因爲他的國民所得五百五十元, 所以**傳統產業**去那邊市場大---
Q: "What kinds of investments are more appropriate?"
A: "Its per capita income is five hundred and fifty US dollars, so conventional industries will have a larger market there…"

(31) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 郝打水岸城市, **是不是**衝著你來的?
A: 這個水岸城市, 因爲八年前, 選高雄市長, 大家都說水質要改, 但今年高雄選舉沒有人在講, 表示做好了. 那他還拿個杯子看著杯子裡的魚, 表示馬沒做, **不是**衝著我來的.
Q: "Is Hao's focus of "the River Bank City" a challenge to you?"
A: "As to "the River Bank City", because eight years ago in the Kaohsiung mayor election, everyone said the quality of water needed to be improved; however, no one mentions it in the Kaohsiung election this year, which indicates that it has been improved. But he still holds a cup watching the fish inside, which means that Ma didn't do well, not me."

In order to make the announcements easier to be accepted by the electorate, the interviewees elicit the answers with elaborate explanations first. This hedge strategy can also be viewed as a persuasive tactic which is used to rationalize the interviewees' stances toward the relationship between a country and the world in

example (29), analysis of economic situations illustrated in example (30), and a metaphor example describing the opponent's watching the fish in the cup to imply the worse quality of the river water in example (31). It will increase the possibility for the audience to adopt the politicians' suggestions with logical estimations and daily life experiences.

4.2.5 The interviewee avoids answering questions by giving neutral answers which leave room for imagination

(32) Taiwan Decode (Sep. 19)
Q: 你會高興嗎? 被排那麼高?(紅衫軍說扁倒後 呂當總統 你當副總統)
A: 我以前就選過副總統啊!
Q: "Are you happy to be put in such a high place? (The Red Shirt Army said that after the President resigns, Lu would be the new President and you become the Vice President.)"
A: "I used to join the presidential election as a vice president candidate."

(33) Taiwan Decode (Sep. 19)
Q: 你已經有準備了?(媒體說要修理你)
A: 平平安安就好!
Q: "Have you prepared yourself? (The media claims that you would have a hard time.)"
A: "As long as I am safe and sound, it would be fine."

(34) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 總統一定要照辯論的結果走嗎?
A: ---總統可以列爲重大參考 2/14
Q: "Does the President need to follow the results of the debate?"
A: "… the President can list them as important references."

By offering vague replies which are neither certain nor irrelevant, the speech manipulated by interviewees with a skillful approach will result in miscellaneous connotations interpreted by different people. In example (32), the question raised by the interviewer is whether the politician is happy after acquiring the information of the Red Shirt Army's suggesting him to be Vice President; however, he replies that he has had the experience of attending an election as a vice president candidate. After hearing this response, the audience still has no idea if he is happy or not and an interpretation might be made by reporters that he, aiming for the presidency, is not satisfied with being a vice president. As for the answer "平平安安就好" of example (33), it can be explained that as long as the contents of the reports are still reasonable and bearable, he will not be very concerned about them. Another explanation could be that the credibility of the narration recounted by the media is decreasing; as a result, it is more important to do his duty instead of paying attention to the reports. Furthermore, "可以列爲重大參考" in example (34) infers two directions; the interviewee hopes that the

President can take the results into consideration, and he cannot encroach on the President's right to make any decision.

4.3 Totally ignore the question

4.3.1. Castles in the air: The answer is irrelevant to the question and the interviewee gives the answers to the question they make up on their own

(35) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 總統, APEC 王金平不能去了, 要換人嗎?
A: 阿, 我也很感謝我們的王院長, 可以以大局爲重, 所以在第一個時間今年八月, 我有機會跟他見面, 我有跟他說, 我要參加這個 APEC 非正式經濟領袖會議可能有困難, 所以我覺得你很適合---
Q: "Mr. President, Wang Jin-ping can't go to APEC, will you change the representative?"
A: "Ya, I also would like to thank our Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang, who can consider the overall situation. So, as soon as I got the chance to meet him in August this year, I said to him that it would be difficult for me to attend APEC, so I thought he would be an appropriate representative…"

(36) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 宋同意軍購, 馬被他綁住, 那他是傾向同意的嗎? 那王也同意嗎?
A: 沒有拉, 我們也知道阿, 所以美國人也跟我說, 現在他們越來愈清楚, 一開始想說是不是阿扁不認真---
Q: "Soong agrees to the armament purchase proposal, and Ma is tied by him. So does he tend to agree? And does Wang also agree?"
A: "Let me put it in this way, we also know that, so Americans also tell me that they realize the situation more and more. At the beginning, they thought it was A-Bian who was not working hard enough…"

(37) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 那那是什麼東西?
A: 阿, 我就拿一個東西給他看, 我說我就是照這樣說的, 我就拿給他看, 我就要讓他知道---
Q: "Well, what is it?"
A: "Oh, I showed one thing to him, and I said that my statements were based on that. I just showed it to him because I wanted to let him know that…"

(38) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 軍購案三十二遍, 程序委員會無法過, 要怎麼解決?
A: 我看選前要通過很難, 所以不只三十二次, 絕對會再破紀錄, 這是我想不到的地方, 國家安全照理來說, 是不分朝野的, 這是全民的共同利益---
Q: "The armament purchase proposal has been blocked down for thirty two times, and can't pass through the Procedure Committee. How will you resolve this?"
A: "I think, it would be difficult to get it passed before the election, so the number would be more than thirty two times, and it would definitely break the record

again. Ah, I don't expect that it would come to this. National security, logically, is the common interest of each person, whether s/he supports the ruling party or the opposition party."

(39) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 馬英九的親中現象對台灣的影響? 會帶來何危機?
A: 當然, 譬如說前不久連戰說: "看到馬英九說很多次的統一, 在我任內---"
Q: "What kinds of influences does Ma Ying-jiu's pro-China phenomenon have on Taiwan? What kinds of crisis will it bring?"
A: "Of course, for example not long ago Lian Zhan said that he had noticed Ma's mentioning unification many times, during his term…"

(40) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 會避免大陸過度吸熱嗎?
A: 我想, 中國是個市場, 台商在哪裡,政府也是要輔導---
Q: "Can it prevent China's economy from being overheated?"
A: "Well, China is a huge market. Wherever the Taiwan-based manufacturers are, the government still has to help them…"

Taiwan Decode (Sep. 19)
Q: 周守訓說十二月九日那天要你倒?
A: 他們就是違反原本的承諾, 原來說沒有政黨介入, 沒有選舉, 沒有候選人---
Q: "Zhou Shou-xun said that you will be expelled on December ninth."
A: "They themselves violate the original commitments, which promise to prevent parties, electoral activities, and candidates from getting involved…"

Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 有許多讓人解讀的空間?
A: 要做自己拉, 當然人民都在看, 不是說你要做什麼就是什麼---
Q: "Is there room left for interpretations?"
A: "We have to be ourselves. Of course people are all watching you and you can't do anything you want…"

(41) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 馬了解法律卻出現異狀,是**性格反覆**,還是**國民黨**是**親中立場**?
A: 我看他是這樣拉!他是**大一統思想**,---
Q: "Ma is familiar with the law but still has problems. Does he has a capricious personality or the Kuomintang holds a pro-China stance?"
A: "Let me put it in this way, he has thoughts that support a Great Unified China."

It takes much effort and talent to produce these statements which challenge the electorate's logical pattern of thinking. Greatbatch (1986) names this strategy as agenda shifting procedures in which speakers lead the talk to their own way by ignoring the present topic agenda established by the anterior questions. The relationship between Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang and the interlocutor is definitely not the required answer to the question (38) concerning the change of

the representative to APEC. The former KMT chairman's quotation is cited in example (39) merely to show the contrast and to satirize Ma's pro-China tendency. The description of China's economic situation is not enough to be the reply to "Can it prevent China's economy from being overheated?" in (40). In addition, the interviewee grasps the chance to criticize a certain group of people breaking original promises when he faces the question of describing his perspectives under the threatened announcement as illustrated in (41). An even more vague answer such as "要做自己拉" in (42) is so neutral that it 'indeed' leaves lots of room for imagination according to the question. In the final example, (43), the politician takes effort to exploit the proper phrase "大一統思想" to divert the question from Ma's capricious personality or the Kuomintang's holding pro-China stances to a self-proposal, which implies the host does not raise the proper choices as well.

4.3.2. The interviewee avoids giving answers by providing explanations to certain phrases

(42) Boss Talk (Oct. 24)
Q: 省籍因素會成爲**關鍵**嗎? 有**贏面**嗎?
A: 我長年都推動共生, 族群和諧, 命運共同體, 所以長年大家相信我不會去挑動**省籍**---
Q: "Is the place where you were born critical? Do you have any chance to win?"
A: "I have been facilitating symbiosis, racial harmony and the fate community for years, so no one believes that I will provoke the issue of provincialism…"

(43) Boss Talk (Feb. 14)
Q: 三月的大辯論, **何人參加**較適當?
A: 之所以要**辯論**, 就是兩方意見不同才要辯論---因爲黨內有不同的聲音, 所以才要辯論---
Q: "About the big debate in March, what kind of persons do you think are more appropriate to attend?"
A: "The reasons why we would hold this debate are due to different opinions from both sides… because there are various thoughts in the party, we have to debate…"

(44) Dahwa News (Oct. 17)
Q: 對十八趴**如何進行**?
A: 其實, **十八趴**的問題, 存在很久了, 起碼差不多二十年, 但是二十年之前還有二十四啪, 也有十四啪, 不管如何, 這不符合社會公平正義---
Q: "How will you deal with the eighteen percent preferential interest rate for retirees?"
A: "Actually, the problem of the eighteen percent has existed for a long time, for approximately twenty years, but twenty years ago there were problems of twenty four percent, and fourteen percent. No matter how you put it, it does not conform to social justice…"

In 3.2, example (44) explores the question about the critical provincial factor and any chance to win; the answer focuses on the pronoun explanation of provincialism. Example (45) explores who the people suitable for attending this debate are. Only the fragment, 'debate' is discussed and elaborated while the real issue 'who' is evaded. Example (46) tends to ask for the way how to solve the problem; the answer only gives the extension of the eighteen percent interest rate. All of the above are called topic extension and topic fragmentation by Hu (1999).

In this categorization, the interviewers tend to raise one to two questions. However, Hu (1999) suggests that the interviewees distance themselves from answering them according to the whole interpretations of the questions but one unimportant part of them. They only give one answer to the less threatening question while ignoring the lethal one.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, I first roughly categorize the corpus, the interviews downloaded from the website, into three parts: approximate direct answer, half answer, and castle in the air responses. Next, several subtypes are analyzed under each of the three categorizations. The results demonstrate that the utility rate of half answers is the highest among the three kinds, twenty nine out of forty six conversational sections in total. The percentage of providing non-complete replies or half answers is around 63% in this study, which is akin to the result of the analysis made by Bull, Elliot, Palmer and Walker in 1996, 63.8%, and Harris in 1991, 61%. The paper is a worthwhile reference for politicians when they attempt to avoid sensitive or threatening questions; meanwhile, they can on the one hand detract the audience's focus, and save face for both the hosts and themselves on the other hand. What is best is that if they deploy the hedge tactics well, they can earn more voters' support.

Acknowledgement

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Figure 1: *The layered representation of hedge strategies in results and analysis*




Certain words
可能(possible)
原則上(in principle)
越來越(more and more)

Involving other people
當事人(candidate)
馬市長(Mayor Ma)
立法院(Legislative Yuan)
小市民(citizens)
台灣人民(Taiwanese)


Answer the other part
Focus on one opponent
Mention opponent's incident
Avoid answering comparison
Focus on person
Not clarify for others
Ignore party issue
Focus on general issue
Answer hypothetical question
Answer easy issue


Give examples
Not give answer at last
Give answer at last
List all proof
List personal experience

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Tours de force – 'Forcing Moves' in Political Argumentation

Examples from a TV debate between Nicolas Sarkozy and Jean-Marie Le Pen

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This article describes and analyses – within a framework of Conversational Analysis (CA) – antagonistic interactive strategies of the two politicians named, who were confronted in a French TV-debate in November 2003, when Sarkozy still was minister of defense and not yet president. CA-studies have brought to attention and shown in great detail the manifold aspects of cooperation inherent in conversational interaction. On the other hand, confrontational and 'combative' talk, polemical, controversial and aggressive interaction, have found descriptive attention only more recently, e.g. in a study by Kallmeyer & Schmitt (1996). The notion of interactive 'forcing' developed by these authors fits well to empirical phenomena as they are present in the data of the political TV-debate at hand. For each of the two politicians I will locate and delimit salient 'forcing moves', used to exert interactive pressure on the opponent. A first step in the presentation of such moves will be to provide a detailed procedural analysis, employing tools of CA, i.e. basically an analyis of sequential structures. A further step will then be to consider their visibility for the audience and their media-rhetorical effectiveness as means of persuasion.

1. Introduction: Dialogue and rhetoric - Some features of audience-oriented interaction

Dialogues have different rhetorical shapes according to their more private or more public qualities.[*] Unlike the privacy, e.g., of a non-public telephone conversation, which is recipient-designed each time from one and for one participant at each end of the line, mediated talk, e.g., a television debate between two politicians, takes place in public. It is subject to an additional *mise en scène*: it is put on stage by the participants to be perceived, acknowledged and evaluated by a large "overhearing audience" (Heritage 1985). Thus broadcast dialogue has a complex, twofold recipient design where participants present one 'face' to each other and, at the same time, one to the audience. Among the several terms that have been coined to relate to this modern media phenomenon is that of 'triadic structure' or of 'double articulation': "All talk on radio and TV is public discourse, is meant to

[*] For suggestions and helpful comments on a first version of this paper I am grateful to Gerda Lauerbach, Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Hugues de Chanay.

be accessible to the audience for whom it is intended. Thus broadcast talk minimally has a double articulation: it is a communicative interaction between those participating in discussion, interview, game show or whatever and at the same time, is designed to be heard by absent audiences" (Scannell 1991:1)[1].

Talk designed for audiences can have many qualities that may make it different from 'natural conversation' and the kind of interactive 'common work' which has been found there and described as elementary in non-institutional conversation, 'self-administered by members' (Sacks et al. 1974).[2] Common work in audience-oriented conversational interaction depends on the complex institutional 'footing' (Goffman 1981) which the participants maintain towards each other within the particular genre of media discourse where they appear.

For instance, in a political talk show like *'100 minutes pour convaincre'*[3] which will be exclusively our material and our object of description in the following, it is obvious that the two politicians, who are 'featured' by the emission as the main protagonists in this part of the show, i. e. Nicolas Sarkozy (in the following: NS) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (LP), will treat each other as antagonists. As celebrities in public political discourse they are known to belong to opposite parties and political camps. And they are specifically selected for the TV-confrontation precisely on the basis of their opposed standpoints on political isssues. Disagreement and opposition thus are an in-built feature of the show and need not, as in other ‚confrontainment'-programs, be generated and animated by a moderator. The moderator of the show, Olivier Mazerolle (OM), mainly acts within the debate to grant – or try to grant – some rough equivalence in speaking rights and length of turns among the two opponents. [4]

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[1] For a study on how, in the course of a radio phone-in program, the moderator successively changes his 'footings' and shifts between these two orientations, cf. Müller (1997).

[2] In CA-work there is a broad discussion on differences of interaction in 'natural conversation' and 'talk in institutional settings' and how they are to be conceived of and described, cf. Drew & Heritage (1992). For a contemporary presentation of the domain, cf., e.g., Hutchby & Wooffitt (2001), Hutchby (2006).

[3] The talk show '*100 minutes pour convaincre'* (from France 2) presents - and 'stars' - each time a different political celebrity as a central figure. In our case (Nov. 20th, 2003) this is Nicolas Sarkozy, who at this time is still minister of the interior. The central figure is successively confronted with a number of political antagonists who have to be 'convinced'. For obvious reasons the confontation with Le Pen is put in last position. In their analysis of the same program Kerbrat-Orecchioni & de Chanay (2006; 2007) give a detailed analysis covering not only the confrontation with Le Pen, but also a preceding one with Tariq Ramadan.

[4] This is not to say that the debate is entirely a *pas de deux*. The moderator is used, for instance, also as a primary recipient occasionally and strategically by both opponents. To quote the most salient instance from the debate: At the beginning, when LP has been introduced and greeted by the moderator, he immediately starts to talk and goes on talking in one of the longest turns in the debate, addressing exclusively the moderator. In this way he manifestly ignores and neglects all this while NS, the proper recipient / opponent and main protagonist of the show, present and sitting in front of him and thus tries to irritate him. This is obviously a premeditated manoeuvre, which has no locally developed history and which is of course a face-threatening 'tour de force'. It

Disagreement and antagonism are favoured, are put on stage for the audience, by the way the turn-taking system is organized and institutionalized in the program: The participants / opponents address – and 'recipient-design' – their disagreements not to the moderator or to any other mediating participant interposed, but directly to each other in a person-to-person confrontation. Opposing reactions thus are immediately 'next-positioned'[5] to each other. A turn taking system of this kind, when it is established between two opponents, facilitates and even provokes a combative type of interaction:

The possibility of immediate next-positioning opens up a great variety of ways how to react to the talk of the opponent in its very emergence: An opponent can thus, rather than wait until the manifest completion of a turn or a sequence of arguments is reached, intercept the current speaker, react at any time to any imaginable verbal and interactive phenomenon of his interest emerging in the course of the turn construction of his antagonist - try to stop its further unfolding, interrupt it, neglect and manifestly refuse to perceive it, disrupt a line of argument at the moment when it becomes recognizable as an attack etc. Completion right, the right to complete an initiated construction and bring it to a manifest closure, is not absent in directly confrontational interaction. It is present as a principle to which the participants recognizably still orient to, but factually – judged by the data of our debate - it is only poorly respected.

All of the turn-incursive resources for antagonism are out of reach, when recipients do not have, as next-positioned speakers, immediate access to the emerging turn-construction of the opponent. This is the case, for instance, when the interaction is mediated by an interviewer who intervenes each time between the turns of the opponents – mediation is mitigation (cf. Greatbatch 1992, Hutchby & Wooffitt 2001).

Putting on stage the interaction of political opponents as a direct confrontation creates the suspense and the entertainment of 'confrontainment' or 'politainment' which is important for the the survival of a talk show. A staging of this kind, however, is avoided in more official political TV-encounters as, for instance, in the traditional *débat télévisé* between the last two presidential candidates who remain in the election, a regular part of the presidential elections in France. A considerably more complex and more indirect framework of participation is chosen here[6]: To preserve a 'presidential dignity' of the interaction transmitted to the audience, two interviewers are interposed between the two political opponents and a distance is created between them, which excludes

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does, however, not succeed with NS, who knows how to receive it with irony and retorts with a rebuke for LP's bad manners (omitting to greet).

[5] 'Next-positioning', as the most elementary resource to relate utterances in conversation, has been pervasively an object of interest and study for Harvey Sacks, cf. his lectures (Sacks 1995). Next-positioning also has a syntactic facet, cf. Müller (1999).

[6] Cf., for a detailed description of the complex framework of participation as it is institutionalized in the televised debate Chirac vs. Jospin, Dausendschön-Gay et al. (1997).

the combative risks and resources of immediacy and avoids the *corps-à-corps* of direct confrontation. Completion right is guaranteed and the debate can proceed in a dignified mode, where complete turn is followed by complete turn.

Seen on the level of definite interactive moves in the debate, it is evident that we will hardly find moves of an affiliative kind, e.g. when participants mutually favour and solicit specific turn-continuations of the other.[7] Preference rules which avoid face-threatening and open aggression in everyday interaction, seem to be reversed in confrontational interaction.[8] Some selected antagonistic moves will be discussed below.

2. Forcing moves

Based on the detailed analysis of a highly controversial debate among opposing parties, Kallmeyer & Schmitt (1996) have presented rich empirical evidence, a typology and an elaborate theoretical description of ‚forcing' in conversational interaction. In the analysis of the authors, 'forcing' is a conversational modality of antagonistic interaction as we find it often to arise in controversial and aggressive talk among opposing parties, e. g. in debates, arguments and discussions, where one party attemps to prevail against the other one and exerts interactive pressure to achieve this.[9] As a basic common origin of the numerous procedures and strategies of forcing they describe, Kallmeyer & Schmitt (1996) locate the 'egoistic' attempts of participants to change the balance of rights and obligations in conversational participation to their favour: participants attempt to enlarge their own rights and to restrict – in quality and quantity – those of other participants. A feature which is of particular importance in the context of media discourse, is the visibility, the manifestly aggressive character of forcing moves: to become effective at all and impress the recipient, their aggressive potential must be recognizable. Forcing moves and the pressure they exert on their recipient must thus be recognizable and impress, in different ways, also the audience – a point to which I will return. For reasons of recurrency and saliency, only two types of forcing moves, described in detail by the authors mentioned, have been selected for a specific treatment in the present paper:

– Expansivity: To extend one's rights to speak in quantity beyond those of the co-participants. This kind of forcing is – saliently and recurrently – a feature which characterizes the combative style of LP, who can be seen to go on

[7] For a study on the affiliative or disaffiliative work of 'continuers', cf. Müller (1996).

[8] "Conversation analysts have used the term 'preference organization' to refer to the set of practices through which persons manage courses of action that either promote or undermine social solidarity. […] The most prominent organizational conseqence of these practices is to maximize the likelihood of affiliative, socially solidary actions, and to minimize the consequences of disaffiliative, socially divisive ones" (Heritage & Raymond 2005:16).

[9] Cf. for a comparable approach the concept of 'interactive dominance' as defined by Linell (1990).

holding and expanding his turns to the very limit of what co-participants are ready to tolerate.

– Insisting and directing: In radical insisting, the insisting speaker tries to pin the other party down to a precisely, often literally specified verbal reaction, e.g., an answer to a particular question, an evaluation of a specific lexical term etc. Insisting is a means to restrict the free flow of topics in argumentation and to direct – at least locally – its further course. Insisting is recurrently and saliently a means of the combative style of NS.

It is evident that the the combative styles of the two politicians are interrelated. To say this in brief, one may use the formulation of Dausendschön-Gay et al. (1997), who also refer to boxing, one opponent 'constructs' - or as we may add: dis-constructs – the other. ('le candidat construit son adversaire').

A first step in the following presentation will be to give a detailed procedural analysis, using tools of conversation analysis (CA), i.e. basically an analysis of sequential structures. (Some knowledge of CA and the technical argot of CA in the tradition of Sacks et al. (1974) will be presupposed, some selected notions of particular interest in the context of combative, confrontational interaction will be briefly introduced.) If this first step can be called a dialogical – or even ‚di-logic' (Doury 1996) – view, as a next step the forcing moves will be considered in the light of the triadic structure of audience-oriented interaction, as parts of public discourse and as persuasive means to represent an adversarial political stance to convince the audience. It is evident that to convince in the debate is related to manifestly be the winner, or, as Kerbrat-Orecchioni and de Chanay (2007) concisely put it, 'Convaincre revient à vaincre'.

3. Examples from the debate Le Pen – Sarkozy

3.1 Overlap and interruption as pervasive strategies of confrontation

Fighting for the floor and repeated overlap are extremely frequent phenomena in the confrontation between the two antagonist politicians and it is beyond the range of this paper to give a more comprehensive account of them or to document and describe the several different classes of overlap and interruption we can find in the debate. [10] For Hutchby (1992), analysing argument sequences in radio shows, interruptiveness is a ‚design feature' of 'confrontation talk':

> Confrontation and interruption can become bound up together, in the sense that participants in this setting will often do being confrontational precisely by aggressively invading each other's legitimate conversational floor-space, attempting to close each other down – in short by 'interrupting'. (Hutchby 1992:350).

[10] Different kinds of overlap, their forms, their occurring and their interactive meanings have been studied in a number of studies by Gail Jefferson, cf. e.g. Jefferson (1984, 1986). For classes and subcategories of overlap and interruption cf., e.g., Kotthoff (1993).

Considered on the level of the two politicians concerned, it seems evident that each must have a strong interest to manifest disagreement with the other and to"do being confrontational". Seeing it from the side of NS: for a conservative main-stream politician it obvously must be important to avoid anything like an *entente cordiale* with the right-wing exponent and leader of the FN, but appear in a stance of unmistakeable and strongly marked opposition.

Interruptiveness is related to status and political hierarchy. Kerbrat-Orecchioni and de Chanay (2007) compare the confrontation NS vs. LP with a preceding one – NS vs. Tariq Ramadan - and note that the political 'newcomer' Tariq Ramadan is much less ready to "couper la parole à un ministre" than is LP, who may claim to be "l'homme politique en position de rivalité" (2007:14).

Clearly, to gain or to loose the floor in the flow of events of a debate does not always have the same meaning - fights for the floor and forms of overlap change in meaning and in importance, locally and contextually. To formulate an adversarial position and maintain an antagonistic affirmation – completely, unimpeded and in clear turn-space – in a situation of face to face with a present opponent – this is not an act which is self-evident in confrontation, but very often has to be achieved. This is true in particular, when the position in course of development touches a delicate point in the identity of the recipient/opponent and even threatens his face, as is the case in our first example discussed below. Turn-incursive overlap here is an interactional move, where NS impedes – or at least tries to disturb – his opponent LP in the further unfolding and concluding of an argument. In the analysis of this we have to keep in mind that the recipient is not simply the present opponent, but also the 'over-hearing audience'. In other words, the face-threatening act in question is a public one, can be perceived by some millions of spectators and thus threatens the 'public face' or the 'image' of the politician concerned.

In the episode documented in (1) below, LP starts his turn with a narrative keynote, at first only reporting a dialogue.[11] Yet the selectively chosen aggressive potential of his turn soon becomes apparent - it touches the political identities of both the two politicians present and their mutual relationship: In the reported dialogue – cf. 01 - 06 – LP constructs a political identity for NS, where NS appears as a minister in a government under the leadership of LP. In the 'preface' which then follows – cf. 07, `mais je vais vous DIre; (.)` - LP announces the imminent challenge: He changes in posture, gesture and gaze direction, pointing now with his index right into the face of his opponent and fixes him with his eyes.

[11] Reported speech often is a means of politicians and journalists in interviews to introduce and use critical points of view for which they will not have to bear auctorial responsibilities (cf. Clayman 1988), or, as in the exemple below, as a means to construct and portray political identities and relations (cf. Lauerbach 2006).

Figure1: *mais je vais vous DIre (1:50:07)*

He then ‚authorizes' and endorses the opinion depicted in the report, offers NS a ministry and even praises him – a praise which is poisoned – for his capacities as a virtual 'minister of propaganda'. As soon as the line of LP's unfolding attack becomes recognizable – cf. 09, where the ministry is offered – overlap by NS starts. In the following, NS manages, by repeatedly inserting overlapping talk – cf. 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 – to impede the further unfolding of the turn of LP, who thus cannot develop his 'poisoned' proposition undisturbed in clear turn-space.[12]

```
(1) 100 minutes (1:50: 05)

01 LP: c'était (.) un de nos compatriOTes NOIRS ;
       it was      one of our coloured compatriots

02     qui était=interrogé euh sur VOUS et MOI (.)
       who was interviewed  uh  on  you and me

03      et il disait ah OUI. (.) monsieur sarkoZY- (.)
        and he said oh  yes       monsieur sarkozy

04      il est PAS MAL-
        he is not bad

05      mais je CROIS- (.)
        but   I  think

06      il serait un BON miNIstre s'il était miNIstre de=
       =jean-marie le PEN. (.)
        he would be a good minister if he was a minister of
       jean-marie le pen


07      mais je vais vous DIre; (.)
```

[12] Cf. the appendix for transcription conventions.

```
        but I will tell you

08          ce que vous serIEZ que/ (.)
            what you would be as

09          ce que vous auriez comme     (minisTÈre dans mon=
            what you would have as        a ministry in my

⇒10  NS:                                 (vous auriEZ  vous=
                                          you would have you

11   LP:    (=gouvernement;
             government

⇒12  NS:    (=auriEZ la VIE Dure.
             would have a hard job

13   LP:    (vous auriez le ministère de la propaGANde-
             you would have the ministry of propaganda

⇒14  NS:    (MONsieur le Pen

15   LP:    où vous ExcellEZ (.)          (BEAUcoup PLUS que =
            that's where you are excellent  much more than

⇒16  NS:                                   (NON )

17   LP:    = n'imPOrte (quel AUtre
              anybody        else

⇒18  NS:               (MONsieur le PEN
```

Note that it is not just turn-space which is at stake here, as the longer first part of NP's turn, where the groundwork for the attack is constructed, remains unimpeded. Overlap only starts at a ‚recognition point' in the emerging turn, i. e. at a point where the line of NP's turn becomes recognizable as a serious attack. [13] The attack touches a sensitive point in NS's political identity: Critics in France often attack him for an exaggerated professionalism and a megalomania in his political campaigning. Overlap, in sum, is used here as a means of obstruction in

[13] As Jefferson has shown, it is the onset of overlap that gives the most important cue to its interpretation: The onset of overlap can reveal "a recipient/next speaker's in-course parsing of a turn in progress" (Jefferson 1984:14), and recipients/next speakers can then place their talk "upon recognition rather than upon imminent completion of the recognized object" (1984:25); "a 'recognition point' is reached, when an understanding of at least the general thrust of the utterance in progress can be achieved" (1984: 30). For the notion of ‚recognition point' and the growing recognizability of turn trajectories in their course towards completion (cf. Auer 1996).

order to interrupt the emerging turn at a moment before its conclusion becomes completely apparent and gets on the air.

The *tour de force*, occupying the floor to disturb or inhibit the further speaking of the antagonist, is used in the example also as a defensive weapon of NS: With his attack, LP is intruding not only into a political, but also into an identity domain of his antagonist. In identity domains the actors concerned have firsthand experience and better knowledge than their co-participants. As speakers in conversation they usually claim specific speaking rights and 'epistemological primacy' on such matters (cf. Heritage & Raymond 2005). The specific rights claimed by opponents to speak about particular identity-related topics give rise to a number of turn-incursive forcing moves in the present debate.

Seen from a more formal rhetorical angle, it seems evident that overlap, as a strategy of defence as in the example above, is less than a masterpiece of persuasion and the episode shows NS in a rather constrained and defensive position, in danger to lose control. Obstruction, in the sense of stopping an opponent to further pursue a topical *parcours* in argument, deflect him and impose another direction – this can be done interactively and verbally in more effective and convincing ways, as will become evident from the discussion of the following examples. It is, incidentally, from the defensive position described above, that NS, a few seconds later, launches the attempt to regain control over the pursuit of the debate which will be discussed in example (3).

3.2 Expansivity – going to the limit

To document facts and facets of a speaker expanding his speaking rights beyond those of the coparticipants cannot easily be presented and shown within the limited space of a few short excerpts on a printed page. It is also the length of an unfolding discourse in time which is involved, but clearly length has to be considered in terms of a number of contextual parameters. In the present debate, a most important one of these probably is to be seen in the interactive management of time, in the way how the ensemble of participants (co-)orient to the highly restricted temporal frame of a TV-program, which in the present case bears the restriction in time in its very title.[14] As was mentioned above, in the constellation with only two opponents and protagonists as primary speakers, the confrontation also has a specific ‚di-logic' temporal dimension: If one speaker extends his share, by so doing automatically he also reduces – in an exactly equal dimension - the time available for the other. We have to keep in mind, furthermore, a pervasive TV-preference rule: turn taking and visible presence of a participant on the screen are bound up together and as a rule it is the person currently speaking which is focussed on the screen. This remains true, even though in *'100 minutes'*

[14] For a sarcastic treatise on the constraints and effects produced by temporal pressure in TV-talk shows (cf. Bourdieu 1996). Bourdieu's critique is conceived, it is true, *sub specie aeternitatis*, i.e. from the point of view of a traditional scholar disposing of time in an autonomous and non-quantified manner.

we do have an unusually extensive visual *mise en scène* of phases and processes of (non-verbal) reception of the current speaker.[15]

Expansivity of a speaker need not be verified in terms of clocktime here, but rather by the way it is rendered manifest by the interactive moves of concerned participants, who react against the forcing move of being slighted in their speaking rights. In the following excerpts expansivity will be documented by showing the last parts of already extended turns of LP and the reactions of OM and NS to their further extending by LP. In the first example the transcript starts, when LP's ongoing turn has already had – stated in terms of transcript lines – the considerable extension of 36 lines. In this turn, LP attacks the minister of the interior of not being able to grant the security of his citizens, particularly in the *banlieues*. The moderator attempts three times in vain to stop the further continuation and make LP pass the floor to NS.

(2) 100 minutes(1:46:49ff.) (Middle part of an extended turn of LP)

```
(0..36)
36  LP :  les banlieues sont PRAtiquement des zones=
          the banlieues are   practically   zones

37        de NON=droit; (.)
          outside of the law

38        PRAtiquement des ZOnes étranGÈres.(.)
          practically     foreign  zones

39        il s'y déROUle beaucoup de comMERces- (.)  divers=
          there you have many different sorts        of traffic

⇒40 OM:                                              alors
                                                     well

41   LP:  très souvent ilLÉGAUx;(.)
          very often illegal

⇒42  OM: il doit réPONdre.
          he has to answer

43    LP: qui leur perMETtent d'ailleurs de VIVre;(.)
          which by the way only allow them to make a living

⇒44  OM:  alors monsieur le PEN il faut (qu'il vous réPONde.
           well monsieur le Pen he has    to answer you

45    LP:                                (de VIVre oui. pas=
                                          make a living yes
```

[15] For the representation and the visual *mise en scène* of recipiency in TV-talk shows, cf. Broth (forthc.)

```
46          =toujours sans d'ailleurs faire des incursIONS;(.)
            not always without making incursions incidentally

47          dans les proprieTÉS des autres franÇAIS; (.)
            into   the private domains of other people
            ((continues to extend the turn))
```

The moderator OM intervenes for a first time in line 40, i.e at a moment when LP uses a quantifier (beaucoup de comMERces, 39). The quantifier may well project – in the monitoring view of a moderator charged to maintain some equality of speaking times and speaking rights among the opponents – that there is much more talk of LP ahead and that the development begins to get out of control. OM then intervenes – politely, i.e. by using transitional relevance points emerging in the continued talk of LP – two more times – cf. 42, 44 - to make LP pass the turn to NS. As the transcript shows, LP completely overrides these interventions: In 41 and 43 he gives no sign of having heard and noticed OM's plea. In 45 he interrupts the moderator, retrieves the last part of his previous utterance and resumes his topical line of talk.

He thus degrades the moderator's intervention and treats it as irrelevant, as merely an interruption to be passed over quickly in order to resume his own talking. Also in his following utterances there is no indication of a projected imminent closure in the construction of the continuing turn. To talk beyond the border proposed by the moderator and to postpone the closure of the turn raises the question – and creates the tension for the opponent as well as the suspense of a *ritardando* for the audience: "How long will this turn still be going on?"

The turn then is brought to a stop, 'wrenched down', by the conjoined efforts of NS and OM who repeatedly intervene now to interrupt LP and make him stop his turn – cf. 58, 60, 62, 63 in (3).

```
(3) (continuation of the same turn)
(48...55)

55 LP :          <<cresc> ce que vous nous DItes=
                 what      you      tell      us

56          =de la LImitatiON de l'immigration=
            about the limitation  of  immigration

57          =en FRANce est T0talement  (FAUX.
            to France is completely     wrong

⇒58 NS:                                (resTONS
                                       lets remain

59 LP:      <<f> vous (avez TRANSforMÉ l'immigration=
            you        transformed   illegal  immigration
```

```
⇒60 NS:               (MONsieur le PEN
61 LP:       illéGAle (en IMmigration    (léGAle. <f>><cresc>>
             into     legal immigration

⇒62 NS:              si vous permettez (un débat
                     if  you allow      a  debate

⇒63 OM                                 (MONsieur le PEN


64 NS:       moi je consiDÈre ((takes over the turn and continues))
             for my part I consider
```

In what turns out to be after all the last part of this turn, LP reformulates and intensifies his attack on the minister, lexically – cf. his *TOtalment* FAUX in 57, but also by a change in the style of delivery: In 55 he begins – cf. the indications in the transcript - to heighten emphasis by prosodic features – increased loudness, reinforced and rhythmicized accentuation. Accentuation furthermore is supported by an onset of corporal and postural movements – moving strongly back and forth in his seat - and a salient gestural activity: ‚Baton-gestures' moving up and down with a pointing index underline the accentuated syllables.[16] By 'brute force' – i.e. increased loudness and pitch height, he is also able to hearably articulate and ‚press home' - across the interventions of NS and OM – a conclusive last line: The generalizing statement he uses – vous *avez TRANSforMÉ l'immigration illéGAle en Immigration léGAle*, cf. 59, 61 – has formal features of a *Gestaltschluss* and can be heard as a closure piece of the turn. After all the extensions and the conspicuous length of the turn, LP does not renounce to ‚completion right' and maintains a claim to properly close his turn at the very last moment, i.e. at the limit imposed here by the coparticipants. To postpone and retard the end of the turn until this limit creates tension and drama.

As noted, coparticipants intervene to massively interrupt and stop the further extension of LP's turn. Clearly this is also a *tour de force*, used to exert pressure on the (still) current speaker and turn-holder. However, this type of intervention, when it is situated in a late part of an already manifestly overextended turn, where coparticipants can display their understanding that the current speaker has had enough turn-space and speaking time to formulate a contribution, can be seen as a legitimate sanction. It has been called ‚egalitarian' (Kallmeyer & Schmitt 1996:68), as it re-establishes a rough turn-distributive justice.

The dramatizing linguistic and sequential features that have been mentioned above are still supported by the (tele-)visual *mise en scène* of this moment of turn-closure in the show: LP here gets a ‚close up' and is shown, on the largest of the three screens in the studio, so as to present to the audience his face and the heightened emphasis of his postural and gestural activities 'larger than life' and in

[16] Cf. Selting (1994) for emphatic speech style.

great detail. The visual staging gives a further clue on how to interpret the features of LP's expansivity and the media-rhetorical pay-offs to be gained from 'going to the limit': Extend the proper turn-space, override the borderlines proposed by the interventions of the moderator, continue to talk beyond and go to the very limit of what coparticipants are ready to tolerate – this is an effective resource for 'confrontainment'. It creates a trajectory of a continually growing dramatic tension in an interaction which is staged for the audience. Going to the limit is a rhetorical resource which is all the more effective when used in the severely restricted time-frame of a TV-program.

3.3 Insisting and directing – demonstrating power and control

The transcript below documents once more a fragment of the numerous and extensive phases of continued overlap in the debate – in fact overlap starts a while before the beginning of the present transcript. In this previous interaction LP has managed to cause some difficult moments for NS – cf. the discussion of the excerpts above – where NS is in danger of losing control. A few seconds later, NS launches an attempt, in fact one of the most salient interactive *tours de force* in the debate, to restrict the thematic range of LP`s rambling initiatives, regain control and to direct, at least locally, its further course. He uses 'insisting', an interactive procedure described by Hutchby (1992) as a 'control device', as it is often used to act out institutional hierarchy: Radio moderators use it to exert pressure on callers to redirect an initiated topical line of their discourse and adjust it to a new direction, defined and imposed by the moderator.

In fact, in the present case NS also introduces an institutional role and even imposes a change in the framework of participation which corresponds to this role: He wants to be treated as a minister and claims to be asked only and exclusively a specific type of questions, i.e. questions that relate to his activities as a minister of the interior. Note that he explicitly evokes this category – `je suis miNIstre de l'intériEUR`, 17 - and thus also legitimizes, 'accounts' for the specific verbal and interactive pattern he has just employed. This pattern is salient enough: Interrupt the opponent's ongoing turn, disrupt his still emerging construction of a topical line, repeat the interruption / disruption again and again to increase its pressure and pursue this up to the point where the opponent finally gives in and follows the line imposed to him. After four times repeating the identical formulation – cf. 09, 11, 13, 15 – this point is reached here in line 11, cf. LP's <<p> `je vais vous le dire.>`. The procedure thus is a salient one also because it has a trajectory across several steps which escalate the interactive tension until a point of submission of the opponent.

```
(4) 100 minutes (1:50:26ff)
01  LP:  j'ai moi aussi des (enFANTS;
         I  also have        children
```

⇒02 NS: (FAItes-moi une propositION-
make me a proposal

03 LP: j'ai des (petits enFANTS;
I have little children

⇒04 NS: (mais FAItes-moi une prop-/
but make me a pro

05 LP: (et j'ai un proGRAMME;
and I have a program

⇒06 NS: (monsieur le pen;

07 LP: que j'ai d'ailleurs expoSÉ aux élections=
which I have presented by the way

08 LP: (=présidentiELles qui m'ont même permis=
at the presidential elections which even

⇒09 NS: (quELle est la meSUre(.)que je devrais PRENdre;
what is the measure that I should take

10 LP: d'arriver en seconde (posi/(.)TION alors que je ne=
to finish in second position although I did not

⇒11 NS: (quELle est la meSUre;
what is the measure

12 LP: =dispose(d'auCUN des moyens COLOSSAUX: dont=
dispose of none of the huge resources of which

⇒13 NS: (quElle est la meSUre(.)que je devrais PRENDRE;
what is the measure that I should take

14 LP: =disposaient(mes adversaires;
disposed my enemies

⇒15 NS: (quELle est la meSUre que je devrais prendre;
what is the measure that I should take

16 quELle est la meSUre; (.)
what is the measure

17 je suis miNIstre de l'intériEUR.(.)
I am minister of the interior

18 vous me reprochEZ de ne pas être assez effiCAce.=
you attack me for not being sufficiently efficient

11 LP: =<<p> je vais vous le dire.>
I will tell it to you

```
12  NS:  c'est votre droit (.) expliquez-moi une meSUre= (.)
               that is your   duty    explain me  a   measure

13  LP:  =une meSURe.=
         one measure

14  NS:  =que je devrais prendre.
         that I should take

15  LP:  TRÈS concrètement
         very concretely((continues with introducing a relevant
         measure))
```

As is evident from the transcript, NS overrides, cuts trough in overlap and treats as irrelevant the continuing talk of the opponent that comes in between the first proposition – in 02 - and his final submission – in 11ff. This feature is foregrounded in the description Kallmeyer & Schmidt (1996:68) give of 'hard insisting': "Hard and inflexible insisting focusses exclusively the goal of the own activity and does not respect or consider the activities of the opponent between the first initiative and the insisting repetitions" (my translation, F.E.M). Clearly, this very inflexibility – strictly maintain and re-enforce the own goal repeatedly and in identical formulations across intervening talk of the opponent - is also, seen in a rhetorical perspective, an effective way to manifest a 'footing' – a stance of steadfastness, unshakeable firmness and decision in the pursuit of one's goals. It is thus an almost ideal ‚political footing' for the minister of the interior.

A further media-rhetorical advantage of the paradigm described lies in the combative and antagonistic value which it has, as a ‚negotiation' and a display of relations of strength between the opponents: It has, at the end of its trajectory, a definite outcome, certainly visible and recognizable also for the audience: There is a winner, who can score on his record a local 'victory', and a loser, suffering, at least locally an 'unconditional surrender'.

NS' *tour de force* in this interactive episode is all the more a demonstration of power and control in interactive discourse, as he remains 'cool' and without a growing emotional heightening of his engagement. It is true that each new repetition demonstrates more rigorously the decision of the speaker to maintain his position. However, when we take into account the prosodic qualities of the four insisting formulations we note that the aggressive character of the move is not increased by manifesting correspondingly also a growing irritation and dramatic involvement on the prosodic level: NS keeps 'cool', i.e. he maintains a firm and strong level of articulation across the several repetitions, but avoids the more dramatic phenomena of a rising in loudness and pitch height that usually

characterize the onset of disaffiliative 'turn-competitive incomings' (French & Local 1983).[17]

As has been shown above, in the first of the three instances where NS introduces the paradigm of insisting in the debate, NS can disorganize, bring to a complete stop the emergent discourse of the opponent and make him restart on a new 'track', imposed by the 'minister'. In the second instance – cf. (5) below – it serves not to cut, but to deflect an initiated topical line of the opponent and prescribe it a new direction. LP here has just started to embark on one of his favourite right-wing topics, the 'racisme antifrançais'. This topic projects, for everyone with some knowledge about the leader of the Front National, the expectation of a long and grandiloqent ideological discourse in the vague. NS knows how to break the *élan* of the effusion to be expected.

```
(5) 100 minutes (1: 53:54)((last part of a longer turn))

01 LP: vous pratiQUEZ=
       your favourite practice

02     =comme votre gouverneMENT d'ailleurs;=
       as well as that of your government by the way

03     =la préférENce étranGÈRe. (.)
       is the preference for foreigners

04     et ÇA je crois que(.)c'est c'qui INSUPPOrte les français;
       and that I believe is what the French people cannot stand

05     qui se rendent compte que NON seulement- (.)
       who      realize      that not  only

06     ils ne (sont pas chez EUX; (.)
               they do  not feel at home in their own country

⇒07 NS:      (MONsieur le PEN pourriez-vous me donner un exemple;
              monsieur  le  pen could you give me   an example

08 LP: ils ne sont pas (chez EUX(.)mais encore CEUX qui =
       they do not feel at home but in addition to that those who

⇒09 NS:               (MONsieur le PEN(.)DONnez-moi un exemple.
                      monsieur  le pen     give me an example
```

[17]In the analysis of French and Local (1983:17) prosodic features are a decisive part of the hearably dissaffiliative and competitive quality of interruptons: "Our analysis reveals that in managing talk of this kind (i.e. interruptions, F. E. M.) participants methodically produce and monitor for certain prosodic features of speech. These features […] involve pitch-height, tempo and loudness variations. By deploying these prosodic features participants can constitute their incomings as competitive". For the prosodic marking of different types of interruptions, cf. Kotthoff (1993).

```
10 LP: =viennent chez eux (de FORce s'imPOsent.
       have come to their  country by force  impose themselves

⇒11 NS:                   (DONnez-moi un exemple.
                           give me an example

12  LP: mais je peux vous en ciTER;
        but  I  could  quote you  one

13  NS: alors CItez-moi(.)en quoi je préfère les français=
        then quote me something showing that I prefer foreigners

14     =aux étrangers.(.) CItez-moi un exEMple.
        quote me   an   example
```

Also in this case, NS can provide, one more time, a salient interactive display of the relations of strength: Again he maintains and escalates the pressure up to a point of manifest submission of the opponent, reached here in line 12, `mais je peux vous en ciTER`; (In 13, 14 he reaffirms once more his position, but – after submission and concession has been reached – also cooperates with LP by accepting LP's slightly modified reformulation, using the verb `ciTER`, rather than repeating once more his own formulation). Also in this case NS remains 'cool' on the level of prosody: He controls his articulation and does not increase the aggressive quality of his insisting formulations by increased loudness and pitch height or other indications of high emotional involvement. Thus the interactive work of almost brutally interrupting and disorganizing the emergent discourse of the opponent is carried out in a calm and controlled manner.

Given the effects of dominance and control that can be achieved with the paradigm of insisting, its use may also be a premeditated and planned resource, due to professional rhetorical advice from the well equipped staff of NS, imported into the interaction rather than being a purely locally and spontaneously developed resource. As is evident, the procedure is particularly effective in confrontation with an opponent as eloquent, expansive and belligerent as LP. The paradigm is used by NS one more time – which cannot be presented here for reasons of space – in the debate with LP. Judging from the data presented by Kerbrat-Orecchioni and de Chanay (2006), it is used several times in a comparable manner also in the debate with Tariq Ramadan.

4. Conclusion

Expansivity – as one characteristic feature of a combative interactive style – fits into the picture of LP, his 'image', as it circulates in wide parts of public

opinion.[18] LP is well-known not only ideologically, as right wing spokesman and radical exponent of the Front National, but also for his highly emotional and provocative style of interacting and debating in TV-performances. He is described as a rude personality and a *transgresseur professionnel* (Bonnafous 1998), who is ready to break rules of cooperation and politeness in order to achieve dramatizing effects in his TV-performances. His interactive style has embarrassed many interviewers, but attracted large audiences and regularly stimulated a broad spectrum of subsequent reactions in other media.[19] Behaving as he does in the interaction described in some detail above, he seems to be entirely in accordance with his image, maintain it and act up to the expectations a mass audience has been accustomed to have of his media-personality.

For NS there does not yet exist – in public opinion and in published literature – a comparably rich description of his style in TV-mediated political interaction. Based also on material from *100 minutes pour convaincre*, Kerbrat-Orecchioni & de Chanay (2006; 2007) present their studies with the aim of describing in a more holistic and comprehensive way the *éthos discursif* of NS. [20] With this notion the authors refer to the specific manner how an orator constructs – by constructing his discourse - at the same time an image of himself in such a way as to convince his audience by gaining its confidence.[21] A basic finding – concurrent and compatible with the more restricted analysis I have given above – is the importance the authors accord in this process to the maintaining and communicating to the audience a style of firmness and control:

> One finds first of all a style of firmness – a firmness which would seem brutality, if it were not tempered by a controlled prosody. Thus his fairly long pauses within turns, for instance, often after falling intonations are indications of control as well as of dominance: dominance of himself as well as dominance of the interaction. (Kerbrat-Orecchioni & de Chanay 2007:18; my translation, F. E. M.).

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[18] Cf. the descriptions e.g. in Eggs (1992, 1993), Zinell (1996), Bonnafous (1997, 1998), Amossy (1999a:137f.), Venturini (2004), Charaudeau (2005: 91f.).

[19] Critics in France have even claimed that the ‚phénomène Le Pen', his surprising career and political celebrity since his first appearances in the most renowned political talk show ‚L'heure de verité' in the mid eighties, have to be seen predominantly as an effect produced by the French media. Cf. for a presentation and discussion of this hypothesis Eggs (1993), Bonnafous (1997).

[20] For the notion of ‚éthos discursif', cf. the contributions in Amossy (1999).

[21] Political orators of course may not convince at all. Cf. Mondada (2005) for the ‚dialogue' that may develop between an orator and an audience which is not a disperse and ‚overhearing' TV-aaudience, but co-present *in situ* and a recipient who is ‚next-positioned' to the emerging speech of the orator.

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Appendix

Transcription conventions (closely following to GAT)

( )	overlap
préCIS	capitals for accentuated syllables
pas=	linking without any intervening pause or gap
pas =	at the end of a line and at the beginning of the next:
=toujours	denotes continued intonational phrase without a break
IN=CA=Pable	syllabic articulation
(.)	micro-pause
(..), (...)	longer micro-pauses
(0.5), (1.0)	pauses in seconds
:, ::, :::,	elongation of sounds, according to length
?	question mark at the end of an intonation phrase for high rising
,	medium rising intonation
;	medium falling intonation
.	deep falling intonation
<<all> j'en suis sûr>	allegro, fast, with indication of beginning and end
<<l>>	lento, slow
<<f> >	forte, loud
<<p>>	piano, soft
<<cesc>>	crescendo

.

Chapter 2:

Specific Media: Computer, graffiti, phone

The Maxim of Quantity in Computer-Mediated Communication

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This paper deals with the role and the importance of the Gricean maxim of quantity in computer-mediated discussions. This maxim is supposed to resolve the problem of intelligibility in computer-mediated discussions. We analyze the importance of the maxim of quantity in the Netiquette and the charters. Then, through the conversational analysis of various French-speaking internet newsgroups, we describe the discursive strategies which permit the on-line discussants to respect this maxim. Theses strategies permit to palliate the reduced context cues: they can be considered as strategies of recontextualization.

1. Introduction

This paper lies within the scope of computer-mediated Communication (CMC) Studies. To be more precise, it addresses the questions of intelligibility and communicative norms in CMC.

The question of norms of discussion is important when one approaches specificities of discussions in a CMC environment (Marcoccia 1998, Mandelcwajg & Marcoccia 2007). Indeed, it has been observed that, in order to facilitate discussion, internet newsgroup users can mobilize a system of rules or standards. These standards are commonly defined in two types of sets:

– The Netiquette is a set of communication rules with global aims. Indeed, these rules of proper communication are supposed to be respected in any type of online discussion group.
– Newsgroups charters present rules with a more local aim.

The discursive behaviour of the newsgroup users reflect these rules. Besides, many meta-communicative sequences relating to discussion rules and standards can be observed in newsgroups. These sequences are generally in the form of warnings addressed to users having transgressed a rule or of apologies for rule violations.

This paper deals more specifically with the role and the importance of the Gricean maxim of quantity (one tries to be as informative as one possibly can, and gives as much information as is needed, and no more, Grice 1975) in computer-mediated discussions. We will first analyze the importance of the maxim of quantity in the Netiquette and the charters. The maxim is supposed to resolve the

problem of intelligibility in computer-mediated discussions. Then, through the conversational analysis of various French-speaking internet newsgroups, we will analyze the discursive strategies which permit the on-line discussants to respect this maxim of quantity. We will also analyze the way on-line discussants evaluate the transgression of the maxim of quantity through the description of meta-communicative comments. In other terms, we direct our attention to the following two questions:

– Do participants of online discussions respect the maxim of quantity?
– Does the maxim of quantity work the same in online verbal discussions as in face to face conversation?

To answer these questions, we will first describe the characteristics of CMC and show that they pose a problem of mutual understanding and intelligibility. We assume that, in order to resolve this problem, internet users call on the Cooperative Principle, for example the maxim of quantity. This hypothesis will be validated by a data analysis. Our methodology will consist in the content analysis of normative and prescriptive texts about computer-mediated Communication (Netiquette and charters): what is the importance of the maxim of quantity in these prescriptive texts? Secondly, we will observe the discursive strategies of internet users which can be linked to the maxim of quantity. Finally, we will identify some meta-communicative comments (apologies and calls to order) which result from the violation of the maxim of quantity.

2. Computer-mediated communication and the Cooperative Principle

According to many researchers in CMC Studies, some features of computer-mediated Communication cause problems for mutual understanding and intelligibility. For example, Sproull & Kiesler (1986) argue that CMC is characterized by reduced social context cues. There is no co-presence in the speech situation: discussants do not share the same physical and temporal context. Other researchers, who insist on the conversational dynamics of newsgroups discussions, underline two phenomena: the problem of interactional coherence (Marcoccia 2004a) and topic decay (Herring 1999) due to the complexity of the participation frame (it is difficult to identify who speaks to whom) and of the structural organisation of the threads (it is difficult to identify which message is a response to which). Consequently, the common ground (Clark & Brennan 1991) of the participants is reduced, even more so in intercultural situations.

These characteristics may cause misunderstanding in CMC. Indeed, reduced social context cues can cause several types of misunderstanding about the pragmatic aspects (illocutionary force, implicatures, indirect speech acts, etc…) and the propositional content of the messages (Bazzanella & Baracco 2003). CMC can also favour mistaken inferences about the geographical localization of the interlocutor and about the identity of the participants (age, sex, social identity,

culture, values). Besides, CMC makes difficult the evaluation of the emotional dimension of the messages (Sproull & Kiesler 1986). In other terms, one can wonder if CMC provides sufficient conditions for generating accurate conversational implicatures (Wang & Lu 2003). Finally, the problems of interactional coherence and topic decay can cause difficulties to identify correctly who is speaking to whom, and to identify the topic organisation (which subject is relevant in this thread?) and maintain the topic coherence.

Despite these characteristics, it is obvious that internet newsgroups are devices which allow mass discussions. But, is the Gricean Cooperative Principle respected in these discussions?

In other terms, do newsgroup users adhere to the following four maxims:

– Maxim of Quality:
  1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
  2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

– Maxim of Quantity: this maxim contains two rules
  1. Make your contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary.
  2. Do not make your contribution to the conversation more informative than necessary.

– Maxim of Relevance:
  Be relevant (i.e., say things related to the current topic of the conversation).

– Maxim of Manner:
  1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
  2. Avoid ambiguity.
  3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary wordiness).
  4. Be orderly.

From our point of view, the second rule of the maxim of quantity and the third rule of the maxim of manner are linked to the idea of concision: one can hold that the second rule of the maxim of quantity refers to informational concision and the third rule of the maxim of manner refers to textual concision.

Is the Gricean Cooperative Principle, and especially the maxim of quantity, respected in newsgroups discussions? Two hypotheses can be assumed.

First, one can consider that, because of its specificities, computer-mediated Communication makes difficult the respect of the Cooperative Principle (Don 1999). For example, it is almost impossible to evaluate the ‘good’ quantity of information expected by the recipient if one does not know his/her expertise about the subject?

Secondly, on the contrary, we can make the assumption that internet users attach importance to the cooperative principle, in order to ensure intelligibility of their messages, despite the low common ground and in order to lessen its impact.

For example, the participants are all the more careful to respect the maxim of quantity since they are not able to evaluate the expertise of their recipients.

3. Data analysis

A data analysis will make us able to identify the most relevant hypothesis. Three levels will be distinguished. First, the importance of the maxim of quantity can be evaluated through the content analysis of prescriptive texts about computer-mediated Communication (Netiquette, charters). Second, we will give prominence to some discursive devices. Third, we will observe the meta-communicative comments which are related to the maxim of quantity (for example, apologies and calls to order).

Our data consist in a sample of messages sent to several French speaking newsgroups (for example, fr.education.divers).

3.1 The maxim of quantity in Netiquette and charters

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) is supposed to conform to certain rules or interactional norms (Hymes 1972). These rules are explicitly defined in Netiquette or charters (Mc Laughlin, Osborne & Smith 1995; Marcoccia 1998) which involve a specific communicative style.

Netiquette (Hambridge 1995) stands for network etiquette, that is the etiquette of cyberspace. Etiquette means the forms required by good breeding or prescribed by authority in social or official life. In brief, Netiquette is a set of rules for behaving properly online (Shea 1994). A charter is a more local system of rules: every newsgroup should contain a description of the good behaviour which is expected. Each newsgroup has its own charter, even if these charters are more or less adaptations of Netiquette.

First, Netiquette refers to a general rule, which can be seen as a kind of prescriptive translation of the general definition of the Cooperative Principle: “Make things easy for the recipient”.

Second, we can observe that the first rule of the maxim of quantity (make your contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary) is formulated in several ways in Netiquette

(1) [Netiquette for newsgroups : extract]
If you are sending a reply to a message or a posting be sure you summarize the original at the top of the message, or include just enough text of the original to give a context. This will make sure readers understand when they start to read your response.

(2) [Netiquette for newsgroups : extract]
Avoid posting "Me Too" messages, where content is limited to agreement with previous posts. Avoid sending messages or posting articles which are no more than gratuitous replies to replies.

(3) [Netiquette for e-mail : extract]
In order to ensure that people know who you are, be sure to include a line or two at the end of your message with contact information.
(4) [Netiquette for e-mail : extract]
When replying to a message, include enough original material to be understood but no more. Mail should have a subject heading which reflects the content of the message.

We can also observe that the second rule of the maxim of quantity (do not make your contribution to the conversation more informative than necessary) is formulated in several ways in Netiquette and charters. For example, in Netiquette, participants should avoid to quote an entire message in order to answer one line. In the same way, they should not send large amounts of unsolicited information to people.

(5) [Charter of fr.soc.politique : extract]
Mistake to avoid : quote an entire message in order to answer one line.
(6) [Netiquette for newsgroups : extract]
Giving context helps everyone. But do not include the entire original!
(7) [Netiquette for e-mail : extract]
When replying to a message, include enough original material to be understood but no more.
(8) [Netiquette for e-mail : extract]
Don't send large amounts of unsolicited information to people.
(9) [Netiquette for mailing list : extract]
If you ask a question, be sure to post a summary. When doing so, truly summarize rather than send a cumulation of the messages you receive.

Moreover, a rule of Netiquette combines the first rule of the maxim of quantity and the third rule of the maxim of manner:

(10) [Netiquette for newsgroups]
Be brief without being overly terse.

3.2 The maxim of quantity in newsgroups discussions

The other level of the data analysis concerns the maxim of quantity in computer-mediated discussions: which discursive devices can be analyzed as applications of the maxim of quantity?

Some discursive devices are linked to the first rule of the maxim of quantity (make your contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary).

For example, newsgroups users often cut and paste the previous message they answer. In fact, in e-mail or newsgroups, the initiative message of an exchange is automatically cut and pasted into the reactive one (Marcoccia 2004b). This device gives access to the textual context (the co-text) which is necessary to bring enough information:

(11) [fr.education.divers - extract from a post]
> Bonjour
> y-a-t-il un texte qui interdit dans le primaire aux parents d'apporter un gâteau a >l'ecole ?
> merci LOIC
> Bonjour, Pas d'interdiction nationale à ma connaissance, quelques circulaires locales
> ici ou là
> Hello. Is there any law which forbids parents to bring a cake in a primary school (…)
> thanks LOIC
Hello, in my opinion no national law but some local administrative rules here and there

Signatures can be used to give information about the social identity of the user:

(12) [fr.soc.politique : signature of a post]
Chercheur CNRS / parent d'élève" / CNRS Researcher / pupil parent

Smileys or expressive punctuation can be used to express "emotional information" necessary for the interpretation of the message.

(13) [fr.rec.sport.equitation : extract from a post]
On a commencé par partir souvent sur de petites balades d'une heure, puis 2h00 puis on a décidé un jour de partir 4h30 avec pique nique :-)
We first made a one-hour horse ride, then two hours and, one day, we decided to go for 4h30 with a picnic :-)

These devices can be analyzed as discursive strategies which permits to palliate the reduced context cues. In other terms, they can be considered as strategies of recontextualization

Some discursive devices are linked to the second rule of the maxim of quantity (do not make your contribution to the conversation more informative than necessary). Sending "condensed" messages can be one of these devices.

– Sending messages which deal with only one propositional content or speech act:

(14) 14. [fr.education.divers : post]
Bonjour
y-a-t-il un texte qui interdit dans le primaire aux parents d'apporter un gâteau a l'ecole ?
merci LOIC
Hello. Is there any law which forbids parents to bring a cake in a primary school ?
thanks LOIC

– Sending "informational messages" rather than relational ones, for example messages which are strictly referential:

(15) [fr.education.divers : extract from a post]
Les gateaux type 4/4 se conservent très bien à température ambiante, et ne posent donc pas de problème s'ils sont bien emballés
Cakes like pound cakes are well-keeped in ambient temperature. Threre is no matter when they are correctly packed.

– Sending messages without greetings:

(16) [fr.education.divers : post]
> Bonjour
> y-a-t-il un texte qui interdit dans le primaire aux parents d'apporter un gâteau a l'ecole ?
> merci LOIC
Il existe bien un texte qui traite ce problème (il n'interdit cependant rien)
> Hello. Is there any law which forbids parents to bring a cake in a primary school. Thanks. > LOIC
There is a text which deals with this problem but it forbids nothing.

– Sending lists:

(17) [fr.education.divers. : extract from a post]
PRODUITS À PRIVILÉGIER :
EXEMPLES
Fruits frais
Gâteaux au yaourt, génoises
Cakes
Tartes aux fruits, au citron
Good products
Examples
Fresh fruits
Yogurt Cake, sponge cake
Cakes
Fruit Pies, Lemon pies

– Sending messages with selection by the sender of the extracts he answers[1]; the sentences which are deleted by the sender are:

(18) [fr.education.divers. : post]
>Bonjour

[1] We have crossed the words and the sentences which are deleted by the sender.

> y-a-t-il un texte qui interdit dans le primaire aux parents d'apporter un gâteau a l'ecole.
> ~~merci LOIC~~
Les gateaux type 4/4 se conservent très bien à température ambiante, et ne posent donc pas de problème s'ils sont bien emballés
> ~~Hello~~. Is there any law which forbids parents to bring a cake in a primary school
> thanks LOIC
Cakes like pound cakes are well-keeped in ambient temperature. Threre is no matter when they are correctly packed.

We can observe that a technical specificity of CMC allows to satisfy both rules of the maxim of quantity. Indeed, when newsgroup users insert hypertextual links in their messages, they allow their recipients to choose the quantity of information they need. If the message is seen as informative enough (rule 1), a recipient does not consult a complementary document by clicking on the hypertextual link. If the message is seen as not informative enough (rule 2), a recipient is able to find more information by clicking.

(19) [fr.soc.politique : extract from a post]
L'éminent linguiste Hagège décrit dans "Le Monde" la "véritable guerre conduite par des institutions et entreprises américaines" pour "l'éviction pure et simple du français" (…)
Dans cet article, Hagège révèle un truc amusant : à la fin de la Guerre d'indépendance des USA, Washington aurait offert à La Fayette, pour le remercier, d'adopter le français comme langue officielle des Etats-Unis. Et ce crétin a refusé !
C'est là : http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0,36-884957,0.html
The prominent linguist Hagège describes in Le Monde the « very war led by the american institutions and firms » for « the straight eviction of French » (…). In this article, Hagège reveals something funny : by the end of the US Independance war, Washington is said to have proposed to LaFayette to adopt French as the official language of USA, in order to thank him. And this cretin refused !
It's here : http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0,36-884957,0.html

3.3 The maxim of quantity in meta-communicative comments

In general, many meta-communicative comments can be observed in discussions in internet newsgroups. They are often related to problems of impoliteness (Marcoccia 2003), but they can also be comments about the respect or the violation of the maxim of quantity. Two phenomena fall into this category:
- calls to order, when a discussant expresses that a message is considered as too informative (20) or not informative enough (21):

(20) [Fr.comp.sys.mac : extract from a post]
Tu donnes trop de détails, donc à mon avis ça va être dur de t'aider.
You give too much details. In my opinion it will be difficult to help you.

(21) [Fr.comp.sys.mac : extract from a post]

> Et si Apple réglait correctement ses dettes et arriérés de paiement avec la FNAC, peut-> être celle-ci ferait-elle preuve de beaucoup plus d'allant envers la marque à la pomme !
Tu peux en dire plus ? Je suis en effet surpris de la baisse des produits Apple (pour ne pas dire la disparition complète) dans ma FNAC locale.
>If Apple had settle its debts and arrears, perhaps FNAC would show more motivation >to Apple.
Could you say more? Indeed, I am surprised at the falling (not to say the complete elimination) of Apple products in my local FNAC.

– Apologies, when a discussant apologizes for sending a message which is too informative (22) or not informative enough (23):

(22) [Fr.soc.politique : extract from a post]
Et pour les délinquants, les vrais, les incurables, aucune discrimination, qu'il soit noir ou blanc qu'on les punisse réellement. Désolé d'être aussi long, mais c'est un sujet passionant.
And for the deliquents, the real, the incurable : no discrimination. White or black, they have to be really punished. Sorry to be so long, but it is an interesting question

(23) [Fr.rec.cuisine : extract from a post]
Je pense effectivement avoir abordé maladroitement le sujet car j'ai été trop synthétique dans mes argumentations. Je n'ai pas assez développé car nous sommes dans un forum de cuisine.
Actually, I think I have broach the question clumsily because my argumentations were too synthesized. I had not developed enough because we are in a newsgroup dedicated to cookery.

4. Results and conclusion

The results of this analysis in three levels confirm the second hypothesis: participants of computer-mediated Discussions are careful to respect the maxim of quantity. Thus, we can assume that, when a communicative situation, here the CMC, makes some principles, here, the Cooperative Principle, but also the politeness or the expression of emotions, problematic, these principles become even more important. Indeed, they can be found as prescriptions (in Netiquette and charters) and as discursive behaviours.

From a methodological point of view, the maxim of quantity (and more generally the Cooperative Principle) is a principle which permits to understand and analyze several specific discursive and communicative devices of computer-mediated Communication (for example, smileys, cut and paste, etc.).

From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of the maxim of quantity in CMC brings us to the question of the constitutive/normative dimension of the Cooperative Principle (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2002): the content analysis of Netiquette, charters and metacommunication shows that in CMC, the Cooperative

Principle, which is originally a set of "constitutive rules" (Flahault 1979), becomes normative/prescriptive.

In conclusion, this research can be pursued in several directions.

First, the question of the relation between each Gricean maxim in CMC has to be examined in detail. Indeed, whereas some maxims seem to be complementary (for example the maxim of quantity and the third rule of the maxim of manner: "be brief"), others seem to be contradictory (for example the maxim of quantity and the second rule of the maxim of manner: how to be concise and avoiding ambiguity).

Secondly, we have to take into account the relation between the Cooperative Principle and other Communication Models, for example the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Rules in CMC (is it better to post precise and concise or polite messages?), the Cooperative Principle and the Pragma-dialectical Rules (Mandelcwajg & Marcoccia 2007).

At last, this research can be enriched with an intercultural approach of CMC (Atifi 2001): what importance is attached to the Cooperative Principle in different cultures and what is the weight of each Gricean maxim in different communicative norms.

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Truck Graffiti: The rhetoric of emulation

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The existence of a relatively large body of literature on a number of aspects of Indonesia—politics and economy, social condition and culture, including literary properties—has not properly documented graffiti in Indonesia. Despite the fact that graffiti have attracted a number of researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds, truck graffiti have been underresearched. Moreover, even though truck graffiti might be classified as *public*, they seem to have been overlooked in the realm of graffiti research. This situation warrants further investigations. An interesting question pertinent to raise is "What makes truck graffiti linguistically catching?" This paper is devoted to addressing this question by presenting a couple of empirical instances of the truck graffiti available in Malang, East Java and thereabouts and discussing them in light of the concept of defamiliarization. Discussion of the agencies and ownership of the truck graffiti will also shed light on how the graffiti are rhetorically enacted and what effects they bring about. The paper will also argue that truck graffiti are not necessarily the enactment of egalitarian expressions as Obeng (2000) claims; rather, they being *public* which are yet "closed" from potential dialogic responses affirm that they denote authoritarian expressions. The paper concludes that truck graffiti demonstrate the rhetoric of emulation in which the owners exercise their (toothless) power.

1. Introduction

It seems a truism that the existence of graffiti is omnipresent, irrespective of the socio-cultural setting and historical line. Graffiti might decorate and, depending on how one views, might also deteriorate spaces, be they private or public. Seemingly, germane to the fact that they are everywhere, graffiti have attracted researchers to do some investigation of their nature (e.g., Obeng 2000, Adams & Winter 1997, Moonwomon 1995, Gadsby 1995, Rodriguez & Clair 1999, Joswig-Mehnert & Yule 1996, Best 2003). However, despite the ubiquity of graffiti and the relatively big amount of research on graffiti, graffiti in the Indonesian context have not received due attention. In my own work (Basthomi 2007), the discussion of graffiti has been quite modest, i.e., in the form of initial intimation of the phenomenon. It is still far from exhaustive. This piece is, in fact, a continuation of the recently published work in the area.

Research on graffiti has been identified to be triumphant in the West in the 1970s and 1980s (Best 2003, Gadsby 1995). However, this situation does not necessarily subdue the significance of today's research on graffiti. Since every kind of human activity and product has cultural values (Kuntowijoyo 2002), graffiti as human products, also possess values. Since truck graffiti are still produced by a number of people in Malang and thereabout, they warrant explo-

rations for the purpose of gaining more comprehensive account of human values. Since there has been literally no report documenting studies on truck graffiti in Malang, except my own unpretentious work (Basthomi 2007), attempts to disclose the values of truck graffiti are warranted.

Researchers studying the nature of graffiti have been those of different disciplinary backgrounds and, correspondingly, have attended to various aspects of graffiti. Obeng (2000), for instance, who conducted graffiti research in Legon (Ghana) set the focus of his research on the political properties of graffiti. In other words, Obeng viewed graffiti in his research venue as a political discourse. Among his findings is that graffiti have been used in Legon as a means of expressing political aspirations of those socio-politically disadvantaged. In line with the political edginess in Legon, graffiti have served as media to put anger and frustrations into words.

Still about politics, yet of different foci vis-à-vis that of Obeng, Moonwomon (1995) was interested in analyzing women's bathroom stall graffiti. Moonwomon viewed the graffiti as a discourse which pertains to the politics of gender and race. Moonwomon found, on the basis of the data taken from the bathroom stalls at the University of California-Berkeley, that women's toilet graffiti represent a community discussion in which issues about rape and responsibility imbricated in the issues of gender and race were fervidly debated. The debates have included the discourse of local and global societal practice and racist/nonracist voices within the circle of women community in the campus.

Unlike those of Obeng and Moonwomon, gang graffiti were what have attracted Adams and Winter (1997) to explore. Among their findings is that gang graffiti constitute media which not only mark the boundaries of the gang as unique community, but also represent the socio-culture of the gang sub-culture. Graffiti function to identify the membership of those internal to the gang and give identity to the gang itself. As communicative media, graffiti also serve as ways to show deference to the dead members of the gang. In addition, since the existence of gangs as organisms is not monological but dialogical (Thibault 2006), graffiti also reflect intra-and inter-gang social webs and the gang's worldview. With regard to the function of graffiti as the reflection of identity, tagging, another form of graffiti, has also been attended to by researchers. Gross, Walkosz, and Gross (1997) took the cosmopolitan cities of Amsterdam, Paris, Vienna, Copenhagen, Auckland, and Victoria as their sites of research on tagging. This undertaking has led them to construe that *tagging* constitutes a kind of individualist defensive expressions in and against the current waves of globalization. In line with notion of graffiti as media of communication, Abel and Buckley (in Gadsby 1995) viewed graffiti writing as a psychological issue. It is a personal communication by which graffiti writers do not necessarily face social impediments as much as when they would typically confront in expressing their thoughts in ordinary situation (Gadsby 1995).

Quite different from the abovementioned studies, Joswig-Mehnert and Yule

(1996) had an educational guise. They were focused on how people or readers, in this case students, give responses or interpret graffiti. They incorporated into the pool of their research subjects fifty-seven students. By asking the subjects to read twelve graffiti, they found that the readers of graffiti tend to have various interpretations of graffiti. They also identified that readers tend to have different foci of what they consider the interesting aspects of graffiti. This project led them to conclude that graffiti readers tend to be confronted with difficulties in interpreting graffiti. This situation might be due to the fact that graffiti tend to be anonymous. As such, the conclusion links to Rodriguez and Clair's (1999) observation about the discursive tensions of anonymous texts which are not easy to tease out.

The corollary of the anonymity of graffiti is that those who produce graffiti have the freedom to write or express literally anything. In other words, graffiti producers are free from the charge of the need to really care about whoever would read. This situation insinuates that graffiti are rhetorical media which, as Obeng (2000) puts it, are seemingly egalitarian (I will, however, critique Obeng's view), for they can be produced by anybody of any background. So, graffiti might function as the balancing discursive media against the pervasive discourses often dominated by those with well-heeled access to wide-reaching media, such as, TV, the press, and the Internet. Subsequently, studies on graffiti might be used to unravel the views of the dominated who, more often than not, make up the majority in the society and whose aspirations are likely to be outside the mainstream of public discourse (Obeng 2000).

Best (2003) conducted a study on graffiti written on spaces of state-owned public transportation in Barbados. This being so, the present study is similar, for it also deals with public transport. However, the present project is different in the sense that it pertains to trucks owned by private companies or individual businessmen. Whilst in Best's study, the graffiti were made by students, the present undertaking deals with graffiti which can be said to belong to truck drivers (and co-drivers) of the trucks. While Best (2003) identified that the readers of the public transportation graffiti in Barbados are segmented—of certain subgroups, the readers of truck graffiti in Malang can be said to be unlimited in terms of their social background. The current study also departs from the mural paintings on trucks as documented by, for instance, Jack Szwergold (2004). While Szwergold's was intended specifically to document the pictures so as they last longer, the present study is concerned with the linguistic expressions of the truck graffiti.

Graffiti have long been the interest of social science researchers (Emmison & Smith 2000). Apparently, this corresponds to the pervasiveness of graffiti. As adumbrated earlier, Graffiti have attracted a number of people from different disciplinary backgrounds (e.g., Obeng 2000, Adams & Winter 1997, Moonwomon 1995, Gadsby 1995, Rodriguez & Clair 1999, Joswig-Mehnert & Yule 1996, Best 2003). Therefore, studies on graffiti have also been varied: sociolinguistic, sociological, educational, artistic, political, cultural, ideological,

etc.

Graffiti might be classified into public and private (Emmison & Smith 2000). Gadsby (1995), however, has more detailed categorization. She classified graffiti into six main points: 1) *latrinalia*, 2) *public*, 3) *tags*, 4) *historical*, 5) *folk epigraphy*, and 6) *humorous*. Among those types, *public* has enjoyed much of the research. Yet, even though truck graffiti belongs to *public*, they have been overlooked in the realm of graffiti research. In addition, another issue which seems to have been neglected is why graffiti are linguistically appealing. This paper, therefore, is devoted to addressing this question by referring to few instances of the linguistic properties of graffiti which warrant further explorations. The instances shall be based on the data I collected during the period of September 2003 up to July 2004.

It is axiomatic that nothing is really new under the sun. This does not, however, imply that everything earthy is dull. Just as many ethnographers go about the field in search for data, there must be things which are believed to be interesting; field work for researchers is expected to lead to elucidating, new insights. Yet, if we heed back the axiom, we would never find anything new. So what? Basically, what exist are things anew, that is to say, what people view as interesting is likely to be something which possesses defamiliarizing power (Shklovskii in Selden & Widdowson 1993). It is the purpose of this essay to argue that truck graffiti in Indonesia do not necessarily offer new materials; rather, they constitute a kind of defamiliarization. While the notion of defamiliarization is often attended to through psychological concepts of perception (e.g., Miall & Kuiken 1994, Porter 2003), the present paper will speak of defamiliarization of truck graffiti in the light of Saussure's concept of human language. In what follows, therefore, we shall briefly discuss Saussure's basic tenets.

A pivotal principle of Saussure's theory is that sign is 'arbitrary'. Such arbitrariness applies to the two levels of signifier and signified. As a signifier, 'elephant' has no necessary connection to the 'concept of elephant'. So, basically, people are free to employ any configuration of sounds or written shapes to signify 'elephant'—for instance, 'ggrroorr'. Yet, as to why (English) people only use the signifier 'elephant' to refer to the concept of 'elephant' has to do with convention. In other words, when truck graffiti writers try to communicate their message through graffiti, they consult the system of conventions from which their graffiti potentially derive and transpire meaning (Saussure 1959, Halliday 1978, Pradopo 1995). Essentially, Saussure's linguistics calls for attention to and warrants understanding of the system (encompassing linguistic and cultural system) behind the realization of linguistic events such as truck graffiti.

Languages not only use different signifiers, but also divide "the phenomenal world differently" (Rice & Waugh 1992:6). Language-specific concepts use different signifieds to articulate the phenomena. Imperative to grasp here is that "language is not a simple naming-process; language does not operate by naming

things and concepts that have an independently meaningful existence" (Rice & Waugh 1992:6). Rice & Waugh (1992) point out that one of the famous illustrations of this is the color spectrum; the colors of the spectrum actually form a continuum. So, part of the spectrum which runs from blue to red does not consist of a series of different colors – blue, green, yellow, orange, red – existing independently of each other. Rather, the spectrum is a continuum which our language breaks up in a particular way. As applies to our way to carve up the color continuum (e.g., Madurese tend to use 'biru' (blue) to refer to 'green' leaves), "there is nothing natural or inevitable about the way we divide up and articulate our world in other ways" (Rice & Waugh 1992:6); each language slices up and constructs different meaningful categories and concepts. Therefore, the fact that "our everyday concepts are arbitrary and that language does not simply name pre-existing things" is not always easily visible. Our tendency to be naturalized to the world our language system has produced makes us find the world natural, correct, normal, inevitable, and, possibly, boring. Since human beings are creative, on the basis of their conventional reserves, they can manipulate the linguistic resources so as to produce non-conventional and defamiliarizing linguistic expressions, such as, truck graffiti. As human beings are bound to make classification, they need a system of difference, i.e., a basic binary system—happy/not happy, etcetera. Since language is a lot more complex than this simple binary system, Saussure emphasizes on the idea of 'system' of language. Without the system, individual elements (the signs) could not mean anything (Rice & Waugh 1992). It is also within the system that we can understand truck graffiti.

Saussure also points out a crucial distinction between synchronic and diachronic aspects of language. The synchronic refers to the structures of language or the system of signs at a particular moment; whereas the diachronic pertains to the language history – the changes the language undergoes, which happens to its forms and conventions over time (Rice & Waugh 1992). When we happen to read a graffito, we are consulting our very moment synchronic system of our language. This is which allows us to get confused (due to failure to fit the graffiti into the system) or understand (when the graffiti are adjustable to the system).

The foregoing discussion has touched upon the idea that signs do not have any essential core of meaning. On the basis of this concept, languages are open to changes. Therefore, as to how instances of truck graffiti gain defamiliarizing effects is made possible by such a state. Yet, as to how the defamiliarization of truck graffiti in Malang, Indonesia comes about is dependent on its existence within the system of Indonesian language(s), inclusive of Javanese, which is complete at any one moment as any other living languages (Rice & Waugh 1992). This implies that the truck graffiti writers are bound to be cognizant of their language system.

Back to the notions of signifier and signified, signs (words) are different from

each other, phonologically as well as morphologically (and graphically); they are negative (of each other), even in relations to other signifiers. The idea of 'negative' refers to the fact that the signifiers negate any other signifiers. This negative characteristic is also true with what the words signify (the signifieds). However, the positive characteristics of words are also worth attending to. Saussure observed that if a sign (word) is seen in its totality, it is positive. It posits ideas. He referred to the instances that alteration of signifiers induces conceptual (signified) changes (1959:121). This seems to apply to truck graffiti obtainable in Malang and thereabouts.

Down to the area of Malang, the ability of truck graffiti writers (mainly the drivers and co-drivers), is not any less likely than the electronic, modern media to posit some ideas through the employment of words. What makes them different is, apparently, the availability of the media they use to reach the public. It is unlikely that the truck graffiti media, that is the trucks proper, will posit ideas as widely accessible to the public as those of electronic, hyper media. The extent to which the spread of ideas to the public is not the focus of the present paper, rather, how the defamiliarization comes about (linguistically) is what is at stake.

Saussure also points out that signs, necessarily including truck graffiti, operate in two ways. The first is paradigm. This is a set of signs from which the one to be used is chosen. Vocabulary can be said to be the paradigm. The second is the syntagm. It is the message into which the chosen signs are combined. Sentences can be said to be the syntagm. So, all messages incorporate the selection (from a paradigm) and the combination (into a syntagm). Applying the concepts of paradigm and syntagm as well as the subsequent notions of norm and deviation might be insightful in the understanding of defamiliarization the truck graffiti curb.

In the application of the paradigm and syntagm, the discussion of norm and deviation is imperative (Fiske 1982). A norm refers to the common practices of a group or society and is thus commonplace, predictable, banal—the expected; pervasive and widely accepted conventions are close to the norm (Fiske 1982). The non-conventional is a deviation from the norm. This is the site of defamiliarization. Yet, we need to bear in mind that normality and deviation have degrees. We also need to remember that in practice, the normal and the deviant are frequently in a continuum. Deviation frequently moves towards the normal position. Trousers for women used to be deviant (at least in the Javanese context); but, today, it has become much more normal. This also seems to be true with the use of non-conventional expressions. In what follows, we will explore the use of the aforementioned points in the writing of truck graffiti in Malang which read 'IREX CONSINGSTITI' and 'Brenksex Sikomo' (see Figures 1 and 2).

2. Defamiliarization: Paradigmatic and syntagmatic breaches

'IREX' is a brand of aphrodisiac recently released to the market in Indonesia. If

we ask the drivers (co-drivers) why they wrote such a word at the back of their truck, they would probably have no answer other than "just for fun". We might go nowhere if our efforts to understand such an expression are solely based on the writers' responses to our inquiries. What is important to look at is that sex-related themes, inclusive of the brand of aphrodisiac, tend to be kept from public talk in Malang, East Java and thereabout. When they do have these themes in public, those are likely to be intended for fun, jokes, and the like. This has been the apparent jocular themes of Indonesian comedians belonging to the groups of Warkop, Srimulat, etc.

In other words, the employment of such a word (and theme) appeals readers' interest in the way that they violate the conventional patterns, that is, sex-related topics are (normally) supposed to be hidden from public sphere.

Figure 1

As well, the expectation that the rear of truck as a public space not to bear private theme is violated by the sample Figure 1; it is a sort of paradigmatic violation. The back of the truck is supposed to be public and thus deal solely (ideally) with public themes. Yet, the fact, as evidenced in the figure, says that the paradigmatic slot of the truck deck is violated by the graffiti writers in that they insert a theme which belongs to the paradigmatic slot of private. As such, it challenges the expected, mundane, and banal. This being the case, defamiliarization is offered by the truck graffiti text. It sustains readers' attention and allows them to resort and busily consult the normal paradigm which they have developed through their cultural and societal upbringing. As the readers realize that the graffiti text breaches the normal paradigm, certain feelings very likely come to the fore. That

is basically what makes the graffiti appealing. This is not to say that such an appeal evocation is always positive, for whether it is positive or negative depends upon how the individual readers deem the value of the breaches or violation of the norm.

Such abovementioned idea also applies to the second figure. Malangese, Javanese are not supposed to use dirty words in public. "Brenksex" seems to be derived from "brengsek" (a four-letter word in an English sense). It is understandable that somebody is prone to use a four-letter word in a distressing, unrelenting situation. However, it would be rude to swear, to employ a four-letter word before the unlimited public of truck graffiti readers. So, it is another violation of the paradigmatic slot of the norms supposed to be adhered to by anybody belonging to the given society.

Figure 2

At this juncture, defamiliarization is also present in the use of unusual orthography, that is, "brenk" and "sex". The combination of "n" and "k" is not quite normal in Indonesian and Javanese (except the loan word, e.g., Bank). "Sex" as well is not Indonesian or Javanese. So the employment of such words which come from different paradigmatic sources and are thus syntagmatically "strange" in their realization avers another defamiliarization.

Another pivotal point to note is that not only do the two graffiti texts (in both Figures) disharmonize the media (truck decks) and the theme on which to write, but also the paradigmatic slots which are supposed to be adhered to in the syntagmatic realization. "IREX" (aphrodisiac) and "Brenksex" (four-letter word) do not normally go well with the good advice of "CONSINGSTITI" (you, be careful and wise) and "Sikomo" (a figure of an artificial komodo-like animal intended as amusement and education for children), respectively. In other words, the text does not warrant automatic, fast, ready "digestion" on the part of the

readers. Instead, it forces the readers to detour the usual-normal route of understanding. This means defamiliarization. The readers are required to roam about possible ways of arriving at a state of coherence of the two phrases normally mismatching; they are to take their time to orchestrate the tensions built in the text.

3. Harmonizing paradigmatic and syntagmatic tensions

Just like a complication needs a resolution or denouement (Forster 1927, Cohan & Shires 1988), the defamiliarization the truck graffiti texts proffer needs a synchronizing state, that is, the moment when the readers find them discernable and secure a balance or coherence in the texts. This needs time on the part of the readers (Miall & Kuiken 1994); they need to trace their literacy-competence (encompassing some sort of linguistic, literary, and cultural competence) which could be referred to as cultural literacy (cf. Chomsky 1957, Hymes 1979, Fish 1980, Gribble 1983, see Schirato & Yell 2000).

After some moment of tracking their storage, the readers might find the seemingly disharmonized texts (at the very moment of the first reading) eventually understandably self-unifying. IREX which is a brand of aphrodisiac widely spread in Indonesia might need our careful attention; readers might think of the necessity to be careful about taking such substance, for it might stimulate sexual arousal, which might not be easy to control. Supposing that this is the case, unmanageable drive for sex might be awaiting. If this is what occurs, the given individuals (readers) might be in trouble against the norm of Javanese discourse and practices. Therefore, the second phrase is a sort of caveat. So basically, in short, the whole graffiti text in the first sample deals with warning so that people are not to breach the common societal practice. Such a warning is presented in a defamiliarizing way so that it evokes certain feeling and attracts the public to read.

As with the second text, the denouement might come to a different end. Although the text is for public consumption, it is not intended to give warning to the readers; instead, it is used to inform readers about what the writers are thinking about their situation. “Brenksex” is employed to react to their bad situation as reflected in their old truck and “Sikomo” further attests that the truck really is in a bad condition. “Sikomo”, as portrayed in a children video-clip, is a huge animal (komodo-like) which brings about a traffic jam due to its clumsy body-movement. This all relates to the condition of the truck: it is old and duly cannot run fast and accordingly causes trouble to both the driver and other car drivers. Another resolution might be that, by swearing, the writer (driver) is trying to call for attention of the other drivers so as to understand his condition. It is a way to show that the driver is aware of his own condition and, therefore, he is pleading to other people to also understand his situation.

So, basically, truck graffiti deserve attention when they have defamiliarizing

power, that is, virtues that fling the readers into a situation wherein their automatic, fast understanding of the graffiti texts is withheld for a certain moment and released as the readers arrive at the coherence of the texts, that is, after securing the needed resource—conventional system in which meaning resides (Saussure 1959).

4. Agency and dialogic tensions of truck graffiti

In Basthomi (2007), I have discussed that it is the drivers (and co-drivers) who own truck graffiti. Based on the interviews during the fieldwork, I have gained information that a number of drivers and professional artists/painters who produce the truck graffiti admitted that it tends to be the drivers (and co-drivers) who decide if the trucks should be decorated with graffiti. In addition, as the trucks go along the streets, the writers (speakers or narrators or declarers) of the graffiti are the truck driver(s) and/or co-driver(s).

The literature on graffiti written on means of transportation speaks predominantly of graffiti which are produced surreptitiously like those written on public transportation in New York and Barbados (see Best 2003). In this situation, the agency of the graffiti is not easy to identify. However, since truck graffiti in and around Malang do not share a similar mode of production, they pose different values with regard to the notion of the agency. The truck graffiti in question have not been written stealthily; rather, they have been written on purpose with a high degree of jollity. As reported in Basthomi (2007), the drivers and co-drivers occasionally ask professional artists to produce graffiti. In such a situation, the drivers themselves pay for the service of the artists. The corollary is that the truck graffiti are the belongings of the drivers and co-drivers.

As noted earlier, it is insufficient for human organisms to have monologues, rather, they are in need for dialogues (Thibault 2006). The issue of truck graffiti does not depart from the issue of dialogism and/or speaking in writing (Wesling and Slawek 1995). They are sorts of dialogic communicative expressions intended by the agent-owners (i.e., truck drivers and co-drivers) to convey ideas. At this juncture, I need to add that most of the drivers and co-drivers are those with relatively low education. I would say it seems unthinkable to expect them to have graduated from tertiary educational institutions. The upshot is that it is unlikely that they can gain access to modern electronic hyper media which can reach very wide audience. What the truck drivers can avail themselves of are truck decks. Within this context of limitation, the agents make use of the resources to reach as wide audience as possible. This is secured by resorting to relatively big size fonts so as not to miss any potential audience. This being the case, the number of words to write tends accordingly to be small.

From the macro point of view, graffiti serve as egalitarian means of expressions (Obeng 2000). However, truck graffiti in Malang and thereabouts do not seem to call for dialogic responses as toilet *latrinalia* (see Moonwomon 1995)

and graffiti in state-owned public transport (see Best 2003) do. Accordingly, truck graffiti in and around Malang function as dominant rhetoric in the sense of not allowing other people to give responses to the graffiti. So, from micro scale point of view, truck graffiti are not egalitarian, for they do not offer balanced opportunities for prospective audience to have dialogic relationships with the graffiti owners. In this regard, the micro-scale media of truck graffiti denote rhetoric of emulation whereby the agents exercise their limited power. The agents do not really care whether or not the graffiti sound good to the readers. In this case, the agents are as dominant as those having access to hypermedia by which they can have dominant and overriding rhetoric or discourse.

5. Conclusion

The paper has touched upon the notion that the upfront merits of truck graffiti such that readers feel invited to read are their virtues in the forms of defamiliarization. This aspect, as the paper has discussed, is achieved by confusing the normal paradigmatic and syntagmatic correspondence of signs (mainly words in the present case). In a sense, this linguistic event of truck graffiti indicates that the graffiti owners, who are in a disadvantaged position and of low education, emulate the rhetorical-discoursal production of those with access to hypermedia, notably, the well off, who can, with some degree of ease, manipulate the paradigmatic and syntagmatic slots of linguistic reserves to dominate the discourse in the society.

From a macro point of view, the phenomenon shows that the disadvantaged have as many chances as the better off to produce any discourse. This point seems to affirm Obeng's (2000) idea of egalitarianism in the production of graffiti, that is, to challenge and counterbalance the domination of the well off. However, from a micro vantage point, the truck graffiti do not allow for dialogic communication; they do not invite any response from the audience. This situation can be safely construed as authoritarianism on the part of the truck graffiti owners. However, since this authoritarianism seems quite modest that it does not have impact across the board, the truck graffiti simply denote the rhetoric of emulation.

The above point, however, needs more extensive data so that more rigorous analysis can be arrived at. Hence, future research agenda would need to substantiate similar analysis with more data collection, that is, more field work. Other approaches, other than linguistic, to defamiliarization are also commendable so that more comprehensive analysis of truck graffiti in and around Malang could be realized.

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Rhetorical Techniques in Dealing with Understanding Problems

Issues in helpdesk encounters involving non-native speakers of English

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The article, based on the author's graduate thesis, presents the results of an investigation on two questions: first, what were the causes of misunderstanding and non-understanding between two parties using English as a common language in helpdesk encounters? Second, how did they deal with understanding problems that occurred during the interaction? In conversational analysis, it is well known that the causes of misunderstanding and non-understanding go beyond the differences in the linguistic skills of the two parties. There are also varied rhetorical strategies involved when dealing with understanding problems – especially in interactions that involve the transmission of crucial information. Although a number of empirical studies shows that repair is the most common approach in solving cases of misunderstanding and non-understanding, the research reported in this article reveals that any party in the conversational act may perform preventive steps before understanding problem arise, thereby eliminating the necessity for a repair.

1. Introduction

The internationalization of 'technical help over the phone' as an enterprise and the increasing application of helpdesk services in organizations highly characterized as intercultural and international have propelled the necessity in employing a common language that could be an effective medium when two individuals with different linguistic backgrounds decide to commence a transaction. A number of researchers (e.g., Gass & Varonis 1991, Weigand 1999, Kurhila 2001) have asserted that when people interact using a secondary language, problems with understanding are inevitable.

It has been pointed out that the causes of misunderstanding and non-understanding in conversations involving nonnative speakers of a language can be attributed to the interacting parties' cultural and linguistic differences (also evident in the works of Gass and Varonis 1991 and Weigand 1999) – and when we focus on linguistic differences, the premise is that understanding problems are due to the interacting actors' difficulty in the correct construction of sentences, their unfamiliarity with the vocabulary of the language in use, and their problems with the proper pronunciation of words and terms. Another view, however, is that misunderstanding is not only caused by linguistic but also by pragmatic factors.

Realizing that problems with understanding are normal occurrences in intercultural conversations, interacting individuals are expected to resort to varied approaches in resolving understanding problems – the most common, however, is repair. Although, in this research the concept of 'preventing possible understanding problems' is also explored.

2. Scope of the study

Since the study intended to explore cases of misunderstandings and non-understandings in telephone conversations involving nonnative speakers of English, recordings of calls in a natural setting were collected. Of special interest for this particular study were calls made by individuals who were seeking for technical help from a commercial call center or from a helpdesk of an organization. It is important to note that the calls were carried out using English as a common medium for the transaction.

The research focused on 11 recordings for analysis – and these recordings were selected from the 25 recorded phone calls that were made in a call center and a helpdesk for an educational institute – both located in Enschede, The Netherlands. Calls were selected in accordance with the fundamental questions for this study, which focused on the causes of misunderstanding and non-understanding and the ways that they are repaired. Calls that contained instances when one party in the conversation act attempts to prevent a possible understanding problem were also included for analysis.

3. Misunderstanding goes beyond linguistic differences

Problems with understanding, oftentimes, have been blamed on the linguistic differences between and among conversational parties who resort to using a secondary language to establish verbal interaction. The common assertion is that people succumb to misunderstanding during the talk because they simply have their issues in their competencies in using the language. As Gallois, Franklyn-Stokes, Giles, and Coupland (1988) advance, the encounter between two individuals from different cultural backgrounds may proceed very smoothly, although oftentimes that same encounter could be confronted by obstacles and incompatibilities that eventually could result in misunderstanding, hostility, and an increase in prejudice.

The analysis of the recorded telephone calls reveals that misunderstanding problems in helpdesk encounter involving two nonnative English speakers go beyond linguistic differences. What the analysis indicates, instead, is that misunderstanding may be due to one conversational party constructing an erroneous inference from the utterance of his conversational partner. Another reason is triggered by the incompleteness of information in the statement of the speaker.

3.1 Erroneous inference as cause of misunderstanding

One drawback for telephone interaction, according to Backhaus (1997), is the impossibility for interacting individuals to share the same environment. This is also true for telephone help – as one party would never have that the opportunity to have a picture of the immediate milieu of the other. When one conversational party points out something, it may be registered as a different item by the partner – and this case we label as erroneous inference.

The first segment is taken from a conversation between a Dutch helpdesk personnel and Chinese office staff. The former is asking the latter about the number of a student.

(1)	6		C2	[Um:: (0.5) Harriett, uh, Zulu (0.5) has a, a smart card but only three, uh, numbers, are
	7			tho, on there (0.5)
	8			and I need more numbers for the (0.5) student number (0.8)
	9	→	C1	But it should be there↓ (0.3) it's, eh, under his, her name (.) is that right? (0.7)
	10	→	C2	hhhh (0.4) Yeah, it's, i, i, on the card?
	11	→	C1	O yeah, ok, moment, yeah ok, I know why, because they, they dint inform us (0.4)
	12		C2	[A-ha

In line 6, the agent proceeds to detail out the matter for discussion – that the smart card of the student has only three numbers and more numbers are instead needed for the student number.

A case of misunderstanding commences in line 9 when C1 insists that the number should be *there* – under the name of the student. However, an instance of self-doubt occurs when she requests for a confirmation of what she has mentioned in the initial phase of her turn. This is apparent towards the end of line 9 (*is that right?*).

The occurrence of misunderstanding in this instance is triggered by C1's flawed interpretation of her conversational partner's intended item (the smart card which should have the student numbers). C1's mention of *there* in line 9 is referring to something where the numbers are to be found – and that *something* is not mentioned in the conversation. *there* therefore marks the display of a mis-match between C1's thinking and that of C2's – thus in line 10 (*it's, i, i, on the card?*) C2 asks for a clarification whether C1 is referring to the card when she says *there*.

After a pause of 0.7 second, C2 deploys a response of *yeah*, in line 10, to C1's utterance in line 9 – which does not necessarily confirm the assertion of C1 in the first part of line 9 (*but it should be there*). C2 frames the *yeah* reply not to approve of C1's claim that the numbers are already on the smart card, which C1 could

have been thinking is with C2 during the talk, although nothing in this segment can prove that C2 really has the student card.

That same *yeah* signifies C2's confirmation of the fact the number should be under the student's name, but during the talk the numbers in question might have not been present on the card because C2 positions an inquiry in line 10 (*it's, i, i, on the card?*) to imply her negation to the assertion of C1. The said question in that same line serves as a form of an invitation for C1 to check on her prior claim.

What happens in lines 9 and 10 exemplifies what Bazanella and Damiano (1999) describe as a situation when C1's wrong interpretation is detected immediately afterwards by C2. The said detection allows C2 to structure the necessary utterance for clarification in line 10.

What is contained in line 11, then, is an example of what Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977) call self-repair that can issue from other initiation. Line 11 shows that C1 does not hesitate to admit that she is mistaken with her earlier claim – which, in this case, can be her way of correcting her misunderstanding only after C2 positions an invitation to repair C1's erroneous assumption.

The next segment also contains a case of misunderstanding that is attributed to the erroneous inference of one of the participants in the conversation. For this example, however, the nationality of the caller is not identified (which makes it difficult to tell whether he is a nonnative English speaker or not), although the agent is still Dutch (a nonnative speaker of the language for this interaction). The use of English in this particular conversation, nevertheless, contributes to the intercultural character of the interaction.

(2)	49	→	C	Um-n'ya the last one I (.) press it (1.1) nothing is °hap-pening° (0.6)
	50	→	A	In (.) sys-tem↑ (0.7)
	51	→	C	Ya (0.2) °in sys-tem° (0.2)
	52	→	A	If (.) you (.) press (.) this (.) ef (0.2) three but-tons:: so-called so, so, lowest but-[ton]
	53	→	C	[ya]
	54	→	C	A' k' ment, for hard disk (.)
	55	→	A	Ya, ok that's the one↓ so now you can select (.) that one (0.4)
	56		A	And for-mat the hard-drive (.) of (.) course (.)
	57		C	°Can try a send° do you want to format (.) yes?

In this phase of the conversation, the caller, after receiving the detailed instruction from the agent, is already pressing a button to handle his problem in formatting a hard drive. In the previous turns, the caller had the difficulty in locating the correct button to press, which is now remedied, as shown in line 49, when he admits he has already found and pressed it. Towards the end of line 49, he claims that after pressing the button nothing happens.

With that utterance, the agent is propelled to ask for clarification, in line 50, if the caller really means that nothing is happening in the system. The request for clarification may have been instigated by the agent's surprise that the system still does not work even after the caller has claimed that he has already pressed the required button.

The caller's utterance in line 51 (*ya in sys-tem↑*) is only expressing his attempt to validate his claim in line 49 (*nothing is °hap-pening°*), which the agent has completed in line 50 with an interrogative utterance *in system↑*, which is the agent's way of saying 'are you referring to the system or something else?'.

Line 52 shows doubt on the part of the agent as he again inquires if the caller really has pressed the F3 button, which he emphasizes by describing that it is the lowest button. The caller's *ya* response in line 53 eventually changes to *a' k' ment, for hard disk* in line 54. What is the implication of the shift in tone?

The first, with *ya*, is his assertion that indeed he has pressed the button which the agent has asked him to – which could be continued by this hypothetical utterance of *ya, I did what you have told me, but nothing has happened*. The caller's next utterance in line 53, however, with an almost inaudible expression of *a, k* or presumably *ah, ok*, is an admission that instead of pressing the F3 button, he has pressed another button – and whatever the button is, the recorded conversation does not indicate.

With an invitation for repair from the agent, in line 52 (*if you press this ef three buttons…*), the caller is then directed to a realization that he has not pressed the correct button, as indicated by his utterance in line 54. The lowest button which the agent describes is the button the caller says as the button for the *hard disk*.

Going back to the agent's utterance in line 52 (*if you press this ef three buttons:: so-called so, so, lowest but-ton*), the request for clarification from the agent already takes the form of repair which, as Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977) claim, is another example of a repair initiated by the person other than the source of the error.

The flow of the conversation is then restored in line 55 with the agent reiterating the button that the caller should press, while line 56 indicates that the caller has already pressed the correct button as he is led to the next option of formatting, in line 57 (*do you want to format yes?*), which the agent has already anticipated once the right button is pressed.

3.2 Incomplete information as a cause of misunderstanding

In conversations relating to highly technical tasks, the completeness of information is expected and always recommended (Kurhila 2001). However, as Weigand (1999) stresses out, not everything is expressed in communication for reasons of 'economy of language' and simply because interacting individuals are not always aware of every piece of information necessary for clear understanding.

It has been disclosed during the analysis of the selected recorded phone calls that when pieces of necessary information are missing one part in the conversational act is highly prone to fall into the pit of misunderstanding. The segment below is an example of misunderstanding resulting from incomplete information.

(3)	121	→	A	Then I leave it (0.2) ah (.) op-en↑ (0.2) as (.)°it° (.) is↑ (0.7) please (0.3) give
	122	→		(0.2) only moni-tor (0.3) in (.) foot (0.5) no (.) ca̲ble (0.5) whatever (.) cable (.) can be
	123	→		(.) taken:: off (0.3) please (0.2) take (.) it (.) off [from] the moni-tor↓
	124	→		[now] ↑ (0.5)
	125	→	C	Now↑ (0.3)
	126		A	E' you don't̲ need (.) to do now:: but (.) in a (.) couple (.) of (.) days) when they (.)
	127			come (.) and (.) swap (.) the moni-tor (0.5) at (.) your (.) place↓ (0.5)

Prior to line 121, the agent requested the caller to give him the date of purchase of the monitor, which can be found in the invoice for the said equipment. The caller, however, claimed that he did not have the invoice with him, thus prompting the agent to inform him that he would not include the date of purchase in the set of information about the problematic monitor, in line 121 (*then I leave it, uh, open as it is*).

For background information, anyway, in the first part of this conversation, the agent had already been collecting the information that he needs to handle the problem of the caller with his monitor. Still in line 121 until line 123, the agent starts instructing the caller with what to do (*please give only moni-tor in foot no ca̲ble whatever cable can be taken:: off please take it off from the moni-tor*).

The caller must have interpreted the instruction as something urgent that needs to be executed right away, thereby spurring him to ask if he should do it *now* in line 124. The interrogative sounding *now* is again uttered in the caller's turn, line 125, which could be the customer's way of nudging the agent to attend to his first question, in line 124, whether he should do right away what the agent asks him to do. The misunderstood agent then positions a response, in lines 125 and 126 (*e' you don't̲ need to do now:: but in a couple of days when they come and swap the moni-tor at your place*), to the caller's inquiry.

It is possible to infer from this particular instance that the caller's notion of the time for him to act out on the spelled out instructions does not coincide with that of the agent's. What is apparent is that the caller misunderstands the agent by thinking that he should do right at that moment the action of 'taking off' whatever cable can be 'taken off from the monitor'. The deployment of *now* as a point for clarification by the caller becomes a signal for repair, which the agent acknowl-

edges in lines 126 and 127 (*e' you don't need to do now:: but in a couple of days when they come and swap the moni-tor at your place*).

4. The ways conversational parties deal with non-understanding in telephone help

Whenever the inquiry on how problems with understanding should be resolved, repair appears to be the instant solution. The definition of repair, which Bloch (2005) proposes, underscores the need to manage problems in understanding in the communicative act.

A rather expanded definition of repair comes from Schegloff (2000, 1997) who stresses out that the act of repairing entails coping with problems of troubles in speaking, hearing, and understanding the talk in conversation or other forms of talk-in-interaction. A detailed look at the mechanism of repair reveals its three components, which, as Rieger identifies (2003), include the repaired segment containing the repairable, the repair initiation, and the repairing segment.

From the analysis of the recorded call, three methods of repair are identified to have been used in dealing with non-understanding. A pattern can be seen from the analyzed segments, as it is evident that the conversational party who falls into non-understanding also indicates that he just experienced a problem (termed as "the initiation of a repair") – therefore allowing the source of the non-understood utterance to execute the necessary repair.

4.1 Repair of a non-understood utterance by repetition

The rhetorical use of repetition by a speaker to get his message across to the intended recipient has been validated in the studies of Bazanella and Damiano (1999), Rieger (2003), and Egbert (2004). In cases when the speaker assumes that the listener fails to understand an utterance, he resorts to repeating the non-understood statement for the listener to process. Consider the segment below that contains repetition as a form of correction of the non-understood utterance.

(4)	6		C	I'm having some problems with my system (.) and I had already complained
	7			about it having some problems with the profiles ((this segment is inaudible)) and it's not
	8			working again
	9	→	A	So you have problems with your profile↓ (1.3)
	10	→	C	°Ok° (0.4)
	11	→	A	You have problems with your [profile is my question↑] [yes,] [yes]
	12		C	[yeah] [yeah] [yeah]

In line 6, the caller mentions that she is having some problems with her *system* and she proceeds to state her problem with the profiles, as contained in line 7. Since the caller cites two *problems* (first, with the system, then second, with profile), the agent attempts to infer from what has been said by the caller that her real problem must be the second one (problem with the profiles). It is, however, possible to claim that in this situation the caller subscribes to the funnel approach in presenting her problem – first general (problem with the system), then specific (problem with the profiles).

In this instance, however, putting finality to an unconfirmed inference would have been a mistake on the part of the agent because such an instance has a potential to trigger misunderstanding as the talk progresses.

In line 9, the agent then constructs her understanding of the caller's problem and delivers it for the caller to confirm (*so you have problems with your profile*↓). After a pause of 1.3 second, the caller responds in line 10 (with *ok*). Since the statement in line 9 is intended by the agent to have her understanding of the problem confirmed by the caller, she would probably be expecting a yes/no response, as she may have also interpreted the caller's *ok* as a display of non-understanding.

The caller's reply, in line 10, to the agent's inquiry in line 9 is interpreted to be inappropriate, thus the agent restates her previous question with emphasis in line 11 (*You have problems with your profile is my question*) presumably after coming to an interpretation that the caller's *ok* signals her failure to understand the agent's statement in line 9.

It is interesting, however, that in line 9, the statement does not sound as if it is a question because it does not possess a rising intonation. In this case, the agent could be expecting a yes/no response, which according to Kearsley (1976) is one possible answer to a closed-form question characterized by a rising intonation pattern.

The caller's *ok* response in line 10, as already cited, could be interpreted as a display of her failure to understand that the agent's statement, in line 9, takes an interrogative rather than a declarative form, thus her reply to the utterance is deemed inappropriate. With this other-initiated form of repair (despite the missing rising intonation that implies questioning), the agent instantaneously executes a repair by repeating her statement with the incorporation of two techniques that differentiate the latest utterance from the previous one: a change in tone (from falling intonation to rising intonation) and an emphasis that she is asking a question for clarification (*you have problems with your profile <u>is my question</u>* ↑), which the caller then receives with *yeah, yeah* – eventually restoring the conversation for continuation.

The addition of *is my question* in line 11 appears to be the agent's way of emphasizing that her utterance is a question, thereby giving the impression that she is urging the caller to give a yes/no response – which the caller responds to in line 12 with the triple production of "yeahs".

4.2 Repair of a non-understood utterance by repetition and modification

When repetition does not suffice as a repair strategy, the source of the non-understood utterance also takes the option of modifying the problematic utterance – as an added mechanism to the repetition procedure as a repair tool.

This next segment is taken from a conversation involving an Iranian student soliciting for the advice of a Dutch agent on buying a hard disk. Before she can answer the question of the caller, the agent requests more relevant information about the hard disk from the caller, as shown in line 14.

(5)	14		A	A-ha and how big must it be? (1.4)
	15		C	Hhhh I don't know, something good, I mean, something which is now available
	16			[under]
	17	→	A	[Ok] like a default size to start with? (0.2)
	18	→	C	Yeah (0.2)
	19	→	A	Something like that?
	20	→	C	Sorry↑(0.3)
	21	→	A	Like a default size that they start with (.) because nowadays they make them very
	22	→		big u-hu
	23		C	I don't know (.) [just] [something] normal [but good
	24		A	[yeah] [ok] [u-hum (0.7)

In line 15, the caller appears to have an insufficient idea about the exact size of the hard disk that she is referring to, as even her reply does not match with the question of the agent (*how big must it be?*). Instead she describes her 'ideal' hard disk as *something good* in line 15, which is rather vague for a description.

The vagueness in the answer of the caller, according to Jucker, Smith and Ludge (2003), allows her to maintain fluency when she cannot access the information at the point where it is needed in the conversation.

Probably sensing the difficulty on the part of the caller to give an exact description of the size of the hard disk, the agent offers her own description in line 17 (*like a default size to start with?*), which the caller receives with a *yeah* to indicate her approval of the description. However, when the agent initiates a follow up question (*something like that?*) in line 19 for confirmation of the caller's response, the caller fails to deliver the same remark positioned in line 18 (*yeah*), and instead she signals a difficulty that requires immediate repair.

Egbert (2004) claims that in cases when the hearer recognizes his problem in hearing or understanding, he would usually use the next turn as an opportunity to indicate the problem through a repair initiation – in this segment, the caller's *sorry* utterance in line 20. It is, then, expected that the speaker of the trouble-source turn would attempt to repair the trouble so that mutual understanding is restored and the conversation can proceed – in this case, the agent repeating in line 21 what she has said in line 17 (*like a default size to start with*).

A minor revision, though, in the statement in line 17 is the addition of *they* and the omission of *to* before the word *start* in line 21, which drastically changes the meaning of the new sentence and which the agent could have intended to improve the clarity of her previous utterance – presumably an attempt on her part to improve the understanding of the caller by repairing the older assertion.

The statement in line 17 (*like a default size to start with?*) sounds more of an introductory expression – an attempt on the part of the speaker to begin a description of an item under discussion. However, the modification of that same statement with the inclusion of *they* implies that the agent means to say something else.

With the repeated but already revised utterance what she intends is to convey a bit of information about the default size of the hard disk in the beginning. More interesting, however, the second part of line 21 already contains further information (*because nowadays they make them very big*) to justify the statement in the first part of the same line.

It is apparent, therefore, that the repair initiation from the caller in line 20 (*sorry?*) yields a three-part repair operation on the part of the agent: repetition of an earlier statement, improvement of the clarity of the previous statement, and the inclusion of new information in the new statement.

The execution of the necessary repair spurs the conversation to continue with the caller admitting that she has no knowledge about the size of a hard disk – in line 23 (*I don't know just something normal but good*).

4.3 Repair of a non-understood utterance by clarification

As mentioned earlier, the impossibility of the conversational parties to share their experienced environments during the phone interaction contributes to the difficulty in attaining full, complete, or correct understanding of an uttered term or a verbalized statement. When it becomes apparent to the speaker, during the telephone conversation, that an element or a portion of his utterance has not been understood, he may opt to clarify the problematic term to assist the recipient in achieving correct understanding. This argument is supported by the segment below.

(6)	40	→	A	So when that is there↑ (0.4) let's::: (0.3) check (0.2) the issues right here (1.1) where
	41	→		are:: we? (3.9) this (.) formatting formatting formatting (1.6) is y'r own sys-tem set-
	42	→		up↑ (.) um::: if you (.) press the (.) ef (.) three but-ton whi::ch is (.) the:: right (0.9)
	43	→		but-ton (0.2) under the navi-ga-tor but-ton↑ (0.4) or tha'd um:: (.) top (0.3) <u>down</u> (0.6)
	44	→		but-ton↑
	45	→	C	N, which <u>are</u> the (.) but-ton?
	46	→	A	The lowest (.) but-ton↓ (0.2)

47 → C Ok the (.) [the]
48 → A [on] the front

Prior to this segment, the caller has already oriented the agent to the nature of the problem which triggers the call. In this excerpt, the agent is already instructing the caller to press a button to ease out the difficulty in formatting the hard drive.

Lines 40 to 44 contain the instructive utterances from the agent and interestingly he refrains from hastening in the formulation of his instructions as shown by pauses at almost regular intervals and some cases of sound stretches. This could be hypothesized as the agent's scheme to accommodate the caller's effort to understand the agent's instructive utterances.

Lines 42 to 44 are particularly important because they are allocated for a description and direction of the steps that the caller should perform. In line 43, the agent stresses the word *down* to differentiate it from the prior word *top* to avoid confusing the caller, since the two terms have obviously polarized meanings.

The agent may have his own mental frame of the term "top down" button which is not shared by the caller in this situation – which further results in the caller's difficulty in making sense of the verbal stimulus (*top down button*), thereby restraining him from immediately acting out after the instruction has been articulated.

However, the phrase *top-down button* may not be the only culprit that is responsible for the failure of the caller to click the appropriate button right away. Lines 42 and 43, which are still part of the agent's turn, are certainly abounding in "buttons". Here the speaker says that the caller should press the F3 button, which he describes to be the right button, and which is under the navigator button, or top-down button.

It is possible, from the previous discourse, that the agent's multiple mentioning of 'button' has adverse consequence on the caller's mental processing, as it spurs him to profess his confusion in line 45 (*N, which <u>are</u> the but-ton?*). This request for clarification is another indication of the caller's attempt to signal the agent that there is another troublesome utterance that requires immediate repair.

Recognizing that the caller could not identify the correct button to press, the agent immediately initiates a repair, in line 46, by clearly indicating to the caller that the lowest button should be pressed, which the caller, in turn, acknowledges with an *ok* in line 47.

What the agent actually does, according to Hirst et al. (1994), is the performance of a linguistic task of referring to some object or idea that involves collaboration between the speaker and the hearer. In this case, Hirst et al. (1994) add, the speaker has the goal of having the hearer identify the object that the speaker has in mind – which therefore makes it necessary for the speaker to construct a description of the object which he thinks will enable the hearer to identify it.

However, that same line 47 (*<u>Ok</u> the… the*) again shows a problem on the part of the caller to locate the button, as indicated by the sudden termination of his

incomplete utterance. The caller's inability to state the missing term or phrase to complete his *ok, the, the* utterance could also be a manifestation of his difficulty in locating the specified button. This consequently triggers the agent to convey a short description of the button's location in line 48 (*on the front*).

When the agent extends the description of the button in line 48, he is just doing what Clark and Brennan (1999) call "establishing a referential identity" – the mutual belief that the speakers have correctly identified the referent. The caller admits understanding in line 49 (*um-n'ya the last*) which allows the conversation to proceed.

5. Prevention before repair

Undeniably, the number of studies conducted to understand the phenomenon of repair is significantly high. Indeed repair has attracted so much attention in the *academia* that it appears to have been christened as the only possible solution in containing misunderstandings and non-understanding. Just as it is widely accepted that errors are inherent in any conversational activity, dealing with these errors must also be a ready strategy for interacting individuals to achieve understanding in the talk.

Clark (1994) points out that in certain situations speakers go beyond repairing errors in conversations – they have strategies for preventing certain problems from arising at all.

This discussion of error prevention draws substantial arguments from Clark's work on managing problems in speaking. He likens conversation problems to infections which people prefer to handle before they grow into something worse. Such an analogy prompted the classification of managing conversational problems in consonance with a physician's strategies in dealing with infections: preventatives, warnings, and repairs.

Misunderstanding and non-understanding in helpdesk encounters are too costly to be deemed as natural occurrences, thus they are better prevented than repaired. The use of the concept of prevention in this research deviates from the original notion of Clark (1994), as he emphasizes that it is the speaker of the problematic utterance who takes the option to employ a preventative approach to avert possible problems in speaking. This argument is rooted on Clark's assertion that self-correction prevents deeper and more costly misunderstandings down the line – thereby resulting in the duality of its function – both as a repair and a preventative.

In this research, however, prevention is hypothesized to be something that the other party in the conversation (primarily the recipient of the utterance) performs in an effort to attain a complete understanding of his partner's utterance. With the avowed objective of gaining full understanding, the employment of prevention in a conversation, therefore, specifically leads to the avoidance of possible problems

of misunderstanding and non-understanding within or during the conversational act.

A proposition is that the participant who anticipates for the occurrence of misunderstanding or non-understanding after receiving a message from the other party will try to thwart the problem by inviting the conversational partner to cooperate with him in this endeavor. Clark (1994) stresses that participants in a conversation have a toolbox full of joint strategies for dealing with misunderstandings and non-understandings that inevitably occur. This assertion gets further reinforcement from Clark and Schaefer (1989) who argue that one of the participant's goal is to reach the grounding criterion, and to that, they must not only repair any troubles they encounter, but take positive steps to establish understanding and avoid trouble in the first place.

From the argument above sprouts the next hypothesis that in order for a participant to reach the ideal of understanding, he has to construct a frame for grounding where he can be assured that his interpretation of the speaker's utterance matches with the speaker's intention for that same utterance. This would suggest that the act of preventing misunderstandings or non-understandings is the first step to the concept of 'grounding' by Clark and Brennan (1999) – where grounding eventually results in understanding.

It must be noted that the fundamental nature of prevention is its use even before the inception of a specific understanding problem during the course of the conversation. The undesirability of misunderstanding and non-understanding in helpdesk encounters can be attributed to the fact that the discussion concerns highly equivocal tasks – and that the ideal is the achievement of correct and complete understanding for the immediate and effective formulation of the necessary solution to the technical problem of the caller.

In institutional encounters (which include helpdesk consultations), as Kurhila (2001) points out, there is a need for a higher level of accuracy – which could be possible only when the two parties share the same mind frame about what is being discussed (implying that they share a common ground) eventually leading to understanding.

Since the claim is that prevention can be an act which even the recipient of the utterance or message can perform, it is just necessary to set the boundary between prevention and repair – as opposed to Clark's original conception of prevention as an *alter ego* of self-repair or self-correction.

In the context of helpdesk encounters, prevention is expected to be performed by the caller after the receipt of information from the agent. The postulation is that the caller would like to be assured that he receives the message from the agent correctly (supposing that the piece of information is highly relevant) – and that he would also like to be guaranteed the information received is complete.

The participant's desire for completeness when receiving a message during the conversational act accords with what Weigand (1999) already claims earlier that not everything is expressed in communication for reasons of 'economy in

language' and because interacting individuals are not always aware of every piece of information necessary for clear understanding. This time it can be asserted that the demand for complete information is high in interactions involving the transmission of information necessary to address the problem or concern that precipitates one party to contact another party for help.

The cases presented below exemplify how conversational parties in telephone help take the route of prevention in attaining the ideal of correct and complete understanding.

5.1 Prevention of understanding problems by requesting confirmation of the received information

Heritage (1984) refers to this request for confirmation as a form of "understanding checks", which identifies a trouble with a previous turn's talk by proposing a solution to that trouble. Gonzalez-Lloret (2005) also classifies understanding checks or confirmation checks as a type of a repair initiation. However, from the example below, it is too inappropriate to claim that such a request for confirmation is only a form of repair, because in accordance with the definition of repair by Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977), repair is used after a problem in understanding has been identified. Consider the segment presented here:

(7)	13		A	Um:: (0.4) let me give you an (.) indi-cation↑ (.) it might (.) be hhhh (1.1) a little bit
	14			less or a little bit more (.) but for instance:: oh one moment (5.9) ((sound of keyboard))
	15			hhh (4.3) mm well let's say::: for a two hundred gee bee for instance↑ it might be
	16			one hundred seventy euros
	17	→	C	One hundred seventy
	18	→	A	Ya
	19	→	C	°For two hundred°
	20	→	A	Ya

The segment above is taken from a recorded telephone conversation between an Indian student and a Dutch agent, as the two parties are discussing about the price of a hard disk. Upon knowing that the student intends to purchase a big hard disk because it is cheaper than the small one, the agent instantaneously checks the price of the specified item on his computer.

However, prior to the actual checking of the price through his computer, the agent first attempts to give an instant information about the price based on what he personally knows, in line 13 (*Um:: let me give you an indi-cation↑ it might be hhhh*); however when after an admission that his estimation may not be correct, in line 14 (*a little bit less or a little bit more but for instance…oh one moment*), he decides right away to refer to the computer to give the caller an accurate information about the price.

After obtaining the price information from the agent, the caller replies by 'echoing' the amount that is stated in line 16 (*one hundred seventy euros*), which the agent responds to with a *ya* in line 18. In line 19, the caller restates the size of the hard drive (°*For two hundred*°), which the agent again receives with a remark of approval – *ya*.

The agent's deployment of *ya* in this context is hinting that he approves of the caller's clear reception of the information. Bangerter, Clark and Katz (2004) mention that *yeah* can be used by a participant in the interaction to acknowledge or display agreement with prior utterances.

The act of echoing of selected but perceived to be highly relevant information is a manifestation on the part of the listener to prevent misunderstanding. This is not just a simple case of meaningless repetition but it actually shows the listener's attempt to inhibit the inception of misunderstanding, or, even non-understanding, within the dialogue. His preventative approach involves requesting confirmation of what has been received through the conversational act. In this segment, the caller wants affirmation of what he understands that a hard disk of 400 gigabytes would cost him 170 euros.

Following Grice's maxim of relation (as quoted in the article of Martinich 1980), when the speaker's contribution has relevance, he is not expected to provide more information than is necessary, and if he does then it implies that the information provided is not necessary. In the segment presented above, the caller appears to have violated this said maxim by echoing what the agent has said. However, this violation also seems to have served its purpose – that the caller would like to be assured that his understanding of the agent's utterance is correct, which could be a manifestation of his desire to prevent or avoid misunderstanding.

5.2 Prevention of understanding problems by requesting clarification

Just a while ago, it was mentioned that in conversations not everything is explicitly said, however unsaid and unstated lexical items and information may be important for an interlocutor to reach full understanding during the talk. So when the interlocutor realizes that some items that are considered important in preventing non-understanding and misunderstanding are missing in the utterance of the speaker, he would request for it to attain the real purpose of the conversation.

(8)	133		A	And I have (.) a:: (.) reference number (.) for you↑ (0.3) that (.) is (0.8) pap-pap
	134			(0.2) <u>four</u> (1.0)
	135		C	°One moment° (0.3)
	136		A	Yes↑
	137	→	C	(9.2) ((saying the phrase 'reference number' like a whisper)) and (.) that's is for the
	138	→		swapping↑ (0.5)

139	→	A	Ya that is (.) for the (.) swap-ping↓ (0.2) yes:: (1.0)
140		A	Pap-pap (.) four (1.3)
141	→	C	What? (0.7)
142	→	A	°And° (.) that is (0.3) the number (0.2)

In the previous phase of this talk, the agent has already informed the caller that his defective monitor will be swapped, though the actual date for the swapping is not yet known. Line 133 shows the agent telling the caller to take down a *reference number*. Recognizing that he needs a writing implement to jot down the number from the agent, the caller requests to halt probably so that he can get a pen and paper for writing, in line 135 (*one moment*) – to this request the agent just deploys a remark of approval in line 136 (*yes ↑*).

Presumably realizing that he needs to indicate that the number is a reference for something, he decides to write the phrase *reference number* before getting the complete number. This in evident in the same line, as the caller says the line *reference number* to himself in a rather low voice, which further implies that he is dictating the phrase to himself while writing during the pause of 9.2 seconds.

It can be seen, however, that in lines 137 and 138, the caller asks for a clarification whether the reference number is for the swapping that they have been talking about or for something else. Although the agent's statements in the prior turns did not include the information that the reference number is for the swapping, it is clearly inferable that the reference number in this discussion is for the swapping. In this case, the agent must have assumed that the caller will eventually understand that the reference number is for the swapping.

However, in this instance, as indicated in lines 137 and 138 (*that's is for the swapping ↑*), the caller does not seem to trust his own understanding, thus he inquires to verify whether he is correct in his understanding or not. In a way, this is already the caller's approach in preventing a potential misunderstanding, or even non-understanding, in the latter part of the on-going conversation. The agent, in turn, cooperates with the caller by affirming the caller's understanding.

When the agent starts to repeat the first part of the reference number (*pap-pap four*) in line 140, which has been uttered first in lines 133 and 134, the caller then deploys an indication of his inability to catch the agent's utterance by positioning a 'what' – another manifestation of an invitation for the agent to execute a repair of his statement in line 138. This request for a repair appears a bit delayed because the caller did not even give a signal of his difficulty in making sense of the *pap-pap four* verbalization in line 133.

It is not so easy to claim, though, whether the *what* question signals the difficulty on the part of the caller in hearing the utterance of the agent in line 140 (*pap-pap four*) or his failure to understand the purpose of the number. The second premise, however, seems weak because it would be impossible to hypothesize that he must have not understood the purpose of the reference number since the agent has already informed him, in line 139, that the said number is for the swapping.

Nevertheless, with the 'what' remark from the caller, as an invitation for a necessary repair, the agent does not hesitate to execute a repair, in line 42, by telling again the caller that the reference number he is about to give to the caller is for the swapping.

6. Concluding remarks

6.1 On misunderstanding

The earlier assumption is that misunderstandings that are inherent in the interaction between individuals who agree to use a secondary language, in which they are not really proficient, can be attributed to the interacting participants' relative unfamiliarity with the language's phonology, syntax, vocabulary, and grammar.

However, the analysis of the segments from the available recordings reveals that misunderstandings that occur in nonnative English speakers' (NNS) interaction are not attributable to the participant's defective sentence structure, faulty pronunciation, wrong use of lexical elements or poor vocabulary, and insufficient knowledge of grammatical rules.

It is, instead, known that cases of misunderstanding in helpdesk conversations, as shown in the analyzed recordings, are caused by false beliefs, erroneous inferences from the speaker's utterances, and incomplete information. This further indicates that the occurrence of misunderstanding in NNS-NNS conversations is not at all different from that of conversations between two native speakers (NS).

In response to the second question of this research, the analyzed segments also disclose that repair is usually initiated by the recipient of the problematic utterance, which then enables the source of the trouble to execute the necessary correction to contain misunderstanding, thereby restoring the flow of the conversation. This is to say that misunderstandings that are found in the data for this research are repaired through the initiative of the participant in the interaction who believes he or she has been misunderstood.

With the initiation of a repair, the participant who unknowingly succumbs to misunderstanding eventually admits that he or she has just misunderstood his or her partner in the conversation – and such an admission explains for the speaker's (the source of the misunderstood utterance) instantaneous execution of the needed repair for the recipient to attain correct understanding.

6.2 On non-understanding

The research also looked into the causes of non-understanding in helpdesk encounters involving nonnative speakers of English. A number of the analyzed segments point to the finding that non-understood utterances are usually those that

that are 'defectively' constructed – the sentence structure is faulty or it is vague and confusing.

It is also revealed that the mismatch in the meanings attached to a lexical item or concept by both the speaker and the recipient can lead to non-understanding. These findings imply that in the case of non-understanding, the cause can be within the domain of linguistics.

From the analysis of the segments presented in this section, it is also revealed that speakers of a non-understood utterance employ varied strategies in repairing problematic statements and lines to facilitate interlocutors in reaching the desired understanding. The segments presented further lead to the point that it is always the recipient of the non-understood utterance who displays his deficiency in understanding what the speaker has recently said.

Such a display of difficulty in understanding on the part of the recipient serves as an initiation of a repair, which the speaker of the non-understood utterance may accept by executing the necessary repair or reject by moving on to a new utterance with the non-understood utterance uncorrected. The analyzed segments, however, disclose that during helpdesk encounters, where the agent and the caller are nonnative speakers of the language in use, the speaker does not hesitate to correct his non-understood utterance to help the recipient achieve understanding.

In helping the listener understand better the non-understood utterance, the speaker may execute the necessary repair by repeating a non-understood utterance, by repeating and modifying a non-understood utterance, by clarifying a confusing utterance or a part of that same utterance, by providing a definition of a lexical element with an ambiguous meaning, or by describing a non-understood item or object being referred during the talk.

6.3 On the prevention of potential problems with understanding

The strategy called prevention is borrowed from Clark (1994) who coins the term "preventatives" to refer to inoculations or interventions "in averting anticipated but avoidable problems" in conversations – misunderstandings and non-understanding being prime examples.

Clark, however, focuses his definition of preventives on being deployed by the speaker himself – and this would be evident in cases of self-repair where problematic utterances, for instance, are immediately corrected before being detected by the recipient. After analyzing the recorded calls for this research, however, a pattern of prevention which the listener executes surfaces to the fore.

In helpdesk encounters, when the agent and the caller are exchanging information relevant to the formulation of a possible solution to a particular problem or concern that instigates the call, both parties are cautious that pieces of information transmitted and received are correct and complete to ensure full understanding during the talk or consultation, or even after it. The analyzed segments show cases

when either the agent or the caller tries to prevent potential cases of misunderstandings and non-understandings.

The results further show that participants in helpdesk encounters attempt to prevent the inception of misunderstandings or non-understandings by requesting for a confirmation of the received information and by soliciting for a clarification.

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Preference Organization and Complaining in (Italian) 118 Emergency Calls to the Ambulance[1]

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This paper focuses on one of the ways in which complaints may emerge in interaction as the product of an interactional achievement in institutional interactions and how preference organization is oriented to by speakers. The emergence of the complaint is strictly linked to information elicited by complainers through questioning, an activity strictly linked to the transactional aim of the encounter and to the specific institutional identities of the complainers. As far as preference organization is concerned, complaining turns display only residual features of markedness.

1. Preference organization and direct complaints against recipients

The study of social and conversational actions like direct complaints against recipients and accusations primarily focused on the way the responses to these activities are related to preference organization, a system through which speakers promote and maintain social solidarity and try to avoid conflict (Heritage 1984). In general, in institutional interactions, direct complaints against recipients and/or accusations are responded to through denials and admissions of fault. The former are immediately produced after accusations, thereby taking an unmarked and thus preferred format; admissions of fault take instead more elaborated, thus marked and dispreferred designs. Their delivery may in fact be delayed by silences or reluctance markers; or these turns may also be followed by accounts (Atkinson & Drew 1979, Bilmes, 1988, Schegloff 1988, Garcia 1991). A further distinction between responses emerges in ordinary interaction, in which complainees mostly respond in delay with "not-at-fault denials" through which they admit to have been involved in the complained of action and concurrently deny any direct responsibility and personal accountability for it (Dersley & Wootton 2000).

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Given the fact that previous research on direct complaints has been primarily concerned with the way these activities are responded to, the need to consider how these activities emerge in interaction and whether they take preferred or dispreferred formats. Here we will analyse sequences – taken from calls to the ambulance emergency service (118) – in which complaints are introduced in interaction through questions. The corpus is formed by calls received by an emergency ambulance call-centre (118) in the north of Italy (based at Hospital Morgagni, Forlì). It is constituted by emergency calls from citizens and institutional identities, such as G.P.s, police, etc., and service calls made by ambulance and hospital staff. Unlike other such services in the U.K. or U.S., 118 is a service exclusively dedicated to medical emergencies. The data are transcribed following Jefferson's C.A. conventions (Atkinson & Heritage 1984); in the second line an idiomatic translation of the data is provided; any personal reference has been changed.

2. Questions and pre-sequences

From previous studies it emerges that questions are a means through which different types of pre-sequences may be initiated. They may be used, for instance, to check whether there are any pre-conditions for the production of activities, like invitations or requests. Through them speakers maximize the chances for the delivery of preferred responses, like acceptances after invitations, thereby avoiding the emerging of dispreferred moves as rejections. Pre-sequences are thus aimed at interactionally and collaboratively implementing preferred action sequences: in other words, that a base first pair-part will be responded through a preferred second pair-part. Thus, the first question of a pre-sequence (as for instance, "what are you doing tonight?") is relevant for the collaborative production of the base first-pair part which is projected by it. Since "pres" are type-specific, recipients may anticipate what the projected base activity will be and may decide whether to respond with a go-ahead response or forestall the sequence. Moreover, by initiating a pre-sequence, first speakers display an orientation to the fact that the base first-pair part might be in some way problematic, in other words that their interactional project might not be successful (Schegloff 2007).

Other kinds of pre-sequences are those found in focused encounters as institutional interactions through which professionals introduce the core activity of the conversation (Maynard 1991, 1992, Heritage & Sefi 1992, Vehviläinen 2001). For instance, doctors may employ perspective-displays sequences in order to deliver unfavourable diagnosis to the family of the patient. They do so by eliciting the view of their recipients on the patient's condition and then align the delivery of the diagnosis to their perspective (Maynard 1991, 1992). Health-visitors may similarly produce focusing enquiries in order to topicalize issues for which advice is relevant and deliver it after the recipient's response, so that the

advice emerges in interaction as the result of an interactional achievement (Heritage & Sefi 1992). The pre-sequences found in institutional exchanges are strictly related to the institutional identities of professionals; they are initiated by them and they are aimed at the successful and interactional production of the core activity of the encounter: i.e. the very reason why that conversation takes place. As will be discussed, the sequences from our corpus are similarly initiated by the professionals and strictly related to their institutional identities and the transactional task at hand.

3. Introducing complaints through questions

In this corpus many are the cases in which complaints may be introduced in interaction by professionals through questions. Here I will consider four different instances in order to understand the orientation speakers display to preference organization in producing and designing complaints; how the displayed epistemic stance of the speakers may influence the delivery of the complaint; how questions and complaints may be strictly related to the speakers' institutional identities. The sequences I consider can be exemplified in the following way:

A: Question
B: Response
A: Complaint

Through questions speakers introduce some issue in interaction and produce a complaint after the recipients' response. In this way, the delivery of the complaint is strictly linked to the kind of response given in second position. We will first consider a case in which new information is elicited through an open question and then instances in which call-takers (CTs) verify some details through confirmation-seeking positive polar questions.

In the first instance, the daughter of a quite old patient calls 118 in the afternoon: he suffers from angina pectoris, has problems breathing and she suspects he had an heart attack. The extract is taken from the interview phase in which CT is asking about the breathing-problems: it must be noted that these problems had already been reported by the caller (C) at the beginning of the call, without however specifying that they started the night before. As soon as this new detail emerges (l. 6-7), CT produces a negative interrogative (l. 8-9):

(1) (118-02-OPcourse-Ettore: 50-64)

1	CT:	adesso fa fatica a respirare?	
		now does he have (any) difficulties breathing	
2	C:	fa fatica >a respi[rare:;<	
		he has difficulties brea[thing	
3	CT:	[molto?	
		[a lot?	
4	C:	(?mah) abbastanza, ([ )	

well quite, ([ )
5→CT: [da quanto tempo?=
[how long for
6→C: =ah::: ha detto da:::: =un po'=ieri sera un pochino=
ah he said since a bit last night a little bit
7→C: =poi sta↑notte, .HHHH e:[:
then in the night .HHHH uh:[:
8 →CT: [↑ma <u>non</u> avete=
[but haven't you (guys)
9 →CT: =chiamato per niente = s i [gn-?
called at all ma[da-?
10 C: [AH UE' IO:::=
[ah c'mon I
11 C: =CIOE' >NON- ME L'HA DETTO SOLO<=
I mean not- he told me just
12 C: =>↑stamattina; sono andata di là adesso l' ho visto <=
this morning I went there now I've seen him
13 C: =>messo così non mi han detto niente!<=
like this they haven't told me anything
14 C: =>io stamattina sono andata a lavorare:::;<=
I this morning I went to work
15 C: =non sapevo n<u>iente</u>!
I didn't know anything
16 (.)
17 CT: tk. ho capito.
tk. I see/right

During the interview phase regarding the patient's symptoms, CT's question ("da quanto tempo?" "how long for?", l. 5) focuses the attention on an extremely relevant new information from which it becomes evident that the patient has been sick since the night before. As soon as this piece of news is delivered (l. 6-7), CT produces a negative interrogative in latency position ("↑ma <u>non</u> avete chiamato per niente =sign-?", "but haven't you (guys) called at all mada-?", l. 8-9). The negative format of the question is due to the fact that CT identifies an omission and/or a failure in the recipient's past conduct which may constitute a troublesome issue both for the patient and the speakers themselves; and for which the recipient is directly held accountable. Due to the strong conduciveness of this format, the negative interrogative is not used to elicit information but to complain against recipient (cf. Heritage, 2002; Monzoni,in press, 2008). This is evident both in the way this turn is constructed and the subsequent response. The question is designed in a particular oppositional and aggravated way: it starts with an oppositional marker ("ma", "but", l. 8), the negation marker is stressed ("<u>non</u>", "<u>not</u>", l. 8) and then emphasised by an intensifier ("per niente"/"at all", l. 9). In this way, CT produces an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) through which the troublesome issue is even more highlighted.

C's response is delivered immediately in competition with CT, it is in fact characterized by louder volume (Schegloff 2000, among others). Moreover, the negative format of the question projects as a response a confirmation through a "no". C, however, responds first through an acknowledgement token ("AH", l. 10) through which she thus treats the prior turn not as a question but as a statement. She then continues with a marker displaying irritation ("UE'", l. 10) and an elaborated account (l. 10-15). Through this turn she does a number of activities. She analyses the previous turn not as a confirmation-seeking question but as a statement of a specific kind: a direct complaint against her; she then provides an elaborated account through which she implicitly confirms the occurrence of the complained of action, by denying any personal responsibility for it and shifting it to third parties, namely the patient (cf. Dersley & Wootton 2000). CT analyses this as a proper and fitted response to his turn by acknowledging it (l. 17).

In this case, then, the complaint is triggered by the new information elicited by a question which is extremely relevant for assessing the actual condition of the patient. As soon as it is evident that a troublesome issue has taken place, CT delivers a direct complaint in very slight delay: he in fact begins in latency position in overlap with the continuation of the recipient's turn. In spite of this slight delay, the complaint takes a quite aggravated format, in which the turn is prefaced by a contrastive marker, the negation is stressed and further emphasised by an intensifier. Hence, in this case we find only a very residual feature of a possible orientation of the speaker to a preference organization in which complaints might take an elaborated and thus marked format due to their strong disaffiliative nature.

This is evident also in the following case in which the complaint is similarly produced after some news elicited through a positive polar question:

(2) (118-00-3B-13//15, 68-75)

1	→CT:	Va bene. arriviamo. mi dà- be' però be' il::: il medico è venuto stamattina?=
		all right. we're coming. give me- well but well has the the doctor come this morning?
2	→C:	=no no. ieri sera.=
		no no. last night.
3	→CT:	=ah be' perché solitamente si portano *subito* in ospedale signora. non si aspetta il giorno dopo.
		ah well because usually one brings them immediately to hospital madam one doesn't wait the next day
4		(.4)
5	C:	e:::mm solo che io purtroppo dovevo andare a lavorare
		uhmm it's just that I unfortunately had to go to work

This case is about an old patient who fell and hit her head the night before. After the interview phase, CT moves into closing by granting the request of the ambulance ("va bene. arriviamo." "all right. we're coming." l. 1, cf. Zimmermann

1992, Zorzi & Monzoni 2004). In spite of this, he then continues by asking some new information about whether the doctor visited the patient in the morning (l. 1, "be' però be' il:: medico è venuto stamattina?" "well but well has the doctor come this morning?"). The question displays a positive polarity and projects a 'yes' as a preferred response: thus it indicates a positive assumption of the questioner. C, however, disconfirms that assumption by providing new information (l. 2, "no no. ieri sera." "no no. last night.").[2] CT orients to the newsworthiness of this information through the acknowledgment token "ah" (l. 3), produces a dis-preference marker ("be'", "well", l. 3; cf. Levinson, 1983; Bilmes, 1988) and then topicalizes it by orienting to that event as a failure on the part of the recipient (l. 3 "be' perché solitamente si portano *subito* in ospedale signora. non si aspetta il giorno dopo." "well because one brings them immediately to hospital madam one doesn't wait the next day"). In this way, CT produces a direct complaint against her, to which the caller responds with an account through which she implicitly confirms the complained-of-action (l. 5; cf. also (1)). In this case, then, the complaint emerges in interaction in third position after an information-seeking question. Only when does the positive assumption of the questioner get disconfirmed and newsworthy details emerge, the occurrence of a failure on the conduct of the recipient becomes evident and the complaint is produced. Similarly to (1), the production of the complaint is interactionally achieved since it is strictly related to the new detail emerging from the recipient's response to the question. As soon as it becomes evident that some troublesome and complainable issue has taken place, the complaint is immediately produced. Similarly to the other cases, the complaint is not mitigated but displays only one residual feature of markedness: the dispreference marker "be'" ("well", l. 3).

This kind of sequences in which polar interrogatives are employed in order to seek information mostly occur in emergency calls made by ordinary citizens and the delivery of the complaint is strictly dependent on the emergence of new details in the recipients' responses. Other cases were found, however, when complaints are produced after recipients confirm the assumption of the speakers. These instances mostly belong to a sub-set of calls between the call-takers at the ambulance emergency call-centre and colleagues who are directly involved in the organization of the service such as doctors, nurses and ambulance drivers. Here, positive polar questions are introduced by callers in the early stages of the interaction in the slot usually dedicated to the delivery of the reason for the call, as in the following case in which the doctor of a provincial hospital calls 118:

(3) (118-02-17/6– B1: 1-18)
1 CT: centrale¿
headquarter

[2] Note that she produces a "no no" employed for skip-connecting: C. ties that piece of information to an earlier part of the call in which she reported that the doctor visited the patient without mentioning exactly when the visit occurred (data not shown).

2		(.)
3	C:	e:: buongiorno sono il dottor Lebulvi
		uh goodmorning it's doctor Lebulvi
4	C:	del pronto soccorso di Santa Lucia.
		of the Accident & Emergency in Santa Lucia
5	CT:	sì:.
		yes
6→	C:	e:: mi sta arrivando un elicottero con un paziente con un codice due
		uh is an helicopter getting here with a patient that is a code two[3]
7→	C:	respiratorio:::¿
		and has problems breathing
8→	CT:	sì.=
		yes
9→	C:	=e:::=e solo che lui poi qui più di tanto:=a parte
		uh uh it's only that for him then here so much apart
10→	C:	=un emogas=analisi=e una lastra del torace
		from a hemogasanalysis and a chest x-ray
11→	C:	[non è che possiamo fare::.
		[we can't do a lot
12	CT:	[>so che lo portavano lì perché lo conoscevate.<=
		[I know that they were bringing him there because you knew him
13	??:	=.HHH
14	C:	AH ↑lo conosciamo
		ah we know him

At the very beginning of the call, the caller introduces an extremely detailed positive polar question through which he displays to know about the occurrence of some ongoing event for which he seeks confirmation ("e:: mi sta arrivando un elicottero con un paziente con un codice due respiratorio:::¿ ", "is an helicopter getting here with a patient that is a code two and has problems breathing", l. 6-7). Moreover, through the question he focuses the encounter right in the slot which is usually dedicated to the production of the reason of the call. After the confirmation (l. 8), he immediately reports the troublesome issue related to this event by starting his turn in latched position (l. 9-11, "=e:::=e solo che lui poi qui più di tanto:=a parte un emogas=analisi= e una lastra del torace non è che possiamo fare::.", "uh uh it's only that for him then here so much apart from a hemogasanalysis and a chest x-ray we can't do a lot") which is slightly delayed by an hesitation (note the syllable lengthening of the first *eh/uh* and the self-repair, l. 9). CT orients to this report as a complaint against her – as representative of that institution – by producing a defensive account through which she denies any personal responsibility and displaces it to third parties (l. 12).

Even though the sequences in these first three cases may look similar, they display important differences in the very nature of the questions – i.e. in the very

[3] "Code two" refers to the condition of the patient; it is one of the least serious codes.

activity they engender – and in the way complaints emerge in the call. In (1) & (2) the interrogatives are information-seeking turns and the subsequent complaints are solely triggered by the new information provided by recipients. In (3), instead, the question is about the occurrence of specific events which both the questioner and his recipient know pretty well. This is evident from a series of elements. First, the questioner's turn is extremely detailed thus indicating the questioner's strong epistemic stance about the events. Second, the complainer does not provide such information through an informing statement (report), through which he would have oriented to the fact that his recipient would have not probably known the occurrence of those events: i.e. that that piece of information would have constituted news for him. Rather, through a confirmation-seeking yes-no question he displays to believe that also his recipient knows those events pretty well. This orientation is given also by the fact that these questions always target information strictly linked to the institutional identities of these professionals and their normal work-routine. In (3), for instance, there would be no need for a confirmation by CT, since the ambulance staff always contacts the emergency call-centre and the hospital before bringing the patient to hospital. Hence, these questions are done in the service of interactionally establishing the existence of shared information about the occurrence of some neutral events. Only after establishing a common ground of understandability between participants, do callers produce informings (reports) through which they specify the troublesome nature of those events which constitute news for their recipients and the real reason for the call. In this way, callers create a sequence in which they strongly orient to the different states of knowledge of their recipients about the matter at hand, and also their institutional identities.

These two types of sequence might remind those pre-sequences through which speakers check up the basis for the production of a base activity in order to avoid the delivery of a dispreferred response (Levinson 1983, Heritage 1984); or perspective displays series through which professional collaboratively introduce in interaction the delivery of diagnostic news (Maynard 1991, 1992) or advice (Heritage & Sefi 1992, Vehviläinen 2001). However, even though it is possible to state that the production of the complaint occurs in third position and is thus produced in delay, so that the question-answer sequence may be similarly regarded as a pre-sequence, the nature of these sequences is rather different. In the sequences initiated through information-seeking questions, the complaint is produced as soon as some troublesome issue is reported in interaction. For instance, in (1) CT delivers the complaint in overlap with the recipient's turn, i.e. as soon as the trouble is evident, thereby displaying a readiness and quickness in pointing out the trouble and holding his recipient directly responsible for it. Such a readiness and quickness in producing the complaint is also evident in the sequences initiated through confirmation-seeking questions. As discussed, the questions are aimed at establishing a common ground of understandability about some neutral events on which speakers may then report newsworthy and

troublesome issues related to them. In order words, these sequences are not aimed at delivering the complaint in delay: in fact as soon as a confirmation has been given speakers immediately produce the complaint. Since the events introduced in interaction through the questions are presented as neutral and the troublesome issues related to them are news to recipients, from the questions recipients may not foresee that callers set up a sequence in which a complaint will then be produced in next position, in fact their responses treat these enquiries as simply looking for confirmation. For this reason, recipients are not in the position to forestall the sequence, as instead it may occur in pre-sequences leading to requests or invitations.

There are, however, also instances in which speakers might have been in the position to anticipate the possible production of a complaint from the question, since they are the ones who directly caused the trouble the question and subsequent complaint refer to: nonetheless, these sequences are not immediately pre-empted by potential complainees. This is evident in the following excerpt taken from a series of three calls from a family of an old person living in the country who had a stroke. During the first call, CT attributes a red code (highest priority) and informs the callers that an helicopter will be sent to the nearby sport-field; some minutes later, they call again and decide they would bring the patient to hospital themselves, in spite of the CT's efforts to persuade them to wait for the helicopter because of the seriousness of the situation, so that the helicopter service is finally cancelled; later on, they call to ask for the helicopter once again. The following extract is taken from the third call and it is made by the same person who had previously cancelled the service.

(4) (118-02-C12-6/20-6-A12)

1	CT:	centrale.
		headquarter
2		(.)
3	??	HHHH.
4	C:	e:: buongiorno telefono da san crocetto=vi ho chiamati prima=
		uh goodmorning I'm calling from san crocetto I called you earlier on
5	CT:	=(?dimmi)
		tell me
6	C:	e:: ( ) vi aspettiamo al campo sporti-
		uh ( ) we are waiting for you at the sport field
7	CT:	pronto? non sento niente.
		hallo? I can't hear anything.
8	C:	e vi possiamo aspettare al campo sportivo?
		uh can we wait for you at the sport field?
9		(.)
10	CT:	.hh ecco.
		.hh here it is/right
11		(.)
12	CT:	.hh[h

13 C: [con- se mandate l'elicottero perché non sta tanto bene.
[( ) if you send an helicopter because she's not feeling very well.
14 →CT: ecco. infatti. l'avevo-=>ho parlato con lei prima che mi ha
here it is/ right. exactly. I had it- => earlier on have I talked with you who has
15 → CT: annull[ato il viaggio?
cancell[ed the service?
16 →C: [sì sì.
[yes yes
17 (.)
18 →CT: co[m'è
wh[y is it
19 →C: [no un'altra.=
[no (with) another one.
20 →CT: =ecco. >in [questa maniera però abbiamo perso del tempo perché
here it is/right. in [this way however we have lost some time because
21 C: [( )
22 →CT: l'elicottero ↓è rientrato adesso deve ↑ripartire.< =
the helicopter got back and now has to leave again.
23 C: =lo so. guardi le chiedo scusa.
I know. listen I do apologise.

In her first turn (l. 4 "telefono da san crocetto=vi ho chiamati prima" "I'm calling from san crocetto I called you earlier on"), the caller identifies herself by providing the location she is calling from and by explicitly stating that she is the person who had contacted 118 earlier on for this case, so that she presents herself as knowing the situation quite well. In spite of this, after the second time she requests the helicopter (l. 13), CT formulates a positive polar question through which he asks whether she is the person who previously cancelled the service (l. 14-15 "ho parlato con lei prima che mi ha annullato il viaggio?" "earlier on have I talked with you who cancelled the service?"). In some respects, this utterance contrasts with the first turn C (l. 4): while C identified herself through an activity which is portrayed as a neutral event ("I called you earlier on"), CT specifies that activity as in someway problematic (l. 14-15). Moreover, CT responds to the request only when it is reiterated, thus potentially treating that issue as problematic (for a similar case, see Sacks 1992, I:7, "I can't hear you"). In this context, C might have anticipated a possible complaint or rebuttal by CT for a series of reasons. First of all, both speakers know the events pretty well, i.e. that the service was cancelled and that this constitutes a troublesome issue. Second, not only is the nature of the request particularly problematic but so is also the way it is engendered in the sequence. Third, CT specifies the failure in the question in l. 14-15. In spite of this, C. immediately provides a confirmation in overlap with the question (l. 16, "sì sì" "yes yes"). After this, CT begins a turn with a wh-question component ("com'è", "why is it", l. 18) which might project a challenge (cf. Muntigl & Turnbull 1998, Kotthoff 1993, Koshik 2003, Monzoni 2004, 2008; among others). Only at this point, as soon as CT starts his turn, does C disconfirm

to be the person who cancelled the trip and displaces responsibility to a third party (l. 19, "no un'altra." "no (with) another one"). Through this turn, she tries to forestall and interrupt a potentially conflictual sequence in which a challenge has just started. Even though C successfully interrupts the challenge, CT then produces a complaint which is less aggressive than the challenge and does not treat the recipient as directly responsible of the trouble (l. 20 & 22 ">in questa maniera però abbiamo perso del tempo perché l'elicottero ↓è rientrato adesso deve ↑ripartire.<" "in this way however we have lost some time because the helicopter got back and now has to leave again."). Nonetheless, C responds through an apology through which she admits of being directly responsible for the occurrence of the troublesome event, thus treating the prior turn as a complaint against her (l. 23).

From this case, then, it is possible to see how it can be difficult for potential complainees to anticipate from confirmation-seeking questions the production of conflictual and disaffiliative activities like complaints (and challenges). This occurs even in those cases when potential complainees are fully aware of the trouble they might have caused and the questions employed to introduce the complaint in interaction are not neutral but they identify quite complainable issues, as in (4).

4. Concluding remarks

The analysis of these sequences shows that one of the ways in which complaints may emerge in interaction is strictly linked to issues related to the knowledgeability of speakers and their institutional identities. In these sequences, in fact, complaints are produced either just after the emergence of some new information which constitutes a troublesome issue, or after the interactional establishment of shared information about the occurrence of some troublesome event. In the first two cases, the production of the complaint is solely related to the delivery of new information which provides elements for CTs to understand that a complainable activity has actually taken place; in the last two cases, instead, CTs are already fully aware that some troublesome event has occurred and the questions are aimed at establishing a common ground of understandability between speakers. In other words, the production of the complaints is grounded in the shared knowledge and certainty of speakers that some troublesome issue has taken place. In this way, these sequences are similar to perspective-display sequences (cf. Maynard 1991, Heritage & Sefi 1992, Vehviläinen 2001). The questions are in fact done in order to focus the encounter and elicit information and/or confirmation about some events which are strictly linked to the interactional aim of the encounter and the very institutional identities of the speakers.

Even though complaints occur in third position, such a delay is not related to a possible orientation of speakers to a preference organization in which dis-

affiliative and conflictual turns might be especially delayed, as it occurs in disagreeing sequences (Pomerantz 1984), for instance. Moreover, these pre-sequences rather differ in their nature from other kinds of pre-sequences through which speakers display an orientation to preference organization, as the ones found before invitations or requests. In other words, these sequences are not aimed at avoiding dispreferred moves and/or maximizing social solidarity.

The opposite actually occurs. As soon as the occurrence of a failure on the recipient's (past) conduct is evident, speakers display a readiness and quickness in pointing out the trouble and holding their recipients directly responsible for it: these turns in fact most prominently occur in latched position or in overlap with the previous turn by the complainee. The complaining turns also display features through which conflictual characters are emphasised through suprasegmental features like stress, louder voice or intensifiers, so that they are produced in an aggravated fashion. However, other elements were also found which might display an orientation of speakers to complaints as marked and thus dispreferred moves. Even though speakers immediately take the floor in order to complain against their recipients, in some cases their turns are prefaced either by dispreference markers as 'well' or hesitation markers. Given, however, the way these utterances are designed, I would relate this to a residual orientation of speakers to a preference organization as we know it from the studies of other conflictual activities, as disagreements (Pomerantz 1984, Kotthoff 1993, among others). This also corroborates the fact that preference organization is a system which may be differently organized in relation to activity types.

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Chapter 3:

Various Aspects of the ‘Mixed Game’

Verbal and Nonverbal Strategies of Political Discourse

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The study of televised interviews is a quite fruitful and interesting area of research and proof of this is the vast amount of literature that exists about it (Bull and Elliot 1998; Clayman 1993; and Greatbatch 1992). In this paper we attempt to analyse the relationship between verbal and nonverbal strategies in political interviews. Nonverbal elements play a very important role in communication in general, and in televised interviews in particular because of the impact of the Media. Two different types of nonverbal devices will be distinguished: those performed consciously and those performed unconsciously. Whereas conscious devices are closely related to what the politician wants to transmit, unconscious devices encode a message sometimes far away from the politician's purposes. The politician is only in control of conscious mechanisms but not of unconscious ones. With this purpose in mind, we have selected a televised interview with the ex-President of the United States, Bill Clinton, which took place in June 22nd 2004.

1. Introduction

For most politicians mass communication is an important element in their lives because they can reach a huge number of people. But it may also have a disadvantage: if their performance is not good enough, their image can be damaged. Therefore we thought it could be interesting to analyse the relationship between verbal and nonverbal strategies in televised political interviews. For this purpose, we have selected a televised interview featuring the ex-President of the United States Bill Clinton.

Although there is a wide range of literature on televised interviews (Bull & Elliot 1998, Carter & Mccarthy 2002, Clayman 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, Greatbatch 1986, 1988, 1992, Harris 1986, 1991, and Heritage & Greatbatch 1991), not many authors have taken into account the interplay between words and nonverbal signals such as paralanguage, gestures, posture, visual contact, etc. Some scholars (McNeill 1985, Poyatos 2002, and Richmond, McCroskey & Payne 1991) have already emphasized that it is necessary to include both verbal and nonverbal elements in discursive studies.

It is very important to highlight that broadcast talk is different from ordinary talk in many ways. For example, interviewers (IRs) should limit themselves to asking questions and interviewees (IEs) should refrain from asking questions or initiate actions such as unsolicited comments on prior talk because they only have to answer the questions posed by the IR (Heritage & Greatbatch 1991). As Heritage (2003) points out, a good IR should be both objective and challenging. It

is very important that he/she gets as much information as possible from the IE and for this reason he/she may ask questions which make the IR feel uncomfortable.

Additionally, it is widely recognised that "what people do is frequently more important than what they say" (Hall 1973:2) and politicians know that. For this reason, they pay a lot of attention to their appearances, face gestures, smiles, postures, visual contacts and hand and body movements and try to use them to their advantage. In a televised interview (in contrast to a broadcast radio interview) these nonverbal signals are particularly important (Hellweg, Pfau & Brydon 1992).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that even though nonverbal behaviour can be intentional, conscious and successful, it can also be unconscious and, consequently, unintentionally performed (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson 1967). This is very important because a politician's gestures may reveal what he/she wants to hide with his/her words as he/she cannot always control his/her bodily behaviour.

2. Method

We have selected an interview broadcast by BBC1 the 22nd of June 2004 at 10:35pm. It is a 45:18 minute long interview from a programme called *Panorama* which took place in a New York hotel. The interviewer was David Dimbleby and the interviewee was the ex-President of the United States Bill Clinton. He agreed to speak to Panorama as part of the publicity campaign for his autobiography *My Life*.

The speech data we have used has been taken from a BBC Panorama Special transcript (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3885521.stm). Afterwards, it has been coded along the following dimensions: (1) numbering and labelling of turns; (2) distinction of turns between "public content" and "private content"; (3) identification and counting of paralinguistic signals along the interview; (4) identification and counting of facial gestures along the interview; (5) identification and counting of hand gestures, posture and body movements; (6) analysis of visual contact between interviewer and interviewee; (7) identification of verbal strategies (3-part list, parallelism, TPCC, oppositeness); (8) synchrony of nonverbal signals with other nonverbal and verbal strategies; (9) rating of emotional state[1].

[1] The coding for the above mentioned categories turned out to be straight forward. The coders agreed on their annotations, even in the rating of categories considered more subjective (ie. "emotional state").

3. The results

Table 1 below shows Clinton's emotional state (1 = relaxed; 2 = angry; 3 = very furious), as well as the number of verbal and nonverbal strategies used in every turn.

Table 1: *Data throughout turns*

turns	emotional state	non-verbal	verbal	turns	emotional state	non-verbal	verbal	turns	emotional state	non-verbal	Verbal
Q/A 1	1	0	2	Q/A21	3	3	2	Q/A41	2	5	3
Q/A 2	1	0	0	Q/A22	3	2	1	Q/A42	2	11	11
Q/A 3	1	0	0	Q/A23	3	5	5	Q/A43	2	5	6
Q/A 4	1	0	2	Q/A24	2	1	0	Q/A44	2	0	0
Q/A 5	1	0	0	Q/A25	2	1	0	Q/A45	2	6	5
Q/A 6	1	4	2	Q/A26	3	2	4	Q/A46	2	7	3
Q/A 7	1	0	0	Q/A27	1	1	0	Q/A47	2	5	1
Q/A 8	1	7	6	Q/A28	1	2	1	Q/A48	2	0	0
Q/A 9	1	2	1	Q/A29	3	16	9	Q/A49	2	12	5
Q/A 10	1	1	2	Q/A30	3	0	1	Q/A50	2	0	1
Q/A 11	1	0	0	Q/A31	2	2	0	Q/A51	2	5	1
Q/A 12	2	11	7	Q/A32	2	4	0	Q/A52	2	1	1
Q/A 13	2	11	7	Q/A33	3	3	0	Q/A53	2	0	1
Q/A 14	1	0	0	Q/A34	3	4	0	Q/A54	2	8	5
Q/A 15	2	2	5	Q/A35	3	3	0	Q/A55	2	11	4
Q/A 16	1	0	0	Q/A36	3	4	1	Q/A56	2	6	5
Q/A 17	1	0	1	Q/A37	3	8	4	Q/A57	1	1	1
Q/A 18	2	2	3	Q/A38	2	2	0	Q/A58	1	1	2
Q/A 19	2	4	0	Q/A39	2	3	0	Q/A59	1	0	0
Q/A 20	3	4	0	Q/A40	2	3	3	Q/A60	1	2	0
								Q/A61	1	0	0

We have examined correlations between variables in order to see their degree of relationship. For the correlation between verbal strategies and gestures, we have used the Pearson product-moment correlation. However, in order to assess the relationship between emotional state and the use of verbal strategies and gestures, we have used Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ) (a special case of the Pearson product-moment coefficient). The reason for this decision is that Pearson's correlation requires the variables to be measured on interval scales, while Spearman's correlation can be used for variables measured at the ordinal level.

Table 2: *Pearson's correlation for the variables 'verbal' and 'nonverbal'*

		nonverbal	verbal
nonverbal	Pearson Correlation	1	**0,795**
	N	61	61
verbal	Pearson Correlation	**0,795**	1
	N	61	61

As noticed in Table 2, there is a high correlation between verbal strategies and nonverbal elements (0,795). This implies there is a tendency for the two variables to increase and decrease together. So, the higher the number of verbal strategies, the higher the number of nonverbal devices. These data will be analysed in detail in the Discussion section.

Table 3: *Spearman's correlation*

		emotional state	nonverbal	verbal
emotional state	correlation coefficient	1,000	**0,500**	0,221
	N	61	61	61

From Table 3 above, we see a different relation between emotional state and nonverbal signals, on the one hand, and between emotional state and verbal strategies, on the other. While the correlation between emotional state and use of nonverbal signals has proved to be moderate (0,500), the correlation between emotional state and use of verbal strategies has proved to be low (0,221). Even though further discussion shall follow in the next section, one of the reasons for this difference may be that verbal strategies are conscious devices intentionally used, whereas nonverbal signals are mainly unconscious when related to emotion. This means, in most cases, Clinton's gestures will show the way he feels. If the politician is furious, we will easily know that by paying attention to his nonverbal behaviour.

Graphic 1 illustrates the three variables 'nonverbal', 'verbal' and 'emotional state' together, so that we can compare their co-occurrence throughout the whole interview. The black area indicates emotional state, the grey area shows the number of nonverbal signals performed, and the white area illustrates the number

of verbal strategies used in the interview (all of them referred only to the interviewee and not to the interviewer).

Figure 1: *Nonverbal Signals / Verbal Strategies / Emotional State*



Finally, we have also used contingency tables to analyse the relationship between the variables "emotional state" (ordinal) and "private/public" (nominal). The contingency table showing the frequencies of occurrence of the two variables mentioned above is illustrated below (Table 4).

Table 4: *Contingency table emotional state / public-private*

		emotional state			total
		relaxed	angry	very furious	
private/public	private (family matters)	1	0	0	1
	private (family matters)	8	0	0	8
	private (sexual affair)	1	6	7	14
	Public (international politics)	0	15	0	15
	Public (domestic politics)	3	1	0	4
	private/public (politics/sexual affair)	5	6	5	16
	Public/private (politics/family life)	3	0	0	3
	total	21	28	12	61

Then, the contingency coefficient of the data in the table above is 0,687.

4. Discussion

As far as structure is concerned, and according to the data from the results above, we can divide the interview into different sections, as shown in Figure 2. These sections correspond to different stages of the interviewee's emotional state when answering the questions addressed by Dimbleby. The first section corresponds to an introductory stage, a kind of warming up, which goes from the beginning of the interview until Q/A8. Then, there is a clip in which Clinton and Monica Lewinsky appear together at the end. This clip is a kind of bridge between the relaxation of stage 1 and the tension of stage 2 (from Q/A9 to Q/A19). Then, stage 3 goes from Q/A20 to Q/A37, which is the stage where more tension is found. Stage 4 starts at Q/A38 and finishes at Q/A56. Finally, stage 5 goes from Q/A57 to Q/A61.



Figure 2: *Interview structure*

Regarding nonverbal signals in the interview, it is worthwhile mentioning that most of them are not really communicative strategies used with a persuasive purpose but unintentional elements which show Clinton's exasperation in many of his answers to Dimbleby's mischievous questions.

One of the most important nonverbal elements is *paralanguage*. By paralanguage we refer to vocal qualities and qualifiers such as pitch, rhythm, intensity, loudness, tempo, etc., as well as to a full repertoire of vocalizations such as coughing, laughing, crying, yawning, etc., that accompany speech or occur in isolation and which show relevant information about the participants in the interaction. Harris and Rubinstein (1975:263) state that our voice is

> […] an unusually sensitive barometer of how we feel, the particular "mood" we are in at the moment of speaking. […] We learn to exude expression of this kind and to perceive it in the speech of others according to a set of shared expectations prescribed by our culture. The basis of most of our intuitive impressions of this kind often turns out to be some conventional combination of the use of pitch, loudness, tempo, and duration.

This combination of the use of pitch, loudness, tempo, and duration helped us to identify the point of greatest tension: Q/A29. This is a clear example of the power of paralanguage to reveal somebody's mood. In this specific example we do not need to understand Clinton's words to perceive his feelings of tremendous anger and fury. The interviewer had been asking him about the Lewinsky sexual affair

from exchange Q/A13 but it is now (Q/A29) when Clinton cannot hide his feelings for any longer:

(1) Clinton: Wasn't as I saw it sir, we had several years of evidence. We had several years of evidence. Kenneth Starr would not be allowed to be prosecutor against me as a defendant in any decent court in the land.
Dimbleby: You obvious[ly]
Clinton: [And], and let me just say this. One of the reasons he got away with it is because people like you only ask people like me the questions. You gave him a complete free ride (…)

It seems that Clinton has just said all he wanted to say when he states "Kenneth Starr would not be allowed to be prosecutor against me as a defendant in any decent court in the land" and so it is Dimbleby's turn. Contrarily to our expectations, Clinton changes his mind and, very quickly, interrupts Dimbleby. Clinton raises his voice and uses a high pitch because he cannot hide for any longer his innermost feelings of anger and fury. The repertoire of vocal qualities present in this extract is unintentionally performed as a result of his discomfort to talk about his sexual affair with Lewinsky. Consequently, in this case, we can say it is an unconscious use of paralanguage.

Clinton also uses paralinguistic elements intentionally. Sometimes his speech slows down with different purposes:

(1) to have time to think what to say (Q/A47);
(2) to emphasize his words (Q/A49);
(3) to give the impression he is relaxed (Q/A6), etc.

In relation to the first one (Q/A47), Clinton had just been asked a very tricky question (whether he urged Tony Blair not to support President Bush) and he has to decide what to say. There is a silence and then a 'linguistic delay' in the sense that even though he articulates words (*Well I have sa… I don't… you're asking me a question and I'm not sure exactly*…) he says nothing. This 'linguistic delay' is uttered very slowly:

(2) Clinton: *Well I have sa… I don't… you're asking me a question and I'm not sure exactly* when I was at Chequers, vis a vis the Iraq date. I've been there several times since I left office…

In exchange Q/A49 (still talking about his relationship with Blair regarding the invasion of Iraq) Clinton slows down in order to emphasize his words. As a matter of fact, these words are so important for him that he even repeats them two lines later:

(3) Clinton: But here's the problem Tony Blair faced. *Blair had a problem unique in Europe* and that's why I went to the Labour Party Conference in Blackpool and defended him …he had a problem unique in Europe (…)

His speech also slows down in order to give the impression he is relaxed (Q/A6). He is talking about anger and he is trying to make us believe that he is not an angry man and for that reason he talks quite slowly, just to show he is a very calm person:

(4) Clinton: …If you go round mad you can't, you don't think very well, and you wind up doing things that you shouldn't do. And I think there are numerous points in my life, where I really was angry and I, it bothered me. I also think a lot of anger is quite healthy and I've bent over backwards because I tried to be a peace maker in my home; I bent over backwards not to be angry, and never to show anger and I think there's a price for that as well.

In other occasions he consciously uses paralinguistic vocalizations such as laughing to soften an unpleasant situation. This is the case when the interviewer asks him about the way he felt when he had to deal with Al Qaeda and at the same time sleep on the sofa because he had been kicked out the marital bed. Clinton knows the interviewer is trying to show he was unable to solve the terrorist problem because of his own personal problems and private life. So, he laughs even though the situation is not funny at all (A40). In some cases it is just a nervous laugh, as in A34 and A35. What is important is that the three of them (A34, A35 and A40) occur in turns which are considered of extreme tension, or tension, something quite apart from any feeling of 'happiness'.

So, by means of paralinguistic signals we are told of the speaker's emotional state, the speaker's relation with other participants, the speaker's intentions to go on speaking or to finish his turn, the speaker's attitude, etc. In Bolinger's words (1986:338): "Intonation is important for who is speaking, for who will be taking the next turn, for how the act is to be understood …, for how the speaker will be evaluated…"

As it was previously mentioned, in the sequence A28/Q29/A29 there is a confusing situation: Even though Clinton's intonation in A28 shows that he has concluded his turn, he interrupts Dimbleby when he has just started to ask another question. As it was stated above, Clinton has been refraining from showing any sign of anger but he cannot hide his feelings for any longer and there is a kind of 'emotional outburst'.

In the same way as voice and its qualities are important, the lack of voice is also relevant. We may distinguish two main types of situations where there is no voice: on the one hand, we may find silences, which are spaces with no voice or noise at all (also called unfilled pauses by Knapp 1980); on the other hand, we may find pauses which are filled with vocal segregates (*uh-huh*, *ah*, *oh*, etc.) or

characterizers (crying, coughing, laughing, etc.). Knapp (1980:222) analyses pauses in the following way: "[…] the two major types of pauses are the unfilled pause (silent) and the filled pause. A filled pause is simply filled with some type of phonation such as "um," "uh," […] Some people associate filled pauses and repetitions with emotional arousal and others feel that filled pauses may reduce anxiety, but jam cognitive processes".

As previously stated, Clinton's pace slows down in Q/A47 in order to have time to think what to say. There is an unfilled pause (silent) and then two filled pauses (false starts). He had been asked a very difficult question (whether he urged Tony Blair not to support President Bush) and he needed some time in order to think what to say.

As regards visual nonverbal devices, *facial gestures* are the most noticeable ones. The face is probably one of the most outstanding nonverbal elements since it is always visible and, consequently, it is always a source of information for the other participants.

Within facial gestures, one of the signals politicians generally use to their advantage is the smile. The smile is a very important and complicated facial gesture. Its main function may be that of showing happiness but it may also serve other purposes.

If we analyse some of the smiles performed by Clinton throughout this interview, we will notice many of them serve a very specific purpose: masking his anger, discomfort and uneasiness. At the beginning, when answering the first questions, Clinton was more relaxed but, after the questions on the Monica Lewinsky affair, Clinton has to fight against his emotions. He tries his best to look calm and nice but his face says the opposite. In this respect, Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1972:2) state: "Although smiles may be a reliable index of pleasure or happiness, a person may also smile to mask a feeling he wishes to conceal or to prevent a feeling when he has no emotion at all. Is the face like an involuntary system or is it subject to voluntary activation and thus vulnerable to purposeful control and disguise? Clearly, it is both".

Regarding *posture*, it gives us important information about Clinton's attitude. For Mehrabian (1972), there are two dimensions of posture which are associated with communication of attitudes: the factor of immediacy and that of relaxation. "Forward lean is suggestive of greater immediacy, as in the presence of someone liked. Asymmetry of arms and legs plus sideways and backwards lean is indicative of relaxation that may be present, for Americans, with another of lower status. While these dimensions may have crosscultural validity, it has not been clearly shown that the postural variables indicative of a particular dimension are universal". (cited in Ramsey 1979:120). In this interview we have observed that whenever Clinton leans forward he either wants to manifest his attention to what Dimbleby was asking him or he wants to intimidate the interviewer because he has been asked a tough question.

A posture typical of Clinton is the one of his hand in his chin. He uses this posture to manifest his attention to what the interviewer is saying. Apart from this classic posture we have found two variants of it:

(1) his hand grasping eagerly his chin and

(2) his hand on his cheek.

The first one is used in moments of extreme tension (he is trying to control himself) and the second when he feels exhausted after an episode of agitation.

Visual contact or eye contact is also an important element in nonverbal communication. It can be used to regulate communication but also as an indicator of dominance. When Clinton gets really angry (third stage) he looks at the interviewer with contempt and disdain (A29). His threatening eyes say everything about Clinton's stance and attitude towards the interviewer's question. In addition to the expression of his eyes, we can also notice the swollen volume of his carotid artery.

Regarding verbal strategies, a detailed analysis of the most relevant ones found in the interview follows below:

4.1 3-part list

This is a well-known rhetorical device used by many politicians as a persuasive strategy. Clinton uses it many times in this interview. In the following extract he has just been asked why he offered the opposition "on plate" a good reason to attack him: Lewinsky affair (lines 198-203).

(5) Dimbleby: You say, then along came the Lewinsky affair and you offered it to them on a plate in effect. How did you come to do that?

Clinton: …It happened at a time when I was angry, I was *under stress, I was afraid* I was going to lose my fight with the Republican Congress…

Clinton is explaining the motives which drove him to do it and he has to sound convincing. For that reason he uses a 3-part list: "I was angry, I was under stress, I was afraid". In order to draw attention to that list he even uses his fingers to enumerate them. In relation to this type of strategy Atkinson (1984:57) explains that:

> In speeches, conversations and most other forms of communication, the most commonly used type of list contains three items, and an example of such a list has just been used to start this sentence. One of the main attractions of three-part lists is that they have an air of unity or completeness about them. Lists comprising only two items tend to appear inadequate or incomplete.

Three is the minimum number in order to offer a pattern. If you are given two elements of a sequence (3/9/?) you can guess more or less the third: 27 (nx3) or

15 (n +6) or 81 (n^2). But if you are given the third (3/9/81), you can establish the pattern (n^2).

4.2 Extreme Case Formulations (ECF)

This term was introduced by Pomerantzs (1986). Edwards (2000:347f.) explains they are "…descriptions or assessments that deploy extreme expressions such as every, all, none, best, least, as good as it gets, always, perfectly, brand new, and absolutely". Clinton uses them quite often to indicate that something is definite and conclusive.

When Clinton was asked about his family's behaviour after the Lewinsky affair, he explains that even though "he was getting a whipping at home" he deserved it. This is a strategic answer in the sense that it is a way to recognise his mistakes publicly. He uses an ECF to strengthen this recognition of this big fault (lines 416-424):

(6) Clinton: …I thought whatever they wanted to say or do to me, Hilary and Chelsea, they had *an absolute right* to do so the fact that I was still able to stay under the same roof does…

This ECF co-occurs with a gesture indicating something definite: palm down and movements to the right and to the left. This gesture reinforces the persuasive effect of this ECF. Pomerantz (1986:227) summarises the three main uses of ECFs in the following way:

- to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings,
- to propose the cause of a phenomenon,
- to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice.

It is really interesting to note that these ECFs are very weak in the sense that it is very easy to refute them. If somebody mentions just one counterexample, the validity of the ECFs is in jeopardy. For this reason, it is very common to find a softer version ('a softener') right after the attack to an ECF. The order is: ECF– challenge – softener. It is also interesting to note that even though there is a 'weakness' to ECFs, a study carried out by Edwards (2000) discovered that the use of ECFs is very popular and widespread, because most of the times people accept them and admit their non literal interpretations.

4.3 Parallelism (repetition)

Sometimes Clinton uses parallel structures to reinforce an idea. He either repeats the same structure or even the same words. When talking about repetition Cockcroft and Cockcroft (1992:131) explain that "This is probably the major resource of schematic rhetoric and the one with closest affinity to the spontaneous expression of emotion".

In the following extract Clinton wants to emphasize that he was fighting against political enemies during the Lewinsky trial. One of these enemies was Kenneth Starr and he insists on the fact that the proofs which support what he is saying are well-known because they belong to the past (lines 310-312):

(7) Clinton: Wasn't as I saw it sir, *we had several years of evidence*. *We had several years of evidence*. Kenneth Starr would not be allowed to be prosecutor against me as a defendant in any decent court in the land.

In order to bolster this repetition he points backwards as referring to something past. According to Cockcroft and Cockcroft (1992:131): "The pattern created by a repeated word, or the rhythm created by a repeated phrase, validate Coleridge's remarkable insight about 'striv(ing) to hold in check the workings of passion'[2]."

4.4 Script formulations

A widely used persuasive strategy is to lead somebody to believe that you share the same feelings and ideas. This is the main goal of the so-called script formulations (Edwards 1994, 1995, 1997): To construct a common socio-psychological reality based on a set of beliefs and experiences shared by speaker and listener. Edwards (1995) names a series of grammatical scripting devices to describe a script formulation: iterative present tenses, the use of the modal *would*, expressions such as *you know*, etc. When a speaker uses these script formulations in his/her discourse, his/her accounts are not framed as a specific, witnessed episode, but as a known and predictable pattern.

Clinton uses two script formulations in turn 13. Dimbleby had just told him that he had offered his enemies a gift with the Lewinsky affair. Clinton answers he had already been asked that question before and for that purpose he uses a script formulation: *But you know when people ask me this question*. That means that he is used to that type of questions and for that reason the interviewer and the audience are induced to think that he is going to provide a good answer. A few lines later he uses *And you know* in an attempt to look congenial in order to get the interviewer's alliance because he knows that the interviewer is about to start a touchy issue (i.e., the Lewinsky affair).

(8) Clinton: Of course I did, and was it rational? No. So I do my very best to explain why I think it happened. *But you know when people ask me this question*, well how could you do something so stupid, when you knew they were after you … *And you know*, it's hard to think straight when that's going on.

[2] S. T. Coleridge (1956:206).

According to Edwards (2003:38): "… formulating events as regular makes them both factually robust and also somewhat knowable in advance without having to wait and see for any specific instance. Script formulations are presented as if based on lots of instances, and perhaps lots of people's repeated (consensual) experiences of instances".

4.5 Use of pronouns

Clinton also uses personal pronouns to his advantage for strategic reasons. In the following example Clinton explains that Starr had turned a private issue into a legal one. Then, the Dimbleby asks him whether he thinks that was wrong and Clinton answers "Of course". Right after that, the following exchange takes place (lines 209-218):

(9) Dimbleby: Did you think it was dangerous at the time?
Clinton: What *they* were doing?
Dimbleby: What *you* were doing. Did you think it was risky?
Clinton: *I* don't know that *I*, *I* don't – *I* can't answer that. *I* don't know what *I* thought about it. (interjects) It didn't last very long and …and the accounts are not entirely accurate of what did happen; so *I* don't want to talk about that. *I*'ve said, all *I* have to say about that in the book. *I*'m not saying any more about that.

It is clear that Dimbleby is asking Clinton whether what he was doing was dangerous but he pretends not having understood the question. He tries to avoid that question because he does not like it. When he answers the question he averts gaze and shows a complete rejection. Clinton feels it was a very personal (he uses 10 times the personal pronoun *I*) and dissenting (he uses 7 negations) question.

4.6 Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions are highly strategic in the sense that they raise the audience's level of awareness. Clinton knows this and for that reason he uses them quite often. It is particularly remarkable the following extract (lines 446-456):

(10) Clinton: … And then could I have… would I have done more after the USS Cole in October two thousand. And could I have if, that's one big if. If the government intelligence agencies in this case the FBI and the CIA had agreed with me even though my term was almost over and had told me that they agreed for sure that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were responsible for the USS Cole, a finding they did not make until after I had left office, I would have done more then. Would it have succeeded in getting Bin Laden, would it have prevented 9/11, I don't know…

Previous to that answer the interviewer had told Clinton that he had given the action against terrorism and against Al Qaeda a low priority. He uses four

rhetorical questions (all of them with conditional tenses: *would*, *could*, *would* and *would*) in order to show that no one can know what could have happened and for that reason no one can blame him for anything. Zillman (1972:161) summarises the strategic use of this type of questions in the following way:

> It may be argued that the assumed covert agreement response elicited by a rhetorical agreement question, as compared to the relatively passive decoding of an assertion in statement form, raises the individual's level of awareness. It makes him cognizant of his position on a particular issue, and it may activate issue-related cognitions to consolidate and bolster his evaluations, thereby facilitating his involvement with the issue, and possibly producing some self-commitment.

4.7 Oppositeness (contrasts)

Another strategy used by Clinton is related to the way he presents something. The interviewer and the audience are shown the two sides of the coin, there is no mid point. In the following extract (lines 145-162) the interviewer and the audience are offered positive against negative alternatives:

(11) Clinton N: …I was interested, to me, the way I kept score in my Presidency was, *Did more people have jobs or not? Did more people move out of poverty or not? Did the crime rate go down or not?* Were more kids breathing clean air and fewer getting asthma? What was our record in the world? *Did we advance peace and prosperity and security or not?* That's how I kept score. Others kept score in a totally different way. You know, *are we hurting the other side or not?*

Right before this question Clinton had just watched a video about Monica Lewinsky and he knows he is about to be asked about her. He tries to focus his answer on exclusively political issues and that is why he reveals his political achievements in an attempt to counterbalance what he knew he was going to be asked about next (his sexual blunder). Clinton uses rhetorical disjunctive questions in which the interviewer and the audience are forced to choose only one option, they are offered no other alternative.

4.8 Comparisons

At times Clinton uses comparisons in order to highlight his achievements or stress his uniqueness. In the following answer (lines 87-94) he compares himself with the rest of Presidents and he defends that he is different from all of them because of his loyalty, support and determination (3-part list) of his personal friends:

(12) Clinton: (interrupts) It, if, when you live …my life has been both selfish and selfless. I mean if you live the kind of life I live, I've lived, you're running for office – it's almost impossible, as I say in this book, *I may be the only person* who got elected President ever,

because of the loyalty, support and determination of his personal friends, who just wouldn't let my campaign die…

This uniqueness which he defends here is supported by a nonverbal strategy: He touches his heart when uttering this.

4.9 Metonymy

When it is not advantageous to Clinton to address something directly, he uses a metonymy. In 1999 Clinton and Blair bombed Iraq for four days. Instead, Clinton says (lines 483-514):

(13) Clinton: … he's not a good man he's getting older and eh, as long as we don't lift the sanctions and let him rebuild his military power, that eventually we'll get a change there. Then in ninety eight when Saddam kicked the inspectors out to try to force us to lift the sanctions. *Prime Minister Blair and I bombed him* for four days and we bombed the sites where thought the chemical and biological materials would be…

It is not advantageous to Clinton to admit that he bombed a country full of innocent people, instead he says that he bombed Saddam. Cockcroft and Cockcroft (1992:120) explain the persuasive use of this tool in the following way: "Through a common association, or 'compact reference' within the minds of author and audience, an idea put into words metonymically represents unexpressed or implicit ideas and associations. This will have obvious implications for persuasion in general, and advertising in particular".

4.10 Delays

When Clinton is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea he takes his time to answer the question. In a previously offered extract (lines 446-456) Clinton does not start answering the question till the 11th word:

(14) Clinton: *Well because, I mean in theory we could have but* we would have been all alone everybody would have thought we were crazy based on that. And then could I have…

Clinton had just been asked why he did not invade Afghanistan based on the African Embassy bombings. It is a very touchy question and for that reason it is delayed. It is interesting to mention here the use of 'well'. Schiffrin (1987) suggests that 'well' is used almost exclusively at the beginning of a response, to signal that an upcoming contribution is not fully consonant with the set of possible responses implied by the question initiator. According to Byron and Heeman (1997), 'well' is "[…] typically used to correct a misconception or to suggest an alternative plan. It is found not only at the beginning of responses, but

also after the other speaker has just stated a fact or drawn a conclusion with which the current speaker is about to disagree.

Byron and Heeman (1997) say that when a speaker starts a turn with 'well' it makes us expect that the speaker is about to disagree with or correct information (implicitly or explicitly) from the prior turn. According to Schiffrin (1985) 'well' prefaces insufficient answers and attributes to 'well' the role of a coherence marker (Schiffrin 1985:650):

> … *well* is more likely to be used when respondents cannot easily meet conversational demands for response because the informational content of their response will not fit the coherence options just opened by a prior referent.

In this study she reveals that clear confirmative or negative responses to yes-no questions are rarely prefaced by 'well' whereas nearly half of the unspecified answers to yes-no questions are prefaced by 'well'. Similarly, the answers to wh-questions tended to be prefaced by 'well' when they did not offer the required information.

Although, for an expository convenience, in some cases we have made reference to specific verbal strategies or nonverbal devices, we know communication is a multi-channel process where both verbal and nonverbal signals are in close relation. As we have seen in the results section above, after calculating Pearson's coefficient for 'verbal' and 'nonverbal', we can observe there is a positive high correlation between variables (0,795). This implies not only that verbal and nonverbal devices tend to appear together, but also that they increase and decrease together. At first sight, this may seem logical and we can interpret that Clinton uses both verbal and nonverbal strategies in order to achieve his purposes. But, if we analyse the meaning and function of elements in detail, we will notice that the fact that they appear together does not imply they coincide in meaning or function. We find two different situations:

- Speech and gestures coincide in meaning and purpose.
- Speech and gestures do not coincide in meaning and purpose.

The first case is the one we have mentioned as a logical interpretation, because it means when Clinton has a purpose in mind he makes use of both verbal and nonverbal strategies. For example, when he is talking of 'anger' and he is saying he is not an angry person, he uses a verbal strategy (a contrast of concepts) and, at the same time, he slows down his speech so that the audience can perceive he is a relaxed person (that is to say, he is not angry). Consequently, verbal and non-verbal signals have a common meaning and function, both of them being used consciously and intentionally.

The second situation is completely different because it implies Clinton's words and his gestures mean different things. That is to say, he uses different verbal strategies with a specific purpose but the nonverbal signals co-occurring with speech are not really part of a strategy but the expression of unconscious

signals. For example, in turn Q/A36, Clinton wants to sound definitive when answering "no" but, at the same time, we can notice there is no visual contact at all with the interviewer because Clinton does not want to look into Dimbleby's eyes. Because of that, what we perceive is that he is lying. Something similar happens in Q/A42 where Clinton uses lots of rhetorical questions to sound convincing but his too slow speech, the use of very long vowels, etc. show he does not really know what to answer or what to say.

As mentioned above, the use of unconscious nonverbal elements by Clinton has to do with his emotional state. By Spearman's coefficient, we can see there is a moderate correlation between the use of nonverbal signals and his emotional state (0,500). One of the reasons why this correlation is not higher may be just because he is a politician and, although his gestures are a barometer of his feelings, he still has some control over them.

The main cause for Clinton's emotional states is the content of the interviewer's questions. The contingency correlation between the variables 'content public/private' and 'emotional state' has proved to be high (0,687). Clinton gets more furious when questions have to do with the Monica Lewinsky affair. Relaxation tends to appear in those turns where Clinton is answering questions about his private family life. But we also find turns whose content has to do with Clinton's public and private lives. In Q/A33 Dimbleby knows Clinton has lost his temper with the previous questions about Monica Lewinsky, and the interviewer wants to follow on this line but he has already said he does not "intend to talk endlessly about her". So he introduces a new theme which has to do with Clinton's public life, Al Qaeda, but at the same time Dimbleby is interested in knowing the way in which Clinton's private life could have affected his public life decisions. That is why we say this section contains questions whose themes are a mixture of the two parallel lives, private and public.

Data gathered in the present study have shown that the use of nonverbal signals is conditioned by the interviewee's emotional state. At the same time, the interviewee's emotional state has proved to be determined by the nature of the question asked by the interviewer. Finally, we have also found there is a positive correlation between the use of verbal strategies and the use of nonverbal signals: the more verbal strategies, the more nonverbal devices.

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Interactional Power Processes

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Spoken interaction involves not only the exchange of information, but also the dynamic process of negotiation, the interplay of communicative partners' actions and reactions. The motivating factor of an interactional episode is the intention of the initial speaker (e.g., to go to the cinema with a friend), other participants enter the dialogue to reflect their own point of view. Speaker intentions function as a driving force in a dialogue – people are guided in their actions by their own interests. In conversation, the interlocutors negotiate both the realisation of their purposes and their social relations and identities through their verbal actions. There is a relationship between linguistic variation and social reality. This paper takes a closer look at interpersonal power, referring either to the capacity to cause such change or to the actual use of that capacity.

1. Language and power

In this study, language is perceived as a primary tool reflecting power relations in society, analogous to Fairclough's conception of "discourse as a place where relations of power are actually exercised and enacted" (1992). Among numerous conceptions of power, I devote attention to interpersonal power, which refers either to the capacity to cause such change or to the actual use of that capacity.

Based on Olson and Cromwell's (1975) concept, I distinguish three dimensions of power: power bases, power processes and power outcomes. The term power bases refers to human potential to exercise influence over other people's thoughts, decisions and actions and to the human resources which prevail in a conflict. The term *power processes* expresses the use of power bases and concerns interactional dominance in conversation. "Dominance is the exercise of power in a particular situation" (Jørgensen 1999). The assertion of the speaker's perspective, which is observable in such conversational techniques as taking the floor, casting conversational roles, changing the focus and introduction of new action is the matter of interest there. Controlling, evaluating, instructing and questioning are some of the significant activities. The term *power outcomes* denotes the results of disputes in conversation: victory or loss. "Power can be won and exercised only in and through social struggles in which it may also be lost" (Fairclough 1992).

In order to reveal the power relationship and the character of the power exerted and its modality, I utilize three analytic approaches:

- initiative – response analysis
- cooperation – forcing concept
- distinction of won – lost conflict outcomes

The first two approaches are concerned with power processes and the third with power outcomes. The multiplicity of methods enables higher analytical efficiency. The essential unit for my analysis is one turn.

The first method of empirical dialogue analysis, *initiative – response analysis*, as I use it, was developed by Per Linell, Lennart Gustavsson and Päivi Juvonen (1988) and simplified by J. N. Jørgensen (1999) for the description of interactional dominance. In a general sense, the initiative introduces new substance into the dialogue, which can be a new theme or a new perspective. The initiating feature points forward, requests a response and is thereby context-determining and distributionally independent. Strong initiative means that the speaker explicitly solicits or demands a response from the interlocutor. On the other hand, the response creates coherence with the preceding discourse and points backwards. A minimal response includes only a brief satisfactory reaction but not more than that. When the speaker provides something more than is minimally required or requested by the interlocutor's previous initiative, the turn becomes an integrated unit of both the initiative and response features and is called an expanded or elaborated response.

The second concept, originally developed by Werner Kallmeyer and Reinhold Schmitt (1996), deals with *cooperative and forcing activities*. Whereas the IR distinction focuses on the actor's activity, the forcing involves some aggressive potential, it is self-centred, expansive and invasive. Forcing indicates aberrance from cooperation. Regarding the balance of self- and other-determination, forcing entails the enlargement of one's own rights and extension of the responsibilities of others. The authors indicate five constitutive aspects of forcing: speech allocation, content, fact of the matter, social action and social identity and relations. There are forcing activities such as the interruption of the partner's speech related to speech allocation, reframing on the basis of the other's speech, the practice of "putting words in the other's mouth", the practice known as "leading the witness" in court, suggesting (misleading) interpretations of another person's social action, self-positioning as a victim, discrediting, or the disqualification of a certain interlocutor on the basis of social identity and relationship.

Thirdly, I differentiate between *the won- and the lost-turn*. I follow Lian Malai Madsen's (2003) approach, which envisages linguistic variation as a means of negotiating power relationships. "I study the power outcomes by analysing the occurring conflicts in the conversations to decide who gets their way." (Madsen 2003:91) Analogous to Gumperz (1982:166), Madsen defines a conflict as a situation in the conversation where opposing interests or values are explicitly expressed, such as a speech event in which the participants place themselves in opposition to each other. I apply the won and lost distinction on the level of particular turns, calling them winning and losing, respectively. Briefly speaking,

in his turn the dominant speaker A postulates the fulfilment of any task and after his communicative partner accepts and accomplishes this task, A's turn becomes a winning turn. In the case of refusal to execute the assigned task, A's turn is designated as a losing turn.

2. Power relation, power holder

Through the investigation of the linguistic characteristics of interlocutors' utterances, we highlight their manner of locution and thereby their communicative behaviour as a part of their social behaviour. The outline of power relations is made via the distinction between the *power holder* (the dominant/powerful speaker) who supplies his power forces in the dialogue, and the dominated/powerless/submissive partner, who accepts that dominance.

Lewin, Lippit and White's (1938) social psychological concept seems to be the appropriate concept for studying group dynamics. Based on their observation, they describe three main leadership styles: *democratic, autocratic and laissez-faire* styles. The democratic leader allows subordinates to participate in decision-making. He encourages, initiates activity, creates an atmosphere of individual involvement, makes alternate proposals, discusses alternatives, provides information, enables and/or promotes self-action and self-regulation. On the other hand, the autocratic leader discourages subordinates from participation in decision-making. He sets objectives and assigns tasks, discourages self-activity, creates a dependent atmosphere, maintains his own responsibility, makes regulations, criticises, interrupts his interlocutors' speech, and embodies aggressive behaviour. The third, the laissez-faire style, is characterised by passivity, lacking in activity, without stimulation and instruction, but providing access to information. Laissez-faire leadership creates the least productive environment.

3. Data, analytical procedure

I recorded and transcribed the verbal interaction of three same-gender bilingual groups of children, with a total time of 7 hours and 20 minutes. The children are pupils of a Czech and a German fourth class (about 10 years old); they had been learning the partner language (German and Czech) for four years, one day per week all together in one class. They were participating in a school excursion where two Czech and two German pupils lived together in one room. I audio-recorded the conversations they had in their rooms in the evenings. During the recording, they were without supervision. The children have equal status in the conversation from the very beginning (contrary to the unequal status of the teacher-pupil, doctor-patient, judge-defendant, and so on), the power-relations thus have to be negotiated and established within their conversation.

In the course of the analysis, I use the following procedure:

- One turn is the basic element of my analysis. I describe each *turn* using three letters (separated by a comma) referring to the IR analysis, to cooperation and forcing activities and to winning or losing turns, respectively. The following letters are used:
  - I = initiative,
  - st.I = strong initiative,
  - R = response and
  - ER = elaborated response;
  - K = cooperative activity and
  - F = forcing activity;
  - W = winning turn and
  - L = the losing turn.
  - For indeterminable cases, I use 0.
- I reveal and specify those *verbal actions* which obviously show power processes in the dialogue. I match those verbal actions with the appropriate structural sequences (pre-sequence, opening, elaborating, embedded and closing sequence).
- On the basis of main verbal actions, I present a *structural model* of the common dialogue in terms of a conversational episode.
- Pursuing these previous sociolinguistic speech characteristics, the *power - holder* and the submissive actors will be identified and the leading style will be specified.

4. Illustrative examples

Now let's turn to the excerpts from my data sample. Each excerpt is given first in the original Czech and/or German version - in italics, then in an approximate English translation. The tape-recorded data were transcribed in accordance with the conventions usually used in Conversation Analysis (e.g. Schlobinski 1996).

In the first example, called "The Czech test", I illustrate the ratification process. The following female actors are present: M and Z – two Czech fourth-graders, F and S – two German fourth-graders, though only M, Z and F take part in the episode. This episode takes place at the beginning of their whole evening conversation. From the window of their sitting room, they can see a church. The intention of the Czech speaker M is to enter into the conversation (to cooperate) with the German girls, which is why she asks an initiating (I) question in turns 1 and 2.

(1) The Czech test (RATIFICATION)

1 M:	*<u>was ist das</u>* (What is that?)	I, K, W
- Z: ((laugh pertaining to previous interactional episode))		

2 M: ~F~, *was ist das, (.) tschechische (.) tschechische (.)* I, K, 0
(~F~, what is that? In Czech, in Czech.)
3 F: *eine Ki:rche* R, K, 0
(A church.)

4 M: *ale tschechische, tschechischel* I, F, W
5 Z: *ale tschechische, tschechischel* I, F, W
(But in Czech, in Czech.)
6 F: *kostel* R, K, 0
(A church.)

7 Z: *dobrý? ((intonation of appreciation)) chacha/ cha/ cha* I, K, 0
(Good. Chacha cha cha.)

8 M: *máš vode mě jedničku, z češtiny.* ER, K, 0
(You have got an A from me, in Czech.)
9 Z: *haha (.) hahaha* ER, F, 0
(ha ha, ha ha ha)

In turns 1 and 2, M assigns a certain task and thus the objective of the dialogue and chooses the girl who has to solve this task. By doing so, M *supplies* her own power forces in the dialogue. The cooperative manner (K) lies in the effort to enter the communication with native speakers of another language, which is more difficult and therefore less common. Here the code-switching (the mother tongue of M is Czech) acts as an accommodation practice used to achieve the successful course of conversation. F realises the second part of the adjacency pair question-answer, she solves the given task in cooperative minimal response (line 3: R, K). Turn 1 becomes a winning turn (W); F does not need to renounce any former intention (turn 3: 0). By those previous activities, F *ratifies* the allocation of conversational roles: she accepts her submissive position and recognizes the dominance of M. The dominance allocation was achieved in that opening sequence.

In turn 4, M changes the main purpose, it is more likely the solicitation of an accurate task fulfilment than starting the conversation, hence the forcing feature of this new initiative turn (I, F). Together with M, the actor Z initiates the repair sequence, M and Z talk simultaneously (lines 4 and 5) thereby creating an intra-ethnic affiliation. F makes a correction using the cooperative minimal response (line 6), the task was fulfilled (W to the turns in lines 4 and 5). The matter of the opening sequence was elaborated in this sequence (lines 4, 5 and 6), it is termed an elaborative sequence. The binary principle is retained due to those "requirement-fulfilment" activities. The main objective of this elaborative sequence was the correct execution of the given task, so I term this verbal action

execution. The third closing sequence follows. The position of power holder is still occupied by the Czech affiliation (actors M and Z). Z initiates (ER) a new action - an *evaluation* of the task fulfilment, M continues in this action and elaborates it with a common school classification (line 8, ER). Both, M and Z express explicit appreciation of F's effort (lines 7, 8, 9, designated K).

Ideal pair actions	
supply	ratification
execution	evaluation
In reality - creation of combinations, embedded actions	

We still pay attention to the modality of the power exerted. The table below draws a comparison between the turns of the example above in terms of number of turns per speaker, number of words per speaker, and coding of the turns.

speaker	Σ turns	Σ words	I	ER	R	K	F	W	L	0
M	4	18	3	1	0	3	1	2	0	2
Z	3	9	2	1	0	1	2	1	0	2
F	2	3	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2

Evidently, the actor M has the quantitative dominance (the amount of speech he produced) as well as the interactional dominance (in terms of Linell, Gustavsson & Juvonen 1988), whereas Z follows closely. The communicative manner of M is mostly cooperative; the manner of Z is rather forcing. M produced two winning turns, Z one winning turn only. In contrast, the actor F occupies the submissive role. She produced less turns and words and all of her turns were cooperative responses without winning or losing turns. S was verbally inactive, it is impossible for us to analyse her communicative behaviour.

The position of *power holder* was obviously adopted by actor M. M supplies her power forces/dominance, she assigns the task and she organizes conversational roles and evaluates. Her conversational behaviour is mostly initiative and cooperative. M accepts the participation of Z in the management process (overlapping line 6) and even the closing sequence was initiated by Z. In social psychology terminology, M aspires to the position of a democratic leader.

It is obvious that not all instances in which domination is supplied are accepted / ratified. The next excerpt (example 2) is an example of a verbal action which I call refusal. Two boys, the German speaker D (8 years old) and the Czech

speaker A (10 years old), solve the problem of "closing the door", which becomes the main matter of the evening. The following transcript is one part only, but it is key for the whole interactional episode (see example 3).

(2) Example 2: Close the door! (REFUSAL)

D: *ZÁVŘÍ DVÉŘÉ.* st.I, F, L

(Close the door!)

A: *AU au ZA:VŘI: SI: JE: SÁM.* ER, F, L

(Au, au, close it yourself.)

Both exchanged turns are labelled as losing activities (the task was not accomplished) with the forcing feature (request). In the strong initiative D supplies his dominance while A refuses to execute the given task (closing the door) and elaborates his response using a new initiating feature - delegating this task back to D.

If the conversational partner refuses to execute the given task and thereby to accept the submissive role, the action of ratification is not accomplished. The interlocutors begin to negotiate their power relations until one of them gives up. After that, the dialogue might continue with common verbal actions (ratification, execution, evaluation). I illustrate the process of negotiation in example 3, which is part of a conversational episode (elaborative and closing sequence). We can notice a number of repeated verbal actions: the new supplies of power forces (always from the German boys D and Ma) and frequent refusals (from the Czech boys M and A). The whole interactional episode takes place at the beginning of the evening conversation. In lines 8-9, there is another conversational episode inserted.

(3) Ukázka 3: Close the door! (NEGOTIATION)

Elaborative sequence

supply (command, code-switching)

1 Ma: *zavři: dveře:* stI, F, W

(Close the door!)

refusal through ignoring

2 M: = ~*A*~ *se tam (zavřel).* I, F, 0

(A closed himself in there.)

supply (command, German affiliation with Ma, code-switching)

3 D: *ZÁVŘÍ DVÉŘÉ.* st.I, F, W

(Close the door!)

refusal

4 A: *AU au ZA:VŘI: SI: JE: SÁM.* ER, F, L

(Au au close it yourself.)

5 Ma*: xxxxx*

6 D: *xxxx denke ich* ER, K, 0

(I think)

A gives up: ratification, execution

7 A: *ja: ((A closes the door.))* R, K, 0

(Yes.)

Embedded sequence

8 A: *(kaktus, kaktus)* I, K, 0

(cactus, cactus)

9 M: *kam si dáš peněženku* I, K, 0

(Where are you putting your wallet?)

Closing sequence

evaluation: negative evaluation (irony, provocation), German affiliation

10 Ma: *NA ENDLICH,* ER, F, 0

(Finally.)

11 D: *góu, jú hú hu hu ((provocatively))* ER, F, 0

Following the analysis of the whole episode (21 classified turns), the following table describes the character of the power exerted:

speaker	Σ turns	Σ words	st.I	I	ER	R	K	F	W	L	0

D	5		2	1	2	0	1	4	1	1	3
Ma	3		2	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	1
A	7		0	4	2	1	6	1	0	1	6
M	6		2	3	0	1	4	2	0	1	5

Speakers D and M produced the winning turns. They aspire to a position of the autocratic leader; their turns are often strong initiatives mainly with forcing character.

It should be mentioned that the very beginning verbal action doesn't necessarily have to always be a supply of dominance, but rather, it could be a demand for dominance (e.g. the turn: "What are we going to do?"). Both actions, supply and demand, could be called proposals (the beginning speaker proposes a division of conversational power).

5. Conclusion

I have described conversation as a sociolinguistic event in which the interlocutor's power relations are established through the interplay of actions and reactions. Focusing on some excerpts, I have created the following diagram of verbal actions:



In all these cases the first speaker does a proposing action; he supplies his own dominance or demands dominance from others. In the next step, his interlocutor ratifies this proposal (adopts the complementary position: dominant – submissive) or refuses it. In the case of refusal, power relations have to be negotiated (other supplies and refusals continue until ratification occurs). Then the actions of execution and evaluation can be undertaken.

In order to be able to determine the power holder and better describe this individual's manner of behaviour, I have labelled each turn in three ways: as

orienting to an initiative feature or a response feature, as a cooperative or a forcing activities, and as winning or losing its intentions.

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Appendix: Transcription conventions

(.)	pause, short
(3s)	pause, elapsed time in silence in seconds
:	prolongation of the immediately prior sound
xxxx	unintelligible words
xxxxxxxxxx	unintelligible passage
~F~	first initial of participant's name (omitted)
(but)	difficult to hear but presumed words and phrases
((laugh))	comments from the transcriber
=	no gap between the two turns
/	sudden interruption of the word or construction
-	part of the word omitted due to the premature ending of the turn (like stuttering)
podtržené	overlapping talk
MAX	sounds especially loud relative to the surrounding talk
font size ten	speech noticeably quieter than to the surrounding talk
?	rising intonation
.	falling intonation
,	slightly rising intonation indicating the continuation of the turn
*	markedly rising intonation
….	omitted passage of the transcript

Direct speech is written in italics. The analyst's description of the transcribed utterances is inserted into the transcript and it is written in normal type.

Implicitness in Dialogue
On the boundaries between rhetoric and grammar

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Standards of speech explicitness vary from culture to culture, because different cultures presuppose different degrees of reliance on interpretive skill of the addressee. Interpretive measures of speech efficiency transcends the boundaries of grammar. Certain parts of stylistics lying outside national measures of speech efficiency may belong to universal stylistics.

1. Stylistics and rhetoric of conversation

Like stylistics, rhetoric of conversation has to do with the choice between different ways of expression which are regarded as semantically but not pragmatically equivalent. 'To say or not to say' and 'How to say' are two crucial problems of rhetoric having to do with this kind of variation. The difference between 'Shut up!', 'Be silent!' and 'Keep silent!' is an instance of this variation.

Stylistics is a discipline explaining why this or that choice from a certain number of alternatives may take place and how this choice influences the interpretation of the whole expression in context.

Rhetoric, on the other hand, introduces such factors as intentionality and efficiency of the use of certain expressions under certain circumstances, relying on standards and paradigmatic cases of human interaction. Thus, classical text books on rhetoric report of especially effective paradigm cases in the practical activity of the students.

I am going to illustrate a possible approach to contrastive rhetoric of conversation.

The boundaries between rhetoric and stylistics on the one hand, and grammar on the other hand, are rather vague, because some grammatical and lexical means serving stylistic/rhetoric purposes in dialogues may be grammaticalized and grow grammatically obligatory in some languages, whereas in other languages they may be optional.

2. Interpretive approach to rhetoric and stylistics

In the last years, the interpretive approach to meaning has become widespread according to which meanings are not "contained" in signs but are rather computed by interpreters. Human interaction is looked upon as a result of certain strategies of language production and interpretation, and not of extracting meanings from the words. Meanings are considered as what is produced by an interpreter on the basis of linguistic signs.

Several groups of modern linguistic theories realize just this approach, investigating semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic features of language use from this point a view. For instance, conversational analysis, certain versions of speech act theory and of discourse analysis are such disciplines.

Rhetoric, too, may be looked upon from an interpretive point of view. Human societies use different sets of interpretive strategies characterizing 'interpretive styles' and 'interpretive cultures'. What is a good style for Russian is not always acceptable for German, and vice versa. And the ways of understanding the same sequences of speech acts for Russian speakers differ from those of English speakers.

3. Contrastive rhetoric of explicitness and implicitness

Since inter-cultural interactions are possible, too, linguists and anthropologists suppose that there is a universal core of human interpretive strategies (e.g. some of the Gricean maxims) and a set of variable culture-specific parameters. This last sort of variation may be the object of *contrastive rhetoric*. Why contrastive? Not only because of the needs of learning and teaching foreign languages but also because some things are better seen from outside than from inside.

Contrastive rhetoric presupposes that different interpretive cultures rely on different sets of strategies of discovering primary and secondary intentions of the speakers. That is, the principle "Rely on your real and/or potential addressee" has different ranges of application in different human societies.

For instance, there are differences between modern West-European and Russian interpretive standards concerning the first of rhetoric problems, 'to say or not to say'. That is, human cultures have different standards of explicitness of turn-taking in dialogues and of the speech proper. Thus, in Russia, traditionally an invitation to visit someone must be repeated at least twice, otherwise it is looked at as an ornamental remark. Therefore, if you invite a Russian friend with a single phrase 'Come to see us on Tuesday by 5 o'clock' be not astonished if he or she does not come: missing reiteration and not very much used to Western standards of face-to-face interaction, he or she may simply pass it by without notice.

Implicitness and explicitness are notions which may be defined in the framework of an interpretive theory.

3.1. Rhetoric implicitness

Characterizing a meaning as non-explicit, that is, *implicit* in some utterance or turn-taking, interpreters suppose that there is something in the discourse or in the text which is not deducible from the words alone: it is the interpreter who must discover or sometimes unveil the intended understanding of the utterance in question, where the guileful, insidious, perfidious, crafty, treacherous or just "lazy" or inadvertent speaker wants to conceal the proper meaning from an addressee or from an eavesdropper. Irony and sarcasm may be defined in this way.

Or it may be the case that the speaker him- or herself does not really understand what he or she wanted to say. Cf.:

(1) Lord Caversham: (Turning round, and looking at his son beneath his bushy eyebrows.): Do you always really understand what you say, sir?
Lord Goring: (After some hesitation.): Yes, father, if I listen attentively.
(Oscar Wilde, Ideal Husband)

The main purpose of the speaker may be then, among other things, masking his or her predicament. Cooperation for proper understanding is then quite natural to be expected.

In a word, implicitness is a sign of interpretive unease, a symptom of interpretive dissatisfaction: the interpreter is dissatisfied with the discourse proper,

– laying in some cases the blame on the inarticulateness of the author or
– magnanimously acknowledging one's proper lack of intelligence, or interpretive incompetency, in a different extreme case.

3.2. Rhetoric explicitness

Explicitness, on the other hand, means interpretive satisfaction: an interpreter, or "understander", evaluates something as an explicit sign of something else, if the thing said satisfies all relevant needs for identifying the thing meant. The criteria of interpretive satisfaction, in their turn, are very inconstant and vary from person to person. What may satisfy one addressee may dissatisfy another, more exigent, exacting or fastidious interpreter. You tell someone "Let's meet in Münster", and your conversational partner replies: "Where exactly?" meaning that he or she wants to know certain details in advance.

4. Standards of dialogic explicitness/implicitness

There are scales of standard and sub-standard dialogic explicitness/implicitness techniques varying from culture to culture. There are also differences between cultures not only belonging to different linguistic communities but also to those

which use the same national language. Thus some people take for granted the following piece of advice of Dan Carnegie: "Criticize yourself before others do it". But others follow a different rule: "Do not criticize yourself, let your best friends do it". In between are cases like this. A professor notes that several students are lively discussing something during his lecture. He may remark: 'Sorry to interrupt you sirs, but I disagree with both of you: Borussia is the best team.'

What is looked upon as satisfactory in the framework of one interpretive culture is considered dissatisfactory or inarticulate in another. This scale of variation is one of the empirical objectives for contrastive rhetoric.

Degrees of explicitness standards of certain conversational formulae vary from one conversational culture to another. For instance, you hear *Guten Tag!*, *Guten Abend!*, *Gute Nacht!* and *Guten Morgen!* in German, but the German for the English *Good afternoon!* ("Guten Nachmittag!") is not as often heard in Germany as in the United Kingdom or in the USA. The Russian *zdravstvujte* literally meaning the imperative *Prosper! / Be healthy!* is the most usual formula in Russia, whereas *dobroe utro* ("Good morning!")' etc. are far less frequent if ever used by most of the Russian native speakers. The German *Guten Appetit* may be rendered in many languages, e.g. *Bon appétit* in French, but not in English.

Certain cases of standard explicitness in some cultures may seem over-explicit or even ungrammatical in other cultures.

Take for instance some English constructions with body-parts.

(2) In his hands he was holding a small bird.
* In the hands he was holding a small bird.
They held out their hands.
* They held out the hands.

Russian translations of these sentences with the possessive pronouns 'his' and 'their' sound expletive and non-natural: Russians usually omit the possessive pronouns in such and other similar cases:

(3) *V rukax on derzhal malen'kuju ptichku*
Oni protjanuli ruki.

It looks like the Russian speakers do not even admit the possibility that one can hold out someone else's hands or hold a small bird in someone else's hand. The English, on the contrary, seemingly do admit such extravagant cases, the function of the possessive consists in undermining the assumption that one can operate with the help of someone else's body part such as a hand.

A notable exception to this translation rule are such cases as:

(4) She took him in her arms
* She took him in the arms
Ona prinjala ego v svoi ob`jatija
Ona prinjala ego v ob`jatija

In Russian, both variants are grammatical, although the first one, according to text statistics, sounds somehow more natural.

Moreover, Russian is known for its indiscriminate use of possessive *svoj* denoting all persons at once: 'my', 'your', 'his/her', 'our', and 'their'. Thus rendering sentences such as

I/you/he/she/we/they took him in my/your/his/her/our/their arms,

you may choose between:

– a possessive form *svoi* coreferent with the subject of the sentence denoting indiscriminately all persons:
Ja/ty/on/ona/my/oni prinjali ego v svoi ob`jatija

And

– possessive forms of respective person:
Ja/ty/on/ona/my/oni prinjali ego v moi/tvoi/ego/ee/nashi/vashi/ix ob`jatija.

This kind of variation has been perplexing Russian grammarians from the 18th century on. The first pattern is ascribed to Greek (via Old-Church Slavonic) influence, whereas the indiscriminating use of *svoj*/*svoi* is considered an idiosyncratic feature of Slavic languages.

There are cases, however, where Russian is more explicit than English when body parts are concerned.

Thus, in practically every museum all over the world there are inscriptions like:

Visitors are requested not to touch the exhibits.

The most common Russian equivalent looks like this:

Rukami ne trogat' literally meaning: *Do not touch with hands!*.

Mentioning hands is obligatory in such formulae (although, as usual, no mention of the possessor is present even here). Other variants, such as

(5) *Ne trogat'!*
Ne prikasat'sja!, etc.

meaning *Do not touch!* are grammatically correct but lie outside the genre of museum inscriptions.

5. Conclusions

Conclusions:

1. Standards of explicitness, e.g. of interpretive satisfaction, vary from culture to culture.

2. Different cultures presuppose different degrees of reliance on interpretive skill of the addressee.

3. Interpretive rhetoric measuring efficiency of speech transcends the boundaries of grammar.

4. Certain parts of stylistics lying outside national measures of speech efficiency may belong to universal stylistics.

5. If there are universal laws of speech efficiency, universal rhetoric is possible. Otherwise, we can only investigate national rhetorical rules.

6. My proposal is in between:

I doubt that there are universal measures of speech efficiency: what counts as efficient in one culture may be looked upon as interpretively insufficient in an other.

Therefore, *a priori*, it is doubtful that there are universal rhetorical laws. But as a result of international contacts such measures do arise, growing more and more common as time goes on.

Thus, the laws of Latin rhetoric grew part and parcel of European peoples but not of Chinese culture as yet. Nowadays, we can speak of Euroversal rhetoric but not of universal rhetoric.

7. Comparing different rhetoric means in languages we actually do universal stylistics and not universal rhetoric. Some hundred years later universal rhetoric may become a reality, too.

Inférences évitées

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Nous observons ici certaines prédictions sur l'interprétation, à savoir, un procédé courant dans les stratégies rhétoriques, celui de nier un effet possible de l'argumentation en cours. Si, à un moment donné de la production du discours, le locuteur en arrive à présumer certaines inférences probables mais non désirées chez son interlocuteur, il pourra les thématiser, nier leur pertinence et diriger l'interprétation vers une autre lecture. Cette opération discursive, appelée ici "stratégie des inférences évitées", se fait explicitement ou non.

Nous nous servons d'un schéma communicatif simple pour rendre compte de certaines stratégies indirectes, moins évidentes autrement : on arrivera à un inventaire, provisoire sans doute, d'expressions verbales – traces d'inférences évitées, représentant l'inscription dans la langue de ce sens procédural rhétorique (verbes cognitifs, constructions plus ou moins figées, etc.).

Le corpus de travail est constitué de discours naturels, de textes politiques, philosophiques, électroniques, et d'exemples repris à d'autres linguistes.

1. Thématiser l'interprétation: les verbes cognitifs

Nous voulons d'abord montrer que parler de l'interprétation et des présomptions que font les locuteurs sur les inférences possibles ou réelles du récepteur est chose assez courante. Or, cette thématisation des inférences présumées se fait souvent explicitement et concerne, entre autres:

- la formation d'hypothèses (1.1)
- les difficultés d'interprétation (1.2)

1.1 La formation d'hypothèses

Les expressions littérales ou non littérales thématisent la possibilité de formation d'hypothèses (inférences sur les états mentaux ou sur les représentations).

Pour ce qui est des traces de cette opération, nous avons repéré dans les corpus, tels qu'apparaissent dans les exemples ci-dessous :

a. des verbes ou locutions verbales encodant des effets cognitifs comme, dans les exemples ci-après: *comprendre* (*on a compris que* 1), *laisser supposer* (23), *imaginer* (*j'imagine* 1, 3; *on peut imaginer que* 2; *tu imagines bien* 4), *voir* (*tu vois* 1), *prendre pour* (6), *trouver* (22), *charmer les esprits* (7) ;

b. des verbes cognitifs souvent associés à des expressions de la virtualité:

pouvoir (2, 7), *devoir être* (23) ;

c. des formes de phrase avec le futur (*je dirai que* 5), ou encore

d. des questions rhétoriques (8):

(1) // on arrive aux [/] aux urgences &euh de Cholet // alors / # tout va bien // bon là on est apparemment les seuls patients // il est [/] il est minuit / minuit et demi &euh à ce moment-là // # et [/] &euh # et d'un seul coup on voit les portes s'ouvrir / des brancards qui arrivent / des cris // et en fait *on a compris qu'*il y avait un accident de voiture &euh avec des blessés relativement [/] relativement graves qui [/] qui arrivent // donc là &euh déjà que moi j'allais pas très bien / mais bon / quand on voit les gens arriver en sang etc. / &euh ouh &euh pas extraordinaire comme ambiance //
*THO: ouais *j'imagine*
*BRU: (*tu vois*) un peu l'angoisse // heureusement hum mon amie &euh Delphine était [/] &euh était venue m'accompagner // # donc les [/] très gentiment les [/] # les [/] les [/] les &in [/] un (Coralrom)

(2) Après cette présentation / *on peut imaginer* qu'il [/] l'autre photo là se passe &euh &a [/] quinze jours ou trois semaines après (Coralrom)

(3) euh j'arrivais absolument pas à &euh à [/] à ouvrir l'œil // [...]*THO: < et là *j'imagine* > que tu commences à < en avoir marre un petit peu? > %mul xxx (Coralrom)

(4) on ne redouble plus // # on a le droit de redoubler une fois dans le cycle / c'est-à-dire C.E.2 C.M.1 C.M.2 // # donc *tu imagines bien que* # c'est un peu [/] &euh c'est vraiment la carotte (Coralrom)

(5) Pour ce qui est de la conception que l'Etat a de la participation et de la façon dont il entend la mettre en œuvre, *je dirai qu*'il s'agit d'une réforme organisant les rapports humains, notamment dans les domaines économiques, social et universitaires, de telle sorte que tous les intéressés, sur les sujets qui les concernent directement, prennent part aux études, projets et débats à partir desquels les décisions sont prises par les responsables. (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 9 septembre 1968)

(6) La plupart des lecteurs, superficiels et pressés, *le prendront pour* un livre réactionnaire, au sens le plus actuel et contemporain. En réalité, j'ai voulu y donner un spectacle de forces contrariées dont aucune, pas même le pape qui y joue le rôle principal, pas même Dieu, n'a le champ complètement à elle. (P. Claudel – A. Gide, *Correspondances* 1926:137) (repris à Julia 2001:165)

(7) Ce sont *des idées qui peuvent peut-être charmer quelques esprits*, mais je ne vois pas du tout comment on pourrait les réaliser pratiquement, quand bien même on aurait 6 signatures au bas d'un papier. Y a-t-il une France, une Allemagne, une Italie, une Hollande, une Belgique, un Luxembourg, qui soient prêts à faire, sur une question importante pour eux au point de vue national et au point de vue international, ce qui leur paraîtrait mauvais parce que cela leur serait commandé par d'autres? Est-ce que le peuple français, le peuple allemand, le peuple italien, le peuple hollandais, le peuple belge, le peuple luxembourgeois songeraient à se

soumettre à des lois que voteraient des députés étrangers, dès lors que ces lois iraient à l'encontre de leur volonté profonde? Ce n'est pas vrai: il n'y a pas moyen, à l'heure qu'il est, de faire en sorte qu'une majorité étrangère puisse contraindre des nations récalcitrantes. (PoliText, Ch. De Gaulle 15 mai 1962)

(8) *Y a-t-il* une France, une Allemagne, une Italie, une Hollande, une Belgique, un Luxembourg, qui soient prêts à faire, sur une question importante pour eux au point de vue national et au point de vue international, ce qui leur paraîtrait mauvais parce que cela leur serait commandé par d'autres? *Est-ce que* le peuple français, le peuple allemand, le peuple italien, le peuple hollandais, le peuple belge, le peuple luxembourgeois songeraient à se soumettre à des lois que voteraient des députés étrangers, dès lors que ces lois iraient à l'encontre de leur volonté profonde? *Ce n'est pas vrai* […] (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 15 mai 1962)

1.2 Difficultés d'interprétation

Effectuant en permanence des présomptions sur les effets de leurs discours, les locuteurs en viennent souvent à parler des inférences difficiles, tel en (9) par une expression littérale (*difficultés d'interprétation*), ou, en (10) et (11) respectivement, par des verbes cognitifs (*ce qui m'a le plus étonné, j'ai jamais compris, je flaire pas bien*):

(9) Le gouvernement assurera en Algérie, comme dans la métropole, la possibilité aux candidats de *faire connaître leur profession de foi*. Il n'y a pas de doute là-dessus et les ordres qui ont été donnés à ce sujet sont très nets. Je ne me dissimule pas, ni vous non plus, que dans les circonstances particulières où se trouve encore, hélas! l'Algérie, il puisse y avoir, par-ci par là, certaines *difficultés d'interprétation*. (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 23 octobre 1958)

(10) et *ce qui m'a le plus + étonnée* / # c'est qu'une personne [/] moi j'étais habillée &euh pff ouais normal / # enfin normalement // j'avais un [/] un tee-shirt de la marine nationale / avec l'ancre xxx blanc / avec les deux [/] &euh les deux rayures bleu marine xxx court / un pantalon bleu marine / bon une ceinture quelconque / j'avais pas de bijou ni rien / et j'avais des sandales / et et
%mul: &d
d'ailleurs je m'étais coupée aux pieds / pareil je pense avec le pare-brise // et il y a une personne qui me dit / vous êtes une sœur? # je lui dis / pardon? hhh
%exp: rires (hhh)
il me dit [/] oui vous êtes religieuse? mais [/] et je lui dis / mais non // et ça *j'ai jamais compris pourquoi il m'avait posé cette question* / parce que j'avais enfin / déjà j'étais pas habillée vraiment comme une religieuse / j'avais rien aucune [/] ni image sainte / ni &euh croix / ni &euh dans la voiture / il y avait rien // et je sais pas pourquoi ils m'ont posé cette question // en plus ils savaient que j'étais française / même si je parlais l'arabe / ça se voit quoi // j'ai pas un accent &euh # hyper [/] &euh # hyper bien // # et après # ben ils arrivaient pas à voir que (Coralrom)

(11) j'arrive pas a distinguer ce qui est de l'ordre de ta personnalité (donc d'inchangeable) et ce que je peux considérer comme "de nouvelles resolutions" ... *je flaire pas bien* la mdr! (CFJ: L'amour sur Internet)

Dans le schéma communicatif esquissé ci-dessous, thématiser l'interprétation s'inscrit à la fin du processus de transmission des connaissances [la phase 3].

[1]	[2]	[3]
I/L	Message	I/L
vouloir dire	Mots (gloses)	interprétation (effets/inférences)

Figure 1: *Schéma communicatif*

Mais, dans *le discours sur les interprétations à éviter* – le cas particulier qui nous préoccupe ici –, les locuteurs adoptent des stratégies qui peuvent thématiser chacune des phases de 1 à 3 : [1] thématiser le vouloir dire ; [2] thématiser les mots choisis ; [3] thématiser les effets. Certaines stratégies vont être essentiellement indirectes ([1] et [2]), d'autres directes [3]. Sur le parcours chronologique de ce schéma [1-2-3], nous choisissons d'observer plus loin, d'abord les stratégies indirectes – celles qui thématisent la phase [2] (v. § 1 Parler des mots), ensuite celles qui thématisent la phase [1] et, enfin, celles qui thématisent les effets [3]. Plusieurs catégories vont ici être distinguées : *inférences à éviter, évitées et écartées.* Nos constatations se limitent au corpus observé jusqu'à présent.

2. Parler des mots ou les inférences à éviter

Il s'agit à ce niveau de l'analyse de voir comment, tout en encodant leurs messages, les locuteurs tiennent compte des virtualités significatives des mots qu'ils mettent en discours. Tout en précisant les sens de ces mots, les locuteurs/scripteurs effectuent, indirectement et par métonymie, un travail consistant en la sélection d'une interprétation sur plusieurs possibles.

2.1 'Fixer le sens': gloses méta-discursives

Nos idées se recoupent ici avec le travail effectué par Julia (2001) sur les gloses méta-énonciatives. Le constat général de Julia est que "les gloses jouent un rôle d'orientation de l'interprétation, elles reflètent inévitablement un *imaginaire de la réception*" (102f.). Or, nous tentons ici de voir comment se manifeste le travail méta-discursif et méta-cognitif du locuteur quand il fait un choix lexical et en anticipe les effets. Nous proposons ce schéma afin de rendre compte d'un processus qui va des sens des mots (*s*) – constitutifs, eux, de la mémoire lexico-sémantique des locuteurs – vers la formation des hypothèses (*h*) interprétatives:

Mot polysémique:	s1	→	h1
	s2	→	h2
	s3	→	h3
	…		…
	sn	→	hn

Figure 2: *Processus vers la formation d'hypothèses interprétatives*

Il s'avère effectivement que les locuteurs contrôlent le choix lexical en fonction des inférences que chaque mot peut produire. Or, comme les mots de la langue sont presque tous polysémiques, cette opération se fait souvent accompagner par des précisions de sens: le locuteur 'fixe le sens' par des 'gloses univocisantes', en dirigeant, de la sorte, l'interprétation, et en éliminant les sens/hypothèses indésirables:

> Les gloses qui sélectionnent un sens et en écartent explicitement un autre, montrent [...] que l'activité consistant à poser une convention est simultanément une activité consistant à *contrôler l'interprétation*. Posant conventionnellement une acception, les gloses signalent la plausibilité interprétative d'acceptions autres, en récusant un sens qui est celui dont l'émetteur postule qu'il est convoqué par le contexte.
> (repris à Julia 2001:109; C'est nous qui soulignons)

Cette stratégie communicative est à l'œuvre de façon plus ou moins explicite dans tous les types de discours. Un exemple intéressant et explicitant cette attention des locuteurs vis-à-vis des mots, est repris ci-dessous à Charles de Gaulle:

(12) Sur la scène où paraissent et se mêlent les cortèges de nos soucis et de nos espoirs, *l'idée et le terme de "participation"* sont aujourd'hui passés au premier plan. Comme il est naturel, *cette notion générale donne lieu à des interprétations diverses* suivant les tendances et les situations particulières aux uns et aux autres. Pour ce qui est de la conception que l'Etat a de la participation et de la façon dont il entend la mettre en œuvre, *je dirai qu*'il s'agit d'une réforme organisant les rapports humains, notamment dans les domaines économiques, sociaux et universitaires, de telle sorte que tous les intéressés, sur les sujets qui les concernent directement, prennent part aux études, projets et débats à partir desquels les décisions sont prises par les responsables. (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 9 septembre 1968)

L'exemple (13), en revanche, est tiré d'un ouvrage de philosophie:

(13) il importe que certains mots [...] dont le sémantisme est saturé des acceptions dont l'histoire du savoir les a chargés, soient entendus dans une acception spécifique: [...] un acte libre peut dépendre d'un autre acte libre, (la liaison entre l'un et l'autre ne pouvant pas relever d'une logique de *l'essence*, *ce dernier terme étant pris au sens philosophique courant, non strictement hégélien*).
(G. Marcel, *Journal métaphysique* 1923:40, repris à Julia 2001:100)

L'expression la plus courante et littérale qui introduit ce type d'opération effectuée sur le sens est: *au sens (de)...,* comme en (14) ci-dessous:

(14) Chez Jansénius aussi la manifestation de Dieu se fait par la grâce *surnaturelle* de l'amour (*surnaturelle, au sens janséniste du mot*).
(*Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, T.4, 1920:800, repris à Julia 2001:101)

Quant à la glose *au sens figuré*, elle pose la non-validité d'une interprétation littérale:

(15) Ils en font le médiateur entre le ciel et le peuple, le "fils du ciel". Ce nom désigne l'empereur et sa fonction. Cela veut dire qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une descendance directe et réelle, mais très logiquement *d'une descendance au sens figuré*. Le ciel, qui est le vrai législateur, est par là le père de l'empereur, le créateur de sa dignité impériale.
(A. Doeblin, *Les Pages immortelles de Confucius* 1947:35, repris à Julia 2001:180)

Enfin, quand une interprétation est à éviter, le locuteur procède à l'élimination, explicitement, d'un des sens virtuels du mot:

(16) Il est bien entendu que la croyance dont il s'agit ici est la croyance au sens rigoureux du terme *et non pas* la croyance au sens vague qui n'est que l'approximation de la certitude. (G. Marcel, *Journal philosophique* 1923:75, repris à Julia 2001:109)

2.2 Parler des effets indésirables

Si, d'un côté, avec les gloses lexicales, les locuteurs/scripteurs dirigent l'interprétation de manière indirecte, ils peuvent, d'un autre côté, la rendre explicite, par des commentaires méta-énonciatifs et méta-interprétatifs décrivant les effets possibles et, de façon plus précise, les effets à éviter:

(17) que je sois sûre de vouloir aller avec==>
tournure à éviter si possible... faut toujours préciser de qui on parle "avec lui" avec le garcon" ... etc etc; *sinon ça fais un peu "objet"* ^^'
(CFJ: L'amour sur Internet)

(18) "je sors avec". *y a pas pire comme expression*, enfin selon moi ^^
(CFJ: L'amour sur Internet)

2.3 Mots à remplacer

Une opération de type proche est celle de repousser explicitement certains mots ou expressions, car non conformes à un effet désiré. On l'a déjà vu avec l'exemple 17 *(tournures à éviter).* Avec 19, un autre mot est suggéré à la place du mon à remplacer *(pénible):*

(19) *JUL: &euh est ce qu'il y a quelque chose qui vous gêne dans ce métier?
*EMA: *gêner / c'est pas le mot* // # c'est à dire qu'il y a des périodes où c'est très difficile // # surtout quand &euh on doit s'occuper d'obsèques je dirais &d [/] d'enfant / de jeune // # où là / ça devient très très pénible // # mais sinon / *gêner / c'est pas le mot non // # non* // (Coralrom)

Les opérations sous 2.1-2.3, où les locuteurs parlent des mots, sont toutes des opérations indirectes sur les inférences possibles, car elles concernent la source des effets de sens.

3. Inférences évitées

En nous référerant de nouveau au schéma communicatif de la Figure 1., nous situons les commentaires qui suivent au niveau de la phase [1] – où les locuteurs thématisent le *vouloir dire*, ainsi qu'au niveau de la phase [3] – où les locuteurs parlent directement des *effets possibles, réels ou déjà déclenchés*. Dans ces stratégies, les locuteurs parlent implicitement (3.1.) ou explicitement (3.2.) des inférences *évitées* ou *à éviter.*

3.1 Parler des intentions

Les locuteurs peuvent communiquer indirectement qu'une interprétation est indésirable, en explicitant leur vouloir dire. On est avec ce procédé dans un cas de métonymie actionnelle, le plus souvent introduite par l'expression *cela ne veut pas dire que…*, comme en (20) ci-dessous, ou (28), plus loin:

(20) Nous avons besoin de règles du jeu équilibrées, compréhensibles et qui soient respectées. On ne peut s'engager vers une Europe où seraient taxés les revenus du travail et pas ceux de l'épargne. *Ce qui ne veut pas dire* que l'épargne ne doive pas être moins imposée qu'elle ne l'est aujourd'hui en France tant elle est nécessaire à l'investissement et à la création d'emplois. (PoliText, Mitterrand 27 juillet 1989)

3.2 Parler des effets

Les expressions explicitant les effets cognitifs chez l'interlocuteur peuvent être du type *mais ne croyez pas que…:*

(21) Je l'avais dit avant, je l'ai répété dès 1981 l'immigration clandestine ne doit pas être tolérée: les clandestins qui viennent en France doivent donc s'attendre à être rapatriés ou dirigés sur un pays de leur choix. *Mais ne croyez pas que* nous ayons affaire à une marée humaine, il y a des clandestins et il y en a sans doute trop, si on savait combien, ce ne serait pas tout à fait clandestin.
(PoliText, Mitterrand 10 décembre 1989)

Ce type d'expression, directe, est moins 'préférée', car plus agressive vis-à-vis de l'interlocuteur. C'est ce qui explique le peu d'exemples que nous avons repérés dans notre corpus.

3.3 Marque ‘grammaticalisée’ (la négation pragmatique)

Comme ci-dessus en (21), il y a des séquences négatives qui explicitent et nient à la fois un certain effet. Dans (22) ci-dessous, le locuteur nie explicitement plusieurs inférences déclenchables par le message:

(22) *moi j'ai toujours &euh trouvé qu'*il y a un certain rapport entre le théâtre et la mort /[...]parce que il [/] il y a un danger de mort // et le théâtre / c’est toujours quelque chose qui est dans le simulacre de la mort // *il y a pas de vraie mort // il y a pas de danger de mort // mais* on joue toujours avec &euh les sentiments / les grands sentiments / avec les grandes idées / avec les grands mythes // et on mime la mort [...] le théâtre / # faire du théâtre / *ça ne consiste pas à* faire des choses faciles / faire des choses évidentes // *mais* ça consiste à &euh faire des choses apparemment impossibles // c’est à dire &euh représenter ce qu’on ne peut pas représenter / dire l’indicible // &euh c’est ça / le travail du théâtre (Coralrom)

Dans l’exemple (23), plusieurs verbes d’inférence (*doit être, laisser supposer, penser),* s’accompagnent d’une négation (*pas violents*), et ce qui est nié ce sont justement certaines hypothèses interprétatives que le locuteur pourrait effectuer:

(23) on va s’apercevoir / &euh de la couleur / &euh de ce vin // c’est un Pinot Noir // # &euh *il doit être issu [/] sûrement sur une plaine* / parce que c’est des vins / &euh Côte de Nuits Villages // donc ouais // c’est au niveau de la plaine vers / &euh Nuits-Saint-Georges // # &euh la couleur de ce vin est rouge / &euh &r rouge tuilé / rouge &euh / un rouge / &euh pas franc / parce que on s’aperçoit qu’il y a des [/] # il est trouble un peu // il a une limpidité qui est / # moyenne // # &euh *la couleur / &euh peut laisser supposer* que ce vin est [/] doit être bon à consommer [...] *je pense que* ce vin / il déçoit un petit peu en bouche // il a des tanins / &euh qui [/] qui sont assez [/] *pas violents* / mais assez forts / (Coralrom)

Mais le cas le plus intéressant pour ce genre de négations semble être la négation grammaticalisée *non que… mais…* qui nie un effet implicite: en compagnie d’un verbe à sens affirmatif, cette marque, autrement dite ‘de concession’, aurait un effet de mensonge rhétorique, comme en (24) ci-dessous:

(24) *Non que* je veuille le lui reprocher

repris à Hanse, et glosé comme: “Il ne faut pas croire que je veuille le lui reprocher” et donc “Il ne faut pas le lui reprocher” (Hanse 1991:647). À notre avis, l’énoncé introduit par *non que* communique bien un possible effet, qui est posé, et l’inférence d’un tel énoncé déjà livré à l’interlocuteur, même si niée, communique le contenu propositionnel assertif-présuppositionnel de cet énoncé (*je veux le lui reprocher*), en même temps que la négation de celui-ci: même si nié, “le mal est déjà fait”, et la manipulation réussie; la vérité qui est ainsi posée communique, implicitement, le mensonge de l’énoncé négatif. C’est un cas indéxable moins comme paradoxe logique (cf. démonstration de Hanse), mais plutôt paradoxe pragmatique.

Par contre, accompagnant un verbe nié, comme en (25), *non que* sera constitutif d'une litote et donnera une instruction du type "Je ressens amèrement... ":

(25) En ce seizième anniversaire d'une victoire que la France atteignit à travers un océan de douleurs, mais qui lui rouvrit l'avenir, c'est d'un cœur ferme et confiant que je m'adresse aux Français. *Non que* je ne ressente amèrement, comme vous tous, ce qu'eut d'odieux et de stupide le pronunciamiento perpétré en Algérie. *Mais* je suis sûr que cet incident ne retardera nullement la marche en avant de la France. (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 8 mai 1960)

Il semble bien que la *négation pragmatique* grammaticalisée encodée dans *non que* soit issue d'un processus de pragmatisation, via une inférence invitée généralisée, d'un emploi véric onditionnel. Le schéma de ce procédé rhétorique pourrait bien être:

emploi véric onditionnel >	emploi non véric onditionnel (intersubjectif et argumentatif) de la négation

Figure 3 : *Pragmatisation de la négation*

Cette hypothèse rencontre la théorie de la pragmatisation chez Traugott (2005), reprise à Traugott et Dasher 2005:40):

truth conditional	>	non-truth-conditional		
nonsubjective	>	subjective	>	intersubjective
content	>	content/procedural	>	procedural

Figure 4 : *La théorie de la pragmatisation de Traugott & Dasher*

Ce cas de figure montre bien l'inscription d'une stratégie argumentative dans la langue, avec, comme marqueur de procédure, la locution conjonctive *non que*.

4. Interprétations écartées

D'autres fois, les locuteurs mettent en mots tout un processus inférentiel, avec l'explicitation et, dans un deuxième temps, l'écartement d'une interprétation déjà produite chez certains, comme en (26) ci-dessous; c'est une stratégie très efficace chez les grands orateurs:

(26) Pour commencer, je vous demande, oui, je vous demande instamment d'assurer un succès triomphal à l'emprunt que nous allons ouvrir, première étape de notre redressement, première preuve de confiance nationale que vous vous donnerez à vous-mêmes, et, permettez-moi de le dire, que vous m'accorderez à moi, qui en ai tant et tant besoin. *"Tout cela, n'est-ce pas trop pour nous"?*, murmurent ceux qui, à

force de croire que rien ne peut réussir, finissent par le désirer, ceux qui ont pour secrète devise celle de Méphistophélès, démon disert des désespoirs: "Je suis l'esprit qui nie tout". *Non. Ce n'est pas trop pour la France*, pour ce pays merveilleux qui, en dépit de ses épreuves passées et du désordre de ses affaires d'Etat, trouve moyen d'avoir dans son jeu tous les éléments d'un extraordinaire renouveau. (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 13 juin 1958)

Pour ce type de stratégie, il y a aussi des marqueurs du type *ce n'est pas parce que... que...*:

(27) *Ce n'est pas parce qu'*on fait tirer des coups de fusil *qu'on a le droit d*'en disposer. (PoliText, Ch de Gaulle 23 octobre 1958)

où tout un scénario est, dans un premier temps invoqué, ensuite repoussé. Enfin, écarter une inférence se fait également par la négation d'un dire (*je vous ai jamais dit que...*):

(28) [/] je sais que ça ne vous intéresse pas beaucoup / # < mais si je suis là / c'est parce que moi ça m'intéresse // >
*MAR: < *mais si* / ça m'intéresse // > *mais j'ai [/] je (vous) ai jamais dit que ça m'intéressait pas* // on est concerné par les problèmes du quartier // (Coralrom)

Pour ces derniers exemples, il semble bien que ce sont des inférences déjà effectuées qui sont écartées.

5. Procédés complexes

Il est clair que les procédés que nous venons de mentionner se combinent très souvent et que le résultat en sont des stratégies bien complexes. Nous en avons recensé quelques-unes ci-dessous.

5.1 Hypothèses en cascade

Plusieurs hypothèses sur les effets des dires peuvent être posées ou, au contraire, repoussées dans la production du discours. Les effets cognitifs et persuasifs d'une telle stratégie peuvent se mesurer dans l'exemple (29), un extrait de discours politique:

(29) *La France unie, cela n'a jamais voulu dire la France confuse. Cela n'a jamais voulu dire* la France monotone, *cela n'a jamais voulu dire* la France sans groupes politiques ou sans partis qui ont pour charge, au fond, de s'affirmer eux-mêmes en critiquant les autres. Ne retombons pas dans des naïvetés ou dans des slogans. *Est-ce que cela veut dire tout simplement*, cette campagne, qu'il n'y aura de véritable ouverture que le jour où les socialistes auront fait un pacte de gouvernement avec les centristes en rejetant les autres, en changeant d'alliance? *Si c'est ce que cela veut dire – et j'ai bien l'impression que c'est ce que cela veut dire* – alors non. Est-ce clair? *Cela ne veut pas dire cela. Cela veut dire* que nous ne trahirons pas ce

pourquoi nous avons été choisis par le peuple, puisque, après tout, nous avons la majorité. (PoliText, Mitterrand 12 février 1989)

5.2 Interprétation explicitant le vouloir dire + litote + question rhétorique

Un autre procédé combine, en une seule stratégie, l'expression du vouloir dire avec une litote et une question rhétorique apportant la conclusion:

(30) Il est vrai qu'après la guerre de 1914-1918, celui qui était le chef de la France à l'époque, Georges Clemenceau, voyant revenir ces combattants qui avaient encore une fois sauvé le pays sur les champs de bataille, sous les ordres des maréchaux Joffre, Foch et Pétain, Clemenceau disait: "Ils ont des droits sur nous". *Je suis sûr que ce que Clemenceau voulait dire* c'était que ces combattants avaient le droit de nous donner, demain comme hier, l'exemple.
[…] L'année dernière, au mois de décembre, la question s'est posée d'une manière aiguë. Nous avons eu beaucoup de mal à rétablir l'équilibre de nos finances, vous le savez bien. A ce moment-là, il fallait réduire le déficit à tout prix, sous peine de ne jamais plus sortir de l'inflation, c'est-à-dire d'aller à la catastrophe. Alors, nous l'avons fait. Pour le faire, il a fallu tailler dans tous les postes du budget. S'est présenté le budget des anciens combattants et des victimes de la guerre: il atteignait et il atteint encore 320 milliards. Naturellement il ne s'agissait pas d'enlever un sou aux veuves, aux mutilés, aux orphelins. Sur les 320 milliards on en a retiré 7 et on les a retirés à ceux qui n'en avaient pas besoin parce qu'ils n'étaient pas économiquement faibles et qu'ils étaient en outre valides. *Je ne dis pas que c'était très drôle*. Ce n'était drôle pour personne et en particulier pas pour celui qui vous parle, mais c'était vraiment une nécessité. […] Français d'Algérie, *comment pouvez-vous écouter les menteurs et les conspirateurs qui vous disent* qu'en accordant le libre choix aux Algériens, la France et De Gaulle veulent vous abandonner, se retirer d'Algérie et la livrer à la rébellion? Est-ce donc vous abandonner, est-ce vouloir perdre l'Algérie que d'y envoyer et d'y maintenir une armée de 500000 hommes, pourvue d'un matériel énorme, d'y consentir le sacrifice d'un bon nombre de ses enfants, d'y entreprendre une œuvre immense de mise en valeur, de tirer du Sahara, à grands efforts et à grands frais, le pétrole et le gaz pour les amener jusqu'à la mer? (PoliText, Ch. de Gaulle 10 novembre 1959)

5.3 Stratégies dialogales

Une stratégie dialogale consiste, pour le locuteur, à poser une hypothèse que l'interlocuteur va écarter, comme dans (31) ci-dessous:

(31) Question – Quand vous dites "je ne vais pas redire", *il n'y a pas de fossé entre le candidat et l'homme de pouvoir?*
Le président – *Quel fossé pourrait-il y avoir?* Je suis engagé devant le pays, devant notre peuple, il m'a élu, je m'efforce d'exécuter ce que j'ai annoncé. (PoliText, Mitterrand 14 juillet 1988)

5.4 Ajustements d'hypothèses

Dans d'autres cas, une interprétation est écartée par le locuteur même, pour être tout de suite corrigée par un autre énoncé, car il juge son l'interprétation indésirable. Dans l'exemple (32), Mitterrand repousse une thèse (*Max Theret n'est pas du cercle de mes amis*) et veut, tout de suite après, corriger les effets possibles de cette assertion. Il le fait littéralement en (32), par *mais je corrige aussitôt car je ne veux pas que mes paroles puissent peser sur lui*:

(32) [...] il a été crié partout: "*l'ami de François MITTERRAND*". Cela ne me gène pas mais il faut être clair et je veux être scrupuleux: *Max THERET n'est pas du cercle de mes amis*. C'est comme cela. Même pas de mes relations. Je ne sais pas où il habite, quelle est sa famille, je n'ai jamais pris de repas dans ma vie avec lui, je l'ai rencontré deux ou trois fois avec d'autres, *mais je corrige aussitôt car je ne veux pas que mes paroles puissent peser sur lui*: ceux que je connais et qui le fréquentent ont de l'estime et de la confiance pour lui. Je n'ai pas d'autre jugement à faire. C'est au juge d'instruction maintenant d'apprécier. (PoliText, Mitterrand 12 février 1989)

6. Conclusions

Nous avons voulu montrer qu'il y a plusieurs expressions dans les langues – traces de stratégies pour faire éviter aux interlocuteurs des inférences non voulues. D'autres se sont grammaticalisées en marqueurs 'concessifs' du type *non que…*, impliquant la subjectivité du locuteur (et glosables par: *je ne veux pas dire que, ce n'est pas ce que je veux dire*), ou communiquant des présomptions sur les croyances auxquelles aurait pu aboutir l'autre (et glosables par: *n'allez pas croire que, ne pensez/n'imaginez surtout pas que,…).* Une possible "grammaire" de cette activité communicative semble ainsi prendre contour, contenant des expressions verbales plus ou moins figées. Certaines expressions, plus ou moins directes, se confondent avec les gloses lexicales méta-énonciatives et communiquent, indirectement, la 'bonne' lecture à faire.

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Emotionen – Ausdruck gesellschaftlicher Beredsamkeit?

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Gefühle sind essentieller Bestandteil des Menschseins. In nachfolgendem Artikel wird deshalb ein Überblick gegeben, wie Menschen ihre Gefühle rhetorisch gesehen "zur Sprache bringen". Zeitgeschichtlich wichtige Epochen wie die Antike aber auch der Humanismus werden dabei im Vordergrund der Analyse stehen. So sind unsere Gewährsmänner unter anderem Cicero, Aristoteles und Baldassare Castiglione mit seinem *Hofmann*. Die zentrale Fragestellung wird dabei lauten, wie Gefühle und rationale Argumentation miteinander verbunden werden, und welche Rolle das *ethos* und *pathos* einnehmen. Es zeigt sich, dass wir es mit einem Umschwung zu tun haben: In der Antike war die praktische Anwendung wichtig, während im Humanismus die Komponente der Ästhetik eine eminente Rolle zukommt. Ein aktueller Interview-ausschnitt wird verdeutlichen, dass auch heutzutage das Zusammenspiel von Gefühlen, rationaler Argumentation und Ästhetik nach wie vor präsent ist, wenn es darum geht, sich in unserer heutigen "Stylinggesellschaft" zurechtzufinden.

1. Gefühle als essentieller Bestandteil des Menschseins

Die Thematik der Emotionen kann sicherlich als ein Gebiet angesehen werden, welches die Menschheit durch ihre gesamte Geschichte begleitete. Ob es sich dabei um Zorn, Wut, Rache oder aber um Enttäuschung, Verletzlichkeit oder Liebe handelt, Gefühle hatte der Mensch immer und musste sich immer mit ihnen auseinandersetzen; in der Antike wie auch heute hat sich daran nichts geändert. Gefühle und Emotionen sind da und müssen auf irgendeine Weise verarbeitet werden.

Somit zählt die Gefühlswelt zu einem essentiellen Bestandteil des Menschseins. Und gerade diese Eigenschaft ist es, welche mich dazu veranlasste, die Emotionen etwas genauer zu analysieren. Doch dies allein wird nicht genügen; den Menschen zeichnet nämlich, wie wir mindestens seit Platon wissen, noch etwas anderes aus: seine Sprache. "Perfekt", könnte man meinen, denn so kann der Mensch seine Gefühle im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes "zur Sprache bringen". Doch darum soll es uns hier nicht gehen. Unsere Perspektive soll eine etwas andere sein: Wir wollen nicht nur fragen, wie sich der Mensch seiner Gefühle bedient, um sich anderen mitzuteilen; wir wollen vielmehr fragen, wie er es dank seiner Gefühle schafft, überzeugend zu sein. Dabei wird sich herausstellen, dass mit Rhetorik auch immer Persuasion verbunden ist, jedoch geht es nicht um eine logische, berechnende, und damit gefühlsarme Argumentation, sondern es geht darum, Persuasion mittels des Zusammenspiels von Logik *und* Emotionen zu erreichen.

Wie oben angedeutet, sind Emotionen ständiger Begleiter des Menschen. Aus diesem Grund wollen wir uns auch fragen, wie Emotionen und Rhetorik in zwei wichtigen zeitgeschichtlichen Epochen gehandhabt wurden: der Antike und dem Humanismus. Gerade dies scheinen Zeitabschnitte zu sein, wie sie vielleicht unterschiedlicher nicht sein könnten: hier die antike *polis*, dort italienische Nationalstaaten, hier Götterglauben, dort der Glaube an den menschlichen Fortschritt. Für die Antike sollen deren Hauptvertreter Aristoteles, Cicero und Quintilian zu Wort kommen. Aus der Epoche des Humanismus wird uns speziell das Werk *Der Hofmann* von Baldassare Castiglione interessieren.

Auch wenn die Weltsicht sich gewandelt hat, so werden wir doch auch sehen können, dass es einige Parallelen zu ziehen gibt. Die Menschen mögen sich gewandelt haben, doch haben dies die Gefühle auch getan? Vor allem: Welches Gewicht wird den Emotionen in Bezug auf die Überzeugung zugemessen? Anders formuliert: Welche Strategien verfolgten die Griechen und Römer, um überzeugend zu wirken? Und welche Methoden wandten die Humanisten an, um ebenso überzeugen zu können? Welchen Nutzen sahen die jeweiligen Bevölkerungen in der Fähigkeit, Gefühle hervorzurufen?

Dies sollen nur einige Grundfragen sein, welche wir im Laufe dieses Artikels zu klären versuchen. Ein Ausblick auf unsere heutige Gesellschaft, deren Verständnis von Überzeugung, aber auch deren Umgang mit Gefühlen soll es des weiteren ermöglichen, zu erkennen, wie der Gefühlsausdruck sich ändern kann, die Wichtigkeit der emotionalen Argumentation jedoch immer eine Rolle spielen wird.

2. *Ethos* und *pathos* im Vergleich bei Aristoteles und Cicero

Möchte man die Antike und ihre Konzeption von emotionaler Einflussnahme besser verstehen, sind zwei Begriffe unerlässlich: *ethos* und *pathos*. Was genau darunter verstanden wird, beziehungsweise, wie sich die Griechen und Römer des *ethos* und des *pathos* bedienten, um rednerisch Erfolg zu haben, werden wir nun sehen.

Bevor jedoch auf einzelne Autoren eingegangen werden soll, einige allgemeine Bemerkungen vorab:

Unbestritten ist die Wichtigkeit der Affektenlehre, die, neben der Argumentations- und Stillehre, eine Schlüsselposition in der Rhetorik einnimmt: “Die Lehre von den Affekten, ihrer Beschaffenheit, Wirkungsweise und dem funktionalen Einsatz für die Absichten des Redners gehört neben der Argumentationstheorie und Stilistik zu den Kernteilen der Rhetorik“ (Wisse 1992:218).

Die Unterscheidung zwischen *ethos* und *pathos* wird oft anhand eines Intensitätsgrades getroffen. So versetzt das *pathos* die Seele regelrecht in Aufruhr (adfectus concitatus) und stachelt sie an, während das *ethos* einer “sanfte[n] und wohlgeordnete[n] Stimmung“ (adfectus mitis atque compositus) gleichkommt

(Wisse 1992:218; cf. Quintilian 1995:VI,8f.). Dass es sich jedoch beim *ethos* nicht unbedingt um eine *Stimmung* handeln muss, sondern damit auch der Charakter des Redners gemeint sein kann, wird uns in den Ausführungen von Aristoteles gleich noch beschäftigen. An dieser Stelle sei noch darauf hingewiesen, dass in Griechenland, mehr vielleicht aber noch in Rom, die Affekte weniger in der Theorie als vielmehr in der Praxis eine wichtige Rolle spielten. Das bedeutet, vor allem der *actio* kam so ein entscheidender Beitrag zum Erfolg der Rede zu.

Bei Aristoteles in seiner *Rhetorik* werden *ethos* und *pathos* unter den von ihm neu bestimmten Aufgaben des Redners (*officia oratoris*) behandelt (Aristoteles 1995:I, 2,1). Entscheidend bei dieser Einteilung in Finden und Erfinden des Stoffes (*inventio*), Anordnen des Stoffes (*dispositio*) und sprachlicher Ausdruck (*elocutio*) ist für uns vor allem die *inventio*. Dieses Stadium unterteilt Aristoteles weiter in so genannte *písteis* (Überzeugungsmittel). Diese können sowohl technischer als auch nicht-technischer Natur sein. Unter die technischen Überzeugungsmittel subsumiert Aristoteles die rationale Argumentation, *ethos* und *pathos*. Dies bedeutet, die *ethos*/*pathos*-Argumentation wird somit eindeutig auf die gleiche Stufe mit der rationalen Argumentation gestellt. Und nicht nur das: Die Affektenlehre wird zudem als eigenständiger Parameter angesehen. *Ethos* und *pathos* erfahren bei Aristoteles eine andere Einteilung als die oben erwähnte, bei der der entscheidende Faktor der Intensitätsgrad ist. *Ethos* steht bei ihm für die Charakterdarstellung des Redners, während mit *pathos* die Affekte bezeichnet werden, und zwar alle Affekte, sowohl die starken als auch die schwachen. Das *ethos* wird hier aufgefasst als eine Charakterdarstellung, welche als solche nicht unbedingt mit den Affekten verbunden werden muss, da es um die Glaubwürdigkeit geht oder, wie Jakob Wisse es ausdrückt, um ein "rationales" *ethos* (Wisse 1992:220). Durch diese "Rationalisierung" des *ethos* und somit der Absprache zu Verbindungen mit Affekten (also dem *pathos*) scheint hier ein Graben zwischen diesen beiden Arten der Überzeugungsmittel gezogen zu werden, wie er bei Cicero oder auch bei Quintilian in dieser Deutlichkeit nicht mehr auftreten wird. Das heißt, bei Aristoteles wird, nach William Fortenbaugh, unterschieden zwischen der "Affekterregung" und dem "ethische[n] Überzeugungsmittel" (Fortenbaugh 1994:1521). Denn das Publikum behält, auch wenn es den Redner für tugendhaft hält, trotzdem seine Fähigkeit einer unparteiischen Meinungsbildung (Fortenbaugh 1994:1521). Und so kommt Fortenbaugh zu dem Schluss: "Also konnte Aristoteles die Affekterregung und das ethische Überzeugungsmittel als gleichgeordnete Überzeugungsgründe behandeln, ohne deren Grenzen zu verwischen oder dadurch Verwirrung zu stiften" (Fortenbaugh 1994:1521).

Bei Cicero und Quintilian dagegen ist die Einteilung anders. Bei ihnen geht es eben um die Intensität; *ethos* und *pathos* sind gewissermassen beides Affekte, jedoch unterschiedlich stark bzw. schwach.

Betrachtet man jedoch den Überzeugungsprozess als ein Ganzes, der sich aus den drei Komponenten Redner, Zuhörer und Rede zusammensetzt, so werden wir auch bei Aristoteles feststellen können, dass es sich bei der Unterscheidung in *ethos* und *pathos* nicht wirklich um eine Trennung handelt, sondern vielmehr um ein Wechselspiel. Ein Wechselspiel, bei dem jeweils verschiedene Perspektiven in den Vordergrund gerückt werden, ohne dass die anderen Komponenten somit unwichtig werden würden.

Betrachten wir dazu eine einschlägige Stelle bei Aristoteles:

> Durch den C h a r a k t e r [erfolgt die Persuasion], wenn die Rede so gehalten wird, daß sie
>
> den Redner glaubhaft macht; denn den Tugendhaften glauben wir lieber und schneller- im allgemeinen schlechthin-, ganz besonders aber da, wo keine letzte Gewißheit ist, sondern Zweifel herrscht.
>
> Durch den Z u h ö r e r schließlich [erfolgt die Persuasion], wenn sie durch die Rede in Affekt versetzt werden; denn wir geben unser Urteil nicht in gleicher Weise ab, wenn wir traurig bzw. freudig sind oder wenn wir lieben bzw. hassen (Aristoteles 1995:I, 2,4-5).

Im ersten Zitat, wo es um das *ethos* des Redners geht, steht dieser eindeutig im Mittelpunkt: Der Redner ist derjenige, der sich durch Werte wie Weisheit (*phrónesis*), *arete* (sittliche Integrität; Tugend) und Wohlwollen (*eúnoia*) glaubwürdig zeigen soll. Doch letztens Endes erfolgt die Persuasion nur dann, wenn auch der Zuhörer von dieser Tugendhaftigkeit des Redners überzeugt ist.

Und auch im zweiten Zitat geht es um ein Zusammenspiel. So trägt sicherlich das *pathos* dazu bei, den Zuhörer in eine entsprechende, dem Redner wohlwollende Stimmung zu versetzen, doch um eine ebensolche beim Zuhörer zu erreichen, muss der Redner selbst die Affekte, die er in anderen hervorrufen will, verspüren. Auch wenn alles vom Zuhörer abzuhängen scheint, so hat der Redner demnach einen wichtigen Part dabei zu erfüllen.

Diese Interrelation zwischen Redner, Zuhörer und Rede finden wir schließlich auch in dem Organon-Modell von Karl Bühler. Schon Jakob Wisse verwies in seinem Buch *Ethos and pathos −from Aristotle to Cicero* darauf. Seiner Meinung nach kann dieses Modell genutzt werden, um das Funktionieren der antiken Rhetorik zu erklären (Wisse 1989:6).

Bei Bühlers Zeichenmodell, welches er in dem Werk *Sprachtheorie* entwickelt (Bühler 1982:28f.), haben wir es mit den Komponenten Sender, Empfänger und Sache zu tun. Liegt das Augenmerk auf dem Sender, so spricht Bühler von der "Appellfunktion"; der Perspektivenwechsel zum Empfänger bringt den Wechsel der Appellfunktion zur "Ausdrucksfunktion", und wenn der Sachverhalt in den Mittelpunkt rückt, handelt es sich um die "Darstellungsfunktion". Bühler, wie er selbst betont, geht es mit seinem Modell darum, zu zeigen, dass die Sprache als ein Organon aufgefasst werden kann, wie dies auch schon Platon machte: "Ich denke, es war ein guter Griff Platons, wenn er im

Kratylos angibt, die Sprache sei ein *organum*, um einer dem andern etwas mitzuteilen über Dinge“ (Bühler 1982:24). Das bedeutet, in erster Linie ist für Bühler der Aspekt der Sprache interessant, welcher uns diese als Instrumentarium bzw. Werkzeug auffassen lässt, mit dem jemandem etwas über einen Sachverhalt mitgeteilt wird. Bei ihm kommt also noch nicht zur Sprache, *wie* etwas mitgeteilt wird, sondern Bühler ist wichtig, zu zeigen, *dass* etwas mitgeteilt werden kann. Auch wenn Wisse dieses Modell für ausreichend hält, so halte ich es für sinnvoll, doch das Kommunikationsmodell von Roman Jakobson hinzuzufügen, um zu zeigen, dass mit diesem die Verbindung zwischen der aristotelischen Auffassung besser zum Tragen kommt als mit einem Vergleich zwischen Bühler und Aristoteles.[1] Laut Jakobson sind bei der Kommunikation, außer den von Bühler schon genannten Funktionen, noch zwei weitere von Bedeutung: zum einen die phatische und zum anderen die poetische Funktion. Mit der phatischen Funktion ist ein sogenanntes Kontakthalten zwischen Sender und Empfänger gemeint; so zum Beispiel die Vergewisserung durch ein fragendes *Hallo?,* ob der Gesprächspartner auch noch am Telefon ist. In unserem Zusammenhang ist jedoch die poetische Funktion von entscheidender Bedeutung. Sie bezieht sich nämlich auf den *code*, auf die Sprache an sich, und es geht genau darum, *wie* etwas dem anderen mitgeteilt wird.

Kehren wir vor diesem Hintergrund nun nochmals zu den aristotelischen Überzeugungsmitteln zurück, so lässt sich auch hier sagen, dass das Entscheidende bei der Überzeugung ebenfalls auf dem *wie* liegt. Sicherlich kommt es auch darauf an, *was* mitgeteilt wird (es sollte kein Unsinn sein), aber an erster Stelle steht auch hier das *wie*: Grundlegend ist, *wie* der Redner sich selbst präsentiert (*ethos*), *wie* der Zuhörer in Affekt versetzt wird (*pathos*) und schließlich *wie* der Sachverhalt dargestellt wird (*actio*: Intonation, Gestik, Mimik). Wenn es auch den Anschein haben mag, dass durch dieses *wie* der Redner wiederum in den Vordergrund tritt, so soll dies jedoch eben nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, wie wichtig eben auch die Rede an sich ist, welche selbstverständlich nur durch den Redner ihre volle Wirkung entfalten kann.

Kommen wir wieder auf die Frage nach der Rolle des *ethos* und des *pathos* zurück, so lässt sich an dem Gesagten gut demonstrieren, wie wichtig die Verbindung sowohl des *ethos* als auch des *pathos* vor allem mit der *actio* aber auch mit den anderen Produktionsstadien der Rede ist. So wird sich ein tugendhafter Redner nur wirklich als tugendhaft erweisen, wenn er die richtigen Beispiele anbringt *(dispositio, elocutio*), oder wenn er fähig ist, sich selbst in einen solch traurigen Seelenzustand zu versetzen, dass der Zuhörer automatisch ebenfalls ergriffen wird. Dies gelingt ihm über die Mittel der *actio* wie der Gestik etc. Vorausschauend soll hier erwähnt werden, dass besonders Cicero schöne Beispiele dafür liefert, wie der Zuhörer durch die *actio* des Redners vollständig erfasst und somit beeinflusst werden kann. Sicherlich spielen dabei

[1] Jakob Wisse hält das Modell von Jakobson für zu kompliziert, was für Wisses Intentionen sicher auch nachvollziehbar ist (vgl. Wisse 1989:6).

psychologische Vorgänge auch eine wichtige Rolle, auf die jedoch in diesem Artikel nicht näher eingegangen werden kann. Ebenso werden bei Cicero die so genannten nicht-technischen Beweismittel (ein blutiger Umhang, eine Leiche) häufig gebraucht, um den Zuschauer in die entsprechende Stimmung zu versetzen. Es bleibt anzumerken, dass auch hier das komplexe Wechselspiel mit den anderen Arten an Beweismitteln beachtet werden sollte.

Aristoteles geht es ebenfalls um die Beeinflussung seines Publikums. Die Affekte werden bei ihm in eine Kategorie gefasst, da sie beide zu einer Urteilsänderung führen können, beide das gleiche Ergebnis haben; es geht also nicht um die die Frage nach Graden von Affekten.

Doch auch bei Aristoteles finden wir nicht nur den technischen Teil, sondern ebenso eine Verbindung zur Psychologie, wie die detaillierte Analyse von fünfzehn Affekten in seiner *Rhetorik* zeigt. Wisse führt diesen Gedanken Aristoteles auf Platons *Phaidros* zurück, in dem gefordert wird, dass eine wirklich technische Rhetorik sich auch auf psychologische Kenntnisse stützen muss:

> Sokrates (zu Phaidros): Da die Kunst der Rede nun einmal Seelenführung ist, so muß, wer Redner werden will, notwendig wissen, wieviel Arten die Seele hat. Deren gibt es nun soundso viele, soundso beschaffene, woher denn die Menschen sich einige so, andere so entwickeln. Sind diese nun so utnerschienden, so gibt es auch wieder soundso viele Arten von Reden, jede in ihrer Eigenheit. Nun sind die Menschen solcher Art durch so beschaffene Reden aus solcher Ursache zu solchen Zwecken leicht zu überreden, die anderen aber aus anderen Gründen schwer (Platon 1988:271b56).

In einem seiner Hauptartikel spricht Friedrich Solmsen ebenfalls von dieser Verbindung zwischen Psychologie und Rhetorik (Solmsen 1941:35-50). Seiner Meinung nach ist gerade diese Verbindung das Verdienst Aristoteles', welche besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient:

> Aristoteles' innovation consists not only in his granting to *ethos* and *pathos* a status on par with the arguments and thereby elevating them to first-rate factors but also in his careful analysis of the nature of the various emotions and of the conditions under which they may be either arroused or allayed (Solmsen 1941:42).

Bekommen wir von Aristoteles psychologische Einblicke in das Funktionieren der Affekte, so werden wir auch bei Cicero diese nicht missen. Haben wir bei Aristoteles trotz allem eine gewisse "Rationalisierung" immer im Hinterkopf (Glaubwürdigkeit steht an oberster Stelle) so verlassen wir mit Cicero diese Ebene und gelangen zur Praxis. Bei dieser wird es darum gehen, die Herzen (und somit die Seele) des Zuhörers zu erreichen.

Bevor wir auf weiter auf Ciceros Auffassung eingehen, sollte betont werden, dass es ihm hauptsächlich um die Gerichtsrede (*genus iudiciale*) geht (Fortenbaugh 1994:1522). Das ist insofern von Bedeutung, als nicht so sehr die Werte der aristotelischen Trias angesprochen werden, als vielmehr der Stil des Redners in den Vordergrund rückt (Fortenbaugh 1994:1522):

> Es ist also von großem Wert für den Erfolg, daß man die Sitten und Gepflogenheiten, die Taten und die Lebensführung derer, die den Fall vertreten, sowie ihrer Klienten anerkennt und demenstprechend die der Gegenseite verwirft, daß man die Herzen des Publikums für eine möglichst wohlwollende Einstellung sowohl dem Redner als auch ganz besonders dem Klienten des Redners gegenüber zu gewinnen weiß. Gewinnen aber lassen sich die Herzen durch die Würde eines Menschen, seine Taten und das Urteil über seine Lebensführung. […] diesen Eindruck unterstützen bei dem Redner eine sanfte Stimme, ein schüchterner Gesichtsausdruck und eine liebenswürdige Ausdrucksweise. […] Anzeichen von Umgänglichkeit und von Großzügigkeit, von Sanftmut und Anhänglichkeit, von Dankbarkeit und Bescheidenheit zu zeigen, ist sehr nützlich. Alles, was für rechtschaffene und schlichte Charaktere ohne Ungestüm, Hartnäckigkeit, Streitsucht und Härte typisch ist, gewinnt die Sympathie in hohem Maße und entzieht sie denen, bei denen diese Eigenschaften nicht vorhanden sind. Deswegen gilt es umgekehrt, der Gegenseite die entsprechenden Nachteile anzulasten. Doch diese ganze Art der Rede zeigt sich besonders in den Fällen überlegen, bei denen sich die Leidenschaft des Richters nicht durch ungestüme, besonders heftige Erregung entzünden kann. Nicht immer ist ja ein energischer Charakter der Rede angezeigt, vielmehr ist es oft ein gefälliger, verhaltener und sanfter Stil, der die Betroffenen am ehesten empfiehlt (Cicero 1981:II, 182f.).

Cicero verbindet somit das *ethos* nicht nur mit dem Charakter des Redners, sondern ordnet ihm gleichzeitig eine Stilebene zu: er empfiehlt das *genus medium*, die mittlere Stilart. Mit den Worten Jakobsons, geht es also gerade um den *code*, aber eben auch um die *actio*, in der die Stimmführung inbegriffen ist.
Wisse spricht bei Cicero auch vom sogenannten "Sympathieethos" (Wisse 1989:33), denn durch die leichten Affekte bzw. die günstige Selbstdarstellung kann man Sympathie gewinnen.[2] Aufrühren und erregen jedoch gelingt nur durch *pathos*, dazu wären die leichten Affekte zu schwach. Die heftigen Affekte behandelt Cicero schließlich unter der Kategorie des *pathos*.

Wie Wisse bemerkt handelt es sich nicht um eine Überlappung der beiden Affektbegriffe (Wisse 1992:221). Andererseits sollte jedoch angemerkt werden, dass der Begriff des *ethos* gewissermaßen eine Erweiterung erfahren hat: Er bleibt nicht, wie noch bei Aristoteles, auf die Kategorie des Charakters beschränkt sondern inbegriffen wird nun auch die Kategorie der Affekte (auch, wenn es nur die leichten sind). Damit verlagert sich das Verhältnis zwischen *ethos* und *pathos*, denn bei Aristoteles haben wir es, nach Wisse, mit einem ‚komplementären' Verhältnis zu tun: *ethos* als Charakterdarstellung und *pathos* als Affektdarstellung (Wisse 1992:221). Bei Cicero hingegen verschiebt sich das Verhältnis, denn die Affekte sind einerseits im *ethos*, andererseits aber auch im *pathos* subsumiert. Hieraus läßt sich gut erschließen, was Fortenbaugh mit folgenden Worten ausdrückte:

[2] Schon der Begriff des "Sympathieethos" gegenüber dem "rationalen Ethos" von Aristoteles zeigt eine Verschiebung der Perspektiven: Beim "rationalen Ethos" geht es eindeutig um den Redner (entspräche Bühlers ‚Sender'), während das "Sympathieethos" auf das Publikum (entspräche Bühlers ‚Empfänger') abzielt. Dies sehen wir gleich auch noch bei Fortenbaugh.

> In Bezug auf die Zweckbestimmung des Ethos weicht Cicero ebenfalls von Aristoteles' Ansatz ab. Cicero versteht das Ethos als Mittel, die Gunst des Publikums zu erwerben (*benevolentiam conciliare*), für den Redner wie für seinen Klienten. Das erreiche man zum Teil dadurch, daß man sich behutsam ausdrücke, was wiederum nach Ciceros Vorstellung eine milde Affekt-Reaktion seitens des Publikums erzeuge. Auch hier liegt ein starker Kontrast zu Aristoteles' Standpunkt. Dieser macht nämlich die Glaubwürdigkeit zum Ziel ethischer Überzeugung, während für Cicero der Redner auf die Erregung positiver Affekte seitens des Publikums abzielt. Folglich wird die aristotelische Unterscheidung zwischen Ethos und Affekterregung als Überzeugungsmittel hinfällig (Fortenbaugh 1994:1523).

Spricht Aristoteles von den Überzeugungsmitteln, so scheint er dabei immer die "Rednerperspektive" im Blick zu haben. Das bedeutet, das *ethos* wird bei Aristoteles dadurch zu einem Überzeugungsmittel, da es der Redner schafft, sich überzeugend darzustellen. Für Cicero hingegen ist nicht nur der Redner wichtig, ihm geht es gerade um das Vermögen, im anderen etwas zu erregen. Das heißt, das Ziel ist das Publikum, und der Redner in dem Fall nur das Instrument.[3]

Fassen wir also die beiden Kontrastpunkte, welche Fortenbaugh herausarbeitete, zusammen, so lässt sich sagen, dass nicht nur das *ethos* eine andere Funktion erfahren hat, sondern auch gerade dadurch ein Perspektivenwechsel vorliegt, der mehr als bei Aristoteles die Achse des Empfängers und des Senders betrachtet. Denn wie wir gesehen haben, mag bei Aristoteles ein tugendhafter Redner die Glaubwürdigkeit erhöhen, dies schließt aber eine unparteiische Meinung seitens des Publikums trotzdem nicht aus. Cicero arbeitet also mehr auf der praktischen Ebene, indem er versucht, das Publikum nicht nur theoretisch-rational (glaubwürdig oder nicht) zu erreichen, sondern eben durch Affekte. In gewisser Weise setzt er das theoretische Wissen Aristoteles' über die Seelenarten in die Praxis um.

Natürlich dürfen dabei nicht nur die heftigen Affekte, also das *pathos*, ins Spiel kommen, sondern gerade die Abwechslung zwischen heftigen und leichten Affekten macht den Erfolg aus. Somit liegt bei Cicero ebenfalls eine Kontrastierung zwischen "ethischem und affektivem Aspekt" vor. Nach Fortenbaugh wird ersterer mit Adjektiven wie "umgänglich und angenehm", letzterer als "heftig, vehement und leidenschaftlich" bezeichnet (Fortenbaugh 1994:1523).

Dabei sollte jedoch nicht vergessen werden, dass Cicero aber mit *ethos* eben gerade nicht nur die leichten Affekte meint, sondern es ihm dabei auch um die Sympathiegewinnung des Publikums geht, welche durch leichte Affekte zu erreichen ist. Somit dient das *ethos* eben nicht dazu, eine Urteilsänderung hervorzurufen, sondern nur dazu, dem Redner gewogen zu sein. Erst im nächsten Schritt, also der Anwendung der heftigen Affekte, wird das Publikum dahingehend beeinflusst, dass es seine Meinung ändert. Denn wie auch bei Aristoteles, gilt der Grundsatz, dass man anders urteilt, wenn man unter dem Einfluss des

[3] Trotz allem soll hier nicht der Eindruck entstehen, dass Cicero nicht auch Wert auf den Redner selbst legt- schließlich war er es, der den perfekten Redner (*orator perfectus*) schuf-, doch an dieser Stelle kann darauf nicht näher eingegangen werden.

Hasses oder der Liebe steht. In beiden Schritten jedoch sind die Affekte im Spiel. Dies war bei Aristoteles eben nicht der Fall, der davon ausgeht, dass das Publikum rational von einer Glaubwürdigkeit überzeugt werden kann, um dann durch das *pathos* schließlich zu der gewünschten Urteilsänderung zu kommen. Die Betonung liegt dabei auf ‚Änderung', da Aristoteles eindeutig von einem Meinungswechsel spricht, steht man unter affektiver Beeinflussung.

Sicherlich das eindrucksvollste Beispiel einer emotionalen Überzeugungsrede finden wir bei den Catalinarischen Reden Ciceros. Auf der *ethos*-Ebene wird Cicero zum "Vater des Vaterlandes" gemacht, also *dem* Repräsentanten der römischen Republik. Die Leidenschaften werden dann erregt, wenn es um die Gefahr und Bedrohung geht, welche von Catilina ausgehen: Er muss angemessen bestraft werden, denn Catilina stellt für den "gesamten Erdkreis" eine Gefahr dar:

> […] wir als Konsuln wollen einen Catilina, der den Erdkreis mit Mord und Brand zu verheeren trachtet, gewähren lassen? (Cicero 1984:I, 1,3)

> O ihr unsterblichen Götter! Wo in aller Welt sind wir? In welcher Stadt leben wir? Welches Gemeinwesen haben wir? Hier, hier in unserer Mitte, ihr Senatoren, in diesem ehrwürdigsten und angesehensten Rat der Welt sind Leute, die auf unser aller Untergang, die auf die Vernichtung dieser Stadt, ja des ganzen Erdkreises sinnen! (Cicero 1984:I, 4,9).

> Endlich haben wir denn, Quiriten, den wahnsinnig verwegenen, Verbrechen schnaubenden, an der Verseuchung des Vaterlandes frevelhaft arbeitenden, euch und diese Stadt mit Feuer und Schwert bedrohenden Catilina aus der Stadt hinausgeworfen. […] Kein Unheil mehr wird von diesem Ungeheuer und Scheusal gegen die Stadt selbst innerhalb ihrer Mauern gestiftet werden (Cicero 1984:II, 1,1).

Catilina selbst wird nicht nur zum Feind erklärt, er ist nur noch das "Ungeheuer", das "Scheusal", welches es aufzuhalten gilt.

Cicero ruft also richtiggehende Horrorszenarien in den Zuhörern wach, und stellt ihnen mit aller Eindringlichkeit Bilder vor Augen. Diese rhetorische Technik des *ad occulum ponere* beherrscht Cicero bis zur Perfektion, ständig den Zuschauer vor Augen habend (Antonius zu Catulus):

> Denn nichts ist beim Reden wesentlicher, Catulus, als dass der Zuhörer dem Redner gewogen ist und dass er selbst so tief beeindruckt wird, dass er sich mehr durch den Drang seines Herzens und einer inneren Aufruhr als durch sein Urteil und seine Einsicht lenken lässt. Die Menschen entscheiden ja viel mehr aus Hass oder aus Liebe […], aus einem Irrtum oder einer Regung des Gemüts, als nach der Wahrheit oder einer Vorschrift, […] oder nach Gesetzen (Cicero 1997:II, 178).

Welche Wirkung Affekte auf den Zuhörer haben können, ist Cicero also bewusst; und genauso wie Aristoteles macht er die Affekte dafür verantwortlich, dass eine "Lenkung" nun möglich wird. Steht der Mensch erst einmal unter einem bestimmten Affekt, dann ist es für den Redner leichter, den Zuhörer in die vom Redner gewünschte Richtung zu lenken. Doch bis es zu dieser Affekterregung seitens des Zuhörers kommt, muss der Redner selbst agieren, muss in sich selbst

die Affekte "einbrennen": "Es ist auch gar nicht möglich, dass der Zuhörer Schmerz oder Hass, Neid oder Furcht empfindet, dass er sich zu Tränen und Mitleid bewegen lässt, wenn alle die Gefühle, zu denen der Redner den Richter bringen will, dem Redner nicht selbst eingebrannt und eingeprägt erscheinen." (Cicero 1997:II, 189). Genau diese Form des Selbst-Ergriffenseins, um andere emotional bewegen zu können, findet sich auch bei Quintilian.

Hingegen sucht man bei Quintilians *Institutio Oratoria* vergeblich nach Definitionen oder Affektbeschreibungen, wie wir es bei Aristoteles und Ciero gesehen haben. Quintilian legt den Schwerpunkt zwar auch darauf, zu zeigen, wie Affekte erregt werden können. Jedoch schon der Titel seines Werkes ‚Ausbildung des Redners' lässt erkennen, dass wir es hier nicht mit einem eminent rhetorischen, sondern einem pädagogischen Werk zu tun haben. Dies betont auch Fortenbaugh: […] Quintilians Interessen sind nicht im engeren Sinne rhetorisch. Sie sind pädagogischer Art und teilweise motiviert von den historisch-politischen Bedürfnissen seiner eigenen Zeit" (Fortenbaugh 1994:1524).

Die pädagogische Ausrichtung in Quintilians Werk zeigt sich auch in seiner Praxisnähe. Ähnlich wie Cicero ist für Quintilian wichtig, wie die Emotionen vom Redner in einer anderen Person hervorgerufen werden können. Dazu gibt er sehr detaillierte Anleitungen. Bei ihm geht es ebenfalls um die Gerichtsrede, und so ist es, wie Quintilian betont, die wohl schwierigste Aufgabe des Redners, auf die Gefühle des Richters Einfluss zu nehmen (Quintilian 1995:VI, 2,1).

> Ein Mann aber, der den Richter mitreißen und in jede gewünschte Stimmung zu versetzen vermag, so daß dieser unter der Macht seiner Rede weinen oder in Zorn geraten muß, ist immer eine Seltenheit gewesen. Und doch ist es diese Gabe, die vor Gericht das Szepter schwingt; sie macht die Beredsamkeit zur Königin (Quintilian 1995:VI, 2,3-4).

Und so ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, dass Quintilian "die eigentliche Aufgabe des Redners" darin sieht, Gefühle zu erregen (Quintilian 1995:VI, 2,5). Anders als Aristoteles bringt Quintilian Emotionen und Glaubhaftigkeit zusammen:

> Denn Beweise bringen es ja freilich zustande, daß die Richter unsere Sache für die bessere halten, die Gefühlswirkungen leisten es, daß sie das auch wollen; doch das, was sie wollen, glauben sie auch. Denn wenn sie Zorn, Vorliebe, Haß und Mitleid zu spüren begonnen haben, sehen sie die Dinge schon so, als ginge es um ihre eigene Sache, und wie Liebende über die Schönheit kein Urteil zu fällen vermögen, weil ihr Herz ihnen vorschreibt, was die Augen sehen sollen, so verliert der Richter allen Sinn für die Ermittlung der Wahrheit, wenn er von Gefühlen eingenommen ist. Die Flut packt ihn, und er überläßt sich gleichsam einem reißenden Strom (Quintilian 1995:VI, 2,6).

Für Aristoteles charakteristisch ist ein rationales *ethos*, durch das der Richter zwar an der Glaubwürdigkeit des Klienten bzw. seines Redners nicht mehr zweifeln soll, jedoch bleibt nach wie vor dem Publikum die Möglichkeit einer urteilsfreien, neutralen Beurteilung des Ganzen.

Bei Quintilian hingegen soll die Urteilsfähigkeit des Richters durch die Affekteinwirkung in dem Maße beeinflusst werden, dass der Richter, ganz

eingenommen von seinen eigenen Gefühlen, genau so handeln soll, wie es der Redner möchte. Dies geschieht dadurch, dass die Gefühlseinwirkungen noch eine weitere Aufgabe übernehmen: Sie sorgen dafür, dass der Richter sich mit dem Fall "identifiziert" oder, wie es Quintilian ausdrückt, meint "es ginge um [seine] eigene Sache". Darüber war bei Aristoteles noch nichts geschrieben. Die Psychologie spürt man förmlich: Quintilian weiß, dass jemand sich immer mehr um seine eigene Sache als um eine fremde Sache einsetzen wird. Auch Cicero macht sich dies zunutze: Mehr als einmal spricht er davon, dass Catilina nicht nur eine Gefahr für den Staat (also eine abstrakte Gefahr) bedeutet, sondern er konkretisiert die Gefahr ebenfalls: Catilina bedeutet eine Gefahr für das Wohl jeden einzelnen Bürger. Diese Konkretisierung eines Abstraktums ist wichtig, denn nur so verinnerlicht sich der Mensch die Gefahr wirklich; sie wird greifbar und somit auch besser angreifbar.

Die Macht der Überzeugung, anders noch als bei Aristoteles, liegt bei Quintilian nicht mehr auf der ‚Vorarbeit' des rationalen *ethos*, etwas glaubwürdig zu machen; die Macht der Überzeugung beruht nun auf der Konkretisierung eines Abstraktum, der Suggestion, es handele sich um die jeweils eigene Sache, um die es zu kämpfen, oder die es zu verteidigen, aber vor allem zu schützen gilt. Dies schließlich, mehr noch als alle rationalen Beweise, gibt dem Richter bzw. dem Publikum die Kraft, quasi selbst aktiv zu werden. Somit gelangt zum Beispiel der Richter zu der Überzeugung, dass er nicht überredet wird, sondern dass er aus seinem eigenen Inneren sich einsetzt, die Initiative also von ihm ausgeht. Es ist das "Selbst-Aktiv-Werden" welches letzten Endes den entscheidenden Impuls liefert. Quintilian lässt den Redner, durch die Erregung der Gefühle im anderen, wichtige Vorarbeit leisten. Die eigentlichen, entscheidenden Schritte kommen jedoch vom anderen selbst, in dem er eben die Konkretisierung vornimmt. In diesem Fall, auch wenn es etwas vereinfacht scheint, könnte man sagen, es geht also wieder mehr darum, *was* gesagt wird; denn es geht um die Identifikation mit der Sache; der Richter solle sich fühlen, wie wenn er sich selbst verteidigen müsste; nicht die Sache eines Fremden.

Oben haben wir angesprochen, dass der Richter nicht das Gefühl haben sollte, überzeugt zu werden, denn die Überzeugung soll aus seinem Inneren kommen. Mit anderen Worten: es wird etwas dissimuliert, was jedoch untergründig immer noch vorhanden ist: die Macht der Überzeugung, die Kunst der Beeinflussung; endlich: die Redekunst. Die Anstrengung, jemanden so weit zu bringen, ein Abstraktum als seine eigene, konkrete Sache zu identifizieren, bleibt dem Richter verborgen; und doch ist es gerade diese Anstrengung, welche der Redner unternehmen muss, um wirkliche Überzeugungsarbeit leisten zu können, wo sich die wirkliche *ars* zeigt.

Eines darf sicher gerade bei Quintilian nicht vergessen werden: die moralische Tugendhaftigkeit des Redners. Denn ein guter, und damit überzeugen-

der Redner, kann nur der werden, der auch moralisch gut ist, das heißt: ein Ehrenmann, der gut reden kann (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*)[4].

3. Baldassare Castigliones *Hofmann* - die "Veräußerlichung" innerer Werte

Als Ehrenmann kann sicher auch der Hofmann von Baldassare Castiglione in seinem gleichnamigen Werk von 1528 bezeichnet werden. Wie Castiglione allerdings die Verbindung zwischen Ehrenmann und der *dissimulatio artes* herstellt, soll im Folgenden untersucht werden. Diese Idee von der Wichtigkeit der emotionalen Mittel in der Rede sowie die Diskussion um das sittlich Gute im Redner werden wir also gerade auch im Renaissance-Humanismus wiederfinden. Ob Philipp Melanchton, Johannes Vossius oder auch Julius Cäsar Scaliger- in einem Punkt sind sich diese Humanisten einig: Die *ars* des Redners, um wirkungsvoll agieren zu können, beruht immer noch auf dem Lehren mittels der Gefühlserregung und somit der Willensbeeinflussung. Dies wird gerade in der Dichtkunst deutlich, wie denn auch Scaliger 1561 in seinen *Poetices libri septem* sagt:

> Aus den Charakteranlagen (*mores*) entspringen die Gemütsbewegungen (*affectus*). Und diese gehen als innere Akte (actus interiores) den äußeren Handlungen voraus. Der Zweck der Dichtung besteht nun in der moralischen Belehrung des Menschen […]; der Dichter lehrt Affekte durch Handeln. Die Handlung ist also das Gewand, in das der Dichter seine Lehre einhüllt, und der Affekt ist der eigentliche Gegenstand der Belehrung, welche auf die Bestimmung unserer Handlung einwirken will (Dilthey 1957:433; cf. Ueding & Steinbrink 1994:85).

Genau dieser Zusammenhang zwischen der inneren Seele und der äußeren Handlung wird uns gleich beschäftigen, wenn es um die Frage der Tugend gehen soll.

Doch bevor wir uns dem Humanismus weiter zuwenden, sollten wir uns die Tatsache vor Augen führen, dass mit dem Humanismus ein Zeitalter anbricht, in dem nun nicht mehr die flammenden Reden eines Cicero vor dem Senat sondern die beratende Rede an Bedeutung gewann.

Wie auch im *Cortegiano* dargestellt, war es für einen idealen Hofmann unabdingbar, dem Prinzen mit Ratschlägen zur Seite stehen zu können. Doch haben wir es hier keineswegs mit einer bloß einseitigen Beziehung zu tun. So sieht Tommaso Garzoni den "doppelten Zweck" als charakteristisch für die Person des Hofmannes an: "Er [der Hofmann] dient einerseits dem Prinzen, andererseits aber, durch dessen Gunst, sich selbst" (Hinz 1992:45).

Damit ist ein wesentlicher Unterschied zur antiken Rhetorik angesprochen: Als Hofmann geht es nicht mehr nur darum, sein Publikum (in dem Fall der Prinz) zu überzeugen, sondern man steht in einem regelrechten Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zu ihm: Nur durch den Erwerb der Gunst des Prinzen kann der

[4] Definition, die auf den älteren Cato zurückgeht.

Hofmann seine Existenz begründen. Verliert er diese Gunst, so verliert er zugleich auch seinen Status als Hofmann. Doch anders als in der Antike, wo persönliche Eigenschaften wie Tugend von hoher Wichtigkeit waren, ist nun vor allem die *actio* entscheidend, wie Manfred Hinz hervorhebt:

> Der Hofmann kann sich […] nicht auf seine persönliche Autonomie und auf die ihr zugeordneten moralischen und anthropologischen Kategorien berufen, vielmehr steht er in Abhängigkeit vom Prinzen, ohne jedoch gänzlich dessen Kreatur zu sein. Ausschlaggebend für seine Professionalität als Hofmann sind demnach nicht so sehr seine persönlichen Eigenschaften, Fähigkeiten und Tugenden, als vielmehr deren Vermittlungsmodus im höfischen Milieu (Hinz 1992:53).

Auch wenn Hinz hier an eine Art "Veräußerlichung" der inneren Werte denken lässt, so sollte doch eines nicht vergessen werden: Auch im Humanismus und Barock wird ein hoher sittlicher Anspruch gestellt, da der Redner nach wie vor als ein moralisch handelnder Mensch definiert wird. Und eben gerade das *Buch vom Hofmann* von Baldassare Castiglione wird es sein, welches die "Verschmelzung von Hofideal und humanistisch-rhetorischer Sittlichkeit" zeigt (Ueding/Steinbrink 1994:87). Castigliones Präsentation des Hofmannes erinnert stark an Quintilian und Cicero, und ihre Verbindung der Redefähigkeit mit der Tugendhaftigkeit: "Der Hofmann soll […] beredsam und in Gesprächen über den Staat klug und vorsichtig sein […] vor allem aber strebe er immer nach dem Guten und sei nicht neidisch und verleumderisch; und nie lasse er sich dazu herbei, Gnade und Gunst auf lasterhaftem Wege und durch unanständige Mittel zu suchen (Castiglione 1960:I,34).

Wenn uns auch allen klar ist, dass es sich beim Hofmann ebenfalls nur um ein Ideal handelt, welches es wohl nie so gegeben hat, wie es Castiglione beschrieb, so wollen wir uns doch ins Gedächtnis rufen, welche Ansichten Castiglione vertrat und welche Ratschläge er seinem Hofmann an die Hand gab. Besonders die Behandlung der Affekte werden uns gewahr werden lassen, dass trotz einiger Unterschiede zu antiken Rednern, der Hauptgedanke eines *ars artem celare est* (es ist eine Kunst, die Kunst zu verbergen) zum Beispiel durchaus auch bei Castiglione ihre Gültigkeit nicht verloren haben. In der Rede ist es nämlich genau das Künstlichkeits-Verbot, welches dafür sorgt, dass "glaubwürdige[s] Sprechen und Handeln […] der kunstvoll erzeugte Schein spontaner und naturwüchsiger Authentizität [sei]" (Hinz 1992:122). Die Verbindung zur klassischen Rhetorik-Lehre ist eindeutig. Aber es lassen sich auch Unterschiede zur antiken Rhetorik feststellen. So zum Beispiel die Reduzierung der ciceronianischen Trias *probare-delectare-movere* (beweisen-erfreuen-bewegen) auf die Funktion des *delectare*. Mit anderen Worten: Die Hauptaufgabe des Hofmannes besteht darin, zu gefallen. Und doch ist es letztlich diese "delectatio-Rhetorik" (Hinz 1992:120), welche gerade die antike Tradition weiterleben lässt; und dies vielleicht noch intensiver: wenn durch den perfekten Hoffmann Mittel und Zweck des *celare artem* in eins fallen. "Der Hofmann also versucht sein Publikum nicht von einer bestimmten ‚natura e verità' zu überzeugen, sondern nur von sich selber, und zwar gerade

dadurch, dass er sich verbirgt“ (Hinz 1992:124). Nicht wie in der Antike soll also eine Sache überzeugend dargestellt werden, nun ist es der Mensch/Redner an sich, der als Person überzeugend sein muss. Und gerade in einem solchen Perspektivenwechsel tritt die Wirkungskraft der Rede wieder in den Vordergrund. So ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, wenn die antike Theorien Folge geleistet werden muss. Nach Castiglione sind es vor allem zwei Kriterien, die er für den Hofmann und seinen Erfolg für unabdingbar hält: die Angemessenheit (*aptum*, griechisch: *prepón*) sowie der richtige Augenblick (*kairos*) müssen erkannt und genutzt werden. Wird nämlich entweder das Kriterium der Angemessenheit verletzt oder werden die Affekte im falschen Augenblick gebracht, kann dies durchaus lächerlich wirken und so die Kraft der Rede zerstören.

Die Parallele zur Antike finden wir in Bezug auf das *aptum*, zum Beispiel im *Orator*: “Der wird mir vor allen Dingen der rechte Redner sein, der erkennt, was schicklich ist. Denn vor allem ist dem vollendeten Redner diese Weisheit nötig, dass er für Zeitumstände und Personen das richtige Maß findet. Der also wird ein vollkommener Redner sein, der seine Rede jedes Mal dem anzupassen vermag, was sich schickt.“ (Cicero 1998:XXXVI, 123).

Wie hoch schlussendlich der Stellenwert des *aptums* an den Renaissance-Höfen war, zeigt uns sehr schön Alain Pons (1998:422), wenn er sagt:

> “Mais ce qui fait la perfection du courtisan n’est pas tant la possession d’un grand nombre de qualités de naissance ou acquises, qu’elles soient physiques, morales ou intellectuelles, que la manière de les exercer, manière qui doit être ‘convenable’.”

Eng mit dem Kriterium der Angemessenheit ist auch das der schon angesprochenen *dissimulatio artis* verbunden: Das bedeutet, der Hofmann, welcher, um zu gefallen, nach Castiglione eine gewisse *grazia* anstreben soll, wird diese mithilfe der Methode der *sprezzatura* erlangen. *Sprezzatura* wird in dem Fall verstanden als eine “elegante Lässigkeit“: denn nichts ist schädlicher für das Bild des Hofmannes, als affektiert und gekünstelt zu erscheinen. Unser Gewährsmann aus der Antike, Cicero, wird im *Orator* von einer “sorgfältige[n] Nachlässigkeit“ (Cicero 1998:XXIII, 78) sprechen, um eben dieser Vorstellung des Verbergens der Kunst, Ausdruck zu verleihen.

Eine weitere Stelle aus dem *Cortegiano* wird uns nun dazu dienen, zu zeigen, wie wichtig das Überzeugen durch Worte zu dieser Zeit noch war und welche Anstrengungen dafür unternommen wurden: “Ebenso muss er, [der Hofmann] wo es nötig ist, mit Würde und Heftigkeit zu sprechen verstehen, und je nach Bedarf jene Leidenschaften erregen, entflammen und bewegen können, die unsere Seelen in sich enthalten. Zuweilen muss er auch mit der Einfachheit und Unschuld, die alles so erscheinen läßt, als ob die Natur selbst spräche, gerührt und fast trunken vor Wonne erscheinen, und zwar mit solcher Leichtigkeit, dass der Hörer meint, auch er könne mit geringer Mühe zu dieser Stufe gelangen, und sich dabei doch weit davon entfernt findet, wenn er es versucht“ (Castiglione 1960:I,34).

Eine weitere Forderung des Hofes hebt die Wichtigkeit der Rede hervor: "Wann immer ein Hofmann spricht, soll er sofort als Angehöriger der Aristokratie bzw. der Bildungselite erkennbar sein" (Hinz 1992:177). Rhetorik funktioniert hier als "distinktives Schichtenmerkmal" (Hinz 1992:177). Ein Kriterium, welches in der Antike nicht unbedingt von Belang war, wird am Hofe zur Existenzgrundlage. Denn die Profession des Hofmannes konnte nur ausüben, wer eben zu jener "Bildungselite" gehörte. Und doch waren es nicht nur "äußere Werte" wie die Standeszugehörigkeit, sondern auch die inneren Werte, welche zählten. So ist immer auch der Bezug zur Tugend wichtig, denn nur ein tugendhafter Mensch ist auch glaubwürdig: "er sollte ein aufrichtiger Mann sein darin ist auch Klugheit, Gütig-, Tapfer- und Mäßigkeit enthalten. Ein wahrhafter *philosophus moralis* ist nur der, der gut seyn will." (Castiglione 1960:I,25).

Und wenn, wie Aristoteles meint, die Glaubwürdigkeit (leichter) zur Überzeugung führt, so ist dies sicherlich für den Hofmann von Vorteil. Denn wie Hinz bemerkt, war die Erlangung oder Bewahrung der Gunst des Prinzen keine leichte Aufgabe: der Hofmann war dabei nur einer unter vielen, die ebenfalls die Prinzengunst zu erlangen suchten.[5] Und doch ist es mit der Standeszugehörigkeit und der Tugend allein nicht getan. Hinz weist vielmehr auf ein "Spannungsverhältnis" (Hinz 1992:44f.) hin, welches geradezu zu einem moralischen Spagat werden kann:

> […] so besteht die Profession des Hofmanns [..] darin, die eigene Natur aufzugeben, um sich dem jeweils herrschenden Prinzen anzugleichen. Für die Berufung des Hofmannes ist sein mitgebrachter Ruhm ausschlaggebend, für seinen Erfolg am Hof selber aber gelten ganz andere und geradezu konträre Gesetze. […]. Er [der Hofmann] muß gleichzeitig tugendhaft und seinem Prinzen, und sei er auch ein Tyrann, ‚grato' sein, oder umgekehrt sich dem Laster am Hof gelich machen, ohne an Tugendhaftigkeit einzubüßen (Hinz 1992:45).

Was also letzten Endes den entscheidenden Vorteil zum Erfolg mit sich bringt, ist die ungeheure Wandelfähigkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit des Hofmannes. Das Prinzip des *aptum* kommt so auf allen Ebenen zum Tragen. Vielleicht ist auch gerade deshalb ein Grund, warum diejenigen Hofmänner, die öfters den Hof wechselten, sicherlich mit Recht als die wirklichen *uomini universali* bezeichnet werden können.

Die Situation am Hof präsentiert sich also als eine ganz andere als dies in der Antike der Fall war. Die Redesituationen könnten also mit ihren Rahmenbedingungen unterschiedlicher nicht sein. Und dennoch, wenn es um Überzeugung geht, sind die Strategien immer noch dieselben: Das Herz des Publikums muss angesprochen werden um so letztendlich die vollkommene Zustimmung des Gegenübers zu erhalten. In beiden Fällen spielte auch die Tugend eine wichtige

[5] Eine gute Möglichkeit, seine "Universalität" (*uomo universale*) unter Beweis zu stellen, war das Wechseln des Hofes. Nach Hinz (1992:61ff.) war dies durchaus keine Seltenheit im Italien des Renaissance-Humanismus. Wie Hinz zu Recht anmerkt, diente dies auch einer "gewissen Unabhängigkeit, zwar nicht vom Hofe schlechthin, wohl aber von einem bestimmten".

Rolle, so war ein tugendhafter Mann zugleich auch immer glaubwürdiger und konnte so einen entscheidenden rhetorischen Vorteil für sich verbuchen.

4. Schlussfolgerungen: Praxis versus Ästhetik

Folgende Schlussfolgerungen lassen sich daraus ziehen: War die Affektenlehre bei Aristoteles und Cicero vor allem am praktischen Leben orientiert, bei dem durch die richtige Affektanwendung über Leben und Tod entschieden werden konnte (was man vor allem in den Reden Ciceros sieht), so ergibt sich für den Hofmann ein anderes Bild: nun tritt eindeutig die ästhetische Komponente des Wohlgefallens hinzu, die Tugenden sind zwar nach wie vor von Vorteil, rücken aber in den Hintergrund angesichts des hohen Stellenwertes des *delectare*. Auch hier geht es nach wie vor um die Seelenlenkung des Publikums, jedoch auf einer anderen Ebene: der ästhetischen. Im Artikel "Affektenlehre" des historischen Wörterbuchs der Rhetorik schreibt denn auch Rudolf Behrens (1992:1142): "Schon der erste und modellbildende Sozialkodex, B. Castigliones ‚Il libro del Cortegiano' (1528), gestaltet den ‚uomo universale' so, dass seine Affektbeherrschung eine soziale Harmonie in ästhetischer Schönheit ermöglicht."

Vor allem das Stichwort der "ästhetischen Schönheit" scheint wie geschaffen, um die gegenwärtige Gesellschaft zu charakterisieren.

Dazu brauchen wir nur zu betrachten, mit welchen Schlagwörtern heute diese Gesellschaft tituliert wird. Nicht nur sind wir eine "Konsumgesellschaft" sondern vor allem eine "Mediengesellschaft". Kameras überall machen es fast unmöglich, sich als bekannte Persönlichkeit dem Blick der Öffentlichkeit zu entziehen. Und oftmals geht es bei der Bewertung nicht mehr in erster Linie darum, zu fragen, wie tugendhaft oder beredet jemand auftritt, sondern die äußere Erscheinung ist von essentieller Bedeutung: "Wir leben nicht mehr in einer Leistungsgesellschaft sondern in einer Stylinggesellschaft, so Michael Grüner, Schulpsychologe (SPIEGEL-Gespräch 2000:104). An anderer Stelle spricht Grüner ein Problem an, welches eng in Verbindung mit dieser "Stylinggesellschaft" steht (SPIEGEL-Gespräch 2000:104): "Der Konformitätszwang ist höher als früher: eine Ausgrenzung erfolgt jetzt schon wegen eines falschen Handys."

Der Begriff der "Tugend", die Suche nach inneren Werten einer Person, scheinen aufgegeben zu Gunsten einer Veräußerlichung. Die Sorgfalt, mit welcher im *Hofmann* noch versucht wurde, jemand durch emotionale Beeinflussung mit Hilfe von Worten zu erreichen, scheint ebenfalls abgenommen zu haben. Salopp formuliert: Überzeugend ist, wer überzeugend aussieht. Um es mit Niccolò Machiavelli zu sagen: "Jeder sieht, was du scheinst, wenige fühlen, was du bist […]" (Machiavelli 1990:88).

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Perlocutionary Goals and Rhetorical Organization in Dialogues: Analysis of a Passage from Arthur Schnitzler's Novel *Fräulein Else*

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In a dialogue speakers pursue 'perlocutionary goals' and organize their utterances in such a rhetorical way as to attain them. We analyse such perlocutionary goals and rhetorical organizations in a 'special' dialogue, i.e. a selected passage from Arthur Schnitzler's novel *Fräulein Else*: while reading a letter received from her mother, Else builds up, at a space-time distance, a 'fictional dialogue' with her. We analyze how Else's mother rhetorically organizes the letter in order to convince her daughter, how Else reacts to the letter in her own 'inner world', how Else verbally reacts to the letter and what decision she takes. In our analysis we also focus on linguistic indexes of *Duty*, *Knowledge*, *Possibility*, *Value*.

1. Introduction

The work we are presenting is a literary passage from the short story *Fräulein Else* by the Austrian writer, Arthur Schnitzler. Born in Vienna in 1862, the son of a doctor and a doctor himself, he was a careful observer and a sceptic by profession. His work is set against the backdrop of the crisis that had beset the liberal bourgeoisie and the resulting waning of values that typified the Habsburg *fin de siècle*; what the caustic writer and literary critic Karl Kraus termed the laboratory of the end of the world or as Hermann Broch put it, the place assigned for the merry apocalypse. It was a time of great cultural experimentation in which artists and intellectuals were searching for ways to confront the crisis facing contemporary humanity. The modern world owes a debt to the culture of the great Vienna: the psychoanalysis of Freud, the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the figurative art of Klimt and Schiele, the new architecture of Otto Wagner and Adolft Loos as well as the attempt by Mahler and Schonberg to break new ground in music and last but not least the exceptional writers and poets such as Arthur Schnitzler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Stefan Zweig. These writers were pervaded by a feeling of historical uncertainty which inspired them to produce memorable works; works which are in part a poetic research into experimental form, a departure from tradition, and in part a criticism of the modern world which is subjected to the laws of economics and politics.

Although Schnitzler was aware of the social contradictions and the uncontrollable dissolution of civil values and moral categories he is not a writer who deals with social issues but rather a searcher of souls. In order to involve the reader deeply in his characters' emotions, Schnitzler chose a new form in which to narrate; the narrative flow is carried by interior monologue in which the deep sensations of the mind are recorded even if they do not surface and are not noticeable to others. The total absence of the narrator means that the reader is in direct contact with the character in the story.

As early as 1900 Schnitzler had used this technique in his short story *Leutnant Gustl.* In *Fräulein Else,* written in 1924, he perfects and enriches it with new nuances. In order to highlight visually the inner separation of the main character from the surrounding world, the dialogues of all the people around Else are printed in italics which, particularly towards the end of the story, has a particularly dramatic significance. Schnitzler took the idea of this narrative technique from the first story to use it extensively, the novel by Eduard Dujardin, *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* written in 1888.

Schnitzler's story takes place on a single day, 3rd September 1896. Else, who is 19 years old and the beautiful daughter of a well-known Viennese lawyer of Jewish extraction, is staying for her holidays in the Hotel Fratazza in the Dolomites as the guest of her rich aunt. The narration begins with Else coming in from the tennis court because she has been told that there is an express letter from her mother. Shortly afterwards the concierge gives her the letter which contains a precise request by her mother.

Until the time when she decides to agree to her mother's request, the reading of the letter is interwoven with Else's interior monologue. It is this passage that we have analysed[1].

2. Research aims

We chose this passage for two basic reasons:

First: Although it is not a dialogue in the true sense of the term, yet in certain ways it can be considered as such. While reading the letter, Else fragments the text by introducing a series of comments which often seem to be directly addressed to her mother as if she were present. For this reason the passage has aspects which are similar to a dialogue. Obviously it is a dialogue *sui generis* in that:

a) it is 'delayed' or in 'asynchronous form': the mother wrote the letter in a time preceding that of Else reading it;

[1] We are presenting the English translation of the text but we have also worked on the original German text and the Italian version.

b) the communicative channels used are not homogeneous. The mother writes and Else comments mentally (or perhaps even aloud) on what is written;
c) only one interlocutor is present (Else), who can reply 'fictitiously' to the other but no one has access to the replies except the reader.

Second: The passage allows us to show Else's inner reactions to the reading of the letter, something which is not possible in the analysis of ordinary conversations.

The passage on the one hand allows us to analyse the rhetorical structure of the letter, in particular its perlocutionary goals (Austin 1962, Castelfranchi & Parisi 1980, Zuczkowski 1995), i.e. the goals the mother tries to achieve, on the other the perlocutionary effects, or Else's reactions. It also means we can analyse, from a conversational perspective, the way in which the interlocutors interact which throws light on the relational dimension of the communication.

The Appendix shows the Schnitzler passage divided into the text of the letter (left hand column of the table) and Else's comments (right-hand column).

3. Plot and characters

Else is a young girl with a great wish to fall in love. She is typically bourgeois, brought up to be a wife and mother. For several years the family has been in financial straits on account of the father's gambling. The rules that regulate Else's and her family's behaviour are those of good Viennese society: their Jewish origin is kept quiet and a certain life-style is maintained even though this means many sacrifices. Despite everything, Else's mother manages to keep up appearances to such a degree that Else ascribes to her miraculous powers: *Mama ist eine Kunstlerin.* Apart from this however, they do not have a particularly good relationship. Else notices the difficulty of the situation that has been created: at first she was granted anything she wanted, now she is obliged to spend her holidays in a hotel as the guest of a rich aunt. Else does not have a job, her only wealth is her beauty and a body which has to be continually cared for and shown off in order to be desirable to the male gaze and competitive on the marriage proposal market. Else observes herself obsessively and puts to the test the effect of herself on others in the game of looking and being looked at. At the beginning of the story Else receives a letter from her mother which upsets her. Her mother, whom she does not admire and goes so far as to describe as stupid, is nevertheless able to blackmail her. We must save your father, we must find the money with which to save him. The person who has this money is Dorsday, a friend of Else's father who is staying in the same hotel as Else. The girl must beg him to give her a loan or else all is lost.

4. Analysis of the internal rhetorical organization of the mother's letter: research methodology

We have divided the letter into 3 parts (5-24, 25-40, 40-58, cf. Appendix) based mainly on their different global semantic content, which can be summarized by leitmotifs, or possible 'headings' that give the theme or the dominant, main or anyway most important themes of each of the three parts.

As we will see, the three parts of the letter interact in order to achieve mother's perlocutionary goals. The main global goal is to resolve the problem of the father and family by finding 30,000 gulden. The intermediate goal, which is a means for achieving the final goal, is to induce Else to talk to Dorsday and convince him to give the money. So the initial goal, essential for achieving the intermediate goal, is to write a letter to Else organising it rhetorically in such a way as to induce her to speak to Dorsday etc.:

Initial goal: Write a letter to Else, organizing it in a way

↓

Intermediate goal: that will induce her to talk to Dorsday in order to

↓

Final goal: obtain the 30,000 gulden
and thus resolve Father's and our family's problem.

The internal rhetorical organization, both of each part of the letter and the letter as a whole, has been analysed with reference not only to perlocutionary goals but also to the following four aspects: 1. positive and negative aspects of the communicated content; 2. aspects concerning Knowing (the Known, the Unknown, the Believed); 3. aspects concerning Duty (Obligation, Prohibition, Permission). 4. aspects concerning the Possible, the Impossible and the Necessary. In other words we asked ourselves whether in the letter as a whole and in each of its parts we were dealing mainly with something concerning the positive/the negative or the possibility/the impossibility/the necessity or knowing/not knowing/believing or whether it was a question of permission, prohibition and obligation (Lai 2003, Zuczkowski 2006).

Let us look at some examples taken from the analysis of the first and second part.

5. Analysis of the first part of the letter (5-24)

Possible leitmotif: the situation is desperate. We must obtain 30,000 gulden within 3 days, there's no other way out. The help of friends and colleagues is no longer possible.

In this first part what predominates is

a) the *Negative*: the picture presented is extremely negative. The father, the famous lawyer, has wrongfully appropriated the inheritance of a minor who was his ward (30,000 gulden) (41). If the money is not found the Father will end up in prison, or worse, as is hinted at the end of the letter, he will kill himself: *quite apart from our all* (i.e. Else too) *being ruined, there will be such a scandal as there never was before*. […] *I am fighting with my tears all the time I write* (17).
b) the *Impossible*: all the possibilities used with success in the past to settle the father's debts are now impracticable: it is impossible that Baron Hoening (17) or relations (17-19) or colleagues (21-23) will help Daddy again as they have done in the past: this time absolutely nothing can be done if the money is not forthcoming (17).
c) the *Duty*: whatever, *thirty thousand gulden […]* ***must be*** *forthcoming in three days, or all is lost*. (11-13).
d) the *Unknown*: in this difficult situation the mother does not know *what to think or do* (9). *But after mature consideration* she is persuaded (Known) that she has ***really no other choice*** (= the only choice, the only possibility) but to write to Else. She does not tell her yet the purpose of the letter; this she will do in the second part, but she makes it clear to Else that she is personally involved and that it is she, Else, who is the only way out of the problem. As this is the only Possibility, it becomes a Necessity; it is this or nothing. The only Possibility is that which will be put forward in the second part of the letter (Else talks to Dorsday), so in this sense the first part prepares for the second, for the mother's explicit (and father's) request to talk to Dorsday.

So in this dramatic situation (Negative, Impossible, Unknown), the only two things Known to the mother are the Necessity (= the only Possibility) to write to Else and the Duty to obtain the money.

6. Analysis of Else's comments: research methodology

We have divided Else's comments on the letter into three different types, based on some linguistic features (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic):

1) *Soliloquy*: some utterances (4, 8, 14, 42, 50, 54 – printed in normal type in the Appendix) seem to be straightforward comments made by Else herself, often of a critical or interlocutory type. Here we find expressions in the third person, e.g.:

(8) Mother does write a fearful style
(14) Heavens, what does she mean?

These expressions are the only comments made by Else on the letter that can be considered 'non dialogic': In spite of the fact that Else sometimes uses interrogative syntactic structures, she seems to have herself as intended interlocutor rather than her mother.

2) *Soliloquy or fictional dialogue*: most of Else's utterances which fragment the text of the letter (6, 10, 12, 16, 20, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 40, 44, 46, 56, 58 – printed in italics in the Appendix), from the linguistic point of view (syntactic, semantic, pragmatic), can be read both as reflections (comments, questions, arguments, criticisms etc.) made to herself, and as fictional conversational turns in which the main character addresses her mother directly, obviously aware that she cannot be heard. There are no deictics in the second person or allocutions or vocatives, but if we disregard the con-text (Else is alone and reading a letter sent by her mother three days before) and the co-text (the Schnitzlerian dialogue taken as a whole) these comments, because of their structure and content, could potentially be used in a face to face verbal interaction.

   Some examples:

   (6) as if it wasn't always holiday time for me, worse luck
   (16) what, the Public Prosecutor?
   (28) Why 'between ourselves'?…

3) *The asynchronous fictional dialogue*: further comments made by Else while reading the letter (18, 24, 36, 38, 52 – printed in bold type in the Appendix), seem to have the characteristics and structure typical of verbal turns in ordinary conversation. These utterances directly involve *(hetero-selection)* a specific interlocutor (the mother) not only through the use of interrogative syntactic structures (all the utterances that we can place in this category are made up of direct interrogative sentences), but also through linguistic features such as vocatives (*Mother*), second person deixis etc. In general these utterances show a rather brusque reaction to the mother, expressed using the interrogative form. Often the interrogatives are 'rhetorical' or redundant questions which act as transactional disqualifications (Sluzki, Beavin, Tarnopolski, Véron 1967), signs of the 'relational distance' shown by Else between herself and her mother, and less explicitly, between herself and both her parents.
   Some examples:

   (24) Well, what what, WHAT do you want me to do?...
   (36) Do you take me for a fool, Mother?

7. Analysis of Else's comments on the first part of the letter (5-24)

Else's comments on the first part of the letter belong to all of the three categories we have mentioned. We find both monological (8) and clearly dialogical comments (24 and in part 18) as well as expressions that can be interpreted as both (6, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22).

At the beginning Else tries to understand what has happened and seems irritated by her mother's wavering (10, 18) as is evident in the discourse marker *Well* followed by incitements in the imperative *(go on, go on).* Else seems to realize that her mother is about to request something of her and on two occasions (18, 24) she explicitly asks for clarification of her role in the delicate family situation.

Even in this first part there are clear attempts to distance herself from her mother, something which we will see emerges more decisively in her comments on the second part of the letter. On the one hand, the mother uses linguistic expressions which clearly act as signals of closeness at the relational level (e.g. 5, 15). Else however does not seem to want to go along with these attempts. In (6) Else exploits semantic repetition (*holiday time*) in order to bring about a shift in the sense of the phrase as well as to express her distance[2]. In (12) the hetero-repetition (Bazzanella 1993, 1994, 1999) mechanism is once again an expression of criticism and distance at both a content and relational level. Her attempt to disqualify her mother's words is evident in this case in a redundant question. In (10) and (18) as already mentioned, Else moves onto the meta-communication plane, thus bringing to the forefront the relational dimension (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson 1967). It is not so much the content of the question as the way in which her mother shilly-shallies in addressing her.

8. Analysis of the second part of the letter (25-40)

Possible leitmotif: talk to Dorsday. The only chance of salvation (Else the saviour). Positive assumptions that Dorsday will give us the money.

In this second part of the letter her mother twice underlines the perlocutionary goal, in other words she states openly the only way of obtaining the money, discussed in the first part. The only way is for Else to talk to Dorsday especially as her mother knows (Known) that he will not say "no" as he has always had a soft spot for Else, that he will not refuse to do this act of kindness, that there is nothing wrong in talking to him etc. The first time the perlocutionary goal is expressed (31) in a gentle way (*So I wondered whether you could not do us a*

[2] In the text of the letter, *holiday time* has a meaning, an extra-linguistic correlate (= stay in the Dolomites) and an evaluation (positive = fun, relaxation etc.) which is very different from the way Else uses the same phrase. For her it refers to the fact that she is a girl from a good family but without means, something to which she assigns a negative evaluation, as can be seen in the expression *worse luck*.

kindness and speak to Dorsday), the second time (39) it is much more pressing in the form of an entreaty (*So I beg you, my child, to speak to Dorsday*).

In the third part of the letter (51) the perlocutionary goal becomes an outright supplication (51) (*So speak to Dorsday at once, I beseech you, and telegraph at once how it goes*). So in the letter as a whole the explicit perlocutionary goal is repeated three times.

What is particularly striking in the second part of the letter, however, is the predominance of

a) *Positive aspects*:

The content of the second part of the letter, unlike the first, is positive:

1. first of all *your letter has come, my dear child, in which you mention among other people Dorsday, who is also staying at the Fratazza, and it seemed to us like* ***the hand of Providence.*** Other positive aspects are the following:
2. present and past relations between the family and Dorsday (25), in particular the relationship between Else's father and Dorsday, both as a friend (29; 29-31) and on a professional level (29);
3. Dorsday's attitude towards Else (33);
4. the fact that Dorsday is a very wealthy art dealer (35);
5. mother's certainty about the positive future outcome of Erbesheimer's trial (39);
6. the reply which her mother imagines that Dorsday will give to Else's request (35). Finally the following sentences also have a positive connotation:
7. *if we get thirty thousand the worst will be averted, not only for the time being, but, god willing, for ever* (37);
8. *I assure you there is no harm in it* (39): her mother again professes herself certain (and tries to reassure Else) that there is nothing wrong in Else talking to Dorsday;
9. *it is quite a different matter, dear, when one talks to a person face to face* (39).

The points listed above paint a rosy picture of the past, present and future and function as a way of arguing in favour of the mother's request to talk to Dorsday.

The mother does not seem to harbour any doubt that Else will go along with the request. In fact, shortly afterwards the mother expresses herself as if she took for granted that Else would speak to Dorsday. She gives her instructions, steps to follow but also prohibitions (*Of course* ***you mustn't mention this***) (35) and permission: *but otherwise you can talk to him quite frankly* (37); *You might also mention, if occasion arises, that*…(37).

b) *the Known* refers not only to the past and present but even to the future (points (5) (6) and (7) listed above): Else could be so sweet as to talk to Dorsday also because her mother knows the outcome of the dialogue will be positive.

9. Analysis of Else's comments in the second part of the letter (25-40)

This part of the passage is particularly interesting since all Else's comments can be interpreted in a 'dialogic' sense, as if they were replies to a physically present interlocutor. Else always seems to be addressing her mother at times implicitly, at others more explicitly.

Still more noticeably in this part we find expressions of relational distance. Yet again Else counters her mother's attempts to establish an understanding verging on complicity with a clear refusal on the same level.

In particular, in (26) Else ironically refutes the content of her mother's discourse saying *Yes*, *very often*[3] and more importantly rejects the manoeuvre towards relational closeness (seen in the phatic expression *You know*). So yet again the disagreement shown by Else in a typical dispreferred reply (Pomeranz 1984) involves in equal measure both the arguments and the relational dimension.

Utterance 28 appears a more determined rejection of a new attempt by the mother at a rapprochement. She tries to appeal to her daughter through the collusive sharing of some gossip with her about Mr Dorsday (27). With this reply Else effects a shift in emphasis by centring the message not on the subject of the gossip, on which she does not even comment, but on the element of meta-communication itself which defines it as such (*between ourselves*), thus contesting and refusing the relational closeness that her mother seemed to want to emphasize. The strategy she adopts is one of 'pretending not to understand' (Mizzau 2002) the sense and affiliative meaning of the expression.

In (30) Else refuses to recognise the novel or 'secret' nature implicit in her mother's words (*why shouldn't you know*) about the news that Dorsday in the past had already granted her father a loan. She does not show any surprise (*I thought as much*). In (34) the protagonist expresses and discusses her disagreement with her mother's assertion about the attitude Dorsday has *always* shown to her.

Utterances (36) and (38) show Else at first annoyed and then disenchanted with what she sees as her mother's ingenuity. In both cases we find rhetorical questions laden with critical judgements. In the first Else accuses her mother of underestimating her intelligence. In the second she accuses her of having a (real or feigned) faith in false hopes.

[3] This is more obvious in the German version (*na, gar so oft*).

10. "Yes, Father, I'll save you!"

We will not linger over the third part of the letter (39-58) because it takes up the leitmotifs of both the first and second parts; it therefore summarises and confirms what was said before.

The analysis of Else's reactions to the letter has shown that they are largely an expression of a relational conflict with her mother. However, in the monologue which directly follows the reading of the letter, Else makes up her mind to save her father.

In order to understand this decision, which is evident in the words *Yes, Father, I'll save you!* we have, above all, to look into the historical-social background and the relationship between Else and her father even if the intended interlocutor is her mother.

Else loves her father, she adores him and her mother knows that she would never be able to bear the idea of his going to prison or committing suicide. Else has only one weapon in her armoury for obtaining the loan and that is her physical beauty but her mother cannot know this. A storm of conflicting feelings is unleashed in Else's mind bringing her to the point of wishing for her father's death, but in the end the love that bonds them prevails. She does not want to lose this love and her desire to save him also represents the salvation of her own social status. Paradoxically the mother and daughter come to the same conclusion that either for reasons of convenience or love or compassion or for all these sentiments, they must save Else's father even if the cost is blackmail and an intolerable capitulation.

Else then is not so much the victim of the mother she scorns but of the father whom she adores since it is impossible not to think that it is he who implicitly entrusted his wife with the job of finding the money at all costs.

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Appendix: mother's letter and Else's comments

Legend to Else's comments:
1) Soliloquy: straightforward comments made by Else herself
2) Soliloquy or fictional dialogue
3) Asynchronous fictional dialogue

	Mother		**Else**
1	My dear child	2	I'll look at the end first …
3	So once more, don't be angry with us, my darling child, and be a thousand times…	4	good Heavens, they haven't killed themselves! No, if they had I'd have had a telegram from Rudi …
5	My dear child, you can understand how sorry I am to burst into your pleasant holiday time	6	*as if it wasn't always holiday time for me, worse luck*
7	with such unpleasant news	8	Mother does write a fearful style …
9	But after mature consideration I have really no other choice. To cut it short, Father's situation has become acute. I don't know what to think or do	10	*Why all this talk?*
11	The sum in question is a comparatively trivial one, thirty thousand gulden	12	*trivial?*
13	which must be forthcoming in three days, or all is lost	14	Heavens, what does she means?
15	Imagine. My dear, Baron Höning	16	*what, the Public Prosecutor?*
17	sent for Father this morning. You know how highly the Baron thinks of Father, how fond he is of him, indeed. A year and a half ago, when things hung by a thread, he spoke to the principal creditors in person and put things straight at the last moment. But this time absolutely nothing can be done if the money is not forthcoming. And quite apart from our all being ruined, there will be such a scandal as there	18	**Well, go on, go on**, what's she driving at? **What can I do about it?**

	never was before. Think of it – a lawyer, a famous lawyer, who – no, I cannot write it down. I am fighting with my tears all the time I write. You know, my dear, for you are intelligent, we have been in a situation like this several times before, and the family has always helped us out. Last time it was a question of 120,000 gulden. But then Father had to sign an undertaking never to approach our relations again, especially Uncle Bernhard		
19	The only one of whom I can think as a last resort is Uncle Victor, but unfortunately he is on a trip to the North Cape or Scotland	20	*yes, he's well off, the horrid creature*
21	and is absolutely unreachable, at least for the time being. Father's colleagues are out of the question, especially Dr. Sch., who has often helped Father out before,	22	*good Heavens, how do we stand with him?*
23	now that he has married again	24	**Well, what what, WHAT do you want me to do?**
25	And now your letter has come, my dear child, in which you mention among other people Dorsday, who is also staying at the Fratazza, and it seemed to us like the hand of providence. You know how often Dorsday used to come to our house in years gone by	26	*Yes, very often*
27	It is the merest chance that we have seen less of him in the last two or three years; he is supposed to be deeply entangled – nothing very grand between ourselves	28	*Why 'between ourselves'?*
29	Father still plays whist with him every Thursday at the Residenzklub, and last winter he saved him a big sum of money in an action against another art-dealer. Besides, why shouldn't you know it, he helped Father once before	30	*I thought as much*
31	It was only a very small sum that time – eight thousand gulden – but, after all, thirty is nothing to Dorsday. So I wondered whether you could not do us a kindness and speak to Dorsday	32	*What?*
33	He has always been particularly fond of you	34	*I haven't noticed it. He stroked my cheek once, when I was twelve or thirteen, and said 'Quite a grown-up young lady already'*
35	And as Father, luckily, has not approached him again since the eight	36	**do you take me for a fool, Mother?**

	thousand, he will probably not refuse to do him this favour. He is supposed to have made eighty thousand quite lately on a Rubens which he sold to America. Of course you mustn't mention this		
37	but otherwise you can talk to him quite frankly. You might also mention, if occasion arises, that Baron Höning has sent for Father, and that if we get thirty thousand the worst will be averted, not only for the time being, but, God willing, for ever,	38	**do you really think so, Mother?**
39	for the Erbesheimer case, which is going on splendidly, will certainly bring Father in a hundred thousand, but of course he cannot ask the Erbesheimer for anything at the present stage of the case. So I beg you, my dear child, to speak to Dorsday. I assure you there is no harm in it. Father could simply telegraphed to him – we seriously considered doing so – but it is quite a different matter, dear, when one talks to a person face to face. The money must be here on the 5th, at noon. Dr. F."	40	*who is Dr. F.? oh yes, Fiala*
41	is inexorable. Of course personal rancour enters into the matter, but as, unfortunately, trust money is concerned,	42	good God, Father, what have you done?
43	there is nothing to be done. And if the money is not in Fiala's hands by twelve noon on the 5th, a warrant will be issued; Baron Höning will keep it back till then. So Dorsday would have to telegraph the sum to Dr. F. through his bank. The we shall be saved. Otherwise God knows what will happen. Believe me, you will not be lowering yourself in the least, my darling child. Father had scruples at first. He even made efforts in two further directions. But he came home quite desperate	44	*can Father ever be desperate?*
45	not so much, perhaps, because of the money as because people behave so shamefully to him. One of them was once Father's best friends. You can guess who I mean	46	*I can't guess at all. Father has had so many best friends, and in reality not one. Warnsdorf, perhaps?*
47	Father came home at one o'clock and now it is four in the morning. He is asleep at last, thank God	48	It would be the best thing for him if he never woke up

49	I shall post this letter myself as early as possible, express, so that you will get it on the morning of the 3rd	50	What made Mother think that? She never knows anything about such things.
51	So speak to Dorsday at once, I beseech you, and telegraph at once how it goes. Don't let Aunt Emma notice anything, for Heaven's sake. It is sad that in a case like this one cannot turn to one's own sister, but one might just as well speak to a stone. My dear, dear child, I am so sorry that you should have to go through such things in your youth, but believe me, Father himself is the last to blame	52	**Who is then, Mother?**
53	Let us hope that the Erbesheimer case will mean the turning of a new leaf in our existence in every respect. We have only to get through these few weeks. It would surely be an irony of Fate if a catastrophe happened over the thirty thousand gulden.	54	She doesn't seriously mean that Father would commit … but wouldn't … the other thing be even worse?
55	Now I must stop, dear. I hope that in any case	56	*in any case?*
57	you will be able to stay at San Martino until the 9th or 10th at least. You must certainly not return on our account. Give my love to your Aunt; go on being nice to her. So once more, don't be angry with us my darling child, and be a thousand times	58	*Yes, I know that bit.*

On the Dialogical Seeds of Language

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The argument has often been made that language cannot be considered to be essentially dialogical because dialogue needs not be linguistic, and is not unique to the human species. This paper attempts to respond to such arguments by suggesting a possible role for dialogical interaction and specific practices within such interaction in the origins of language. For this purpose I present and integrate in a dialogical framework, on the one hand, some of the literature using computerised models for simulating the emergence of linguistic structures, and, on the other hand, linguistic and psychological theories stressing the role of mnemonics in spoken interaction and grammaticalisation. The paper suggests that recurrent practices in dialogical interaction between members of a community or group may well forge all sorts of regularities in the way interaction is conducted, including linguistic regularities. Thus the structures of language can themselves be viewed as emerging from dialogue.

1. Introduction: a challenge to viewing language as essentially dialogical

I would like to begin by describing a common situation from my personal experience of routine interaction with my cat. Quite often, my cat would start following me around the house, meowing, jumping on the table any time I pass near it. I take it that she wants me to pick her up. Once I stretch my arms to her, she pushes herself up a bit and immediately starts purring.

There is nothing extraordinary about such interactions as this, as any pet owner knows. I do want to stress, though, that such interactions are dialogical. The term 'dialogue' is here taken in a very inclusive sense as the sort of basic attitude we have toward one another and toward other living creatures, of viewing what they do as meaningful in some sense. This means dialogue can exist over and above words, even without words, and before words. In the situation described above the interaction follows a familiar pattern of request or demand followed by its fulfilment, and then by an expression of gratitude or satisfaction. Each party in this interaction engages in purposeful action, the purpose of which involves an action by the other party, and each subsequent action is a response to the preceding one. My cat's behaviour can probably be explained away by some mechanisms of conditioning and the like, but that is really beside the point. The fact is that we seem to communicate, and even successfully.[1]

[1] One would object that I refer to my cat in anthropomorphic terms, that is, I interpret her behaviour as I would interpret similar behaviour by a human being. That is true, of course, but there is nothing wrong with that. The attitude we have towards another being, when we view that being as a potential or actual partner in dialogue, is necessarily anthropomorphic. In Buber's (1983) famous description this principle holds even for dialogic contact with a tree. Our attitude

But this fact gives rise to a challenge to a conception of language as dialogue.[2] If dialogue is possible without words, without what is often called "the use of language", it would follow that dialogue is in some way inessential to language, that what makes language what it is, is exactly what distinguishes it from dialogue.[3]

The argument against dialogue being essential to language can be presented as a "can't get there from here" sort of claim. Dialogue in itself, as can be witnessed in non-verbal modes of communication, cannot, according to this claim, account for the structured nature of the syntax and semantics of natural language. Something else, of a totally different nature, should have intervened. This something may be Reason, or some kind of abstract linguistic system, or the pure rules of logic, or some physical incarnation of such abstract systems and rules that appeared in a mysterious fashion in our brains.

One thing that cannot be overemphasised in reply to such a claim is that our natural languages are not as structured and rational as they are often presented to be, and actual speech is much more akin to non linguistic forms of dialogue than some are willing to admit. A word taken in isolation may be an arbitrary sign, but an utterance[4] is not arbitrary, and is not a sign in any straightforward sense, and all words appear in utterances. A sentence used as an artificial example in a grammar book or an academic paper may be compositionally structured according to strict rules. What we actually say when we speak, in the context in which we say it, all too often fails to obey such rules, and is not necessarily compositional in its semantics.[5]

But then, natural languages do have vocabularies, and do have grammatical regularities, not as strict as some posit, but not as loose as to be ignored. Are these imperfect renderings of what is essentially an abstract structure informing language, or can they be explained after all in terms of dialogue? Can we get there from here?

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towards humans is "anthropomorphic" as well, precisely because (and when) human beings are seen by us as potential partners for dialogue. Without this basic attitude it is as easy to explain away human action as it is to explain away animal behaviour. For a more extended critique of the anthropomorphism objection, see Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker & Taylor (1998).

[2] A conception I will assume my readers share, so I will not explicate it here.

[3] In the philosophy of language and in theoretical linguistics this argument sometimes gives rise to a sharp analytical distinction between language and communication (e.g. in Stanley 2000, where even obviously linguistic utterances are labelled "communication", rather than "language", since they fail to conform to a prescribed logical structure). A much more sophisticated version of the same argument type can be found in Brandom (1994), who, to oversimplify his position a bit, claims that normativity and rationality are essential to language because they separate humans from other sentient beings.

[4] Here I am using the word "utterance" in Bakhtin's (1986a) sense. An utterance is all one says in one's turn of talk, or a whole written text. It is a complete dialogical action, which responds to other such actions and can in turn be responded to.

[5] A point I discuss at length elsewhere (Sandler 2005; an English-language paper based on that talk remains so far unpublished).

This question will be answered in the positive if the regularities in language can be shown to be, in a way, by-products of dialogical activity, which have developed over time, and which developed in humans, rather than in other species, for reasons that have to do with some human abilities not specific to language.[6]

Of course, despite the renewed interest that the old question about the origins of language has attracted in recent years, and despite the impressive advances that were made in the wake of this renewed interest, we can still only speculate about how language developed. Most likely, this is simply something we will never know. But what I want to do now is to make a case based on the integration of existing literature in the field with some findings in other fields for the mere *possibility* of explaining linguistic regularities in dialogical terms. After all, the argument against viewing language as essentially dialogical states that dialogue as a matter of principle *cannot* account for linguistic regularities, so it will suffice for my purposes to show that speculating such a possibility is not altogether wild and improbable.

I will first review a piece of the literature on the origins of language that is of special interest in this context, and will then try to reframe some of its findings from a dialogical perspective.

2. Simulating the origins of language

The classical 18th and 19th century debate on the origins of language (Gode & Moran 1966) appeared to many to be a thing of the distant past. However, in the last two decades or so, for a number of reasons, this old subject gathered new interest. The new discussion of the origins of language grew now into an impressive body of literature, involving contributions from linguists of the generative creed (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005), neurophysiologists (e.g., Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998), primatologists (e.g., Tomasello 2000), psychologists (e.g., Donald 1991, and again, Tomasello 2000), and many others.

I will not here try to review all aspects of this literature. Instead, I will focus at first on one particular branch (and within it – on a small selection of works), and then see what else it brings into play. Namely, I would like to focus on the attempts to model the appearance of various linguistic regularities using computer simulation (see, e.g., Cangelosi & Parisi 2002; Steels 1998, 2000, 2004; Steels et al. 2002; De Boer 2000, Kirby 2000, Hurford 2000 and many others).[7]

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[6] But see Segerdahl et al. (2005) for an argument that it is more human culture, in a deep sense of this word, than human biology, which is responsible for the way human language has developed, and that other species (at least great apes) may well possess some sort of language.

[7] I do *not* by this intend to imply that "interaction" between pieces of computer code is just like interaction between human beings and other living creatures; at most, there is sometimes room for

The kind of computer simulations I am talking about involves "populations" of virtual "individuals", or "agents", communicating with one another in a way that eventually yields some sort of stable linguistic structure (or rather, an element thereof). The particular design of each "individual", what kind of "games" these individuals play, what "meanings" they communicate and what changes occur in the population itself (simulating death and birth, and in some cases also natural selection) – all this differs from one experiment to the next, depending on the linguistic trait the author is trying to generate.

A particular example could be used to illustrate this approach. Kirby (2000) chose the appearance of compositionality as his target for simulation. He designed a small population of "individuals", each of which could use a string of symbols (the letters a-e) of any length, to communicate one of a number of "meanings" to the other "individuals". The "meanings" in this simulation belong to a closed set of predications with five possible two-place predicates ("verbs", glossed by Kirby as, e.g., "finds" or "loves", etc.) and five possible arguments ("nouns", or in Kirby's own presentation of the model, five names of people, e.g., Mary, John, etc.). Thus possible "meanings" may be labeled: "Mary finds John", "Zoltan loves Mike", etc.

In every run of the simulation, pairs of individuals were chosen to be the "speaker" and "hearer", communicating one of the "meanings" (randomly selected), using the strings of symbols at their disposal (the "meaning" itself was "communicated" together with the string of symbols). This process was repeated a large number of times.[8]

At the outset, none of the individuals had any "vocabulary" or "grammar rules" at all, and thus "speakers" had to "invent" new "words" (at least once in a while). This was done by picking up a random string of symbols and arbitrarily assigning it to the "meaning" chosen to be communicated in that turn. "Hearers", in turn, subsumed these new meanings under the simplest possible rules of grammar (at first simply linking that "meaning" as a whole with that "word" as a whole). Both "individuals" ended up "learning" these new items.

Later on, if some "vocabulary" and "grammar" was already "learned", the "individuals" used their existing "knowledge", and tried, with the aid of a compacting algorithm, to simplify their set of rules.[9]

Eventually, after enough rounds of such "communication", the "individuals" inevitably developed compositional grammars, with a separate string of symbols for each of the five "nouns" and five "verbs". The "word order" in this com-

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drawing a loose analogy in a particular context. I will keep here to a relatively popular presentation not getting into formal descriptions and subtle details, to avoid excessive length.

[8] There were also provisions for introducing new members into the population, removing old ones and inserting random "noise" to disrupt communication once in a while. These are all important factors in each of the simulations described in the current literature, but I will not devote any special attention to them here.

[9] The compacting algorithm does not in itself favour compositional rules over non-compositional ones.

positional grammar varied from run to run. This is the result of the simulation.[10] In other simulations artificial "individuals" formed common "vocabularies" to refer to various objects and relations (Steels et al. 2002)[11] or developed vowels typical of human languages by imitating each other (De Boer 2000), etc.

These results are very impressive, but let us not be overawed. It is true that "[s]imple theorising about the likely behaviour of complex adaptive systems is not good enough … our intuitions about the evolution of even simple dynamical systems are often wrong", and indeed, "[r]ecently, many researchers have responded to this problem by taking a computational approach" (Kirby 2000: 305). But the computational approach, while it can improve our intuitions and our "simple theorising", cannot replace them. Computational models abstract from most factors in the modelled system, and each of these factors may turn out to change the behaviour of the system in unpredictable ways.

All extant computer simulations of the emergence of language are in many aspects quite deficient as models. For example, the "individuals" in Kirby's simulation (and indeed, this is a feature common to all such models) "invent" new vocabulary items when required to communicate a new "meaning". In real life people don't just invent new words. Rather, they extend existing vocabulary, use descriptions, metaphors, or even gestures. Even when new words are invented, they are not made up out of the blue, but are somehow tied to existing stems, words, proper names.

Note also that Kirby's "individuals" automatically analyse every "utterance" in terms of rules linking the symbols "uttered" to meanings. It is not self obvious that this should be the case. Indeed, in real human and animal communication context and situation, which are external, as it were, to the "text" being uttered, are crucial in understanding the meaning of an utterance (as emphasised already by Voloshinov 1926).

But the most obvious shortcoming involves the set of "meanings" available to the "individuals". In the case of Kirby's simulation this set is closed. There are only 100 possible "meanings" for the "individuals" to communicate, whereas there is no limit to the variety of meaning in dialogue. Moreover, the "meanings" themselves are supposed to stand for simple propositions. Now, *pace* what some philosophers of language would claim, dialogue is not the communication of propositions from one individual to another (or rather, such communication is merely one of the endless affordances of dialogue). In dialogue, interlocutors are

[10] This was the result for a situation in which all "meanings" had equal chance to be "communicated". When Kirby changed the simulation so that one of the "meanings" had a much higher chance to be "communicated" than the rest, this one "meaning" ended up having a separate, non-compositional, "idiom" attached to it in all "individuals". This is so because the frequency with which a rule can be successfully applied determines its chances of its "survival" in the population in the long run.

[11] The work of Steels and his collaborators is particularly interesting because their "agents" are "embodied", that is they are linked to robots and cameras, and communicate "names" for real objects in the frame of the cameras.

motivated by various interests and goals (Weigand 2000), they are doing things to and with one another, getting one another to do things. All this happens in a given context and situation, and always involves emotional and evaluating attitudes on the part of all participants (see again Voloshinov 1926).[12]

Above all, the "meanings" themselves have a compositional structure. Each "meaning" is a set of one "agent", one "action" and one "patient", and the strings of symbols "uttered" by the "individuals" in the simulation are mapped upon this space of "meanings". In this sense, the set of "meanings" predetermines in an important sense the results of the simulation, because an optimal mapping of "utterances" to "meanings" would clearly be compositional.

In other words, the entire design of "individuals" involved in rounds of communicational "games", common in one form or another to all the simulations in this literature, can be simply viewed as an optimisation algorithm. De Boer (2000) says so explicitly, but the same holds for the work of others as well: in each successful run of a simulation, a near optimal solution to a problem posed by the design of the simulation is obtained. The "language" developed by the "individuals" merely mirrors the simulation design.

This said, the success of such simulations nevertheless shows something interesting. It shows that under some conditions, interaction between individuals *can* optimise the means of communication in an entire population. Moreover, such optimisation may be very powerful, precisely in terms of creating various regularities across the population. We need not assume human beings are endowed with a specialised language faculty, or with the abstract ability of "recursion", or with a language-independent capacity for logical reasoning, especially designed to generate the structures of a system of language. If some basic conditions are met and the needs of communication put the right pressures on it, repeated interaction between individuals will hammer out all the regularities and structures needed. Or at least, it is possible that it will, and this in itself is enough for our purposes here.

Many of the conditions needed for language-like regularities to emerge in a simulation seem to resonate with our understanding of a *dialogical* interaction between people:

– To follow Steels et al. (2002), computerized "agents" have to engage in coordinated interaction, with shared "scripts" of actions used in these interactions. He glosses such an interaction as involving "shared goals and a willingness to cooperate".
– Further, at least initially, "Agents must have parallel non-verbal ways to achieve the goals of verbal interactions" (Steels et al. 2002: 260). In Kirby's

[12] Again, the work of Steels (Steels 1998; Steels et al. 2002) should be noted for taking some of these factors into consideration. His "meanings" are connected to real objects or events (albeit not in a very natural setting), and there is not, in principle, a closed set of them. In his latter work (Steels 2000, 2004) he tries to some extent to take into account the pragmatics of communication, the fact that interlocutors act upon one another, rather than just transmit messages.

simulation discussed above (as in most other simulations), this is achieved simply by exposing both parties to the interaction to the "meaning" being communicated, together with the symbols aimed to express it, but other, less direct means are possible. Thus, Steels et al. (2002: 260) use a kind of pointing (by zooming a robot's camera) as a means of "non-verbal communication" between "agents".

– The way different "agents" are programmed to "conceptualise" what they communicate about must be similar enough to allow one "agent" to "have a good chance at guessing the "conceptualisation" that [another 'agent'] may have used" (Steels et al. 2002).
– Of course, there are also other factors, such as having a sufficient number of interactions for each "agent" to participate in. Interestingly enough, the resulting "language" of the population needs not be identical for all "agents". Individual differences in the way "meanings" are represented inside "agents" are tolerated.

3. Dialogue and the emergence of language

Now, if we try to pursue this, admittedly not very rigorous, analogy between dialogue and the sort of "interactions" examined above, we are confronted with four questions about how linguistic regularities could emerge from dialogue. One question relates to the features of the initial state, as it were, of pre-linguistic dialogue. Another question deals with the sort of pressures dialogue would put on the process (towards what could interaction be expected to optimise the means of communication). Yet another question is about what kinds of regularities we might expect there to appear. Finally, what kind of "games", of those played in dialogue, could be a vehicle for the appearance of such regularities?

Two creatures may be said to engage in dialogue, in the broad sense I am using here, if they each act with regard to the other's actions. To put it another way, *a* and *b* can be said to engage in dialogue if we would feel inclined to describe *a* as performing action *x* so that *b* would perform action *y*, and in turn *b* performing action *z* so that *a* performs action *t*, and so on.[13] We need not assume they have any specific cognitive infrastructure for language or for logical reasoning. We do need to assume they can cope with the complexities of various situations, including social situations ("episodic cognition", in Donald's terms,

[13] In principle, it is not even essential to insist that *a* and *b* are *really* acting with these intentions. For all we care, they might both be fictional characters (indeed, Bakhtin often talks of fictional characters as engaged in dialogue). The only constraint here is on actions *x* and *z*: they should not be seen as bypassing the addressee's consciousness. Thus, setting an alarm clock, so that it rings at a certain hour, is not a dialogical action for this reason. One could paraphrase here the analysis of meaning proposed by Grice (1957) – *a* acts dialogically in doing *x* if by doing *x* she can be said to intend *b* to intend to do *y*. For the present purposes, though, I will assume that we are talking about *actual* dialogue, where both participants somehow indeed view each other as performing actions in some sort of mutual regard.

1998). This general description of dialogue holds for us as well as for at least some other animals.

From this minimal description it is clear that to engage in dialogue one needs to be able to distinguish potential and actual partners for dialogue in one's environment, and to take them to perform various actions. That is, to distinguish actors, actions, and possibly also inanimate objects (indeed, feeding, mating and avoiding predators require as much).

But why would any such distinctions be reflected in regularities of interaction? One reason is that repeatedly engaging in dialogue favours the creation and propagation of regularities of all kinds in the way communication is done. This is simply because any regularity that can be spotted in the way dialogical interaction proceeds can be used to make it more powerful and effective.

A case at point is the process known as ritualisation. A fight between two dogs is not a classical example of dialogue (though see Mead 1934), but it involves action with mutual regard to the actions of the other. Now, before biting an opponent, a dog has to move its lips away from its teeth. This simple regularity has become ritualised into an agreed sign: potential victims could spot the lip movement and avoid attack; potential attackers, in turn, could use it as a threat, without (yet) actually biting their opponent.[14] A simple behavioural regularity, once spotted, made for new kinds of action that have not existed before.

In general, regularities allow us to form expectations. We can then make ourselves meaningful to others by confirming their expectations, as well as by deliberately frustrating them.[15] Regularities become *instruments* to be used in dialogical communication. As such, regularities are never redundant. If I wish to inform my partner of something, I can use different such instruments to convey (roughly) the same information, for greater reliability, or I can refine or complicate the message by using different instruments to convey different information each.[16] Finally, when a regularity is established as such an instrument in the practice of some group of individuals, its use can become automatised and allow for more complex interaction, involving more instruments, in the future (Donald 1998).

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[14] I am here following Burling (2000). Burling himself further distinguishes ritualisation that has made its way into the animal's genes, as in the case of the snarl, from what he calls "conventionalisation" – a similar treatment of behavioural regularities, but one which is learned.

[15] It's the same quasi-Gricean structure: I expect you to expect me to do *x* in order to achieve *y*. I can therefore conspicuously do *x*, and expect you to understand that I wish to achieve *y*, or I can conspicuously avoid doing *x*, and expect you to understand that I do not wish to achieve *y*.

[16] Goldin-Meadow (2005) presents examples of young children using single words and gestures together, with the two conveying either the same information (holding up a ball and saying "ball") or different information (pointing to a slot in a toy cart where a ball could go, and saying "ballie").

So, if repeated dialogical interaction can optimise communication, as the computer simulation literature suggests, we may expect as many regularities to appear in such interaction as can be retained within a group.[17]

And these indeed may be regularities of all sorts. The literature on the origins of language focuses on the phonological, lexical and syntactic regularities linguists have identified as belonging to "the system of language", but many other kinds of regularities are just as relevant: prosodic, gestural, functional, and many others. On the other hand, not all features of the grammatical structure of languages, as described in the literature, should be explained as emerging exactly in the same way. Many of these features are peculiar to written texts (Linell 2005) and to literate, rather than primary oral societies (Ong 1982). Others can be explained by grammaticalisation processes (Hopper & Closs Traugott 2003).

4. The seeds of language and the role of mnemonics

In the computer simulations literature reviewed earlier, interaction between the virtual "agents" did not proceed in an unstructured way. Instead, the "agents" engaged in "games" – certain scripts for how interaction proceeds and how its results affect the state of each "agent". Is there an equivalent for such "games" in real dialogical interaction?

I propose that there might be several such equivalents (or seeds of language, as I shall call them here). I cannot offer a complete list of them, or speak with any certainty about them. But I would risk saying that they are, in a sense, basic elements of dialogical interaction, and that they have to do with mnemonics, with what we can remember and recall.

I deliberately use the term "mnemonics", rather than just "memory". The study of memory is today mostly a study of where different kinds of memory are located in the brain and how its particular neurophysiological and cognitive mechanisms work. My focus here, on the other hand, will be on the integrated ability of the whole organism to remember and recall.

Mnemonics, in this sense, has been taken to have a more essential role in the way in which we speak and in the way in which linguistic regularities and structures come into being and are sustained. I refer in this respect to such positions as that of Bolinger (1976), Hopper (1987) and Gasparov (1996).[18] This position views language as such, as being made up of formulaic expressions, commonly the size of a phrase-unit or so, Communicative Fragments, as Gasparov calls them. These fragments are simply remembered. When we speak

[17] This is not to say that speakers would necessarily be bound by ever more regularities all the time. As noted above, one way to use regularities in interaction is by conspicuously countering them.

[18] Gasparov's book has not yet been translated into English (though an English edition is apparently in the making; see Gasparov forthc.), so I will use the opportunity here to present some of his ideas; the brief account below is thus based mainly on this work.

we recall them and stitch them together or blend them in various ways, to fit into Utterance Contours (prosodic) patterns and to create and recreate images, sharp and vague, which we also keep in memory. Gasparov suggests that the fragments recalled need not be reproduced with complete 'literal' precision, nor indeed be remembered in any precise form; there is instead ample room for variation. The speaker is thus like the oral epic poet (Lord 2000), weaving utterances from formulae, variating them and variating between them. Grammatical structures are on this view epiphenomenal, or emergent, in Hopper's (1987) sense.

Now, have a look at the following brief transcript:[19]

(1) A: *Ma* *ze* *ima* *(.)* *ha* *shnitzelim*
What that mom the schnitzels
"What's that, mom, the schnitzels?"
...
B: *Ze* *hamburgerim*
That hamburgers
"That's hamburgers"

The underlined word *ze* (a singular demonstrative pronoun) is here repeated in both turns. One might expect this not to be the case. After all, the word "*ze*" in B's utterance does not agree in number with the plural "*hamburgerim*".[20] So why did B use it? A possible answer is that she used it to establish her turn *as* an answer to A's question. And why was using this word a way to achieve this? Precisely because it conspicuously repeats a part of A's utterance. In any case, the need to imitate something in the utterance of one's interlocutor appears here stronger than the rules of grammar; something very important, and perhaps very basic to interaction, is *achieved* by such imitation (see Tannen 1987, for a more systematic presentation of the role of repetition in ordinary talk).

The role and importance of imitation in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, and its force as a means of communication, have been studied extensively from many angles (see, e.g. Donald 1991; Bråten 1998; Tomasello 2000; Nadel 2005; Rizzolatti 2005; Fadiga 2005). Here I would just like to stress a few points about it:

– Imitation is in itself a potent means of interaction. It is possible to conduct interaction of great complexity based almost entirely on imitation (Nadel

[19] Taken from a (home-made) recording of a four-party conversation in Hebrew in the course of a family meal. B is the host and A is her adult daughter; an intervening turn by another participant was omitted for the sake of simplicity.

[20] The similar disagreement in number in A's turn is due to the fact that the sequence "*ma ze*" is formulaic. It is used very frequently in colloquial speech. On the other hand, the formally correct plural form of this combination, "*ma ele*", is extremely rare in ordinary conversation, and sounds high-browed and bookish. In B's turn, on the other hand, the plural demonstrative pronoun "*ele*" could well have been used without sounding stylistically improper.

2005, shows it to be a central method of interaction among children up to the third year of their lives).

– But note that imitation is not the precise reproduction of the actions of another. The action or utterance being imitated is often conspicuously modified (e.g. when an interlocutor repeats part of a preceding utterance giving it a sharply rising intonation contour to show surprise or disbelief). But even when no such modification is apparent, the 'origin' and imitation are two different acts, one responding to the other, copying something of it into a new context and position of utterance.[21] In the terms of Linell (1998), any act of imitation necessarily de-contextualises some action, sound sequence, intonation contour, element, from the imitated utterance, and then re-contextualises it in a new utterance.
– Finally, there is a mnemonic side to imitation as well. Something is said or done twice, has an increased frequency of use (cf. Bybee & Hopper 2001). In mnemonic terms, an imitated element of utterance, if it gets imitated again and again in different contexts, is simply learned by rote.[22]

So, to bring all the threads back together, if we take imitation to be a seed of language, a standard script repeatedly enacted in dialogical interaction, some elements of utterances are likely to be remembered and kept in use over time.[23] For us, as speakers of already developed languages, this would yield something akin to Gasparov's (1996) Communicative Fragments, but also, perhaps, smaller regular chunks of talk, such as single words.

Moreover, since imitation not only reproduces what is imitated, but also modifies it, some distinctions between different kinds of elements are likely to be retained. Thus, if it becomes common to modify the intonation contour of an utterance being imitated, for whatever communicative purpose, a more general distinction between the intonation contour and the timbre of sound, or the sequence of different timbres, may itself become part of the inventory of *instruments* used for communicative purposes.

Imitation is one example of what I'm calling here "seeds of language". There may well be others. For example, Couper-Kuhlen (1993) has shown that

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[21] "[T]he reproduction of the text by a subject (a return to it, a repeated reading, a new performance, quotation) is a new, unrepeatable event in the life of the text, a new link in the historical chain of speech interaction" (Bakhtin 1986b: 106; I have slightly modified the translation).

[22] Here and below I will be relying on Rubin (1995) for an account of what features aid remembering and recall. Rubin's own model of the way memory is used in performing oral poetry gives very interesting insights into the use of memory in speech in general.

[23] In De Boer's (2000) computer simulation, focusing on phonology, the computerised "agents" play "imitation games". Namely, they imitate the vowels produced by each other, with the result of all "agents" eventually settling on a common small inventory of vowels. The dynamics of imitation as I present it here could arguably be similar: there may be a potentially unlimited range of possible vocalisations, gestures, etc., but only a limited common inventory becomes regularly used. Unlike the production of vowels, true dialogical communication is not something that can be modelled on a computer, so I can only raise this analogy as a conjecture.

rhythmical patterns are used in ordinary conversation to convey agreement, disagreement and the like. To present it in a simplified manner, if you finish your utterance with a certain rhythmical pattern of stressed syllables, I am likely to continue this pattern if I agree with you, and to break it if I don't. On the other hand, rhythmical patterning is an ancient mnemonic technique, and indeed aids remembering and recall (Rubin 1995). Such "poetic devices" as rhyme and alliteration often appear in ordinary talk (Jefferson 1996),[24] and they are again highly mnemonically effective (Rubin 1995). I am not trying to provide anything like a complete list of candidates.[25]

There is one more possible seed of language I would like to mention. I have already noted (and it is indeed common knowledge) that dialogical interaction strongly depends on the situation in which it occurs. Indeed, one's task, as someone involved in such interaction, is to make oneself meaningful to another *in the given situation*. Now, any situation is, by definition, unique. Nevertheless, there are also typical, recurrent situations, similar enough to one another to have interactions often follow similar scripts in them. On the mnemonic side, the recurrence of a situation (even of a physical location or setting) aids the recall of things associated with such a situation in the past (Rubin 1995). So, particular expressions, constructions, interaction scripts, etc. might over time become associated with particular settings, places, typical situations, contexts of use. Bakhtin had something like that in mind when he was talking about speech genres (Bakhtin 1986a) and about the words of a language "smelling" of their contexts of use (Bakhtin 1981:293). In dialogical terms, this is an important part of what *meaning* is all about.

But what does it mean for two situations or contexts to be similar, to belong to the same "type"? The best answer would be that they should be seen as similar by the people involved in the interaction. That is not an objective characterization, but perhaps no objective characterisation is needed. In a sense, two situations would be considered similar *because* they have a tradition of genre linking them together. My point here is that I do not understand the seeds of language as some sort of mechanical processes with a static definition. Rather, what *counts* as being "the same situation" as another is constantly redefined as our society and culture develop new social settings, functions and means of interaction. The same goes for imitation. Nowadays one novelist may imitate the style, or the plot development technique used by another. This is the same good old imitation. What is new is the kind of utterances we have now and what we view them as being made of.

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[24] In some languages this seems to be "institutionalised" in morphology, with agreement in tense, number or gender being marked with, e.g. repeating the same suffix, thus creating a rhyme.

[25] Of course, all this already assumes the use of syllables. It has been argued (Carstairs-McCarthy 1999) that the anatomy of the vocal tract has developed for reasons that have nothing to do with language or communication. This may or may not be so. It is anyway not my aim here to make any strong causal claims; what and how an organism can remember depends on how that organism interacts with others, and vice versa. Such abilities as these evolve and develop in tandem.

The dialogue between us continues all the time, and keeps building its edifice on the sediments of its own past.

5. Conclusion

I would now like to return to that challenge to the conception of language as essentially dialogical, from which I began. My aim in this paper was to show that it is *possible* to explain the emergence of regularities in language in what are essentially dialogical terms. I am sure I did not completely satisfy my opponents. I left out discussion of important philosophical questions.[26] I have also considered only a few of the kinds of regularities natural languages exhibit.[27] Above all, I by no means claim that my description of how some linguistic regularities might have formed out of dialogic interaction represents what really happened. For all its development in recent years, any contribution to the study of the origins of language necessarily involves a high degree of speculation.

I have also not yet addressed directly the question of why human beings all speak languages, while animals do not seem to possess language as we know it.[28] To this question there might be a relatively trivial answer. Some of the difference might lie in the unique anatomy of the human vocal tract (see Carstairs-McCarthy 1999; Vihman & DePaolis 2000). Much of the difference might well lie in the better, more effective and versatile, mnemonic ability humans have, compared to other animals. Perhaps there is some threshold level of capacity to remember or recall the actions of others, which is necessary for the sort of regularities we find in human languages to start developing.

Again, my aim is not to show exactly what happened and how language has originated; that would have been untenable. My aim is more modest: to show that it is not necessary to postulate a radical break and essential difference between language on the one hand and dialogue on the other; that there is nothing wrong with viewing language as essentially dialogic; that linguistic structure (whatever there is of it in our actual practice) *can* in principle have arisen as a direct consequence of our dialogical interaction itself.

Finally, such an approach to the emergence of language yields a methodological advantage. In our study of the past, of historical and evolutionary developments in every field of science, we are guided by the assumption of uniformity: the same general principles and processes that have been in force in the past are also in force in the present, and vice versa. The approach radically

[26] For instance, I did not touch explicitly on the distinction between regularities and normative rules in language (so central to Brandom 1994). This is a matter that deserves separate discussion.

[27] In particular, I made no attempt to give an account of predication. Bakhtin's (1986a, 1986b, 1984, 1981) notion of inner dialogicity and of secondary speech genres – of the possibility to, as it were, play out an exchange of several utterances inside one utterance made by one subject – could be a good starting point for such an account. But this is a theme to discuss at length elsewhere.

[28] Though Segerdahl et al. (2005) suggested we greatly overestimate the depth of this difference between species, and that apes use means of communication that might qualify as language.

breaking and distinguishing language from dialogical communication also, necessarily, inserted a radical break between the time when there was language and an earlier time when there was none. The way language works and develops is seen in such an approach as essentially different from anything that went on before, from anything extra-linguistic, and the uniformity principle thus could not have been applied to explain the emergence of language itself. But if we see language as a form of dialogue, the study of dialogue then gives us access to the general principles of change and development that can bridge this gap, and allow the principle of uniformity to be applied here as well.

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Speech Style and Metarepresentations
Acts of social class (dis)affiliation[1]

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Style as a pivotal construction in sociolinguistic variation has been dealt with, inter alia (Labov 2006, Bell 1984, 2001), as a means of constructing social meaning (Coupland 2001; Eckert 2000, 2001). Against the backdrop of 'speaker-design approaches' on style (Schilling-Estes 2002:388-94), this paper sets out to explore the negotiation of the social meaning of Northern Suburban (henceforth NS) Athenian social class on behalf of three native NS female interactants. More specifically, the analytical focus is on their stylistic resources (Coupland 2007) and the ways they employ them, in order to (dis)affiliate themselves from the practical activities and metarepresentations (Rampton 2006) relevant to NS social class the way they are evident in Greek popular literature. The basic claim made and illustrated through stylistic and ideological data analysis is that the participants' otherwise strategic style use and negotiation of NS social class is constrained by their unconscious influence by popular culture.

1. Style in 'speaker design approaches'

The 'style as speaker design approach' is grounded on the belief that style shifting is not a reactive phenomenon, which was the point of departure in previous approaches (Labov 2006, Bell 1984). Rather, style variation is the core of the active shape and reshape of speaker identity. Identity has a two-dimensional meaning here: the first is the personal one, and it is for the speaker 'to pick out as a particular person', while the second dimension is the interpersonal, which states that a speaker is 'recognized as a part of some larger entity' (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985:2). According to the speaker design approach, these two dimensions are in a symbiotic relationship, i.e., on the one hand, the individual speaker's style reflects attitudes towards groups. At the same time, it is constrained by certain identifiable factors. On the other hand, the identity of a group of speakers lies within the projection of the various styles.

[1] The findings reported here stem from my PhD research project titled: "Indexicalities of Modern Greek Speech Style: A Comparative Sociolinguistic Study on Athenian Suburban Class Identities", which is funded by the Foundation for Education and European Culture (IPEP), the Greek State Scholarships Foundation (IKY) and the Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation. Their support as well as the guidance of my supervisors, Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Devyani Sharma, are acknowledged and highly appreciated. Any errors remaining are my own.

This kind of approach is firmly rooted in the idea of social constructivism, in that language and society are treated as co-constructive. This means that speakers' linguistic repertoire is not mere a reflection of a static identity. On the contrary, it is used by them, in order to create or recreate – either consciously or subconsciously – not only social structures, such as gender or social class, but also their positioning with respect to these structures and to each other. Furthermore, through the use of their linguistic repertoire, speakers position themselves with respect to the talk itself, whether to its subject matter or its entire 'frame', namely the sort of speech activity that is taking place at a specific moment (e.g. Goffman 1974, 1981).

In a nutshell, the models that are based on this approach put a special emphasis on the agentive character of style. They treat style as an initiative taken by speakers, in order to create their identities and to define their stance and attitude towards talk. This entails that in this approach we are not dealing with reified, ready-made structures. Instead, social practice and speaker agency move to the forefront, and they become the focus of research.

A question that arises then is how exactly do people employ speech style in their discussions, in order to construct their identities, and how can analysis capture this sort of process? An answer to this question can be given through Nik Coupland's (2007) 'stylistic resources'.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Stylistic resources

Coupland's 2007 framework is the epitomy of all his previous work on style (for an extensive reference list of Coupland's previous studies, see 2007:192-4) and, essentially, a reconsidered[2] proposal on how to go beyond autonomous linguistics, namely on how to inform the 'restrictive' variationist (or correlational) sociolinguistics of style, which takes the independent variables (or social identities, as Coupland would put it), like age, gender, social, class, ethnicity and so on, for granted, instead of investigating how they are made relevant in people's interactions. In order to overcome this restriction, Coupland proposed the incurporation of other social science frameworks, notions and tools, such as communication science, social psychology, sociology and linguistic anthropology. In his own (2001a:186) words: 'A more broadly conceived 'dialect stylistics' can explore the role of style in projecting speakers' often-complex identities and in defining social relationships and other configurations of context. This is a

[2] My reading of his 2007 proposal is that he has taken into account Rickford's observation (2001: 227), who points out the possible 'limits to the extent to which individuals can consciously adapt their style to project a certain persona or identify with a particular group'. These limits, according to Rickford, have been already identified by Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's Acts of Identity Model (1985), which Coupland had not referred to in his earlier proposal but does so in his 2007 book by considering it in fact as his point of departure.

perspective that allows sociolinguistics to engage with recent inter-disciplinary literatures on selfhood, social relationships and discourse'.

Aiming at making the field more interdisciplinary is in accordance with treating a sociolinguist as somebody who lives in the society, and focuses on the actual variation in speech. A sociolinguist contradicts formal linguists, who assuming a homogenized competence for every native speaker of that language treat language as something abstract. Therefore, in order to cope with variation, the sociolinguistic analysis needs to do justice to the 'complicated' and 'complex' data it tackles by taking into account the psychological, cultural, social, political, ideological, communicative, and of course, linguistic underpinnings and ramifications of the language data under scrutiny rather than making up ad hoc explanations of its own. This interdisciplinarity in the data analysis could also be seen as a significant step towards the effort of sociolinguistics to engage itself more in social theory (Coupland 2001b), a transcendence which is imperative if 'we seek to move from descriptive or observational adequacy to explanatory adequacy' (Rickford 2001:221).

A significant dimension in Coupland's 2007 model framework on style is the 'stylistic resources' one, a schematic representation of which can be found in Figure 1:

Figure 1: *Stylistic resources (Coupland 2007:103-5)*

The reason why this specific model has been chosen as the analytical toolkit for the purposes of this paper is because it covers a wide range of diverse resources,

as will be shown immediately below, hence it can contribute towards a thorough stylistic analysis, which takes into account various dimensions of people's choices. These resources. available to speakers, can be *(socio)linguistic*, namely specific *features (lexico-grammatical and phonological systems)* or whole *dialects* and *speech varieties* imbued with potential for social meaning, and *communicative competence*, namely linguistic awareness of social rules and norms for speaking (Coupland 2007:103). A speaker would engage with social norms and practices based on their knowledge of what variables in their language index, a type of knowledge they have accumulated during their socialization process and their general exposure to social experience. This linguistic awareness can be manifested not only through the speakers' ability to perceive the differences in what these variables index (e.g. –ing indexes prestige and/or formality, while –in' indexes lack of (or perhaps covert) prestige and informality), but also through people's propensity to comment on these differences metalinguistically. In addition, as has been proven through social psychological experiments on language attitudes, speakers display varying degrees of control over these sociolinguistic features, with regards to both using and analysing them (e.g. Preston 1996; Niedzilski & Preston 2003:22ff., Campbell-Kibler 2005:101-27. For a review of sociolinguistic uses of perceptual studies, see Thomas 2002).

This awareness could be seen as a type of reflexivity, which allows the speakers to design their own stylistic operations and attend creatively to the form of their linguistic products (Coupland 2007:101). The notion of reflexivity or awareness is Coupland's argument against Bourdieu's notion of habitus, which constrains people's communicative dispositions, by embedding speakers' style deeply into their social experience. For Bourdieu, 'linguistic competence is a dimension of bodily hexis in which one's whole relation to the social world, and one's whole socially informed relation to the social world, are expressed... Through the mediation of 'articulatory style', the bodily hexis, characteristic of a social class, determines the system of phonological features which characterizes a class pronunciation' (Bourdieu 1991:86). Coupland argues against habitus as a pre-conditioning of practice that precludes choice by suggesting that awareness of the functional and indexical implications of people's utterances is a core quality of all communicative interaction, and as such can also lead people to question, resist or even challenge social norms. This can be realized through the performativity of speaking or *performance*, which forms the third aspect of the stylistic resources dimension of his framework.

In line with Judith Butler (1997:161), he claims that perfomativity, namely 'a unifying thread typing together the marked, segregated aesthetic genres and other spheres of verbal behaviour into a general unified conception of verbal art as a way of speaking[3]' (Bauman 2001:166), leaves space for people to perform

[3] Although performance holds such an important position in Coupland's model, no definition of it is provided. The reason why Bauman's definition is given here is because, notwithstanding its folkloristic point of departure, it encompasses sociolinguistic and anthropological origins (Bauman

'insurrectionary acts' (Butler 1997:145), and thus for their styles to break with the social contexts, in which they occur (Coupland 2007:101). In other words, if performance is incorporated into a framework of how to deal with style, it can allow for realizing (and thus capturing in the analysis) the possibility of speakers' undermining the established, conventional meanings, which are indexed by specific linguistic variables.

As a unifying thread, performance is the level where things are brought together and are synthesized, in order to produce the final product, namely the performed speech act, or to put it simply, the (contextualized) utterance.

Departing from Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's 'acts of identity framework' (1985), whose centrepiece is that 'the individual creates for himself the patterns of his linguistic behaviour so as to resemble those of the group or groups with which from time to time he wishes to be identified, or so as to be unlike those from whom he wishes to be distinguished' (1985:181), Coupland identifies some unresolved issues in this model. The first one is that the model departs from a very western perspective, which tends to downplay, or even to erase (Gal and Irvine 1995) the diversity of people's origin (Maya, Carib et al. as well as English) within a given speech community. Hence, it does not put too much emphasis on the cultural and sociolinguistic inheritance of their data, which are both conversational data and reflections on language use, ethnic and social differences from people, who lived in Belize, St. Vincent and London (2007: 110). The second drawback in this model is the phrase 'wishing to identify with' (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985:181), which according to Coupland is 'ambiguous as to ownership and commitment' (2007:110). He makes a distinction between 'projecting', i.e. launching, making relevant, a specific social identity, such as 'Carib' etc., and feeling or inhabiting a social identity. In this case, it is implied that the person, who 'lives' a social identity owns it. Coupland makes the point that this emic, i.e. person- and not researcher-driven dimension of identity can be erased (Gal & Irvine 1995), when we are viewing identities from a practice-oriented perspective, in the same way as processes or practices tend to get lost, when dealt with from a descriptivist or cognitivist point of view (Coupland 2007:111). What he means by that is that the practice-oriented perspective, as well as the descriptivist or the cognitive one, are interested in dealing with a final product and not with the process, that has given birth to this product, hence these approaches do not pay any attention to the agent, whose action has resulted in a specific practice or product.

Considering this lack of interest in the context of the practices, which also includes the social actors and their understanding of the context, as a significant disadvantage (Coupland 2007:26), he suggests that in order for practices – and for that matter discursive practices – to get meaning, they need to be woven into

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2001:165-88), hence it is in accordance with Coupland's statement that in order to move into non-autonomous sociolinguistics in stylistic research, we need to incorporate tools and notions from other relevant social sciences.

specific contexts; in other words, they need to be contextualized, in order to become socially (and interactionally) meaningful. He prioritizes contexts, namely pre-existing social architecture and a genre structure of a conversation, in which styles are used and identities are constructed, because the meanings of a specific identity label, e.g. social class, can change dramatically over time and over circumstances, hence the only way to understand how the interactants negotiate its meaning is through ethnographic understanding of the social context of the conversation.

To sum up, stylistic resources are employed as a type of performance, constrained by people's communicative competence. Thus, style in general and stylistic resources in particular take their social meaning not on the basis of distributional facts alone but against the backdrop of the context, in which they are embedded. In other words, the readings of the socio-political values and loadings of stylistic practices are dependent on context, therefore basic structural and categorical models, such as variationist (or correlational) sociolinguistics cannot suffice to entertain these considerations (Coupland 2007:176). It is the human agency, translated into strategic uses and manoeuvres of stylistic devices that needs to be taken into account, if we are interested in fleshing out the social meanings that people create in their communication.

In this paper, social class and its social meaning are of interest. However, before moving into the actual analysis of its social meaning, we need to answer the question: 'What is social class?' The answer is provided in the next sub-section.

2.2 Social class and agency

British social historian E. P. Thompson (1978:295ff.) and the Drama Professor R. Williams (1976:60-69, 1977:108-114) deal with social class as the outcome of human agency, as a historically situated activity, as a 'subjectively experienced, lived reality' (Williams 1977:130). Using this approach towards social class, Rampton (2006:215-38) makes the distinction between practical activity and material conditions on the one hand and secondary or metarepresentations on the other through synthesizing Foucault and Williams' positions (2006:222-3). Practical activity or material conditions include the 'primary realities', which are experienced differently by different people in different times, places and networks. On the other hand, secondary or 'meta-level' representations are identified with the ideologies, images and discourses *about* social groups, about the relations of power between them (this is the Foucauldian contribution, see 1982:211-212), and about their different experiences of material conditions and practical activity. The relationship between the two is a close connection, since they are intricately interwoven (Thompson 1978, as cited in Rampton 2006:223). Secondary representations are profoundly shaped by unevenly distributed material conditions and everyday experiences. At the same time, they influence the

apprehension, interpretation, explanation, reproduction and change of material conditions and practical activity.
In what follows, I illustrate how these two dimensions of social class, which form its social meaning, are styled in Modern Greek conversational data.

3. Data analysis

3.1 Background ethnographic information on the participants

All three girls are native Athenians living in the northern suburbs (henceforth NS) of the city. Kynthia is 26 years old and is doing a master's in Biology. Giolanta is 26 years old as well, she was a schoolmate of Kynthia's at a private school in northern suburban Athens, has studied English literature at a Greek university and is now working at a bank. Stelina is 25 years old, has graduated from the same private school and graduated from the Mathematics Department of the university of Athens in January 2008. They are very close friends.

3.2 Context of the conversation

The participants are talking about the relationship between people from the posh and leafy northern and the working class western suburbs (WS) of Athens (Maloutas & Karadimitriou 2001:711) by exchanging experiences they had with colleagues and ex boyfriends. Immediately before this excerpt, they have been focusing on one of Kynthia's colleagues, who comes from Peristeri, and they are negotiating this person's tendency to count every single penny of what other people from the NS choose to spend their money on, by positioning themselves towards this person.

3.3 Data analysis

GREEK TEXT	*ENGLISH TRANSLATION*
1 K d όχι όχι αλλά εε από τα από 'μας ας πούμε	1 K d no no but from us let's say
2 απ'τον κύκλο μας μμ _δεν θα το 'χε σκεφτεί	2 from our peers mm _none would 've thought about it
3 κάποιος κανένας έτσι κανένας έτσι (..) δεν έχω	3 somebody nobody that's it (..) I 've never
4 ακούσει κανέναν από μας ή από άλλα άτομα	4 heard of anybody from us or others whom we
5 που κάνουμε παρέα να το σκέφτονται	5 're hanging out with thinking about it
6 Σ ναι	6 S yeah
7 Γ όχι βέβαια	7 G of course not
8 K όχι όχι κανείς δεν μου το 'χει πει εμένα=	8 K no no nobody has told me so
9 Γ =εννοείται εγώ ποτέ δεν το 'χω	9 G absolutely I 've never thought about it
	10 S f maybe you guys are

σκεφτεί	11 K have you ever thought it like this?
10 Σ f ίσως επειδή παιδιά κάνετε	12 S no maybe because you ‘re hanging out with
11 Κ το ‘χεις σκεφτεί ποτέ εσύ	13 S rich what can I say ((laughing))
12 Σ ffόχι ίσως επειδή κάνετε ~ παρέα με πλούσιους	14 K man, we three are hanging out (.) have you
13 Σ τι να σας πω ((laughing))	15 ever thought↘ like this for me?
14 Κ παιδί μου μαζί κάνουμε παρέα (.) έχεις	16 S no
15 σκεφτεί ποτέ εσύ αυτό το↘ πράγμα για μένα	17 K that’s what I’m saying (.) or would I p ever
16 Σ όχι	18 think that let’s say a d_ Melina goes to London
17 Κ p αυτό σου λέω (.) ή θα σκεφτώ εγώ ας	19 (.) hence Stelina goes too (.) a they went on
18 πούμε ότι α d _πάει η Μελίνα στο Λονδίνο (.)	20 their holiday they ‘ll also do their clothes shopping
19 θα πάει κι η Στελίνα τώρα (.) α πήγαν τις	21 G they ‘ll do their clothes shopping yeah @@
20 διακοπές τους θα ψωνίσουν και τα ρούχα τους.	22 K how could that be possible?=
21 Γ θα ψωνίσουν και τα ρούχα τους ναι @@@	23 G = to think like this?
22 Κ μα είναι δυνατόν;=	24 S if by any chance I ‘ve thought about
23 Γ = να κάνεις τέτοιους συνειρμούς;	25 K yes
24 Σ αν όμως το ‘χω σκεφτεί για	26 S yeah but maybe it doesn’t cause me ↗ a stir
25 Κ ναι	27 K but that’s what I’m saying to you
26 Σ ναι ίσως όμως δε μου κάνει↗ αίσθηση	28 S maybe because I too have the ability to
27 Κ μα αυτό σου λέω	29 do it
28 Σ ίσως επειδή κι εγώ έχω τη δυνατότητα να	30 K it doesn’t cause us a stir
29 το κάνω	31 G but you don’t pay attention to it
30 Κ εμάς δε μας κάνει αίσθηση	32 K it doesn’t cause us a stir to others
31 Γ μα δεν το υπολογίζεις αυτό	33 it may make a sensation
32 Κ εμάς δε μας κάνει αίσθηση σε άλλους	34 S yeah
33 μπορεί να κάνει αίσθηση	35 K that’s what I’m saying I didn’t tell that I’m
34 Σ ναι	36 hanging out with ↘rich people of course I’m not what (.) ee
35 Κ αυτό λέω δεν είπα ότι κάνω παρέα με	37 _we all belong to the same financial
36 ↘πλούσιους εννοείται και δεν κάνω (.) εε εδώ τι (.)	38 status I think (.) more or less
37 _στο ίδιο οικονομικό status νομίζω είμαστ’	39 S yeah

38 όλοι (.) πάνω κάτω 39 Σ ναι	

In this dataset, the issue at stake is whether people from the NS are (or should be explicit about) counting the money they spend on material goods. In the first nine lines of the excerpt we can observe an agreement on behalf of all the participants that nobody from their social circle (line 2) would even think of being explicit about their expenses. Through this agreement achieved by the use of several stylistic resources, including the discourse markers *yes* (line 6), *of course not* (line 7), the repetition of *no* juxtaposed with an anecdotal declaration on behalf of Kynthia (line 8), and Giolanta's latching in line 9, the participants are constructing their social circle background by means of affiliating themselves with this circle's or class's individual consciousness and action (Burawoy 1990: 348), which is translated into not stating explicitly how much money they spend on material goods. This is exactly Coupland's notion of communicative competence that is at play here: the non explicit statement that the practical activity of spending money is identified with the social rules and norms associated with the NS speech style. In other words, the more implicit a NS person is with providing details on the exact amount of money they spend on an item the more NS-embraced this behaviour will be considered. In addition, through the verbalizing of social circle or group or, eventually, class formation, different instantiations of the participants' practical consciousness are also to be observed: even though Stelina agrees with the participants on the received interpretation of their class's standard behaviour (line 6), in line 10 and especially in lines 12 and 13, she is trying to disaffiliate herself from her interactants by suggesting that the latter share the same opinion because of the fact that they hang out with wealthy people, while by implication, she is not. In order to index this implication, she interactionally, i.e. through the use of the second person plural, positions herself against them. It is exactly in this positioning that we can notice the underpinnings of her different practical consciousness compared to the one of Kynthia and Giolanta's; even though she accepts that such a behaviour, i.e. not being explicit about one's expenses, is indeed typical for NS people, she is personally trying to distance herself from it, by implying that she does not hang out with wealthy people. In this way, Stelina delineates her practical experience from the experience of the other two female participants with the aim to distance herself from them in terms of how she deals with the NS behaviour. Such a stylistic and interactional choice of disaffiliation on Stelina's behalf breaks with the social contexts, in which it occurs (Coupland 2007:101), both at the level of the discussion she is having with her friends, and in which the expected line (or preferred sequence (Schegloff 2007), in conversation analytical terms) would be that of agreement with her interlocutors, and at the level of her endorsement of the NS lifestyle in general (ethnographic notes). In this sense, these lines could be analytically treated as an instantiation of performance, which essentially

undermines the established, conventional meanings associated with Stelina's stylistic choices both at the linguistic and the level of social practices.

Nevertheless, in line 14 Kynthia is trying to reaffiliate Stelina to their social circle and, by extension, to their social class. The probing yes/no question in lines 14 and 15 is strategically used by Kynthia to make Stelina accept that her actual practical consciousness is line with the consciousness of the other two participants. The strategic flavour lies in the question's personal character: Kynthia in a way 'imposes' indirectly to Stelina that the latter really belongs to the same social class as she is by asking the question whether Stelina has thought like this, i.e. whether she has thought negatively about Kynthia, because the latter is explicit about her expenses. When Stelina provides Kynthia with the expected answer *no* in line 16, Kynthia in a reassuring way indexed by the phrase 'that's what I'm saying' in line 17, carries on her argument on why she thinks that she herself belongs to this social class, namely the NS one; because she also would never think that her friends, including Stelina, spend a lot of money on travelling, and buying clothes. The implication of such a thought is that people do not have enough money, this is why they need to be careful and not spend it without reason. Nevertheless, if somebody does not have enough money and, as a result, cannot spend it easily, then they do not belong to the NS social class, and this is something that Kynthia and Giolanta want to avoid by explicitly referring to their practical consciousness.

It is exactly this explicit reference to their practical consciousness that renders it relevant for the analysis issues of hegemony. As a lived system of meanings and values that views social class as 'relations of domination and subordination' (Rampton 2006: 220), practical consciousness is evident in this excerpt in the form of the jointly constructed rhetorical question made by Kynthia and Giolanta in lines 22 and 23, the use of which indexes the fact that NS practice of not being explicit about expenses is dominant, i.e. felicitous or 'appropriate' for the participants, while the opposite, namely being explicit about their expenses, which is a typical WS practice, is subordinate, namely inappropriate. This rhetorical question functions as a statement (it's impossible for people belonging to our class to think like this) rather than as a request for information. In line with Stenström (1984:53-4, cited in Ainsworth-Vaughn 1994:198), it functions as a 'forceful statement' because its response is supposed to be obvious to all interactants.

In the subsequent lines, Stelina is trying to make the point that it is due to her being accustomed to spending much money that she is not thinking about it, and as a result, expenses does not cause her (and her interactants) a stir. By claiming this, she essentially aligns with both Kynthia and Giolanta's practical consciousness.

So far, I have been analyzing a manifestation of the practical activity, namely a conversation on the similarities and differences between NS and WS, among three native NS people. However, a question that arises is if and how the analysis of this activity can get currency and be rendered generalizable or at least

expandable, i.e. reflecting the worries and thoughts of a wider range of people in the Athenian society. To answer this question, I now turn to the level of popular culture. The rationale behind this correlation is that if in popular culture data, which are widely accessible and as such can have a major impact on audiences, the same practical activities and metarepresentations associated with social class are to found as the ones presented in the aforementioned conversational data, then these stylistic features of popular culture have a bearing on the general perception of the social class, and thus influence its social meaning by rendering it negotiable among people in the context of everyday discussions.

3.4 Popular culture data

The term 'popular culture', echoing Giddens (1997:364), encompasses the "entertainments watched, read or participated in by hundreds of thousands or millions of people". The specific excerpt that is used in this section stems from the popular literary text 'Mykonos Blues' by Pavlina Nasioutzik (2007). The book's plot is rotated around the life-style of people, both women and men, who live a wealthy life in the northern suburbs of Athens, and provide many dimensions of the NS and WS social meanings associated with the NS-WS discourse.

Greek text	English translation
(σ. 217) Γι'αυτό ήθελα να φύγω από το Ψυχικό, τη Φιλοθέη και την Εκάλη. Ήθελα να βρω ένα μέρος όπου οι άνθρωποι δεν θα προσπαθούσαν να σε κατατάξουν με το που σε γνώριζαν, όπου το κοινωνικό status, η υπερβολική σημασία στα υλικά αντικείμενα δε θα κυριαρχούσαν. Αναζητούσα ένα μέρος όπου δε θα χρειαζόταν να παίρνω μια συγκεκριμένη πόζα.	(p. 217) That's why I wanted to leave Psychico, Filothei and Ekali[4]. I wanted to find a place where people wouldn't try to classify you, as soon as they got to know you; a place where social status, overwhelming attention to material objects wouldn't be the rule. I was after a place, where it wouldn't be crucial to put on a specific persona.

The excerpt from the literary text Mykonos Blues contains metapragmatically stated ideologies and Discourses (Gee 1999) about social groups and the relations of power between them, and about their differences in terms of their peculiar positioning towards material conditions and everyday activity. The two excerpts, namely the excerpt with the conversational data and the underlined sentence in the current one are linked to each other on the basis of their common implicature and presupposition (Levinson 1983):

[4] These are the names of three of the most typical Athenian northern suburbs.

- *What is said →spending a lot of money in travelling, education and shopping does not cause a stir to none of the participants*
- *Implicature → they have the ability to spend lots of money for these purposes and each one of them knows that the other two has this ability*
- *Presupposition → they come from wealthy families, who support them and provide them with the capacity to spend lots of money on material goods*

The secondary or meta-level representations of the NS social class are explicit in the literary excerpt, which as part of the popular culture, is widely accessible to masses of people, including the three female participants whose data were analysed above (ethnographic notes). These representations could be seen as belonging to the ideology associated with the NS culture, and as such, echoing Van Dijk's view of ideology (Blommaert 2005:167), they could be seen as a dimension of the conceptual framework in which people, and in this specific case, Kynthia, Giolanta and Stelina, live and act. Seen like this, these representations fall into Raymond William's view of hegemony as 'deeply saturating the consciousness of a society' (1976:145). Hence, on the basis of their common implicatures and presuppositions, the linking between these two excerpts could be seen as a link between the micro-macro level of social class construction: at the micro-level, it is individual participants who agentively construct their sense of social class, while at the macro level there is a synergy of the micro-levels of participants' and represented social class construction, accessible to the consumer, that constructs social class.

4. Conclusion

The basic claim that this paper tried to put forward is that the negotiation of the social meaning of social class takes place through people's strategic, i.e. agentive, employment of stylistic resources (sociolinguistic features, communicative competence and performance), which however are constrained by the power of hegemonic ideology associated with social classes. Such an ideology is evident at the level of popular culture, which people have a very good command of; in fact, the knowledge people have of popular culture and the ways it represents ideology is so good and so deeply rooted inside them, that this ideology could be characterized as 'subconsciously penetrating' people, a fact that becomes evident through the identification of implicatures and presuppositions associated with the metarepresentations of NS culture relevant to both the aforementioned excerpts. In light of the above, we can see the constructionist view of social life in action: the social meaning of NS social class and the ideology behind it as well as the participants reaccentuations of stylistic features ('our circle' in line 2 becomes

'rich people' in line 12 and ends up being 'financial status' in line 37) and the representations associated with them and the NS culture in general are constantly negotiated by the participants in their unique discursive context, which in the case of this excerpt, is the informal conversation.

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Appendix

Transcription conventions

CAPITALS mark very emphatic stress
' original Greek word stress
word' apostrophe used when the last vowel of a word has been omitted (oral speech)
(.) pause less than 0.5 sec
(..) pause between 0.5-1 sec
(…) pause longer than 1 sec
: vowel lengthening
[utterance
[overlapping
=
= second utterance latched onto first
@@ transcription impossible
(( )) transcriber's comments
, low pitch on word
~ high pitch on phrase, continuing until punctuation
_ low pitch on phrase, continuing until punctuation
. sentence final-falling intonation
; sentence final-rising intonation (question)
p piano (spoken softly)
pp pianissimo (spoken very soflty)

f forte (spoken loudly)
ff fortissimo (spoken very loudly)
acc (spoken quickly)
dec (spoken slowly)
⌜ overlapping
⌞ utterances

Thinking between Passions and Deliberation

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This paper traces the historical roots that foster the mighty opposites between passion and reason by way of the works of Arendt, Weber, Schmitt and game theorists. Hannah Arendt's work on the French Revolution will help us understand how the opposites create and distort our idea of the political. Both Arendt and Max Weber see the role of passion in the formation of the political. In Weber's case, in the time of political crisis, a charismatic leader who is capable of mustering and riding on the waves of passion that are swaying the tumultuous political scene, will win the day. Both Weber and Carl Schmitt's view of the necessity of the sovereign to take the decisive move over and above the political turmoil or stalemate puts the principle of open dialogue and deliberation into serious question. The emergence of game theory in which "tacit bargaining" plays a dominant role is the latest dramatis persona in the play between passion and the rationality of open dialogue. Perhaps a potential way of out of the waiting-for-Godot-of-the-spirit-of-dialogue scenario is by focusing on the "minor" passions that answer to emotional needs without inundating the need to negotiate the islands of individual need.

1. Introduction

Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I've tasted of desire
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice.

- Robert Frost, "Fire and Ice"

Robert Frost's poem brings to life the part cardinal passions play in our modern life. But the poem also maps out a dialogic situation where the proponent of fire is at odds with their counterpart who embraces ice or fire[1]. But of course the poem carries the story beyond its zero-sum potential: there is the poetic "I" who listens to and in the dichotomized debate. Although he does not seem to be able to offer a concrete proposal of how to end the hostility, he provides us with a vantage point of imaginary history as someone who has been or seen twice: "From what I've tasted . . . But if it had to perish twice . . ." The thoughtful voice also reminds the

participants of the mortal game in which ice harbors enough fire to accomplish what fire may have set out to do or vice versa: From out of either the fire or the ice, the poet enables us to envision the tug of war as almost a kind of dance, a counterpoint. Perhaps none from the opposing camps can survive the game of either fire or ice but the poetic persona lives to tell the tale even if it is a tale of mortal embrace. If we look upon the fire and the ice in the poem as passions that to thinkers such as John Locke, Shaftesbury, Hannah Arendt and Weber are at the heart of modern politics, then in Frost's poem the passions are not the only forces at work.[2] The poet not just portrays the trajectory of the opposing passions but by giving them an overarching plot, an arc, a scenario where in no matter it is ice or fire the pieces obey some kind of regularity, an entropic regularity or otherwise, he sets the parameters of the emergent interaction that is born of the opposing passions. The possible fate of the counterpoint then will not be the inevitable mutual cancellation of fire and ice. In short, the poem outlines the important topics of this paper, i.e., passions play crucial roles in modern political world ever since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution but these passions that foster revolutions past and present risk terror and annihilation if the voice of reason cannot bring the passions down to earth at the very moment of the passionate founding of societies and laws. But in contrast, no one will be ignorant of the role cold calculation plays in the antebellum turmoil, the ensuing horror of WW II and the later conflicts where death and destruction are but stakes in a game. The illimitable negative potential of cold calculation that both Arendt and Weber complain about is succinctly summarized in the poem: "But if it had to perish twice, / I think I know enough . . . / To say that for destruction ice / Is also great / And would suffice." [3] And finally the voice of the poet represents the role of thinking as envisioned by Arendt in relation to both deliberation and passions.

From what has gone before, it is obvious that I can only aim to talk about passions in a very general way just as I plan only to look at the relationship between the former and rational deliberation in a sweeping manner. The reason behind the choice is linked to my view of the role of pivotal passions. First, I consider in the relevant discussions of Rousseau, Weber and Arendt, specific passions constitute the focus in the establishment of the social contract (for Rousseau), the birth of the charismatic leader (for Weber), and the failure of the French Revolution (for Arendt). As focus, a particular kind of passion distinguishes itself from more commonplace emotions. For example, melancholy or (religious) enthusiasm may characterize the 17th century, for Arendt and later theorists, sympathy or commiseration marks the beginning of modern revolutions, and for our own age, terror or its negation, negative furor which verges on nihilistic piety (if such term exists).[4] These fundamental passions are more than specific moves or moods. Perhaps they also dictate the game we play, particularly if it is a mixed one, that is, game in which passions (and reason itself) play an ambivalent role, facilitating and debilitating at the same time.[5] Second, if we admit to the founding contribution of the passions, we should be particularly

interested in the ways through which they are incorporated into Rousseau, Weber, Arendt and indirectly game theorists such as Thomas Schelling and Ken Binmore. For Rousseau, passion (selfish or unselfish, peaceful or belligerent) and compassion are the almost inaudible voice-over in the theorization about the state of nature, the emergence of artificial inequality and the social contract. For Weber, passion takes center stage and takes the form of the charismatic leader, the politician who takes on the vocation of politics and is able to rally mass support and to gain the necessary plebiscite through demagoguery. The Cesarist for Weber often is not the person who dwells too much upon political deliberations but one who terminates it. Passion at the eve of the war with all its rhetorical effectiveness and prominence perhaps deigns not to create a spirit of cooperation but of uniformity. But when we come to the post-war era, passions are put on a par with any other things and as long as they serve as foci, as the meeting place through imagination for the participants, they facilitate mutual accommodation and the final resolution. In compassion, we reach out to others, similar to or different from us through our imagination rather than other means. Through imagination, we suffer what others suffer and therefore demand the sufferings should cease. By shifting the emphasis on the function of imagination, passions not so much lose their prominence but prominence itself can be bestowed on any available thing, without needing much or even in lieu of communication:

> People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same. Most situations—perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game—provide some clue for coordinating behavior, *some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do*. Finding the key, or rather finding *a* key – any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes *the* key – may depend on imagination more than on logic. (italics added) (Schelling 1980:57)

You can give symbolic, aesthetic, geometric significance to this prominence but Schelling's choice of the word, "focus," is not just a neutral one. The seemingly bland or neutral word in fact signals not just the leveling out of the passions into the commonplace but it also suggests that the revolution fueled by the passions that Rousseau anticipates can happen anywhere anytime. In fact, it would not be considered as revolution but negotiation and bargaining because the outcome can be foreseen. Revolution can hardly be treated as game. Yet games (game theories) are revolutionary in the sense that by recognizing the prevalence of focal points, mutual accommodation is often the foreseeable rule rather than the exception. Hannah Arendt's discussions of the role of passions in relation to instituting laws and implementing justice and later remarks on the same subject in another context well illustrate the ambivalent and mixed status of our topic. But before going on to specific examples, one last point: Schelling's discussion of the presence of the "rallying point", of particular focus in achieving final accommodation beyond zero sum, has as its model the *tacit* bargaining. It is in this latter case, where communication is partial or impossible that we see the ineluctable working of the

focus and emergence of the mutual frame of reference in bringing the rational parties to a certain agreement and balance. This is the case for Schelling and basically Binmore, who, in place of Thomas Hobbes' state of nature, deals with the theory of social contract by invoking Rawls' theory of the "original position" ("Members of society are asked to envisage the social contract to which they would agree *if* their current roles in society were concealed from behind a *veil of ignorance*. From the point of view of those in such an informational state, the distribution of advantage in the planned society would be determined as though by lottery. The idea is that a social contract agreed to in such an original position would be 'fair', the intuition being that 'devil take the hindmost' will not be an attractive principle if you yourself might end up with the lottery ticket that assigns you to the position at the rear" (Binmore 1994:13)). Both Schelling's model of the tacit bargaining and Binmore's alternative theoretic fiction go beyond explicit communication. The drive towards a final optimization takes precedence over the presence or absence of communication or dialogue. In other words, empathy or sympathy, as the hallmark passion of the Enlightenment for Rousseau, Arendt as well as for Binmore, is at the heart of the final optimization often without the need for communication or dialogue. The passion of commiseration is the bane of the French Revolution for Arendt but it is rendered harmless by Binmore. By eliminating the need for a priori conditions such as natural laws for the success of social contract, Binmore sees the revolutionary struggle play themselves out in every parlor games and bargaining. When commiseration turns into empathy, revolutions will be able to become parlor games. One excuse in invoking game theories offhandedly like this is that I want to highlight in very broad strokes the crucial role sympathy or imagination play in the theorists' descriptions of the process of bargaining and establishing social contracts. This sympathy and imaginary identification may pave the way for later dialogues and deliberation but in themselves they are adequate to the task of bargaining. The reason that I broached the subject of game theory is to bring to the fore the relationship between dialogue and the passions: should the relationship be seen as compatible activities or as one overall game that includes several sets of moves in which passions may dominate?

2. Hannah Arendt's critique of the politics of passions

Arendt's attitudes towards the role of passions and their connection with rational deliberation and thinking give us a rich example of the questions involved. Instead of emphasizing the fictional quality or equating the social contract with the original position, with or without the Kantian connotation, Arendt turns her attention to Rousseau face to face with the misery of the masses. Rousseau's "natural man" with his simple needs and naivety may be looked upon as someone who would survive if the hypocrisy and callousness of the ruling class can be eradicated. Natural man, the bare necessity that sustains people's lives, natural

rights that are so close to that necessity, all these makes the French Revolution a struggle to free the natural man from Nature: In the revolution, politics is reduced to the question of nature ("The Social Question" 108-109). For Arendt, politics should strive to differentiate itself from Nature and from the "necessity of life" (*Not des Lebens*), so to speak. To liberate the natural man, Rousseau "summoned up the resources of the heart against the indifference of the salon and against the 'heartlessness' of reason, both of which will say 'at the sight of the misfortune of others: *Perish if you wish, I am secure*…" (italics added) (Arendt 1990:88). The last part reminds us of Binmore's interpretation of the benign potential of the original position (i.e. the 'devil take the hindmost' situation will not happen). But in a way, the assessment of the true nature of the state of nature affects the shape of their theories. To Arendt, Rousseau's all-encompassing, boundless sentimentalism and its realization in Robespierre steers the revolution away from paying attention to the singular case, the instituting of law and order and specific real problems. The boundless pity for the suffering multitudes incapacitates Robespierre from considering politics: "[T]he ocean of suffering around him and the turbulent sea of emotion within him … drowned all specific considerations … the considerations of friendship no less than considerations of statecraft and principle" (Arendt 1990:90). The revolution opens the floodgate and let the torrents of social problems surge into the territory of the political realm. The latter has since become the realm of the social and what belongs to the space of the household has now burst into the public realm but the problems belonging to *oikos* or *oeconomia* cannot be solved in the public space and through political means of "decision and persuasion" (Arendt 1990:90f.). This boundless emotion of compassion will prove a grave challenge to the future of modern nations: "Robespierre once compared the nation to the ocean; it was indeed the ocean of misery and the ocean-like sentiments it aroused that combined to drown the foundation of freedom" (Arendt 1990:94). Arendt actually is adding a new page to the discussion of the so-called "oceanic feeling"(in the context of religion) apropos of Romain Rolland and Sigmund Freud's demystification in the latter's 1930 *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Just as Freud the scientist would revolt when confronting Rolland's plea for religion, Arendt has problem with the sweeping rallying of the masses or even humankind under the umbrella of the concept of the general will, the people or the race. Catastrophes occur under the sea swells of the unbounded oneness. Therefore, to continue Frost's metaphor, it seems that after fire and ice, ocean too is enough to overwhelm. Although we would question the Enlightenment naïve understanding of the relationship between passions and reason and would question its simple equation of thought and reason as well as reason with rationality, yet we need to realize that the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart (Arendt 1990:95ff). By celebrating the natural man behind the mask of hypocrisy, Rousseau exposes to the light of day the deep chasm and the split of the human psyche that hounds us still. He creates the ever urgent need for truthfulness, even in the realm of politics. This fault line

not only creates the contest between deceit and truthfulness, but it also stirs up the recesses of the human psyche that man himself should not be forced to brave. Doubt and self-doubt or motive witch hunting may not be conducive to political deliberation which should follow a different path than monologues questioning every motive including their own. This is a significant practical and political guideline. There should be a fundamental difference between exposing the dark recesses of the human heart and the work of conjecture in Schelling's game of tacit bargaining. In the world of politics and human actions, the public airing and display of motives, especially radically good motives, often courts the exact opposite of the putative aim:

> To be sure, every deed has its motives as it has its goal and its principle; but the act itself, though it proclaims its goal and makes manifest its principle, does not reveal the innermost motivation of the agent. His motives remain dark… most of the time, from himself, from self-inspection, as well. Hence, the search for motives, the demand that everybody display in public his innermost motivation, since it actually demands the impossible, transforms all actors into hypocrites. The effort, moreover, to drag the dark and the hidden into the light of the day can only result in an open and blatant manifestation of those acts whose very nature makes them seek the protection of darkness; it is, unfortunately, the essence of these things that every effort to make goodness manifest in public ends with the appearance of crime and criminality on the political scene… In the realm of human affairs, being and appearance are indeed one and the same. (Arendt 1990:98)

This is an extremely insightful and far-sighted statement, harkening back to the Greek tragedy. Perhaps the passages imply that one of the morals of Oedipus' tragedy is that to drag into the light of day that which in its very nature seeks darkness for protection is *hubris* against the *polis*. Action in the political world does not involve the distinction between appearance and being and because his heart is elsewhere, the man of action refrains from disturbing the darkness. The passage also poses challenges for Arendt herself and for us because public or televised trials against war criminals and open pleas for justice for atrocities or suppressed history and memories have never ceased. How can we *not* look into and examine ourselves in an age of violence and global depletion and deprivation? In face of the tragedy and modern tragedies, Arendt calls for the clear division of labor between public persuasion and decision and the gaze, publicized or not, in the mirror. Human action demands no confessions before or after decisions. And game theory deals with this world of action. Confession and action is to be distinguished. It needs no examination of secret motives at least in the sense of confessing guilt or revealing hypocrisy. In the world of games, we seem to see the clear division between the operation of human affairs and the lure of the dark side. Confession as a derivative of the passion for innocence and its safeguard is on the one hand related to action, e.g. political action in the modern world, and on the other hand, its poses threat to effective action. The demand for confession is derived from the image of the natural man and our urge to be as innocent and free from selfishness. Compassion's primary aim is to restore the

natural man. Yet, beyond a certain limit, compassion and its imagination inhibit action. Or to put in another way, compassion or sympathy works if it mobilizes imagination not just inwardly but also transitively and transitively in a manner that does not include, automatically, a whole body of people.

3. The world of games

But suddenly the action-oriented utopia Arendt struggles for after WW II, after the Holocaust, and the Vietnam war, appears in the world of games. Where has the danger that Arendt warns against gone? Or, where is everything else in contrast to the operation of human affairs, e.g., the world of darkness and passions? Therefore, can we say that by taking the fire out of the passions and locate them in commonplace actions, we risk the unending icy white nights? In theoretic terms, a key passion such as commiseration does not need to and cannot be simply brought in line by rational dialogue probably because for Schelling empathy works itself out in the tacit bargaining process. A key passion by being the focus or contributing to the appearance of a focus achieves cooperation and mutual accommodation in lieu of dialogue. Arendt's insistence on the division of labor actually brings into focus our and Oedipus' undeniable passion for truth: we tend to speak louder than our actions just as our actions speak louder than words. Arendt addresses the mis-match by pointing out the excess in passionate self-exposure that inhibits effective action and, in contrast, the game theorists demonstrate how negotiating actions have no need for words, for dialogue or deliberation.

Living in the time of the Weimar Republic and witnessing the political stalemate and the crisis of parliamentary democracy, Weber has profound understanding of the reign of passions in modern politics:

> Active democratization of the masses means that the political leader is no longer declared a candidate because a circle of notables has recognized his proven ability, and then becomes leader because he comes to the fore in parliament, but rather because he uses the means of mass demagogy to gain the confidence of the masses and their belief in his person, and thereby gains power. Essentially this means that the selection of the leader has shifted in the direction of *Caesarism*. Indeed every democracy has this tendency. After all, the specifically Caesarist instrument is the plebiscite. This is not the usual 'casting of the votes' or 'election', rather it is a confession of belief in *the* vocation for leadership of the person who has laid claim to this acclamation… Every kind of direct *election by the people* of the bearer of supreme power… lies on the road towards these 'pure' forms of Caesarist acclamation. (Weber 1994:220f.)

Weber's recognition of the irreducible part passions play in politics and especially in the birth of the political leader is in step with his understanding of the rational and dialogic spirit of the parliamentary system and the particular concept of law in support of the system. The essence of parliament rests on the principle of "public deliberation of argument and counterargument" but for Weber, the decision of a democracy will have to be arrived at by a Caesarist depicted above

who has the full mandate of the people. The concept of law implied by this view of the true nature of democracy as opposed to liberal parliamentarism of open dialogue cannot be more pointedly expressed by Hobbes: "*Auctoritas, non Veritas facit Legem* ("Authority, not truth, makes the law")" (qtd. Schmitt 1988:43). Carl Schmitt, writing in 1923, reminds us of the limitation of open deliberation and he answers to a specific political reality. More important to us is the following: What exactly is the missing key to the heart of the universal law based on reason or what always stops dialogue from reaching the desired generality? According to Schmitt, Bodin has located the quintessential problem: "it will always be necessary to make exceptions to the general rule in concrete circumstances, and the sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception" (Schmitt 1988:43). The demagogue's passionate bid for the plebiscite constitutes an exception, an exception to the rule of open dialogue but this exception which manages to muster enough authority and mandate somehow brings a sense of closure to the open dialogue. A few observations: First, an alternative to the importance of the exceptional passion is that we can look into the working of the dialogue and the classical example would be the Socratic dialogue. Perhaps there is some inherent instability or indeterminacy in the very essence of dialogue that requires a certain "leap of passion" in order for the opposites to converge.[7] Second, the exceptional power and the state of emergency are related to the lone sovereign of Hobbes, the odd man out, so to speak. No matter how we look at the odd-man-out figure, as the sovereign, the demagogue, or the failed interlocutor, he highlights a fact which Bodin has pointed out in the above quote. In it, Bodin is not just stressing the unique role of the sovereign in the application of the general rule but he is also insisting on the fact that, at all time, general rules are inadequate. They have to be completed by making exceptions suitable to concrete situations. It asserts unequivocally that there are only concrete situations and they demand unique intercessions. I think this touches upon a core of our discussion of the relationship between the key passions (such as sympathy, or the political passion of the demagogue) and open dialogue and deliberation. Related to this, Arendt makes the important distinction between compassion and pity that will contribute to a first answer. The former takes place by the intimate connection with a singular person and his or her situation, no more no less, and is felt in the flesh. Because compassion is incapable of generalization and comprehends only the particular, it differs from reason. In contrast, pity is depersonalizing in that it sweeps over the full length of humanity (Arendt 1990:85). Compassion comprehend only the particular, the singular other person. Arendt is quick to point out that compassion implies co-suffering, with the other person. The singular and the reach of the passions are the heart of the matter here.

For Weber, only through the unique intercession of the sovereign or the dedicated politician can the deadlock of endless argument and counterargument be lifted and turmoil avoided. Weber touches on both the exacerbated openness of deliberation and the danger of single-minded political will that holds the whole

populace for ransom. Where does the deliberation stop and where the political will start? When will political will pause and allow interlocutors speak for effect? In a way, Arendt's understanding of co-suffering in compassion can give us a clue to the means of achieving a Gestalt without risking too much tyranny. Compassion is passion but a passion for two, a co-passion. Compassion is a legitimate passion for it shares with just another person: It is limited, bounded, in contrast to the unbounded revolutionary passions. To use one of her depictions of the Socratic dialogue, it is a two-in-one, the one who asks and the one who answers within the confines of thinking: "It is this *duality* of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering process . . . whereby we constantly raise the basic Socratic question: *What do you mean when you say …*? (Arendt 2000:408). Weber's odd man out and Arendt's two-in-one interpretation of the singular in terms of thinking perhaps will force us to modify our idea both of the dialogue and about passions.

4. Conclusion, or where does dialogue stop and thinking begin?

We need to take into consideration of the termination of the dialogue and the difference between thinking (as two-in-one self examination) and dialogue. Their views also pose a question for the game theorists who chart out the inevitable evolution from zero-sum to equilibrium whether the participants are engaging in non-cooperative or cooperative game, engaging in tacit or explicit bargaining: Singularity means the former two thinkers operate on the level of individual cases and within the confines of unique existence and presence. What we need to ask is the time scheme on which we are operating. Should we either make provisions for individual cases while pursuing long-term results or should we refrain from the political use of the game conclusions, for we understand politics as about particular circumstances? It may well be that despite the tortuous process of going from deliberation that begs for closure, through the critical self-questioning of thinking, and then to the passions that see only the rise and fall of the empire, we will end up with what the game theorists have mapped out, but the process through thinking, doing and talking, in slow motion, may still hold something worth pondering over for this day to day pace is the time scheme everyday people normally operate on.

The poet, Robert Frost, certainly causes us to pause and ponder. His talk forces us to falter and hesitate in the middle of things. We begin with Frost's fire and ice and circle around the oceanic pity. Arendt's depiction of thinking can serve as the end of journey through the elements. For Arendt, thinking throughout the Western philosophical tradition is often linked with the element of the wind. Thinking sweeps away fixations and even its own past stance. It is like the whirlwind or storm: "It is in this invisible element's [i.e. wind's] nature to undo,

unfreeze, as it were, what language, the medium of thinking, has frozen into thought" (Arendt 2000:404). Arendt mentions here the peculiar relationship between thinking and language. For her, thinking has the ability of raising fundamental questions to language and this implies, unlike passions which work beyond tacit or manifest communication, thinking works both on and in language. Because of the radical questioning, thinking cannot guarantee anything constructive, cannot provide improvement, or even worse, it sometimes demolishes the very generality that perhaps characterizes the language system: "If what you were doing consisted in applying general rules of conduct to particular cases as they arise in ordinary life, you will find yourself paralyzed because no such rules and routine can withstand the wind of thought". The best you can ask from thinking is not on-hand application of ready concepts on everyday situations. "Practically, thinking means that each time you are confronted with some difficulty in life you have to make up your mind anew" (Arendt 2000:405).

In short, perhaps we can make a tentative conclusion concerning the distinct characteristics of thinking, passions and dialogue: First, thinking operates uniquely and non-reiteratively. Second, passions of the cardinal kind project a time frame of such a length that particular cases probably will only create minor ripples in the overall rise and fall. Third, this cardinal kind of passion will then profoundly affect or even vie with deliberation that is convinced of the long-term validity of rational process and result. Perhaps we can invoke the idea of the "ordinal" in ordinal utilities (as opposed to cardinal utilities). There are passions, ordinal or minor passions, in contrast to Schelling's key passions (such as compassion in Arendt's sense), that deal with unique experiences[8]. These may be the passions that paradoxically speak to us and allow dialogue, because perhaps they do not have their eyes only on definite results. Finally, thinking, on the other hand, creates the staccatos in the deliberation process. It deals with practicalities and asks questions about the person himself or herself. It works in and on language so that dialogue, after the staccatos, may move on.

To go back to the element of wind, if we take into consideration Arendt's depiction of the two-in-one nature of the Socratic dialogue and the nature of thinking to always backtrack on itself and on fixed concepts, maybe we can envision the wind of thinking as wind of two-in-one, that is, it is breathing. Thinking is the breath, the rhythm, the finite periodicity of questioning and answering within the process of deliberation which is more long-lasting.

Notes

1. The term "cardinal" derives from the distinction between "ordinal" and "cardinal" utilities in game theory. Ordinal utilities, the satisfaction we obtained by pursuing our preferences, deal with the order of the satisfactions gained regardless of the common ground of comparison. Cardinal utilities supplement the order with the strength of the whole range of satisfactions, enabling precise comparison and calculation on a common basis (Heap *Game Theory*, 8-9). My use of the adjective is intended to reflect comparative importance of the passion of

compassion in relation to both cool reason and other candidates of passion. From some of the explicit and implicit usages in this paper, the reader can certainly sense my intention of trying to explore the connection between some basic ideas of game theory and the role of emotions or passions; moreover, this will assist us in understanding the interaction between (or lack thereof) emotions and rationality.

2. One connection between the third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper) and the present paper lies in Shaftesbury's emphasis on the role of practical concerns of life and the importance of the passions in an age reason and systematic philosophy of Descartes or Locke is at their height. Without sacrificing rationality whole-sale, he advocates the use of a practical kind of self-reflection and dialogue with oneself in an unprejudiced examination of the passions in order to arrive at a useful recognition of what is good for us. Shaftesbury's stoic heritage enables him to embrace the inevitable importance of passions in a life guided too by reason and self-interests. Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, is of importance here because she represents a critique of the dangerous use of specific passions in modern politics from Enlightenment onwards. For her, in *On Revolution* and in other works where she discusses the relationship between passions and politics, matters of the heart which belong to human necessities should not possess monopoly over politics which operates on rational deliberation rather than on necessities. Weber, addressing the pre-war context, foresees the central role of the modern political leader as mater manipulator of passions.

3. Arendt's analysis of the use of cold calculation is best seen in her essay, "Lying in Politics" (collected in *Crisis of the Republic*), in which she discusses political secrecy and American government's policy and decision-making process in the Vietnam war (10; 37). Weber's relevant views on the deadening effect of bureaucracy and the need for a responsible political involvement in the German context appears in his "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order". But of course, Weber's advocacy of the necessity of the political mobilization of emotions, the need fro the charismatic leader, and the sense of mission of the political leader do not sit well at all with Arendt, who sees the danger of linking politics with passions in modern revolutions.

4. "Enthusiasm" is a term on which a lot of seventeenth-century religious controversies center. It represents not only religious fervor and a histrionic use of the imaginative faculty but also involves the phenomenon of possession which pushes the emotionalism and imaginary projections to the verge of delusion and religious fanaticism. In his "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm", Shaftesbury points out while the possessions and prophecies may breed fanaticism, we owe ourselves the understanding of an own unique imaginative ability if we relinquish the intimate knowledge of the working of the passions. More importantly, poetic creation just as religious enthusiasm depends upon similar spiritual transport. Only by going through the emotions with an acute self-understanding can we turn the fanatic enthusiasm into what Shaftesbury calls the "divine enthusiasm" (27). In enthusiasm, Shaftesbury squarely faces with the wrenching power of the passions: they force us to depart from ourselves. To be able to come to terms with this distracting power of the passions is the one of the crucial challenges for any theory that wishes to negotiate the relationship between passions and reason.

5. A mixed game according to Thomas Schelling (1980:89) is one that is characterized by the combination of conflict and interaction:

> The difficulty is finding a sufficiently rich name for the mixed game in which there is *both conflict and mutual dependence*. It is interesting that we have no very good word for the *relation* between the players: in the common interest game we can refer to them as 'partners'… and in a pure conflict game as 'opponents' … but the mixed relation that

> is involved in wars, strikes, negotiations… requires a more ambivalent term. (italics added)
>
> I basically see dialogue as participating in a mixed game. In this game, emotions play a key role but at same time emotions cannot be separated from reason with which the former is in constant conflict and interdependence.

6. What is the meaning of nature and what is the relationship between nature and the state of nature to human political activity. These are important questions we need to pursue if we wish to better grasp the important interaction between the natural world, the resident human beings and our activities that tells us apart, if we think we need to tell apart human beings and the rest of the world we call nature.

7. According to Michael Prince, the fundamental difference between dialectics and dialogue is that the latter ultimately leads to open-endedness. The case in point is the Socratic dialogue (Prince 1996:1). The dialogue form by giving equal weight to the views of the interlocutors ends in non-resolution and impasse. The modern novel is the culmination of the Socratic dialogue. Shaftesbury's major works are also crouched in the dialogue form.

8. A useful example from *Game Theory* is worth quoting here to bring out the characteristic of the ordinal utilities, which basically is unworkable, i.e. cannot be theorized, in game theory:

> Two consequences of this arbitrariness in the ordinal utility numbers are worth noting. Firstly the numbers convey nothing about the strength of preference. It is as if a friend were to tell you that she prefers Verdi to Mozart. Her preference may be marginal or it could be that she adores Verdi and loathes Mozart. Based on ordinal utility information you will never know. Secondly there is no way that one person's ordinal utility from Verdi can be compared with another's from Mozart. Since the ordinal utility number is meaningful only in relation to the *same* person's satisfaction from something else, it is meaningless across persons. (Hargreaves-Heap 1955:8)[22]

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Chapter 4:

Argumentation

Evaluation of Reasonableness of Argumentative Moves in Dialogues

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The paper presents a study on argumentation in dialogues between Polish native speakers. The advanced pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is applied to the study of the argumentative discourse. The theoretical model of a critical discussion introduced by the Amsterdam school of pragma-dialectics provides a series of norms by which it can be determined whether in an argumentative move, analysed on the micro-level, the balance between rhetorical and dialectical aims is maintained. The aim of the current study is to show that the advanced pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation may be adapted to the study of real-life discourse if the inferential nature of 'pragmatic optimum', 'topos' and 'warrant' is taken into account while evaluating arguments in terms of their reasonableness on the macro-level. The study shows that if 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' are strong and refer to the 'macroproposition'/ 'common propositional content', then an argumentative move functions as the commitment to the 'burden of proof' and is not to be considered as a 'derailment of strategic manoeuvring'.

1. The role of inferential rules in the study of reasonableness of arguments – theoretical considerations

The paper presents a study on argumentative discourse in one language group, namely native speakers of Polish. The material for the study comprises transcripts of discussions recorded in the year 2005. Each of the discussions lasted approximately half an hour. Each of the speakers who took part in the recordings is an acquaintance of the author of the paper. The speakers were asked to discuss an issue on which they had opposing views. None of them was informed about the aim of the research. The discussions were held between speakers of similar educational and social background. This paper presents the qualitative analysis of two sample cases. The pragma-dialectical framework serves here as a tool for the analysis.

Pragma-dialectics is an argumentation theory which has been developed by Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Peter Houtlosser, Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels in the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam. The theory provides a series of norms by which it can be determined whether an argument should be treated as a dialectical misbehaviour.

In the advanced theory of pragma-dialectics, the rhetorical perspective is included into the dialectical framework. Thus, any attempt by an arguer to win the discussion is to be held within the standards of reasonableness of a critical discussion. In each stage of the critical discussion, i.e. confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage and conclusion stage, arguers are to pursue the rhetorical aim of making the strongest case and the dialectical aim of resolving the difference of opinion. The joining of the rhetorical perspective and the dialectical perspective is in line with Johnstone's (1978) perception of philosophical argument. However, in Johnstone's idea of philosophical argumenttation, the dialectical perspective is incorporated into the rhetorical perspective, not vice versa. Johnstone (1978:92) believes that a philosophical argument is to a large extent rhetorical, but the "final account of philosophical argumentation will have to be given by a philosophy which endorses dialectics". Although the rhetorical and dialectical standards of philosophical argumentation appear to be different from pragma-dialectics, the idea to join the perspective of both dialectic and rhetoric is adopted by Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002a:135) who introduce a special term for the attempt to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims, namely 'strategic manoeuvring'. The pragma-dialectical concept of 'strategic manoeuvring' is also referred to the concept of 'burden of proof' and the concept of 'topical potential' (Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002a:139-140, 2002b:16). The concept of 'burden of proof' is derived from Rescher (1977) and Waltona nd Krabbe (1995). Rescher (1977) defines the concept of 'burden of proof' as the "division of labour of argumentation". Walton and Krabbe (1995:9) describe it as a joined effort by both arguers to take on commitments created by the expression of a standpoint and argumentation. Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b:17) argue that "in the pragma-dialectical perspective the burden of proof of a standpoint is the obligation to defend the standpoint once challenged to do so, i.e. to justify or refute the opinion expressed in the standpoint." The concept of 'topical potential' is derived from the classical division into 'rhetorical topics'. 'Topical potential' refers to the Greek term 'topos' which is a special area of topics associated with a given theme of argumentation. In the case of pragma-dialectical approach, the term pertains to the restriction of disagreement space in the confrontation stage by enlisting the 'topoi' which cannot be applied in the argumentation stage and to the creation of common starting points in the opening stage (Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002a:139, 140). Both the concept of 'burden of proof' and the concept of 'topos' will be applied in the study.

It is assumed in the advanced theory of pragma-dialectics that the rhetorical and dialectical objectives will not always be balanced. If dialectical objectives are overruled by rhetorical objectives, then the derailment of strategic manoeuvring is said to occur (Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002c:290, 291). Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002a:142) argue that "all derailments of strategic manoeuvring are fallacious and all fallacies can be regarded as derailments of strategic manoeuvring". Fallacies are said to violate one of the rules of a critical discussion:

> Rule (1) Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints.
> Rule (2) A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so.
> Rule (3) A party's attack on a standpoint/argument must relate to the standpoint/argument that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
> Rule (4) A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.
> Rule (5) A party may not disown a premise that has been left implicit by that party or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party.
> Rule (6) A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.
> Rule (7) A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.
> Rule (8) A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
> Rule (9) A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint.
> Rule (10) A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.
> (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1996: 283f., 304f.)

Scholars in the advanced theory of pragma-dialectics (Eemeren et al. 2002:275-278) carried out comprehensive research concerned with violations of the rules of a critical discussion in naturally occurring discourse. The aim of the research was to check whether ordinary arguers perceive the pragma-dialectically fallacious moves as unreasonable on a micro, two-turn level of analysis. Spanish and Dutch students were to evaluate 48 discussion fragments which consisted of two turns in terms of their reasonableness. An example of such a dialogue is provided below:

(1) Argumentum ad baculum (appeal to threat):

A: Mom, I think you should watch your calories; you are growing too fat now.
B: Watch your words! Otherwise I'll smash you in the mouth.

(Eemeren et al. 2002: 276)

The results of the study showed that on the micro-level ordinary users' standards of reasonableness are the same as those described in the advanced pragma-dialectical theory (Eemeren et al. 2002:275-278).

The aim of the current study is to show that the advanced pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation may also be adapted to the study of real-life discourse on a macro-level[1]. We argue, however, that the concepts of 'topos' (Ducrot 1996)

[1] The macro-level analysis pertains to the retrospective analysis of discourse focusing on sequences of speech (van Dijk 1977)

and the 'warrant' of argumentation should be taken into account while evaluating arguments in terms of their reasonableness on the macro-level. As the analysis of argumentation on the macro-level pertains to the analysis of inference processes (Carston 2002, Recanati 2002), the concepts of 'warrant' and 'topos' will be understood as inference rules. Although pragma-dialecticians introduce the concept of an inference rule, it is only limited to 'logical minimum' and 'pragmatic optimum' (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:63). Pragma-dialecticians believe that if a speech act appears not to comply with the principle of relevance[2] on the surface level, an analyst should study 'logical minimum' and 'pragmatic optimum' of the speech act.

Both 'logical minimum' and 'pragmatic optimum' are concerned with referring a supposedly fallacious argument expressed by a speaker to the standpoint of the same speaker. 'Logical minimum' has the form of modus ponens, i.e. "if p then q", where p refers to the argument advanced by a speaker and q refers to the standpoint of the speaker. It is thus an unexpressed premise which does not externalise any new information. The generalised form of 'logical minimum' which refers to the closest possible context of a speech act is called 'pragmatic optimum'. 'Pragmatic optimum' does not ascribe any additional commitments to the speaker except for the commitments present in the speech act. It must be in line with the Interaction Principle. Only if those conditions are fulfilled, the 'pragmatic optimum' may validate a supposedly fallacious move. If the Interaction Principle is not observed, then no validation of an argumentative move is possible.

As mentioned above, to determine the most adequate 'pragmatic optimum' of a speech act, an analyst is not to consider the context which refers to far-reaching commitments (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:62-66). Our aim here is to show that the role of additional commitments is substantial in the analysis of reasonableness of an argument. Clearly, the analysis requires complex forward and backward reasoning associated with constant emergence of new implicatures. Although the concepts of 'logical minimum', 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' come from different theories on argumentation, they all function as inferences to the best explanation. In other words, they are assumed to be underlying explanations for a standpoint. Treating the concepts as inference rules allows to indicate the degree of pragmatic relevancy[3] of a potentially fallacious argument.

It should be indicated at this point that in pragma-dialectics, pragmatic relevancy is not treated as the basis for the evaluation of reasonableness of all

2 The pragma-dialectical redefinition of the Gricean Maxims of a rational conversation is called the 'Interaction Principle'. Principle of Clarity, Principle of Honesty, Principle of Efficiency, and Principe of Relevance are subsumed under the name the 'Interaction Principle' (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1991:151-170).

3 Pragmatic relevancy pertains to the relation between an argument and common propositional content/macroproposition of a discussion.

kinds of arguments. 'Logical minimum' and 'pragmatic optimum' are indicated only if arguments appear to be phrased as ignoratio elenchi .We believe, however, pragmatic relevancy of every potentially fallacious move should be indicated. In this way, the chances for the "retention" of arguments which only potentially do not fulfill the pragmatic relevancy[4] are increased.

We believe that pragma-dialectics should to a certain extent rely on inferential models of communication. So far the pragma-dialectical model has been derived from the coding/decoding models[5]. For instance, it adopts the characteristic features of the coding/decoding models such as unidirectionality and fixed meanings. Although pragma-dialecticians differentiate between coordinatively compound, subordinatively compound and multiple relations between arguments, the effects of the relations are considered to be unidirectional. They are perceived only as contributions or non-contributions to resolution of a dispute. In contrast, in cognitive/inferential pragmatics, the effects of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes may be characterised by multidirectional effects (cf. Jacobs et al. 1991: 58). The pragma-dialectical violations of the Ten Commandments do not relate to dynamic and transient development of meaning but rather to the determination of once formed meanings. Contrary to the pragma-dialectical model, in inferential models, utterances are perceived sequentially, multidirectionally, dynamically and transiently (cf. Walton 1995).

We also assume that for the analysis on the macro-level, the pragma-dialectical ideal of 'topical potential' should be expanded. Clearly, it should not only refer to disagreement space and common starting points. Therefore, we propose to apply Ducrot (1996) definition of 'topos' which describes 'topoi' as gradual inference rules on the basis of which topical fields of an argument in a given context are linked. As in the example of common topos of two arguments:

(2) Arguments: "There has been frost last night, the plants must be dead"
"The weather has been very cold last night, the plants must be almost dead"
Topos: "The colder the weather at night, the worse the conditions of the plants the day after"

[4] In some cases, the indication of the 'pragmatic optimum', 'the warrant' and the 'topoi' may involve the complex relations[4] between arguments. Pragma-dialectics differentiates between three types of complex relations between arguments, namely multiple argumentation, coordinatively compound argumentation subordinatively compound argumentation. Coordinatively compound argumentation is either of a complementary subtype or a cumulative subtype (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:73-85).

[5] Lasswell's model (1948), Shanon and Weaver's model (1949), Gerbner's model (1956), Jakobson's model (1960), and Berlo's model (1960) are the best known coding/decoding models of communication. See also section 3.1.1.2. for the desription of the features of coding/decoding models.

Both Aristotle's (Aristotle 1959:325) conception of special topoi and Aristotle's (1966:19, 281, 283, 285,) conception of topoi based on one of the four predicables, i.e. definition, property, genus or accident are rejected in the study. The reason for it is twofold. First, special topoi are only confined to particular types of rhetoric, namely deliberative, forensic or epideictic rhetoric (Aristotle 1959:33,169,171). Second, topoi based on one of the four predicables refer either to particular types of rhetoric or to the Aristotelian dialogue[6]. None of the Aristotelian topoi is assumed to be a general inference rule for each type of a spoken discourse. Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca's conception of loci[7] is also not applied in the study. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969:85) distinguish between a limited number of loci, namely loci of quantity, loci of quality, loci of order, loci of the existing, loci of the essence and loci of the person. In contrast, Ducrot's (1996) conception of topos is neither restricted to particular disciplines nor to particular types. Therefore, it is preferred over Aristotle's and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's conceptions.

Also, Toulmin's definition of a warrant as "rules, principles, inference-licences, (...) hypothetical statements" is considered too general (Toulmin 2003:91) and is not adopted to the study. Freeman maintains that "rules and inference licences are not statements". Since the meaning of the notion 'inference licences' and the meaning of the notion 'hypothetical statements' appear not to be compatible, Freeman's conception of a warrant (2005:331) is preferred in the study. The conception is in accordance with the aim of the study. Freeman's (2005:332) definition of warrant focuses on its role as an 'inference rule'.

It is important to note at this point that the analysis of each discussion will involve the indication of 'common propositional content'. In the pragma-dialectical theory, the term 'common propositional content' describes the subject of a discussion, known also as the 'expressed opinion' (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984:5, 78). The idea of the 'common propositional content' has not, however, been elaborated upon by the Amsterdam school of argumentation since its brief introduction in 1984. As the current study pertains to the analysis on the macro-level, we believe that the pragma-dialectical term 'common propositional content' and the term 'macroproposition' can be used interchangeably (see van Dijk 1977). Both the pragma-dialectical term 'common propositional content' (1984) and Van Dijk's term 'macroproposition' (1977) are perceived as topical propositions of discourse (cf. Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984).Van Dijk (1977) and Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) maintain respectively that the form of 'macroproposition' and the form of 'common propositional content' are either explicitly presented in discourse or need to be constructed by an analyst by the application of the rules for 'semantic information reduction'.

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[6] The Aristotelian dialogue refers only to dialectical reasoning. It consists of a series of question-reply moves which are strictly defined (Aristotle 1966:281)

[7] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 85) prefer the Latin term 'loci' over the Greek term 'topoi'.

In the next section, we will focus on the qualitative analysis[8] of two dialogical exchanges. We will first determine common propositional content and standpoints in each dialogue. Subsequently, we will determine 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' of every pragma-dialectically fallacious move (not only ingnoratio elenchi). If a pragmatic relevancy between an argument and a standpoint will be absent, then 'logical minimum', 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' of a complex argumentation relation to which an apparent fallacy belongs will be established. It will serve as corroboration of our claim that re-evaluation of pragma-dialectically ineffectual moves is possible due to inferentially grounded concepts.

2. Reasonableness of argumentative moves in Polish context – a qualitative analysis

2.1 Case 1

In CASE 1, each of the inference rules, namely 'logical minimum', 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' validate the supposedly fallacious move on the macro-level. The naturally occurring discussion takes place between two native speakers of Polish and is not divided into subdiscussions. The theme of the discussion emerges in the first line of the argumentative discourse when speaker 1 expresses a speech act which carries the directive illocutionary force:

(3) SPEAKER 1: marsz równości za czy przeciw?
SPEAKER 1: equality march for or against?

As speaker 1 does not define the meaning of the term 'equality march', he probably assumes that speaker 2 is acquainted with it. The term 'equality march' known also as "Gay Pride March" refers to the marches initiated by gay rights campaigners in two Polish cities, Warsaw and Poznan. They took place on the 11th of June 2005 and on the 16th of November 2005 respectively.

The 'common propositional content' of the discussion is to be flashed out both from the theme of the discussion and from the 'coordinated management of meaning' which takes place between speaker 1 and speaker 2 and which refers to the life scripts, cultural patterns and episodes concerned with 'equality

[8] Despite the fact that we are aware of the various transcription methods used in discourse analysis, especially the one developed by Gail Jefferson (2004), we argue that in the analysis of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes, the use of symbols for vocal and non-vocal actions is not required. We believe that their indication does not contribute to the systematical organisation of opposing elements in naturally occurring discourse in which a dispute is externalised. Above all, however, our aim is not to study the phenomena represented by the Jeffersonian system but to verify the application of the pragma-dialectical model for the analysis of reasonableness of argumentative moves.

marches'. The externalised 'common propositional content' has the form: "Equality marches of homosexuals should take place"

The discussion is of a mixed type[9]. Both speaker 1 and speaker 2 take a position on the 'common propositional content'. Speaker 2 advances a positive standpoint. Speaker 1 advances a negative standpoint. The propositional contents of the standpoints are neither qualified nor quantified.

(4) SPEAKER 2: ja jestem za
SPEAKER 1: ja jestem przeciwko takim marszom i chciałbym dodać do tego, że nie mam nic przeciwko gejom lesbijkom i ludziom którzy uważają że kochają swoją płeć że mają zagwarantowane prawa w konstytucji że jest równość wyznań swoboda miłości aczkolwiek uważam że ludzie którzy demonstrują publicznie swoją seksualność nie powinni tego robić.
SPEAKER 2: no ale zobacz jeżeli oni się posunęli do takiego czegoś że jest marsz to znaczy że musieli mieć jakiś powód do tego że muszą być bardzo gnębieni przez środowisko
SPEAKER 1: dobrze to niech znajdą inną formę swojej ekspresji i wypowiedzi bo jest takie coś jak moralność publiczna tak

SPEAKER 2: i'm for.
SPEAKER 1: i'm against such marches and I would like to add that I'm not against gays lesbians and people who think that they love people of the same sex that they have their rights recognised in the constitution that there is equality of faiths freedom of love although I think that people who demonstrate their sexuality in public should not do that.
SPEAKER 2: but look if they went as far as this that there is a march then it means that they must have had a reason for it that they are persecuted by the society a lot
SPEAKER 1: good so let them find another form of expression because there is something like public morality isn't there

Clearly, if one were to take the argumentative moves out of the context of the discussion, one would perceive the argument "there is something like public morality, isn't there" as *argumentum ad populum* and the argument "they are persecuted by the society a lot" as *argumentum ad misericordiam* and thus also violations of rule 4 of a critical discussion (Eemeren *et al.* 1996:304). According to the pragma-dialectical approach, *argumentum ad populum* and *argumentum ad misericordiam* are committed if argumentation becomes more rhetorical than dialectical. Pragma-dialecticians maintain that manipulation of the other party's emotions can take place both by advancing argumentation referring to the universally held opinion (*argumentum ad populum)* and by appealing to pity

[9] According to the pragma-dialectical principle of externalisation, two types of dispute can be distinguished, namely, a mixed dispute and a non-mixed dispute. In mixed disputes, both a positive commitment of one speaker and a negative commitment of the other speaker are to be externalised. In non-mixed disputes, either a positive commitment or a negative commitment is to be externalised.

(*argumentum ad misericordiam)* (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:134). Non-argumentative use of pathos in *argumentum ad populum* and *argumentum ad misericordiam* is concerned with the exploitation of positive or negative emotions and thus pragma-dialecticians sometimes call the arguments 'pathetic fallacies'.

Whether the argument "there is something like public morality, isn't there" and the argument "they are persecuted by the society a lot" are supposed to be perceived as fallacies in the context of the discussion, will be decided on the basis of the analysis of 'pragmatic optimum', 'topos' and 'warrant' of the arguments.

The contextual analysis of the argumentative move "there is something like public morality, isn't there" indicates that speaker 1 refers to the opinion held by a certain group of people called *Młodzież Wszechpolska*[10] when he advances the argument. The pragmatic optimum of the argument "there is something like public morality, isn't there" has the form of optimally relevant 'implicated premise' "Equality marches of homosexuals are against public morality". The pragmatic relation between the standpoint and the argument is drawn on the basis of the 'reference assignment'. The nominal phrase "public morality" from the argument is referred to the nominal phrase "equality marches of homosexuals" from the standpoint. The 'topical fields' of the two phrases are referred to the negative evaluation of the 'common propositional content' by speaker 1. The 'logical minimum' of the argument is fulfilled only if the variable 'p' is defined on the basis of the 'pragmatic optimum'. The variable 'p' of the 'logical minimum' specified on the basis of the 'pragmatic optimum' functions as a commitment to the 'burden of proof'. Although the argument is based on the universally held opinion by a group of people, the *Mlodziez Wszechpolska*, the topical field of the phrase "public morality", which is brought out by the argument, constitutes the part of the 'commitment' of speaker 1 to the 'burden of proof'. The 'topos' of the argument "The more equality marches are against public morality, the less they should take place" and the warrant of the argument "If equality marches are against public morality, then the equality marches shouldn't take place" are drawn on the basis of the 'pragmatic optimum'. They both refer to the negative evaluation of the 'common propositional content' and function as commitments to the 'burden of proof' which rests on speaker 1. The dialectical aim of the resolution of the dispute is not overridden by the rhetorical aim of launching the most effective attack. The balance between the rhetorical aims and dialectical aims is retained and no intention of the misuse of the argumentation scheme of the causal reasoning appears to be present[11].

In the case of the argument "they are persecuted by the society a lot", quoted below again for the convenience of the analysis, potential exploitation of the negative feeling of fear and pity can be observed:

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[10] Mlodziez Wszechpolska- an ideologcal extremist organisation which is against doctrines professing tolerance and liberalism (Przybylska --. Szostak 2006)

[11] Three kinds of argument schemes are differentiated in pragma-dialectics: syptomatic argumentation scheme, casual argumentation scheme and comparative argumentation scheme. The casual argumenation scheme refers to the casual relation between an argument and a standpoint.

(5) SPEAKER 2: no ale zobacz jeżeli oni się posunęli do takiego czegoś że jest marsz, to znaczy że musieli mieć jakiś powód do tego że muszą być bardzo głębieni przez środowisko.

SPEAKER 2: but look if they went as far as this that there is a march then it means that they must have had a reason for it that they are persecuted by the society a lot

The variable 'p' of the logical minimum defined on the basis of the reference assignment and the higher-level proposition relates directly to the variable 'q' of the 'logical minimum' which is the standpoint of speaker 2. Therefore, the 'logical minimum', which has the form : "If homosexuals are persecuted by the society a lot, then I think that equality marches are justified" is fulfilled and functions as a 'commitment' to the 'burden of proof'. The 'pragmatic optimum' of the argument "Equality marches of homosexuals should take place to stop the persecution of homosexuals", the 'topos' of the argument which is of a doxal type "The more the homosexuals are persecuted, the more the equality marches should take place", the 'warrant' of the argument "If homosexuals are prosecuted by the society a lot, then equality marches should take place" also show that pragmatic relevancy of the argumentative move is fulfilled. Both the 'pragmatic optimum' of the argument and the 'topos' of the argument prove that the 'strategic manoeuvring' of speaker 2 is correctly applied and the potential tension between pursuing simultaneously a dialectical and rhetorical aim is maximally diminished. Neither does the argumentative move "derail" in the dialectical nor in the rhetorical direction on the macro-level of the analysis. Each of the 'implicated assumptions', namely the 'pragmatic optimum', 'topos' and 'warrant', is strong in the context of the discussion and refers to the 'common propositional content'. Thus, in the argumentative move "they are persecuted by the society a lot" rhetorical and dialetical objectives are balanced and the move is pragmatically relevant.

2.2 Case 2

In CASE 2, the inference rules are applied to the study of cumulative argumentation. The natural discussion takes place between two native speakers of Polish and is not divided into subdiscussions. The 'common propositional content' on which speaker 1 advances her positive standpoint is "Working at school can give you a lot of satisfaction". The 'common propositional content' is characterised by the indefinite quantifier 'a lot'. According to the pragma-dialectical framework, expressing the argument "But I think that you can be very happy, especially if you work in such a school, where, for example, there are not many students with such, for example, problems, for example" speaker 1 commits the fallacy of composition.

The fallacy of composition is supposed to be committed because in the argument "But I think that you can be very happy, especially if you work in such a school, where, for example, there are not many students with such, for example,

problems, for example" the property of some students is ascribed to a bigger, albeit indefinite number of students. The lower-order propositional content of the argument: "There are schools with a lot of students who have no problems" appears also to be rejected by speaker 2:

(6) SPEAKER 2: ale nie ma takich szkół prawie (…)
SPEAKER 2: but there are almost no such schools (...)

Eemeren et al. (1996: 302) maintains that "erroneously attributing a (relative or structure-dependent) property of a whole to its constituent parts or vice versa" is a violation of rule 8 of "Ten Commandments." The rudimentary assumption of pragma-dialectics would also be that the argument is a fallacy of hasty generalization or a sequndum quid as it overlooks possible qualifications. Therefore, from the pragma-dialectical perspective it would be considered as a violation of rule 7 of "Ten Commandments": "A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied." In terms of pragma-dialectics, the scheme of the 'symptomatic argumentation'[12] seems to be incorrectly applied.

The most informative 'pragmatic optimum' of the supposedly fallacious argument is "Working at school with a lot of students who have no problems can give you a lot of satisfaction". The 'pragmatic optimum' of the argumentation does not function as the commitment to the burden of proof which rests on speaker 1 because it qualifies and weakens the standpoint of speaker 1: "I think that working at [any] school can give you a lot of satisfaction". As the 'pragmatic optimum' does not validate the argumentative move considered separately, 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' of the cumulative relation[13] between the supposedly fallacious argument and next argument by speaker 1 should be determined:

(7) SPEAKER 2: ale nie ma takich szkol prawie zawsze masz problemy albo masz zróżnicowany poziom, ale masz osoby które w ogóle nie mają ochoty się uczyć albo osoby które mówią ze jesteś beznadziejna zanim cię zobaczyły na przykład musisz walczyć każdego dnia z nimi.
SPEAKER 1: no tak Aśka ale myślisz że w innej pracy nie trzeba walczyć no mi się wydaje że jest przynajmniej o co walczyć, bo masz kontakt po prostu z ludźmi z którymi masz coś zrobić nawet jeżeli są beznadziejni

[12] See section 2.2.2. for the description of the argumentation schemes distinguished in pragma-dialectics.
[13] Coordinatively compound argumentation is either of a complementary subtype or a cumulative subtype (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:73-85). Pragma-dialectitians adopt the term 'cumulative argumentatio' from Pinto and Blair (1989:220) who define it as a relation between arguments in which "each premise (...) lends some support to the conclusion, but with each additional premise the sort of support in question gets stronger and stronger".

> SPEAKER 2: but there are almost no such schools you always have problems or there is a differentiated level or you have people who do not feellike learning or people who say that you are hopeless even before they met you for example you have to struggle every day with them
> SPEAKER 1: yes Joanna but do you think that in other jobs you don't have to struggle i think that there is at least something to struggle for because you have contact with people and you are to do something with them, even if they are hopeless

The supposedly fallacious argument has the form "But I think that you can be very happy, especially if you work in such a school, where, for example, there are not many students with such, for example, problems, for example". The strong contextual implicature from argument creating cumulative relation with the potential fallacy has the form "You can struggle for people in schools in which there are problems". The most informative 'pragmatic optimum' of the cumulative argumentation appears to be "Working at school can give you a lot of satisfaction because you can be very happy working in schools with a lot of students who have no problems and you can struggle for people in schools in which there are problems". The symptomatic argumentation scheme is correctly applied in the 'pragmatic optimum' of the cumulative argumentation. The rhetorical aim and the dialectical aim are reconciled in the 'pragmatic optimum' of the cumulative argumentation. The 'warrant' of the cumulative argumentation appears to have the form of the pragmatic optimum "Working at school can give you a lot of satisfaction because you can be very happy working in schools with a lot of students who have no problems and you can struggle for people in schools in which there are problems". The 'gradual topos' of the potentially fallacious argument is of a doxal type and has the form "The fewer students who have problems you teach, the more satisfaction working at school can give you". The 'gradual topos' of the argument which creates a cumulative relation with the previous argument by speaker 1 is also of a doxal type and has a form "The more you have to struggle for students when you work at school, the more satisfaction working at school can give you".

'Pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' of the 'cumulative argumentation' validate the potentially fallacious move. The rhetorical aim of making the strongest possible case and dialectical aim of the resolution of the dispute are balanced in the concepts. The move is not to be considered as fallacious when analysed on the macro-level, in which the cumulative relation between arguments is taken into account.

2. Conclusion

The present study attempts to show that argumentation should not be treated as a sequence of theorems which are axiomatically-grounded but a sequence of complex actions. First, it has been underlined that that specification of pragmatic relevancy of an argument involves a series of steps concerned with the

identification of the concepts of 'logical minimum', 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' which are inferential in nature and refer to both close and far-reaching commitments. Second, it has been shown that specification of pragmatic relevancy may require the analysis of complex argumentation relations. Evidently enough, the study of inferential processes is a complex phenomenon when considered on its own. It rejects unidirectionality and fixed meanings offered by the pragma-dialectical model. The findings of the above study prove that no 'derailment of strategic maneouvering' takes place if the transient meanings of 'pragmatic optimum', 'warrant' and 'topos' are strong and relate to the 'common propositional content'.

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How to Make a Quotation Credible

Characteristics of the quoted source in British and Russian press

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The aim of the present paper is to compare characteristics ascribed to the quoted sources in modern British and Russian quality press, to reveal differences and similarities in argumentative strategies. The research showed that although the range of characteristics given in the two countries is essentially the same (the name of the quoted person, the position he/she holds, his/her place of work, profession, title, membership in a political party, as well as marital status, age and personal qualities), the relative importance and the corresponding frequency of use of each characteristic varies due to the cultural differences between the two countries.

1. Introduction

Argumentation is an essential part of contemporary newspaper discourse all over the world. People as independent thinkers don't take anything for granted. They want to make their own judgments after hearing all the possible pros and cons. However, some vital issues touched upon in newspapers are so complex that in making their judgments the readers have to rely upon the experts' opinion. This epistemic dependency tends to increase in proportion to the increase of complexity of public life. That is why one of the effective argumentative strategies used by contemporary press all over the world is appeal to authority most often expressed verbally as direct and indirect quotations from competent sources.

We can't make ourselves share somebody's opinion if we are not sure that it is the opinion of an authority in the question under discussion. So it is a very important task for the journalist to justify the competence of the quoted person. This is normally done by ascribing to the quoted source various characteristics that create the required image of the speaker. The information we get about the quoted source can be more or less detailed. The way the source is presented to the reader differs from culture to culture. The information seen as vital by one culture may prove quite irrelevant in another. The aim of the present research is to compare characteristics ascribed to the quoted sources in British and Russian press, to reveal differences and similarities in argumentative strategies. The empirical basis of the research was the quality press of Great Britain (the Times,

the Guardian, the Financial Times, the Herald) and Russia (the Rossijskaya Gazeta, the Izvestia and the Vedomosti) for 2003-2006.

The research showed that the range of characteristics given to the quoted source in newspaper discourses of the two countries is essentially the same: the name of the quoted person, the position he/she holds, his/her place of work, academic degree, profession, title, membership in a political party, as well as nationality, family relations, age and personal qualities. However, the relative importance and the corresponding frequency of use of each of these characteristics vary (Table 1).

Table 1*: Characteristics ascribed to the quoted source in British and Russian press*

Characteristics ascribed to the quoted source		Average frequency of use	
		In British press	In Russian press
Name		97,0%	88,2%
Professional characteristics	Position	91,9%	85,4%
	Place of work	28,1%	67,5%
	Academic degree	13,5%	1,7%
	Profession	8,7%	7,3%
	Membership in a political party	8,5%	1%
Personal characteristics	Title	13,4%	4,6%
	Nationality/ place of origin	1,4%	5,9%
	Age	1,0%	-
	Marital status/Family relations	1,0%	-
	Personal qualities	-	1,3%
Additional argumentative information		23,0%	3,7%

As we can see from Table 1, in the majority of cases we come to know the name of the quoted person. But only in rare cases in both countries it is the only information we get about the source. Usually it is accompanied by some other information:

(1) A 20 – storey tower block should be built 50 meters from the entrance of the Tate Modern.

Vincenti Todoli, director of Tate Modern: "It is like putting a sky-scrapper next to the Eiffel Tower, or the Coliseum in Rome." (Guardian, Wednesday, July 9, 2003. P.9)

(2) Прекращение поставок газа из России в Белоруссию вполне возможно.

«То, как сейчас идут переговоры с Белоруссией, заставляет нас готовиться к критическому варианту развития событий», - заявил вчера официальный представитель Газпрома Сергей Куприянов. (Российская газета, воскресенье,

31 декабря 2006. № 297 (4263). С. 1)

Termination of gas supplies from Russia to Byelorussia is quite possible.

"The way negotiations with Byelorussia proceed makes us prepare for the worst", an official Gazprom representative Sergey Kupriyanov declared yesterday. (Rossijskaya gazeta, Sunday, December 31, 2006. # 297 (4263). P. 11)

However, there are certain names in both cultures that require no comments, for example:

(3) Yet there is something unseemly in this scrabble for photographic recall.

For John Donne, a "memory of yesterday's pleasures" was a potential distraction from the great inner concentration of prayer. (Times, Saturday, March 15, 2003. P. 27)

(4) Когда создавалась «Театральная компания Евгения Миронова» и замышлялся её дебютный проект – «Женитьба Фигаро», продюсер, а равно исполнитель главной роли Миронов вместе с постановщиком Кириллом Серебренниковым сразу продекларировали: «Пьеса Бомарше – не шампанское».

На тождественности двух этих продуктов, как известно, настаивал Александр Сергеевич Пушкин. (Известия №242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 10)

When "Eugeny Mironov theatrical company" had just been created, and its debut project – "Le Mariage de Figaro" was being planned, the producer and at the same time the leading actor Mironov together with the director Kirill Serebrennikov declared: "Beaumarchais' play is not a bottle of champagne".

As you know, it was Alexandr Sergeevich Pushkin who insisted on the identity between the two. (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 10)

It is important to note that though the two poets quoted in (3) and (4) are indisputable authorities, especially in the ethic and aesthetic issues, in their corresponding countries, they would certainly require justification of their authority in another culture. The set of names that are known and perceived as authorities by any reader without any further justification is limited in number and very culture-specific.

As we have already mentioned, in the majority of cases to be accepted as an authority the quoted source requires additional characteristics, which have been split by us into two groups: professional and personal ones.

2. Professional characteristics

Professional characteristics justify the right of the quoted person for power as authority and prestige (Maier 1991).

Both in Great Britain and in Russia the most important of these are the *position* the quoted person holds and his/her *place of work.* This information helps to influence the reader in several respects: it arouses respect to a person capable of occupying such a position and characterizes his/her opinion not only as the opinion of a private person, but partially as an official opinion of the organization he/she represents. The latter becomes especially evident in cases when the name of the speaker is not given and it is only the position that matters. Such examples can be found in both cultures:

(5) Tolls on the Forth road bridge will rise by 25%.

The Fourth Estuary Transport Authority said that based on current toll levels it was estimated that its management, maintenance and operation would not be affordable. (Guardian, Thursday December 9, 2004. P. 17).

(6) Газовые проблемы между Россией и Белоруссией не станут проблемой для Европы.

По словам представителя Еврокомиссии, ряд стран ЕС имеют более чем достаточные запасы газа – в частности, Германия, Австрия и Нидерланды. (Известия № 242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 2)

Gas disagreement between Russia and Byelorussia is not going to become a problem for Europe.

According to the European Commission representative, a number of EU countries, including Germany, Austria and the Netherlands have more than sufficient supplies of gas. (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 2)

Despite all the abovementioned similarities, attitude to the position and place of work of the quoted person is not the same in Great Britain and in Russia. As you can notice from Table 1, for Russian readers it is far more important: it determines how influential the person is in social life and access he has to information hidden from public. To a very high degree the attitude to the person in Russia is determined by his position and place of work. This can be illustrated by an example taken from the Izvestia article mocking at the analysis of Russian economy in 2006 given by Andrey Illarionov, who is presented to the reader as the "former President's adviser". The journalist further writes:

(7) Андрей Илларионов теперь представляется главой института экономического анализа и старшим научным сотрудником американского института Катона, но в глазах общественности он навсегда останется бывшим советником президента. (Известия № 242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 2).

Now Andrey Illarionov presents himself as the head of the Institute of Economic Analysis and a senior staff scientist of the Cato Institute in the USA, but for the

public he will always remain the former adviser of the President. (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 8).

Here it is explicitly shown that for a Russian reader only a high position in political hierarchy, even though a past one, can grant a person the right to make credible economic forecasts, the right that can't be justified by any of his present scientific achievements. At the same time a reader from Great Britain would pay more attention to the present position of the speaker and find it sufficient for being an authority in economic issues.

The difference between the two cultures can also be clearly seen in the attitude to *academic degrees.* In British press an academic degree is an important characteristic showing a person's competence in this or that issue and it is often used for argumentative purposes. According to Sergey Kara-Murza, a man of the Western culture stands in awe of an academic degree and takes for granted the words of any person possessing such a degree (Kara-Murza 2007:269):

(8) Couples are to be banned from using science to determine the sex of their children.

Tom Baldwin, professor of philosophy at the university of York, said that they were worried about the potential psychological damage to a child born by such techniques. (Times, Wednesday, November 12, 2003. P. 6.)

However in Russian press very few examples of this type can be found. This can be explained by the fact that during the Perestroika and the subsequent years the prestige of science and scientists in Russian society fell very low as people with academic degrees were often unable to find a decent place in new life. Things were worsened by the fact that an academic degree could not be an indication of competence, as it could be purchased by any wealthy Russian. It is only in the very recent years that the situation began to change together with the state policy of increasing the prestige of science, and a few examples of using academic degrees (though still strengthened by other characteristics, like in example (9)) in press can be an indication of this current process:

(9) Надолго задержать естественные роды невозможно.

Владимир Серов, профессор, заместитель директора Научного центра акушерства, гинекологии и перинатологии РАМН: «Естественные физиологические роды – это процесс, не зависящий ни от самой женщины, ни от врачей, - им распоряжается природа». (Известия № 242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 9)

It is not possible to delay natural birth for a long time.

Vladimir Serov, professor, deputy director of the Scientific Centre of obstetrics, gynaecology and perinatology of the Russian Academy of Medical Science: natural

physiologic birth is a process that depends neither on the woman, nor on the doctors, - it is regulated by nature. (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 9)

The profession of the quoted person is mentioned almost with the same frequency in Russian and in British press and is used to characterize people whose profession by its nature doesn't suppose a fixed place of work and a distinct position:

(10) There is hardly anything predictable in our lives.

The American poet Alice Walker wrote, of life today, "Expect nothing. Live frugally on surprise". (Times, November 12, 2003. P.23)

(11) Сейчас набивать копилки нет большого смысла.

Психолог Артем Толоконин считает такой процесс накопления самообманом – в итоге это не приносит человеку никакой пользы, ведь помещающаяся в копилке сумма мизерна (Ведомости, пятница, 29 декабря 2006, с. А6).

Now there is no great sense in filling piggy banks.

Psychologist Andrey Tolokonin considers such a way of saving a self-deception – as a result it is of no use, as a sum that can be fitted in a piggy bank is scanty. (Vedomosti, Friday, December 29, P. A6)

In both examples position and place of work would be inappropriate, it is only the person's profession that is important for argumentation.

Another characteristic of the quoted source used in British and Russian press is *membership in a political party.* This characteristic can be viewed also as a personal one because it reflects the system of political believes and ideas of the given person. However for the majority of people quoted in press membership in a political party is part of their profession and is used as a booster of their political career, so we have included it in the group of professional characteristics. Regarding membership in a political party, Table 1 again shows distinct differences between the two countries. In Britain this characteristic is often mentioned, as it is capable to portray unequivocally the political outlook of the quoted person:

(12) The council tax should be replaced with a new system of local income tax.

John Swinney, SNP leader, said his party's plans would be fairer than the existing tax, and only about 10% of the working population would be worse off. (Herald, Saturday March 6, 2004. P. 6)

However in Russian press this information can be hardly ever found. An average Russian sees practically no difference between the numerous political parties that emerged after 1991. For him there are only two parties: those who are in power and all the rest. Membership of the quoted person in a political party is thus of no argumentative value and appears only in the articles describing relationships between the parties:

(13) Центризбирком лоббирует интересы «Справедливой России»

> Центризбирком рекомендовал переименовать отделения «Родины» в «Справедливую Россию», что заставило единоросса Андрея Исаева обвинить ЦИК в лоббизме интересов одной партии. (Ведомости, пятница, 29 декабря 2006. С. А2)
>
> The Central Election Committee lobbies the interests of the Russia of Justice.
>
> The Central Election Committee recommended to rename "Fatherland" into the "Russia of Justice", which made Andrey Isaev of the United Russia accuse it of lobbying the interests of one party. (Vedomosti, Friday, December 29, 2006. P.A2)

In can be also noted here that in both countries this characteristic can become positive and negative depending on the political position of the newspaper and be used to arouse in the reader various feelings ranging from complete trust to full aversion.

Thus, the group of professional characteristics possesses substantial argumentative value and is widely used for characterization of quoted sources in British and Russian newspaper discourse.

3. Personal characteristics

The group of personal characteristics includes title, marital status/ family relationships, nationality/place of origin, age and personal qualities. Characteristics of this group work, in terms of Maier, for power as charisma (Maier 1991). Table 1 shows a much lower frequency of use of these characteristics compared to the professional ones, especially in Russian press, where none of the abovementioned groups reaches the 10 per cent level. Because of this minor frequency we shall not give here examples of argumentative units as a whole, but only of the nominations of the quoted source.

The title is a personal characteristic used in the British press most often. In the Russian press it is not so frequently used, but what is more important, the difference between titles in Britain and Russia is more qualitative than quantitative. Thus, in Great Britain hereditary titles still retain their argumentative power:

(14) Gordon, Lord of Strathblane,… (Times, Friday, October 20, 2006. P.10)

However one may argue that to a big degree they are a tribute to tradition, and titles of another type that show the person's personal achievements sound more persuasive to the reader:

(15) Steve Smith, a high jump bronze medal-winner in Atlanta in 1996… (Times, Wednesday, November 12, 2003. P. 18.)

In Russia there are at present no hereditary titles (in spite of some attempts of their revival), so in Russian press we can only find examples of the second type:

(16) Давид Гусейнович Пашаев, герой России, лауреат государственной премии Российской Федерации… (Известия № 242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 5)

David Gusejnovich Pashaev, the Hero of Russia, laureate of the state award of the Russian Federation,… (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 5)

The next personal characteristic – *nationality/ place of origin* – again shows both qualitative and quantitative differences in British and Russian newspapers. In Great Britain it is used only rarely and when used it is mostly to show the speaker's place of origin. It is, so to say, internally oriented:

(17) Raymond Hounslow, 59, from Hounslow),… (Times, Friday, October 20, 2006. P.7)
In Russia it is used more frequently and in all cases refers to the speaker's nationality. We can call it externally oriented:

(18) Российский математик Григорий Перельман… (Российская газета, воскресенье, 31 декабря 2006. № 297 (4263). С. 1)

Such personal characteristics as age and marital status/family relations are sometimes used in British press to portray the speaker more vividly, to make him seem a lad living next doors:

(19) Mike, her husband,… (Times, Friday, October 20, 2006. P.20)

(20) Katie Gent, 62, from Barnes,… (Times, Friday, October 20, 2006. P.20)

These details promote a more emotional attitude to the quoted person, when he/she is regarded as a distinct personality. Examples of this type haven't been found in the investigated Russian newspapers.

In Russia for the same purpose the journalists mention personal qualities of the speaker:

(21) …известный историк моды, космополит и эстет Александр Васильев… (Известия № 242, четверг 28.12.2006. С. 3)

…a well-known historian of fashion, cosmopolite and aesthete Alexander Vasiljev… (Izvestia No 242, Thursday, 28.12.06, P. 3)

Examples of this type haven't been found in the investigated corpus of the British press.

Finally, we should mention a separate group of characteristics, which grammatically refer to characterization of the quoted source, but semantically describe the argumentative situation in general. We called this group "Additional argumentative information":

(22) Northern regions need special treatment in terms of investment.

Kevin Morgan of Cardiff University, an adviser to a select committee of MPs that last July made a robust case for compelling funds to poorer regions, says: "I see no reasons to think that the fundamental drivers of inter-regional disparities – innovation, technological investment and the graduate brain-drain – are becoming more muted, let alone being addressed". (Financial Times, March 6/March 7, 2004, p.9)

(23) «Евгений Онегин» - премьера на новой сцене Большого театра - оставляет противоречивые впечатления.

Как выразилась Галина Вишневская, осудившая спектакль, это премьера «в театре через дорогу от Большого театра». (Ведомости, пятница, 29 декабря 2006. С. А8)

"Eugene Onegin" – the first night performance on the new stage of the Bolshoi Theatre – leaves contradictory impressions.

As Galina Vishnevskaya, who condemned the performance, put it, it was staged "in a theatre across the road from the Bolshoi". (Vedomosti, Friday, December 29, P.A8)

Such types of characteristics are frequently used in Great Britain, where probably the reader demands more information about the previous context of argumentation, whereas the Russian reader may be not curious enough to go into such details.

4. Conclusion

Thus, to sum up we can say that to be accepted as an authority the person quoted in the newspaper discourse must be relevantly characterized. For this purpose journalists both in Great Britain and in Russia use professional and personal characteristics of the quoted source. Professional characteristics are based on power as authority and prestige and portray the speaker as a person competent in the questions discussed. In both countries professional characteristics possess a

much bigger argumentative value, and are used much more frequently. Personal characteristics are based on power as charisma and promote emotional perception of the speaker as a distinct personality. They are viewed as less relevant for a sound argumentation.

In spite of the abovementioned similarities between the two countries, we can also observe clear differences in the way of characterization of the quoted source. In Great Britain the greatest emphasis is laid on such professional characteristics as position, place of work and academic degree. Such personal characteristic as title is also often used, but more as a tribute to tradition. Additional argumentative information tells the reader about the previous argumentative situation and helps to understand the quotation better.

In Russia we find only two characteristics apart from the name of the speaker that are important: position and place of work. The attitude to a person and his perception as an authority completely depend on his/her place in a social hierarchy. All other information proves practically irrelevant.

These differences are explained by cultural differences and by differences in political, social and economic situations in the two counties, which determine preferences and priorities for the newspapers target audiences.

To finish with I would like to quote the Vedomosti newspaper that wrote,

> Президент может назначить министром, но звание профессионала даже он присвоить не в силах. (Ведомости, пятница, 29 декабря 2006, С. А1)
>
> The president can appoint you a minister, but even he can't give you the title of a professional. (Vedomosti, Friday, December 29, 2006. P. A1)

However, what can't be done by the President is done daily by the journalists with the help of characteristics of the quoted source in the newspaper discourse.

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Notes

Translations of examples from Russian press are done by us.

Dialogic Argument and the Rhetoric of Openness

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the rhetor can either open or close argumentative space. In the Socratic dialogue "Gorgias", Plato demonstrates the opposition between closed and open argumentation strategies. In Shakespeare's "The merchant of Venice", the heroine Portia skilfully first opens and then closes argumentative space – to the detriment of her opponent. These two examples from literature illustrate dialogic principles that can be applied to real-life dialogues in business, politics, or academia. In arguing a position the rhetor can either open or close down (or try to close down) argumentative space. The dynamics - even the drama - of this process is well demonstrated in Plato's "Gorgias" and Shakespeare's "The merchant of Venice."

1. The Socratic dialogue

Plato introduces five characters in this dialogue: Callicles, Chaerepho, Gorgias, Polus and Socrates. The first four are Sophists and rhetoricians, Socrates' opponents in the debate. Against their practical and realist position, Socrates is the lone voice of the philosopher and idealist, seeking not power but truth and knowledge. Socrates, however, is also the robust strategist, knowing full well how to divide the ranks of his interlocutors.

This is perhaps the first (not very lofty) rule of argumentation: know your opponents and their manner of speaking and lead them into temptation. Socrates knew the Sophists well, and especially the powerful position which they as orators reserved for themselves in democratic Athens, that is, in the Assembly and in the courts of law. He therefore, cunningly clears the stage for them to proclaim the qualities of Gorgias, their teacher.

Polus does this in a manner that, according to him, forecloses the matter. In answering Chaerepho's question as to what art Gorgias practices he says:

> There are many arts, Chaerepho, among mankind experimentally devised by experience: for experience guides our life along the path of art, inexperience along the path of chance. And in each of these different arts different men partake in different ways, the best men following the best arts. And Gorgias here is one of the best and partakes in the noblest of arts. (Woodhead 1953:187)

In responding to this, Socrates at first does not attack the merits of the argument, but the way in which it is put. Polus, according to Socrates, has delivered a "speech", that is he has answered at length. It might also be that Socrates (as do Polus' friends) recognises that Polus is here quoting from his own text-book. Socrates refers to this treatise later on (Woodhead 1953:207).

Socrates, in other words, is looking at the surface of the text, not its deep or argumentative meaning. He further argues that the lengthy speech does not answer the question, namely who and what Gorgias is. Polus therefore disobeys three argumentative rules in one single answer: the rule of brevity, the rule of relevance, and the rule against auto-reference, that is quoting yourself as expert witness (and in a lofty treatise-style as well).

Socrates could have gone deeper in his critique of Polus' speech, but he does not, demonstrating another rule of argumentation: silence (at the appropriate moment) is golden. If we do this on behalf of Socrates we could accuse Polus that he is using a non-evident or illogical syllogism (that is an argument of the kind: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal). Simplified Polus says:

- There are many noble arts among mankind
- Gorgias is a noble man
- Therefore Gorgias' art (= rhetoric) is a noble art.

Socrates does not say that the syllogism is skew, but he will demonstrate why the logic cannot hold (not *telling* but *showing* as the new critics would say). He will do this not by attacking (or opening up) the premise, but attacking the central term of the premise, namely the term *noble*.

But before he does this, he will lead his opponents into a second temptation. From Gorgias he gets the assurance that he (Gorgias) will give brief answers. What follows is a bit comical:

(1)	Socrates:	This is what I want, Gorgias: give me an exhibition of this brevity of yours, and reserve a lengthy discourse for another time.
	Gorgias:	I will do so, and you will admit you have never heard a speaker more concise.
	Socrates:	Well then: you claim that you are an expert in the art of rhetoric and that you can make rhetoricians of others. Now just what is the scope of rhetoric? Weaving, for example, has to do with the the making of garments: you agree?
	Gorgias:	Yes.
	Socrates:	And music with composing melodies?
	Gorgias:	Yes.
	Socrates:	By Hera Gorgias, I marvel at your answers: they could not be briefer.
	Gorgias:	Yes, I think I succeed pretty well, Socrates.
	Socrates:	Good: and now answer in the same way about rhetoric: what is the field of this science?
	Gorgias:	Words.
	Socrates:	Of what kind, Gorgias? Those that reveal to the sick what treatment will restore their health?
	Gorgias:	No.
	Socrates:	Then rhetoric is not concerned with every kind of words.

Gorgias:	Certainly not.
Socrates:	Yet it makes men able to speak.
Gorgias:	Yes.
Socrates:	And able to think also about the matter of their discourse?
Gorgias:	Of course.
Socrates:	Now does not the science of medicine, which we have just mentioned, make men able to think and to speak to their patients?
Gorgias:	Assuredly.
Socrates:	Then medicine also, it seems, is concerned with words.
Gorgias:	Yes.

(Woodhead 1953:188-9)

What Gorgias commits here is the fallacy of brevity, the belief that if I say little, I say something worthwhile and conclusive. This is the opposite of Polus' fallacy of wordiness, the belief that if I say much, I will somehow speak a truth. Pupil or teacher, much or little, in the Socratic realm of argumentation rhetoric cannot hold.

The term Socrates attacks (and thereby opening the argument) in Polus' speech is the term *noble*. The one in Gorgias' answers is the word *words*. To say that rhetoric is the art of words is not distinct, says Socrates. Other arts, such as medicine or arithmetic, also use words. To say that rhetoric is the *noble* use of words, does not hold either. If rhetoric is used, for instance, to set the guilty free (as in a court of law) it is an *ignoble* act. It does not serve the good or the wise. Rhetoric does not, according to Socrates, have its own field of knowledge or its own ethos.

Plato, it has been said, is seldom as rhetorical eloquent as when he attacks rhetoric. This observation holds for the "Gorgias" as well. In attacking rhetoric, Socrates not only uses rhetorical means, but also instructs the rhetoricians in the art of rhetoric. The famous Socratic maieutic method (to help a person bring conceptions of his own into life) is a form of *parrèsia*, the rhetorical rule to speak freely, without fear for the public opinion or shame that one has made an argumentative mistake. Socrates admonishes Gorgias to "complete for yourself" an answer (thus finding the truth in himself); he admonishes Callicles that he "never says the same things about the same subjects" - thus teaching him the rule of argumentative consistency.

2. The Shakesperian dialogue

What is the rhetorical link between Plato's "Gorgias" and Socrates' anti-rhetorical stance, and "The merchant of Venice"? Socrates' argument is that rhetoric is a fake, a pretence, a masquerade. He says:

> It [rhetoric] has no need to know the truth about things but merely to discover a technique of persuasion, so as to appear among the ignorant [the crowd] to have more knowledge than the expert. (Woodhead 1953:203)

But Gorgias sees something positive in this:

> But is not this a great comfort, Socrates, to be able without learning any other arts but this one [rhetoric] to prove in no way inferior to the specialist? (Woodhead 1953:203)

In the same vein Callicles later argues the merits of rhetoric - in words that might just as well bear directly upon the Shylock character of "The merchant of Venice":

> For now if anyone should seize your or any others like you and drag you off to prison, claiming you are guilty when you are not, you realise that you would not know what to do, but you would reel to and fro and gape open-mouthed, without a word to say: and when you come before the court, even with an utterly mean and rascally accuser, you would be put to death, if he chose to demand the death penalty, [would it not be good to have a rhetorician on your side?]. (Woodhead 1953:244)

The court-room scene in "The merchant of Venice" enacts these suppositions in the "Gorgias". Portia is a woman masquerading as a man; she is not a trained lawyer; she "merely" (as Socrates would say) has words to save her beloved Antonio. But seldom has there been a more forceful demonstration of the power of words. I quote extensively:

(2) Portia: Do you confess the bond?
Antonio: I do.
Portia: Then must the Jew be merciful.
Shylock: On what compulsion must I? Tell me that.

Portia: The quality of mercy is not strain'd;
It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the earth beneath : it is twice bless'd;
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes:
'T is mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown;
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above the sceptred sway,
It is enthroned in the heart of kings,
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore Jew,
Though justice be thy plea, consider this –
That in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy;
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render

The deeds of mercy. I have spoke this much,
To mitigate the justice of thy plea;
Which if thou follow, the strict court of Venice
Must needs give sentence 'gainst the merchant there.

(Knight n.d.: 141)

The first step in Portia's plea is to position the issue on law. Shylock's judicial syllogism forecloses the argument:

- Venice respects the rule of law.
- There is a bond between him and Antonio.
- The bond is forfeit. Therefore, he may claim his pound of flesh.

The second step is to open the syllogism by pointing to a third term - mercy. By way of metaphor (*mercy droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven*) she confronts the strict judicial reasoning with an ethical argument. This is a step-up argument, applying a higher-order term to the dispute. The moral argument, one would tend to say, is the weaker argument, the soft one. But Portia knows this. She leads Shylock into the temptation to formulate his claim in the hard talk of judicial language. Then she offers him an honourable way out. But she knows full well that he will refuse. We are back at the first rule of argumentation: know your adversary. After demonstrating to the court (not telling them) how vengeful and unforgiving Shylock is (thus foreclosing any argument that he might receive mercy), she steps down to the quantitative argument: he may have his pound of flesh (not more, not less) and not shed a drop of blood.

(3) Portia: This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;
The words expressly are a pound of flesh:
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh;
But in cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate
Unto the state of Venice.

(Knight n.d.:142)

Shylock, Antonio, the whole male court of Venice is defenceless against the feminine logic of Portia and her lateral thinking. And stepping back two thousand years, Socrates as well. From Portia he might learn that even if rhetoric is a lie and works with pretence, it can be used to the good. The ethics of rhetoric is what Portia teaches us all, from Socrates to Shylock.

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Chapter 5:

Culture

Pragmatic Implications of Language Selection in Polish University Communication

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This paper discusses the question of language selection in student – teacher e-mail communication related to an EFL course at a Polish university. The eventual decision is a result of a careful consideration of language-specific pragmatic resources available in both codes, in particular in terms of distinct systems of pronominal forms of address and the relevant conventions of academic politeness. The latter may currently be subject to negotiation, in consequence of the observed inter-code transfer of pragmatic strategies as well as merging of academic and non-academic discourses. As the results of the empirical analysis show, this process may lead to such phenomena as the withdrawal from the long-established Polish title-based system in favour of pragmatically defective calques from English, and the overall conversationalization of academic discourse, which is visible in Polish and English e-mails alike. Evolution of the pragmatic conventions is explained in relation to the macro-context of Polish academia in transition.

1. New socioeconomic context and university communication in Poland

The 1989 breakthrough in Polish politics and the consequential socio-economic changes have affected the general condition of institutions and their responsiveness to the demands of liberalism, globalization and free market economy. The debate is particularly vital to Polish academia, which has lost its monopoly for higher education and now faces fierce competition with private schools and colleges. University's prolonged transition is mainly due to the unsettled question of its status in the new context, especially in terms of autonomy and ethos. The resulting fuzzy borderline between university and other social domains is conducive to an inflow of discourses and practices once alien to academia.

Tuition-based private education and market demand for professionalization entail a challenge to the existing hierarchy, being conducive to a commercial relationship in which students become customers and the teacher the provider of educational services. The system may be affected by endeavours to level the established distance, from asymmetry to solidarity-based partnership. Given the privileged role of the customer in free market economy, attempts to reverse the relation of roles cannot be excluded.

Questioning the validity of long-established academic standards is a corollary of the rationalist attitude in post-traditional societies (Giddens 1991), which reject

historically sanctioned values and rituals, and where priority is given to pragmatic criteria for evaluation. The status of social institutions, their identity and relationships between their members are not taken for granted, but negotiated in a democratic debate between all parties concerned.

Equally critical for the evolution of university is the change in its communicative practices, in particular the introduction and popularization of e-mail. While its use has become a standard in scientific communication, its transfer to the context of university is not always approved without reservations, often for fear of "a shift in power from the previously recognized authority figures within an organisation" (Mulholland 1999:68). The context-related colonization of academic discourse, a consequence of its penetration by business and marketing discourses, co-occurs with the medium-related informalization, intrinsic to e-mail's brevity and verbal economy, and concomitant with a relatively direct style characteristic of interaction in private encounters.

It may be argued that e-mail is a major locus in which the possible repositionings in Polish academia are tested. In this respect a pragmatic analysis of university e-mail communication may provide insights into the assumed attempts to review the traditional student – teacher relationship.

2. Contextual and intersubjective uncertainty in Polish university

The variety of discourses available in academia entail the general sense of uncertainty. I would distinguish between contextual uncertainty and intersubjective uncertainty, both being closely related and co-existent. The former applies to the macro-level socio-economic context, the latter is involved in the context of actual interaction. Contextual uncertainty is related to the contemporary condition of academia, subject to transition to meet the demands of globalization and free market economy. In consequence, encounters in such an unstable context may give rise to serious tensions, or intersubjective uncertainty, in that participants may vary in their perception of the academic ethos and their mutual roles. Intersubjective uncertainty may be further divided into uncertainty of the student, for whom incompatibility of their discourse with the teacher's standards entails detriment to the desired communicative goal, and uncertainty of the teacher, who is responsible for maintaining the acceptable standards of communication and who is expected to react when they are violated.

Plurality of discourses and their potential incompatibility in student – teacher communication have been analysed by House (2003). However, her study has focused on national and ethnic heterogeneity of participants and use of German as the lingua franca in face-to-face interaction at Hamburg University. In the present study interactants share a homogenous cultural background, but still the specificity of the context enables the possible choice of either the mother tongue or the foreign language. In both cases, however, the potential conflict would result from the participants' diverse (1) conceptions of institutionally sanctioned

standards of communication, (2) objectives they pursue, and (3) perceptions of the institution, its members and relations between them. Pragmatically, incompatibility of discourses may also involve different standards of politeness, in which the inviolable ethos of academia is juxtaposed with certain relaxation concurrent with the market-driven pressure for targeted instruction. The latter may explain, for example, the observed Polish students' excessively demanding attitude, imposition with no alternative being left or categorical demands (Duszak 2005).

Uncertainty results in testing of various discourses, rhetorical and pragmatic resources to confirm their legitimacy in post-traditional society. What is not explicitly objected becomes a practice, and may then pervade into contacts with other participants, and eventually be tested as a potential practice in other institutions. The change is brought into university primarily by students rather than academic teachers. However, younger staff may be more tolerant to innovation and accept it by tacit consent, which may lead to the widespread use of these forms in the students' contacts with senior staff as well.

As a contextual variable in student – teacher e-mail communication in EFL courses in Polish universities, language selection has been investigated by Dąbrowska (2006). In her study the topic of the message is considered the essential parameter. Accordingly, English (the language of instruction) was used for discussion on the course's subject matter, while Polish was preferred for other inquiries, such as credit requirements, excusing absences etc. The tendency has also been confirmed in my corpus. I would claim, however, that language selection in students' e-mails may be more than a topic-bound, contextual variable; it may also be approached as a pragmatic parameter.

Accordingly, corpus analysis has been carried out to investigate the role of language selection in student – teacher communication in Polish university, as applied by 2nd year students, at the Institute of Applied Linguistics, University of Warsaw. The corpus consists of 56 e-mails in English and 105 e-mails in Polish addressed to one teacher and written between 2004 and 2007 during a course in Practical English Grammar. The language of instruction was English, while all students and the teacher were native speakers of Polish, a context which justifies language selection in the framework of the course.

Due to spatial limitations the paper concentrates on salutations, which are of critical relevance for the entire act of communication, in that they reveal the writer's perception of the participants' mutual positioning and may be evaluated in terms of consistence with standards of academic politeness perceived by the addressee. Salutations are therefore decisive for the eventual effectiveness of the student's e-mail, as a pragmatic resource which may enhance the chances of achieving the desired goal.

3. Salutations in Polish and English e-mails

As the analysis has shown, the prevalent discourse strategy applied by students is omission of any salutation whatsoever, in more than half of English e-mails and in almost 40% of Polish messages (see Table 1). Omission of salutations in e-mails may only partly be explained in terms of the genre-specific verbal economy and brevity. Avoidance strategy often seems a corollary of the student's unawareness of the accepted standards and conventions of academic communication. In this respect omission of salutations could be a safeguard against the possible negative reaction of the teacher and the consequent non-achievement of the student's goal.

Table 1: *Salutations in English and Polish e-mails*

English e-mails		Polish e-mails	
No salutation	55.5%	No salutation	38%
Dear Mr + surname	19.5%	*Dzień dobry* 'good morning'	16%
Dear Sir	9%	*Witam* 'welcome'	16%
Hello	7%	*Szanowny Panie* 'Dear + V-form'	15%
Dear Mister	3%	*Dobry wieczór* 'good evening'	9%
Good evening	2%	*Szanowny Panie* + surname 'Dear + V-form + surname'	3%
Hey	2%	*Szanowny Panie Magistrze* 'Dear + V-form + Master [degree]'	3%
To Mr + surname	2%		

The diversity of the remaining forms confirms the hypothesis of contextual uncertainty in academia in transition, and its susceptibility to colonization by external discourses. The resulting confusion is further increased by the co-existence of two systems in the bilingual context in question. The difference in the repertoires of polite salutations is the one between the traditional Polish title-based system, and availability of openings unmarked for the academic title in English. This context may be conducive to linguistic interference and pragmatically erroneous transfer of forms between languages. A result is the now observed retreat from long-established title-based addresses in Polish institutions towards a more egalitarian attitude.

3.1 Withdrawal from title-based system in Polish e-mails

The analysis has confirmed that the all-pervasive Polish tradition of institutional title-reference in the forms of address is now being challenged. As Duszak (2005: 86) observes, "If Poland was once a culture that loved titles and a ceremonial form of being in official context (...), today we witness an entry, if not an invasion of direct and casual forms of address".

In order to verify the extent of the assumed withdrawal the corpus has been confronted against a comparative sample of 24 e-mails written in Polish by the students of the same faculty and sent to academics with a PhD degree (12 e-mails) and full professorship (12 e-mails). It has been revealed that the percentage of title-identifying forms is increasing in direct proportion to the academic rank, with professorship being more often recognized (33%), in contrast to infrequent mentions of the recipient's doctor's degree (8%). This regularity is further confirmed in the main corpus, where only three e-mails in Polish contain explicit references to the addressee's MA degree, all written in the year 2004/2005. No other occurrence was found in the following years.

The results may suggest that the hierarchy-sensitive convention of using academic titles in student – teacher communication at Polish university is in decline, at least in the e-mail medium and in relation to lower academic ranks. The reluctance to mention the MA degree may also be due to the socially recognized use of the same form when addressing a pharmacist (Wierzbicka 1999:221).

By contrast, English offers no distinct form of address for an academic with the MA degree, therefore escaping the potential dilemma as to the use of the title in the address. Instead two other salutations are applied, neither of which being marked for academic title: *Dear Madam* / *Sir* or *Dear Ms* / *Mr* + surname. Both forms have proven to be common salutations in English e-mails in the corpus.

3.2 Transfer of English forms: pragmatic incompatibility

Compared with other languages, the English system of forms of address has been described as democratic (Wierzbicka 1985:164, 1999:220), mainly due to the single 2nd person pronoun rather than separate T/V forms, which would otherwise require distinct rules for usage in specific contexts. By contrast, the Polish system is based on the grammatically distinguished T/V dichotomy: *ty* (T-form) is considered intimate, distance-limiting, and downgrading in hierarchical contexts, while *Pani* / *Pan* (gender-marked V-form) is the distancing form, emphasizing the privileged position of the addressee in a hierarchical context. Combined with the complex system of titles and sensitivity to their being mentioned in interaction, Polish standards of politeness in institutional contexts provide no single form of address, which can be reciprocated by the participants in unequal positions. However, in the state of contextual uncertainty, when traditional rules are prone to be questioned and reviewed, attempts may be made to adopt universally applicable forms, sometimes modelled on the existing English patterns. Examples of this process have been found in the corpus.

Firstly, the conventional *Szanowna Pani* / *Szanowny Panie* + academic title is simplified to *Szanowna Pani* / *Szanowny Panie*, which shows much surface similarity with *Dear Sir* / *Madam*. Pragmatically, only the latter is polite enough to be used in the context in question, since it is inherently marked with distance and respect (Wierzbicka 1999:57), while the Polish counterpart is not, unless the

academic title is added. Admittedly, its components are both formal and polite; however, politeness of the entire construction is questionable when used by students to address the teacher, since in institutions the V-form alone may only be permitted when talking to persons whose position in the hierarchy is not known to the speaker. It is also commonly applied by a teacher addressing a student, and it has been found that students often write *Szanowna Pani* / *Szanowny Panie* in reply to the same form used by the teacher or its collective equivalent *Szanowni Państwo*. Reciprocating this address is, however, contrary to the rules of academic politeness: when used by the subordinate it often expresses irritation and impatience. It also sounds patronizing and belittles the autonomy and personal freedom of the addressee, and may be interpreted as a claim for the privileged position, if it is supposed that the writer ignored the addressee's title purposefully.

Secondly, the salutations *Szanowna Pani* / *Szanowny Panie* + surname (one instance in the corpus), though possible and polite in English e-mails in this context (*Dear Ms* / *Mr* + surname), are not only pragmatically maladjusted, but also artificial, in that they have never been used as 2nd person V-form reference in Polish academia. The reason is that using surnames in addresses emphasizes the subordinate position of the addressee, a fact which may account for their presence in employer-employee interactions or in the army. By contrast, the English counterpart is sufficiently polite and duly recognised by Polish students, which may explain its relatively high frequency in the corpus (19.5%).

3.3 Conversationalization

The fact that e-mail contains elements characteristic of speech, such as syntactic ellipsis, redundancies and repetitions, spelling slips (e.g. Crystal 2001), may account for the adoption of salutations originally used in face-to-face interaction. In this respect, however, the respective percentages indicate a greater predilection for these forms in Polish (*Dzień dobry* – 16 % and *Dobry wieczór* – 9 %), compared with their relative scarcity in English messages (no occurrence of *Good morning* and only one of *Good evening*).

Conversationalization of e-mail may be concomitant with the increasing informalization in student – teacher correspondence (Kowalski 2006), a corollary of the more general colonization of institutional discourses and practices by discourses and practices of the private domain (Fairclough 1995, 2001). Consequently, informal spoken salutations may become more frequent than the standard, neutral forms of *Dzień dobry* / *Good morning* and *Dobry wieczór* / *Good evening*. This is observed in the presence of *Hello* (7%) and, more strikingly, *Hey* (2%) in the English corpus, both being inappropriate in the formal, hierarchical context.

Frequently exploited in Polish e-mails is the notorious *Witam* in the salutation, a syntactically defective form due to lack of the following object, which is usually combined with *pozdrawiam* ['(My) regards'] in the closing. Both *Witam* and *Pozdrawiam* seem to have their origins in electronic correspondence in

e-commerce, between customers and web-based service-providers. Lack of physical contact and the resulting impossibility to define the other party in terms of power, social status or professional role have presumably resulted in the introduction of these artificial, quasi-universal forms, without the risk of ignoring any of the relevant contextual parameters or violating the rules of politeness. Owing to this assumed neutrality *Witam* and *Pozdrawiam* have since colonized communication practices in various social institutions, becoming an alternative to the traditional title-based systems. However, in terms of the title-sensitive tradition of academic communication in Poland and non-virtual relationship between participants, whose institutionally determined roles are reciprocally recognized, the use of both these forms is not justified.

4. Conclusions

Within the above-described bilingual university context language selection may be analysed as a pragmatic resource in student – teacher communication, entwined in the contextual and intersubjective uncertainty of Polish academia. Like many other Polish institutions in transition, university, its practices and discourses are prone to colonization by diverse social domains, thus making university sustain "a variety of coexisting, contrasting and often competing discursive practices" (Fairclough 1995:131). In this respect contextually justified decision to use English in e-mail may be considered an escape from the intricacies of the title-based Polish system, all the more confusing in the state of uncertainty. However, the results show that bilingualism is an additional variable contributing to the general confusion and increasing pragmatic incompatibility between students' and teachers' perception of academia and the related standards of interpersonal politeness.

Statistically, English has not proven to be the primary language of communication in the bilingual context of an EFL course for 2nd year students at University of Warsaw. However, it may exert considerable influence on the standards of politeness in academic communication in Polish. A number of Polish salutations in the corpus seem to have been coined on the basis of the established English forms of address, though usually the transfer entails a loss of the minimum pragmatic value expected. In consequence, English can hardly be a reliable donor of polite forms to Polish, since the assumed neutrality of such pragmatic borrowings and literal translations is not compatible with the long-established, title-sensitive conventions of communication in Polish institutions.

Moreover, departure from titlemania, which is now observed in e-mails written in Polish, in particular to teachers with MA and PhD titles, is not only motivated by linguistic transfer. It is also a symptom of the more general shift towards informalization of institutional discourse and the inflow of private discourses into the public domain. In this respect, the egalitarian potential of English addresses and lack of T/V distinction may be treated as a stimulus to

search for similarly democratic forms in languages which have historically developed context-bound conventions for using specific forms of address.

Finally, conducive to this change is the development of e-mail communication in the academic context, gradually becoming the principal form of student – teacher interaction. Influence of the medium, in terms of both its generic features (brevity, colloquialisms, informality) and its embeddedness in the Anglo-Saxon global dominance, may be at least partly responsible for the pragmatic change observed. Indeed, the drive towards informalization in institutional interaction co-occurs with democratisation of e-mail communication in general, and communicative brevity of the medium in particular.

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The Nonverbal Behavior of Russian and German Chatters

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The internet has changed the lives of people in many ways. In fact, the internet has influenced so many parts of everyday life, that it seems unwise to even try to give a complete list. Most astonishing of all these changes, still, seem the changes that occurred in the communication sector: We now use emails, newsgroups and chats as naturally as if it had always been like this. All these kinds of computer-mediated communication are thereby more than just an alternative to already existing forms of communication: They add to the traditional forms of communication without completely replacing them. The aim of our study was to compare the communication behavior of chatters in two different nations. We concentrated on the nonverbal behavior, analyzing the distribution of nonverbal signs in the turns, and the employment of certain nonverbal signs among different groups. The question was whether the age, the nationality and the context of the communication influence the amount and the quality of the nonverbal signs.

1. The properties of the Web-Chat

Computer-mediated communication in short is understood as all kinds of communication between two or more people through the computer and some kind of network connection (cf. Fix 2001:39, Misoch 2006:37f). It can be roughly divided into two groups: the *synchronous* and the *asynchronous* communication**.** (cf. Misoch 2001:54f) We find asynchronous forms such as email-conversation, newsgroups, bulletin boards and websites. On the other hand, chats provide the possibility of synchronous talking. There can be as well a distinction between these different forms accordig to whether they are characteristically one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many communications. In the case of chat communication all different types of interaction are possible.

Table 1: *Forms of online communication and their properties as. vs. s and one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many (following Fix 2001: 40)*

	o-t-o	o-t-m	m-t-m
Email (as)	yes	yes	-
Newsgroups (as)	-	-	yes
Bulletin boards (as)	-	yes	yes
Websites (as)	-	yes	yes
Chat, IRC, MUD (s)	yes	yes	Yes

as = asynchronous , s = synchronous

There are, in the meantime, many different possibilities for the person willing to engage in chatting: a vast amount of programs, different kinds of online chats or small chatting devices that are built-in your mail program (e.g. google mail). These varieties fullfill all possible needs for chatters that might vary from the wish for a short online chat with some stranger to the want for a sophisticated chat program allowing the chatter to engage in chat communities for a long time or even to built up a community of her/his own.

In a nutshell, chatting describes an online activity in which two ore more persons 'talk' to each other while virtually present in a chat room. Participants in a chat room type their contribution/sentences and respond to each other in a nearly real-time style (cf. Fix 2001:46f). Discussions have been raised and are still going on about where to locate chat comunication on the axis between speech and writing, but most scientists do agree, that it is very close to speech, although realized in written form. Hess-Lüttich and Wilde (2003) refer in this context to the distinction between conceptual and medial speech and writing as drawn by Koch and Oestricher 1994 (cf. Hess-Lüttich & Wilde 2003). A compromise between the different points of view can be reached insofar as chatting is nowaday mostly described as a conceptual oral text, that is realized in written form (cf. Hess-Lüttich & Wilde 2003, Misoch 2006:166ff., Schmidt 1999, Schlobinski et al. 2005:6f., Wirth 2005:67ff.).

Comparing the properties of speech (face-to-face communication) and those of chat communication, Crystal (2000) as well places chat communication in the vicinity of face-to-face communication and dialogue as it shows quite some characteristic traits of speech. Chat communication and face-to-face interaction are alike as they are both

- time governed
- expecting immediate response
- spontaneous and therefore use an informal laguage

There are some more characteristics of the online chat that slightly differ from face-to-face interaction:

- The partners are present – but only virtually.
- The communication is transient - in principle.
- Some backchanneling behavior can be observed – but it is not simulatenous.
- Turn-taking is a distinctive feature of both kinds of communication as well, although we found that there are larger lags in between the turns in chat communication.

The main differences are the complete lack of prosody due to the absence of auditive signals and - due to the absence or merely virtual presence of the chatters - a complete lack of facial and gestural expressions or body posture.

We can well say that chat communication lacks first and foremost the non- and paraverbal information[1] compared to face-to-face communication. The nonverbal elements nevertheless are crucial for the addressee when it comes to decoding a message, especially if irony or ambiguity is involved, which is often the case in chat communication (cf. Thaler 2003:85). Crystal (2001:36) states

> "[…]Netspeak lacks the facial expressions, gestures and conventions of body posture and distance (the kinesics and proxemics), which are so critical in expressing personal opinions and attitudes and in moderating social relationships." (Crystal 2001:36)

And accordingly he draws the conclusion:

> "A rapidly constructed Net message, lacking the usual courtesies, can easily appear abrupt or rude." (Crystal 2001:39)

Realizing this, Scott Fahlmann proposed in 1982 the use of the first icon that became widely known as 'smiley'. Since then, many graphostilistic elements including a large variety of smileys have been implemented in numerous chatrooms, possibly driven by the desire to create new and therefore unique signs, for which the user then could take the credit. John Suler commented on this observance:

Humans are wily. Give them a limit and they find ways around it. Give them a seemingly simple and straightforward medium, and they find all sorts of ways to creatively fiddle with it. (cf. Thaler 2003:85.)

For our purposes - and following previous researchers - we divided these elements into six groups.

[1] From now on we will refer to both, para- and nonverbal information, with the phrase nonverbal elements or nonverbal signs due to realize an easier reading. Please note that with this term both phenomena are meant.

Table 2: *Nonverbal signs and their functions*

Smileys	=) =-* 8-) :-~)2	Mimic, gestures, status
Acronyms	Lol *lol* g rofl3	Mimic, Behavior
Inflectives/actionstrips4	*grinning* yawningwidely*	Mimic, gestures, prosodic elements, behavior
Iteration of letters/Writing in capitals	Whaaaaaaat?	Prosodic elements
Iteration of punctuation marks	Really?????? Well…i don‘t know	Prosodic elements
Special characters	…	

Of course, these are only tendencies, and some devices can as well serve other purposes that are not mentioned here. But yet they display the main function of the signs, rather than all functions.[5]

The function of these nonverbal signs can be quite different. We decided on the following main functions:

Prosody can be used for:
- emphasizing (Well PETER did not forget about it…)
- signaling loudness (CAN YOU HEAR ME???)
- signaling a pause (I…. well….I have not decided yet)

Mimic can:
- connotate an utterance [“I just love waiting for you ;-)”]
- be used for backchanneling [“And then my computer crashed.” – “=)]
- accompany an utterance [“and then my computer crashed =((( ]
- be used in order to honor the addressee [“Hello everybody!” – “HelloPeter Pan =)]
- express the mood [=) =(=/)
- express an opinion [“I think Macintosh is much better than windows” – “=)”]

Behavior can signal:
- backchanneling behavior [*Mary007 nods*]

[2] Meaning of the smileys from left to right: laughing/happy (mmic/behavior), Kissing (behavior), user is wearing glasses (Status), user has a cold (status/behavior)
[3] Meaning of the acronyms: laughing out loud, grin(ning), roling on the floor laughing
[4] Inflectives and actionstrips have been put together here in one goup even though they are slighly different. But as the Russian language does not seem to provide a possibilty for the construction of the so-called inflective-forms, and as the actionstrips serve the same purpose we refrained from making the distinction.
[5] For a more deta iled overview of the different graphostilistic elements see for example Thaler 2001: 85ff.

- the status [*Mary007 is away*]
- engagement in some kind of roleplay [*Mary offers a glas of coke to PeterPan*]
- the mood [*Mary007 sits completely at ease in a hammock*]
- the opinion [*Mary frowns in disgust*]

The same nonverbal sign – for example the rather crude smiley - can, as shown here, serve very different purposes. It can either express the mood of a chatter, it can reinsure the chatter, serving as a backchanneling device, it can display an opinion or simply honor the adressee as one can express his/her positive attitude towards this person. Note that these functions do not display all the functions that nonverbal signs might have in reallife communication. They are subjected to the conditions of computer-mediated communication that modify the circumstances of the communication as well as the content (cf. Höflich 1998). Referring to Runkehl et al. (1998) many researchers have divided the different signs into three main functions:

- an emotive function, which would equal every measure that is used by the chatter to express his/her mood or feelings
- an evaluative function, that subsumes all kinds of expressing your opinion and are used in order to avoid any misunderstandings
- a communicative-regulative function which describes all nonverbal elements that are simply used in a phatic function to generate a certain atmosphere. (cf. Thaler 2001, Runkehl 1998)

Most of the functions we described above can be fit in one of these three categories, nevertheless we decided to make a more precise distinction. Also, we did not concentrate on the function as much as we did on the appearance of the nonverbal sign – its written representation.

2. Influences on nonverbal behavior

Communicating via internet in a chatroom is influenced by various factors, so is the nonverbal behavior in a specific chat situation different from another. To survey the assumption that there is a specific nonverbal behavior depending on the influencing factors, we divided the six investigated groups by nationality (cultural background), age and context.

With reference to culture-anthropological studies which show that elements of nonverbal communication in terms of their implementation and interpretation can vary depending on the culture of the participants (Misoch 2000), we divide the chatters along two national groups (Russians and Germans), expecting a

different use of nonverbal elements for each nation.[6] As Hall is convinced that understanding nonverbal communication is an important part of cultural learning, enabling one to understand not only what others try to communicate verbally but also what they communicate unintentionally (1990), we conclude that nonverbal behavior on the internet also mirrors cultural elements that are inherent in this acquired language. Nevertheless we must consider that most people are affected by different cultures and subcultures (in this case the internet culture) and that nonverbal information has to be typed, and thus cannot be communicated fully unintentionally.

Consequently, the conscious use of nonverbal elements marks them as intended rhetorical elements and makes them more significant, allowing the chatter to delibarately pick a nonverbal sign and posting it during the chat. Still, the conscious use of nonverbal signs does not neglect Hall's statement, it rather has to be limited according to the possibilities of the internet: altough a chatter has to decide on a nonverbal element, there is still a pattern he is not aware of, but which can be influenced by his culture.

However, the influence of the channel and its possibilities might be stronger than the already existing specific nonverbal behavior of the country, as it limits the possibilities of nonverbal communication. We note that both, culture and subculture, are two important influences on communication on the internet. At this point it is self-explanatory that we cannot concentrate on investigating differences in nonverbal behavior between Russians and Germans in computer-aided communication and draw conclusions to their nonverbal behavior in everyday life.

The last two influencing factors we researched in chatrooms are age[7] and context. These factors confine subgroups of the Russians as well as of the Germans.

The age of a person is a factor that is worth considering, as studies reveal that the internet serves a different function for both age brackets.[8] We expect that young people make more use of nonverbal signs, because they are more familiar with the possibilites of the internet than older people.

The last influence examined by us is the context of the chatroom. In what way does a person communicate differently, talking to another person in a flirt chatroom? There might be a preference for a certain nonverbal behavior to attract others. It should not be difficult to find nonverbal elements that are attached to this specific situation.

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[6] We have to mention that there is a slightly different set of smileys in Germany and Russia. However we do not want to concentrate on its form – during our research it was more important which function the smileys served.

[7] Of course we cannot prove the age of a person in a chatroom, we must assume that the person tells us his/her real age in his profile.

[8] For further interests – there are many studies on the internet, to name just a few: Forrester Research, NetValue, Stanford Study (Study of the Social Consequences of the Internet)

We keep in mind that Jandt's statement about cultural diversity might apply for this research. He stated that "the diversity within cultures probably exceeds the differences between cultures." (Jandt 1995:8). We do not want to concentrate only on the differences between cultural nonverbal behavior that can be seen by comparing two nations, we are also interested into other participating factors that have a great influence on the choice of a specific nonverbal element.

3. The data

3.1 Collecting the data

We have collected the data in the following way:

At first we have located chatrooms that fulfill the following characteristics:

- Strict online chat programmes, no download necessary
- No integrated chat programmes (such as g-mail) that would negate a true random sample because some people using the net but using another email provider at the same time would be excluded.
- More than 100 registrated or online users, meaning 100 ore more potential or actual users, so that a large variety of people was guaranteed.
- No possibility of 'clicking in' prefabricated smileys. Some chatrooms allow the chatter to just choose from a given list of smileys and inserting them by just clicking on the motive. As smileys still seem to be the most popular form of compensation for nonverbals signs, we wanted to avoid an distortion of the figures due to conditions that are not explained within the user but because of the technical conditions.
- Identifaction of the approximate age is possible. Of course it is always possible to lie in an online chatroom but at least the chatrooms were labeled 'under 20' 'over 50' and so forth so that it is justifiable to act on the assumption that the users are at least close to the age line.

Having identified suitable chatrooms, we then went to them and 'lurked' in there (meaning staying in the room but not interacting in any way), recording the conversations. We then picked, in a second step, randomly a passage of about 100 turns from every recording and set this as one sample.

As we were aware that the communication situation and the purpose of a conversation is of great interest when interpreting the nonverbal signs, we decided to form three groups for every country, dividing the chatters in a younger group (up to 30 years) and older group (older than 30 years) and a group with younger chatters that talked in a chatroom declared as a 'flirt-room'. We then ended up with six groups that were distinctive from each other either by age or by the intended purpose of the chat.

Table 3: *Distribution of the samples among the groups*

	German	Russian
Young chatters (ap. 15 – 35 yrs.)	6x100 turns	6x100 turns
Older chatters (ap. over 30 yrs.)	6x100 turns	6x100 turns
Chatters in „flirt rooms“	6x100 turns	6x100 turns

Six samples, each containing 100 turns as described above, have been taken for every group which equals 3.600 turns, 24.000 words and 803+1607 nonverbal signs (nvs).

3.2 Coding the sample

We coded the sample using a codesheet. We calculated the turns-nvs ratio, the words-turn ratio and the words-nvS ratio to have a reliable measure to compare between the groups. Furthermore, we calculated the percentage rate of a specific nonverbal sign that is whether a smiley, an acronym, an inflective or some kind of prosodic element was used.

Concerning the function of the nonverbal signs we made a first division according to whether the sign intended to replace mimic, gesture, prosody or behavior. We then decided, in a second step what function the sign held that is whether it was a backchanneling device, used to conotate the utterance and so on.

4. Results

4.1 Results I: German chatters

We calculated the figures as average means for each sample taken.

We found that the younger chatters use a maximum of only 3.8 words per turn, which is also true for the flirt group, while the older chatters use a maximum of 6.2 words per turn. The differences between the minimum and the maximum are very small for all three groups (1.1 to 1.7). The younger chatters only use a maximum of 0.42 nonverbal signs per turn, while the older chatters use a maximum of 0.6. The largest amount of nonverbal signs per turn can be viewed in the flirt group. The real rate of nonverbal sign usage is shown in the ratio words per nonverbal signs. The figures indicate that the highest number of words between nonverbal signs is used by the older chatter groups, which is hardly surprising. Also the minimum in this group (8.5) is only just beneath the maximum of the younger flirt group, and even still above the maximum for the flirt chatters (5.9). These findings are also displayed in the averages. We calculated the order of the ranks as well, but as they equaled the rank of the averages, we have not displayed them here.

Table 4: *Figures for the the German chatters over the three groups: young, older, flirters*

Sample	1	2	3	4	5	6	Diff.	Average
Words/turn								
Young	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.8	2.4	2.9	1.4	3.25
Older	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.5	7.3	6.2	1.7	5.65
Flirt	2.7	2.6	2.7	3.7	3.0	3.3	1.1	3.0
nvS/turns								
Young	0.37	0.4	0.35	0.34	0.42	0.37	0.8	0.4
Older	0.27	0.23	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.34	0.37	0.4
Flirt	0.55	0.67	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.6
Words/nvS								
Young	9.5	8.5	9.7	11.0	5.8	7.9	5.2	7.1
Older	19.4	23	8.5	11.4	17.5	18.1	14.5	16.3
Flirt	4.8	4.0	5.8	4.6	5.9	5.5	1.9	5.1

Concerning the functions of the nonverbal signs we distinguished between the compensation of prosody, mimic, gesture and behavior without subdividing the communicational functions such as backchanneling behavior, honorification etc.

Table 5: *Distinction between prosody, mimic, gesture and behavior according to the three groups (in % and ranks)*

(In %)	Young	Older	Flirt		Young	Older	Flirt
Prosody	13.1	61.1	13.1		4	1	4
Mimic	42.3	34.5	51.9	Ranks	1	2	1
Gesture	13.3	1.9	19.7		3	3	2
Behavior	30.9	2.4	13.6		2	4	3

Table 5 shows on the left side the percentage figures, indicating, that the compensation of mimic seems most important in all groups. The replacement of behavior and indicating gestures is seemingly unimportant for the older chatters. These findings are also displayed in the rank order correlation shown on the right side. We can also see here, that foremost older chatters use prosodic elements to structure their utterances.

4.2 Results II: Russian chatters

At first glance the table of the Russian groups reveals a different nonverbal behavior compared to the German chatters. But before we compare the results, we want to look closer at the typical nonverbal behavior of Russian chatters.

Indicated by the bold numbers we see that the group of older chatters uses the largest number of words per turn (4.5), while the flirt groups use the least (3). The difference between the maximum and minimum within the groups ranges from 1 to 3.9, this is a reasonable value. The older chatters use the largest number of nonverbal signs per turn (0.7), while the other two groups show a very similar distribution, the difference between maximum and minimum within the groups is very small (0.5 to 0.7). The last results, showing the amount of words per nonverbal sign, reflect that young chatters use twice the amount of nonverbal signs (11.3) in comparison to the group of older chatters (6.9). However, the value of difference within the groups of young and flirt chatters is relatively high (13.7 and 10 words/nvs) and mirrors a certain discontinuity within the groups.

Table 6: *Figures for the the Russian chatters over the three groups: young, older, flirters*

Sample	1	2	3	4	5	6	Diff.	Average
Words/turn								
Young	4.2	4.5	3.6	3.5	3.8	4.1	1	4
Older	4.5	5.1	4.1	3.0	3.6	6.9	3.9	4.5
Flirt	2.4	2.7	2.3	3.4	4.5	2.9	2.2	3.0
nvS/turns								
Young	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4
Older	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.4	1	0.7	0.7
Flirt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.4
Words/nvS								
Young	15	8.8	4.8	18.5	12.7	8.1	13.7	11.3
Older	6	6.1	5	9.1	8.5	6.6	4.1	6.9
Flirt	4.8	5.6	4.3	14.3	6.1	10.3	10	7.6

The second table displays that the replacement of prosody and mimic is the most important function of nonverbal elements in Russian chatrooms. In all groups only about 10 per cent of nonverbal signs are used to express gestures or behavior. The ranks attest a similar importance of prosody and mimic. These results are equal in all three groups, proving that is not only characteristic for a specific group within the nation, but for the nation itself.

Table 7: *Distinction between prosody, mimic, gesture and behavior according to the three groups (in % and ranks)*

(In %)	Young	Older	Flirt		Young	Older	Flirt
Prosody	59.4	38.6	39.3		1.5	2	1.5
Mimic	37.5	49.8	46	Ranks	1.5	1	1.5
Gesture	0	1.5	3.4		4	4	4
Behavior	3.1	10.1	11.3		3	3	3

4.3 Comparison of the countries

Concerning the words per turn ratio, we found that in both countries the older chatter groups use the largest amount of words per turn while the flirt group uses the least number of words per turn. The distribution of the nonverbal signs per turn ratio does not point towards any age- or purpose related evidence. In Germany the flirt chatters use the largest amount, while the other two groups show a similar application. In Russia the older chatters seem to use the largest number of nonverbal signs per turn. Astonishingly, while in Germany the older chatters use the largest amount of words between nonverbal signs (16.3) and the younger ones use least (7.1), the results are vice versa for the Russian group (older: 6.9, younger: 11.3).

Comparing the field of compensation, we found that gestures are most seldomly replaced in both countries. The replacement of facial expressions is the most important application of nonverbal signs in both countries. Prosodic elements are more often used in Russia than in Germany, whereas Russians rarely use any replacement for behavior. The roleplay that is often expressed using inflectives is hardly found in all three groups. This phenomenon can be easily explained when looking at the preference for certain nonverbal signs:

The Germans use a larger variety of nonverbal signs than the Russians do. Summing up the percentage for the two most popular nonverbal elements, we found that in just under 60% of the cases Germans use inflectives or the iteration of punctuation marks. The Russians, on the other hand, use in more than 80% smileys or the iteration of punctuation marks. That leaves 40% resp. 20% of nonverbal signs to be distributed between the other devices and displays the larger variety of nonverbal signs in German chatrooms.

Looking at the three most favorite devices in the six different groups, we found that regardless of what age the chatters are that all German chatters like inflectives, while they are not in the topmost ranks in all russian grous. On the other hand, only Russians use the so-called special characters, meaning little pictures that can be pasted in a conversation and have very different functions. Smileys are in all groups among the most favourite means to compensate nonverbal signs. But here as well the Russians tend to paste in smileys, while the Germans often use the iconographic design.

5. Conclusion

Having investigated and compared the nonverbal behavior of German as well as of Russian chatters on the internet we brought interesting phenomena to light. First of all, the use of inflectives and action strips is the least popular element that is used in Russian chatrooms, while it is broadly used by German chatters to serve a large variety of functions (behavior, mimic, gestures, prosody). This can be traced back to the fact that the Russian language as such does not provide for the productive use of inflective-forms like the German language. Also, Russian chatters have a strong affinity for graphic elements and are more likely to express themselves with special "netlike" characters like e.g. a rose to congratulate or to show that they like the other person. In this respect it is noticeable that Russian chatters favor using illustrated smileys rather than the iconographic type. Russians do not avoid the use of iconographic smileys by all means, they have only three or four different types of iconographic smileys, while Germans have a larger set of smileys which bear a specific meaning. This difference can be explained with the late access to the internet in Russia. Chatrooms and iconographic smileys in Germany have been popular for a long time already, when Russian chatrooms boomed and at the same time graphic characters were spreading on the internet. Nowadays it is easy to find a website with specific iconographic signs and its meanings in German, while it takes a long time to find the equivalent information on a Russian website[9].

The last interesting difference is the high frequency of ellipses ("…") in the Russian groups, which symbolize a variety of nonverbal elements, such as pausing, intonation and connotation. Although German chatters make use of this stylistic mean as well, it is less popular. This use is an evident difference that is influenced by the culture of the chatter, as this nonverbal behavior was found in all Russian subgroups.

The differences among the subgroups are quite similar, but each nation has its own characteristics.

In spite of all differences between the two nations it is apparent that all chatters are concerned to replace missing facial expressions in the first place.

Altogether we discovered that the channel (internet) as well as the nationality influence the usage of nonverbal elements. Concerning the function of nonverbal elements, the internet seems to be a stronger influence, as the groups appear quite similar despite national borders.

Our research left some questions which are to be investigated deeper.

Although there is a correlation between the culture of a chatter and his/her nonverbal behavior it is still not clear to what extent the internet as a subculture

[9] We have to take into account that the internet access in Russia is limited, not all social classes have enough money to spend it on chatting on the internet. Mostly well-off families or students (with the possibility of internet access at university) are frequent users in chatrooms.

influences the chatter. This could be examined in a long-term experiment, comparing chats during a longer period.

Having examined only a few factors we are curious to see what more can be said about the interaction of chatters in nonverbal communication on the internet.

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Aus der "Rhetorik[1] der Europäischen Integration" Am Beispiel Rumäniens

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About the "Rhetoric of the European Integration": The Romanian Example: In times dominated by a massive talking about *globalization* and about *the integration process* of some countries in well defined structures like EU and NATO, the need for efficient communication in the above context (*through the intercultural communicative competence building*) is obvious. The development of the intercultural communicative competence starts with the reinforcement of the capacity to delimitate different sociolinguistic identities, i. e. trough the *development of the communicative* or *pragmatic conscience*. The pragmatic conscience is represented by the *metapragmatic discourse* regarding the values which generates, at speakers belonging to an ethnical group, a certain linguistic behavior. Concretely, the paper studies some *aspects of the metapragmatic discourse in the present Romanian public space*, *taking into consideration the globalization and European integration process.* Examples, collected from Romanian media texts, are treated according to the *cross-cultural pragmatics* view.

1. Einleitung

Ein wichtiges Thema der öffentlichen Debatte, das im Programm der Mitglieds- und Beitrittsländer der Europäischen Union vorgesehen ist, ist die Erweiterungsproblematik ("l'elargissement") im Hinblick auf die *Kommunikation*.

Zu einer Zeit, zu der viel über den Intergartionsprozess einiger Länder in klar definierte Strukturen (EU, NATO) und über die "Globalisierung" obsessiv gesprochen wird, kommt auch die Notwendigkeit der *effizienten Kommunikation* in den eben erwähnten Kontexten zur Geltung (durch *die Bildung der interkulturellen Kommunikationskompetenz*)[2].

Das Ziel der interkulturellen Kommunikation auf pragmatischer Ebene ist *der Konsens.* In einer ersten Phase wird der Konsens durch die Abklärungsdiskussion dargestellt. Das heisst, es besteht eine gemeinsame Bestrebung zur Entmythisierung der Mythen und zur Klärung der kulturspezifischen Metaphern.

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[1] Hier verwenden wir den Terminus 'Rethorik' in seiner Grundbedeutung als "Art (Kunst und Wissenschaft) der Diskursgestaltung im Allgemeinen, mit Überzeugungs- sowie mit Erklärungs-, Beweis- oder Beratungsfunktion" (*DŞL* 2001: 440).

[2] Siehe, in diesem Sinne, Magda (2007).

Eine erste Phase in der Entwicklung der interkulturellen Kommunikationskompetenz ist *die Fähigkeit, die unterschiedlichen soziolinguistischen Identitäten abzugrenzen*[3], es geht also um *die Entwicklung des kommunikativen oder pragmatischen Bewusstseins*. Das pragmatische Bewusstsein ist anhand *des metapragmatischen Diskurses* verdeutlicht. Dieser bezieht sich auf Werte, die bei den einer gewissen ethnischen Gruppe zugehörigen Sprechern ein bestimmtes linguistisches Verhalten generieren.

Das Referat hat vor, einige *Aspekte des Metadiskurses in der aktuellen rumänischen Öffentlichkeit im Kontext der europäischen Integration* zu präsentieren, die in den schriftlichen Medien in Rumänien vorkommen.[4]

2. Die Allgemeinsprache der "europäischen Integration": eine exzessiv objektive Sprache

Das Phänomen der Entstehung und die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union hat zur Entwicklung einer *Integrationssprache* (EIS) geführt, die sich im weitesten Sinne auf den Gesstaltungsprozess der Gesellschaften im geographischen Raum genannt "Europa" bezieht.

Die Komplexität dieses Phänomens rechtfertigt die Komplexität des Kommunikationsinstruments, das von den neu entstandenen politisch-administrativen Organismen verwendet wird.

EIS, als *Kommunikationsinstrument im europäischen Öffentlichkeitsraum,* bildet sich aus einem Konglomerat von funktionalen Sprachregistern zusammen, die der Kommunikation in formalen, halbformalen und informalen Kontenxten zugrundeliegen.

EIS nimmt konkret die Form eines komplexes Systems von Sprachvarianten an, die sich untereinander durch die in der Kommunikation erfüllten Funktionen unterscheiden.

Abhängig von diesem Kriterium kann sich die EIS in zwei Hauptformen verwirklichen:

Die *EIS der offiziellen Dokumente und die EIS der gängigen Kommunikation in der Öffentlichkeit.*

Die prototypische Form der EIS-Verwirklichung ist die *Kernsprache* der Offizielldokumente, die im Allgemeinen in der unpersölichen Rechts- und Verwaltungssprache[5] verfasst werden.

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[3] Als Grundsatz der Identität definiert *die Alterität* die Beziehung zwischen *Ich (Wir)* und *Andere*, und ist in jedem zwischenmunschlichen Verhältnis und in jedem Diskurs über das menschliche Wesen zu finden. In einem weiteren Sinne bezieht sich die Alterität auf den Unterschied zwischen Räumen, Landschften und Wesen und versteht sich als wesentlicher Teil des geographischen, biologischen und sozialen Imaginäres (Utopien).

[4] Es ist anzuführen, dass das vorliegende Referat vorwiegend den journalistischen Auktoriell-diskurs in Monologform betrachtet. Die Texte wurden vom *Internet* übernommen.

Die Kernsprache der Integration ist also eine institutionalisierte Sprache. Sie besteht aus einer Vielfalt von diskursiv-textuellen Sprachstilen, die im Bereich der offiziellen Beziehungen vorkommen und gemeinsam folgende pragmalinguistische Merkmale aufweisen:

- Verwendung im Bereich der Wirtschaft-, Rechts-, Handelsbeziehungen, in den diplomatischen Beziehungen sowie in der Verwaltung;
- Die Kommunikation erfolgt unidirektional im Allgemeinen (vom Sender zum Empfänger), wobei sich die Aufmerksamkeit ins Besondere auf den Punkt der Mitteilungsemission und –Kodifizierung fokussiert;
- Die diskursgenerierenden Wesen, die in der Kommunikation wirken, sind *unpersönlich* (unpersönlicher Sender (Autorität) – abwesender und unbestimmter Empfänger); Die Kommunikationsteilnehmer haben *feste Rollen*: der Sender ist die Autorität, die Gesetze erlässt; er ist eigenartig, abstrakt; seine Merkmale sind [+ Autorität] und [+ Kompetenz];
- Die EIS-Mitteilungen sind statisch und solitär (Sie werden aus einer Entfernung gesendet);[6]
- Die Verfassungsweise entspricht den Rechtsnormen. Deshalb sind auch die EIS- Mitteilungen wie Vorschriften ausgedrückt. Sie sind klar, präzise und kurz gefasst, um von allen Adressaten verstanden zu werden. Dabei werden die genausten verwendet und, wenn nötig, werden einige Termini erklärt; die Regeln der formalen Logik und der Grammatik werden rigoros beachtet;
- Der unpersönliche Stil (charakterisiert durch Merkmale wie *Klarheit, Genauigkeit und Zugänglichkeit*) verleiht den EIS-Mitteilungen *einen universalen Charakter*;
- Aus der Perspektive der linguistischen Ausdrucksweise umfasst die Kernsprache der EIS die meisten spezifischen Merkmale des Rechts- und Verwaltungssprache; die Konventionalität und die Stereotypie dieses Sprachstils kann durch *die Formeln* und durch *die spezifischen syntaktischen Schemata (Schablonkonstruktionen)* bewiesen werden;
- Wegen der starken Spezifizität gilt diese Sprache als ein Fachjargon, das außerhalb des Spezialistenkreises schwer zu verstehen ist.

Rund um die Krensprache der Integration haben sich die *Satellitsprachen der "Umsetzung"* entwickelt. Diese sind zur Anwendung der Normen der Referenzunterlagen in den konkreten Kommunikationssituationen notwendig.

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[5] Siehe, unter anderen, Stoichțoiu-Ichim (2001).

[6] Siehe Cornu (1990:266): "La loi est un message étatique et solitaire. Seule à se faire entendre, la voix du législateur tombe de haut et vient de loin. Dans ce monologue du pouvoir à des destinataires absents et muets, le message émane d'un émetteur maître et distant."

3. Von einer exzessiv objektiven Sprache zur "hölzernen Sprache der Integration"

Im Allgemeinen hat EIS einen engen und direkten Bezug zum *Sozialleben*. Die korrekte Wahrnehmung dieser Sprache hat wichtige praktische Konsequenzen für die Nichtspezialisten (*die Bürger*).

Im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftspolitik werden auch Sonderprogramme vorgesehen, deren Ziel ist, den zu fachlich und karg formulierten Inhalt der EU-Ofiziellunterlagen dem Publikum bekannt zu machen.

Die exzessiv stereotypische Form der eben erwähnten Unterlagen bewirkt das Entstehen einer echten *hölzernen Sprache der Integration.* Diese Sprache weist alle charakteristischen Eigenschaften des Genres auf und entwickelt jeweils sprachspezifische Aspekte.

Die Verbreitung dieser hölzernen Sprache in der Őffentlichkeit, in den unterschiedlichen Sprachgemeinschaften, ist, letzten Endes, den örtlichen *Medien* zu verdanken.

4. Die Dialogkomponente von EIS

Die Medien-Gemeinschaften suchen nach einem "realistischen"-Wortschatz, der einen Ausgleich zwischen dem dominierenden und utopischen Wortschatz der EU-Beamten und den "vorgegebenen" Konzepten, die die Fachliteratur in mechanischer Weise gebraucht, darstellen soll.

Die Anpassung an den Kommunikationspartner ist ein Grundsatz der kommunikativen Kooperation und setzt die Erstellung der Mitteilungen je nach Zielen, Sprachkompetenz und Haltung des Adressaten voraus. Die Hauptmöglichkeiten, diese Anpassung zu vollführen, sind die vorwiegende Verwendung der gebräuchlichen Vokabeln mit konkreter Bedeutung, ein häufiger Gebrauch von Personalpronomen, die Erläuterungen, die Zusammenstellung eines Glossars von Fachtermini oder die Erläuterung der Fachbegriffe in einem "freundlichen", *personalisierten Ton.*

Parallel zur Entwicklung von spezialisierten Codes entsteht eine *Alltagsprache der Integration*, die als eine exzessiv subjektive Sprache zu charakterisieren ist. Sie umfasst Formeln oder Verhaltensmustern der Kommunikation, die in Verbindung mit der Herausbildung von Haltungen und von Kollektivmeinungen in Sachen der Europäischen Integration (*das Imaginäre der Europäischen Integration*) stehen.

Die Darstellung der mit der europäischen Vereinigung zusammenhängenden Ereignisse hat den Journalisten ermöglicht, ein medienspezifisches Imaginäres über Europa und den Integrationsprozess zu entwickeln:

Das gemeinschaftliche Europa, definiert als Raum der "hochrangigen Diplomatie" und der statistischen Auswertungen, koexistiert mit "Ihrem Europa"[7], einem Europa der Kulturen und der spezifischen und individuellen Vorstellungen.[8]

Im Falle der ehemaligen kommunistischen Länder, entspricht dieses Sachverhältnis im Kommunikationsbereich dem Übergang von einer *monologischen Gesellschaft*, die auf die *kommunistische hölzerne Sprache* basierte, zu einer *Dialoggesellschaft,* in der die Vielfalt der Ausdrucksformen der *Suche nach neuen kollektiven oder individuellen Identitäten* entspricht. Es ist kein Zufall, dass wir die Zeugen eines wahren Kommunikationsausbruchs sind, der sich auf das wichtigste Epochenereignis fokussiert: die Europäische Integration.

Die neue Beitrittssprache bleibt dennoch, zum Teil, ein Opfer der *"sprachlichen Trägheit"*.

Der *osteuropäische diskursive* B*eitritt* gewinnt Kontur durch die Anpassung der Sprachindizien der medientypischen Kommunikation (die obsessive Rethorik der Europäischen Integration) an die vererbten Mechanismen der viel geübten *kommunistischen hölzernen Sprache*.

5. Das Beispiel Rumänien

5.1 Der Diskurs nach der Revolution

Nach den revolutionären Ereignissen im Jahr 1989 wurde Rumänien in zwei umfangreichen Prozessen engagiert: ein erster Prozess - die Űbergangsetappe ("vom Kommunismus zum Kapitalismus"); ein zweiter Prozess - der Beitritt zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft.

Meistens sind die zwei Prozesse schwierig voneinander zu trennen, insbesondere seit dem die Europäische Integration ein pragmatisches Anpassungsphänomen des *acquis communautaire* an die Bedingungen der rumänischen Gesellschaft geworden ist (die Formel "alle sollen es verstehen").

Die *Veränderung*snotwendigkeit findet in Rumänien die Zustimmung der ganzen Bevölkerung. Das beweist, dass die Rumänen die Trennung von der kommunistischen Rückständigkeit mit dem EU-Beitritt identifizieren.

Im rumänischen öffentlichen Raum der politischen Entscheidung und der Bürgeraktionen ist Europa, demzufolge, ein Bezugselement geworden. Die politischen Führungskräfte und die Bürgergesellschaft rechtfertigen ihre Programme mit Bezug auf Europa. Je nach dem Informations- und Ausbil-

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[7] Siehe Bildhafter Titel einer Rubrik in der Zeitschrift *Dilema veche*, paraphrasiert nach einer Redeart des berühmten rumänischen Dramatikers I.L. Caragiale.

[8] Egal, ob es um die Nationalidentität, um die europäische (immer noch in der Projektphase) oder um die sprechliche, regionale, minderheitsspezifische Identität etc. geht, ist das Verständnis äußerst wichtig für die zukünftige Architektur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, wie die Vorstellungen einiger Gemeinschaften über sich selbst und über ihre Nachbarländer entstanden sind.

dungsniveau, nach der Erfahrung im Westen und nach den Lebenserwartungen haben die Rumänen unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über Europa. Schlicht gesagt, die Rumänen sprechen, denken und träumen von mehreren Arten von Europa: gemeint werden *das rettende/messianische Europa, das bukolische ("mioritische") Europa (rum. "Mioara" = dt. "das Schaf"), das Europa der Rumänien-Skeptischen, das funktionale Europa, Europa der Ergebenen* (gem., unter anderen, ...). Die "Europas" der Rumänen sind unterschiedlich und nicht unbedingt identisch mit denen, die von den Gemeinschaftsbeamten oder von diversen Nationalstrukturen gefördert werden. Die Vorstellungen der Rumänen über Europa entsprechen auch nicht den Vorstellungen über Europa, die in den Ländern entwickelt wurden, die 2004, nach 15 Jahren Kommunismus, der EU beigetretenen sind.

Das führt zu einem Aufkommen der *deklarativen Kommunikation* , die suggestiv für das in der Őffentlichkeit herrschende Klima ist. Die Europäische Integration ist in dieser Etappe (ausgenommen die schlicht administrative Intergration) eine vorwiegend diskursiv-deklarative Integration.

Studien über die Struktur des *mediatischen Diskurses in der rumänischen Öffentlichkeit*[9] haben diesen Dirkurs als : *rethorisch-induktiv*, *kollektivistisch* (oft werden auf das Klischeehafte, Sprichwörter, Sentenzen, Aphorismen zurückgegriffenen) beschrieben. Des Weiteren kommt dieser Diskurs als *eine Mischung zwischen Information und Meinung* vor. Er verwendet zusätzliche Argumentationsmittel (Para-Argumentativ) als Überzeugensinstrumente, die auf die *Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten der Umgangssprache* aufbauen. In der argumentativen Konstruktion der öffentlichen Texte wurde folgendes bemerkt: a) Die Abwechselung der Sprachregister, als eine Form der Trennung des Basistextes (These) von dem Kommentartext einerseits, und die *Polyphonie* andererseits ;[10] b) Die diskursive Verteilung der auktoriellen Vorgehensweise in Paralleldiskursen; die Paralleldiskurse umfassen eine einmalige These in Bezug auf die Textkonstruktion, bzw. in Bezug auf die Möglichkeit der Imagebewahrung des Argumentierenden vs. der Imagekompromittierung des Gegners (siehe Manu-Magda 2004:451).

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[9] Siehe, unter anderen, Gross (1999), Manu-Magda (2003, 2004, 2005), Scollon & Scollon (1995), Şerbănescu (2002), Zafiu (2001, 2002)

[10] *Der Dialogismus* manifestiert sich im Monologtext (nach Bakhtin 1977, 1978, 1984 und Anscombre/Ducrot 1983, Ducrot 1980, 1984, nach Moeschler & Reboul 1999:304), unter anderen, durch:

- die *Vielfaltt der Ideolekte*: Regionaldialekte, Fachjargons, etc.;
- *Die intertextuelle Dimension* (die Fähigkeit eines Dirkurses, sich mit Diskursen mit ähnlichen Themen zu assoziieren oder von themengleichen Diskursen zu trennen);
- *Die interpretative Dimension* (Das Verstehen ist *dialektisch,* bedingt von der durchzusetzenden Antwort);
- *Die produktive Dimension* (durch verschiedene Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten *des bedingten Diskurses);*

5.2 Der Metadiskurs der Integration11

Da die Kommunikation in der kommunistischen Zeit nach dem Motto "*Die Partei ist überall"* erfolgte, steht auch die Integrationszeit im Zeichen von "*Europa ist überall"*.

Auf Sprachebene lässt sich das Phänomen vor allem durch die außergewöhnliche Produktivität des Präfixoides *euro-* übersetzen, der sich in den verschiedensten Wortschatzbereichen hineindrängt:

> Im Rumänischen sind einige Sprachneuerungen mit Integrationsanspielungen erschienen. Wir haben Wortmuster von anderen Sprachen übernommen oder neue Muster geprägt, so haben wir plötzlich festgestellt, dass sich "euro" als *ein neues Präfix im Rumänischen* durchsetzten will. Egal, ob wir wissen, oder nicht, gibt es *Euroängste, Euroerwartungen, Euromanien, Eurobeobachter*, die nach dem Betritt zu *Europarlamentariern* werden. *Die Euroübergangsphase* kommt auf uns zu, das heißt die Zeit, bis die Eur-.Währung eingeführt wird. Dann klirren unsere Taschen wegen des *Eurokleingeldes*; damit sollen wir *Eurosouvenirs* kaufen, die an Freunde *geschickt werden, die sich nicht innerhalb der Grenzen der Europäischen Union befinden! Pardon! Innerhalb der Eurogrenzen*. Wir verfügen also über *ein Eurojargon*. (Jurnalul Național, 1. April 2006)

Darauf reagieren die Journalisten selbst: zunächst auf den komplizierten Sprachstil der Offizielldokumente, dann auf das Durcheinander der täglichen Kommunikation in Bezug auf die Integrationssproblematik.

Einige untersuchte Texte drücken *klar* die Notwendigkeit aus, verschiedene Stereotypen aufzugeben. Es sei nötig, die Distanz zwischen den von der EU-Institutionen ausgestellten politischen Dokumenten als etablierte wissenschaftlichen Paradigmen, und der sozialen Wahrnehmung der europäischen Realitäten, "rechtzeitig" zu signalisieren.

Beispiel:

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[11] Unter M*etadiskurs* vesteht man (laut Vandle Kopple 1997:2, nach Camiciottoli 2003:28) den vom Verfasser verwendeten Diskurs, um seinem Empfänger beim Organisieren, Interpretieren, Evaluieren und Gestalten der Eindrücke über das behandelte Thema zu helfen.
Was die Diskursfunktionen anbelangt, unterscheiden sich zwei Metadiskurskategorien: *informationell oder textuell* (mit der Rolle, dem Empfänger beim Verstehen der Primärmittelung durch einen Bezug auf deren Inhalt oder Struktur oder auf die illokutiven Ziele des Verfassers) und *einstellungsbezogen* oder *zwischenpersönlich* (mit der Ziel, dem Empfänger beim Verstehen der Auktoriellperspektive zum Inhalt oder zum Struktur des Primärdiskurses zu helfen). Als metadiskursive Kennzeichen werden angeführt:
Kennzeichen des textuellen Metadiskurses: Erklärungen, logische und diskursive Konnektoren, Endophorkennzeichen, Hervorhebungselemente.
Kennzeichen des zwischenpersönlichen Metadiskurses: Modalisatoren, Intensitätsmittel, Anredemittel, attitüdsspezifische Mittel

Mit der Zeit wurde es klar, dass die Integration nicht nur durch Wirtschaftindikatoren oder durch die wenigeren Visastempeln auf dem Pass ausgedrückt wird. Es wurde allmählich klar, die Integration wird sich auch *auf unsere tagtägliche Sprache* auswirken, die mit *den anspruchsvollen Formulierungen "à la Bruxelles"* Schritt halten muss. Die EU-Beamten können kaum verstanden werden. Syntagmen wie "Absorbtionsfähigkeit", "Aquis", "Komitologie", "Eurokrat" oder "Schengen-Raum" *haben die Medien und die gängige Sprache mancher Leute überflutet*. Obwohl die europäischen Institutionen zur Vermeidung spezifischer Termini aufgefordert wurden, so dass das Publikum die zentral übertragenen Informationen wahrnehmen kann, wäre für die Leute nach wie vor ein Wörterbuch der integrationbezogenen Termini nützlich. Ein "*Eurojargon*-Wörterbuch".

(Jurnalul Național, 1. April 2006)

Zahlreiche Artikel beziehen sich auf *die hölzerne Sprache der Integration*. Beispiel:

Die BOR-Vertreter haben oft unvollständige Meinungen zur öffentlichen Debatte gestellt, die in einer hölzernen oder konjunkturellen Sprache ausdrückt wurden, deren Bestehen doch nicht verneint werden kann.

(Adevărul, Mittwoch, 22. November 2006 Nr. 5094)

Ich irrte mich überhaupt nicht, als ich behauptete, dass "die PCR-Aktivisten", die zu Agenten der Europäischen Integration geworden sind" triumphierend, in einer hölzernen Sprache "die großen Integrationsrealisierungen" präsentieren werden. Diese Sprache besteht aus Ausdrücken wie *"wir haben umgesetzt", "wir haben unsere Pflicht getan", "wir sind vorbereitet"* etc.

(Zi de zi Online, 2006-05-16)

Der Kalasnikov und die Deportationen sind nicht mehr "in" und die *proletarische Propagandasprache* wurde mit einer anderen *hölzernen Sprache*, nämlich mit einer *EU-typischen Sprache* ersetzt. Das Geld kann zugänglich gemacht werden, nur wenn man einige "Krieterien der Förderfähgigkeit" erfüllt; die ehemaligen landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften heißen nun "landwirtschaftliche Anlagen".

(Agonia, 05 01 2007)

Die rumänischen Fernsehsender haben sich von der östlichen Enklave getrennt und haben die Mediensprache in Westeuropa und in den USA übernommen. Die Übernahme hat zu einer Annäherung an den Zuschauer geführt, aber auch zu einer Etablierung der *Kunststoffsprache der Werbung und des Marketings* im öffentlichen Fernsehdiskurs.

(Jurnalul Național, 06 04 2006)

Im Folgenden werden einige Sprachindikatoren präsentiert, die die Erhaltung der EU-bezogenen Information, den Umgang damit und deren Beurteilung andeuten, und die sich in den Medientexten befinden.

Der rumänische Integrationsdiskurs zeigt eine gewisse Präferenz für bestimmte metadiskursive Kennzeichen im Text, die der Argumentantion in der rumänischen journalistischen Kommunikation entspricht. In der diskursiven

Realitätsgestaltung aktivieren der Sender und der Empfänger Interpretationsmechanismen, die ihrer Kultur [12] spezifisch sind.

Der Metadiskurs des rumänischen Leitartikels basiert in der rumänischen Kultur vorwiegend auf *Diskurstechniken, die der mündlichen Tradition zugeordnet sind.*

Hier einige relevante Elemente:

In dem aktuellen Journalismussprachstil erscheint häufig die *Textgestaltung als Dialog mit dem Leser* oder die Substituierung einer Aussage oder einer theoretischen Beurteilung durch eine *anekdotische Dialogreplik* (Zitieren eines anderen Dialogs als Informationsquelle) (siehe Zafiu 2001: 418-419). Eine Folge des nichtvermittelten Verhältnisses ist *die stärkere Affektivkomponente der Mitteilung.*

Zum Beispiel

> *Wie wird Europa vom anderen Ende des Landes betrachtet,* von Alina Darie
> Die Bewohner des Dorfes Albita, das an einer östlichen Pforte zur Europäischen Union liegt, haben große Freude an dem Beitritt gehabt, aber die Angst vor der Zukunft spüren sie immernoch. *"Unsere Armut, sagen die Leute in Albita, wird nicht mehr als die Armut der Leute am Rande Rumäniens wahrgenommen, sondern vielmehr als die Armut der Leute am Rande Europas"...*
>
> Rodica hat sich den Beitritt im Fernsehen angeschaut. *"Es war schön, aber viel wichtiger ist es, wie es weiter geht. Ich freue mich, dass man nicht mehr so viele Unterlagen braucht, um ins Ausland zu fahren, weil meine jüngere Tochter in Italien arbeitet. Nun kann sie öfters nach Hause kommen",* sagt die Frau und Hoffnung funkelt in ihren Augen.
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 4 01 2007)

Der sprachliche Ausdruck der Subjektivität wird durch die verschiedenartigen Formeln (Höfflichkeitsformeln, Formeln, um einen Dialog zu starten), durch die verschiedenen Formen des Personal- und Sozialdeixis, in der großen Anzahl der Anredeformeln (insbesondere markierte Vokative oder Anredeinterjektionen, die typisch für die direkte Kommunikation sind) illustriert.

Die Texte weisen *eine empathische und partizipative Sprache* auf. Die Kommunikation enthält zahlreiche *Emotionalkennzeichen* (*Interjektionen, hypokoristische Bildungen, Wiederholungen, Exklamativaussagen,rhetorische Fragen, Intensivierungsmittel, Kolloquialausdrücke etc.),* die typisch für die mündliche Kommunikation sind. Sie umfasst auβerdem Pronominal- und Verbalformen, die durch ihre Nuance den Einfluss des Senders auf den Gesprächspartner erhöhen (dazu die 2. Person beim Verb mit allgemeiner Bedeutung, das Kollektivplural etc.)

Beispiele:

[12]Hier verwendet man den Begriff *Kultur* im anthropologischen Sinne: eine Reihe von Verhaltensweisen, Lebensweisen und spezifische gesellschaftliche Werte.

– Ausdrucksvolle Fragen:

"Wie werden die beiden Länder zum europäischen Wohlstand beitragen?" Die Bulgaren bringen ihr bekanntes Rosenöl und den sogenannten bulgarische Joghurt, selbstverständlich, auch das kyrillische Alphabet - das zweite nach dem nichtlateinischen Alphabet in der EU. Die Rumänen - sie bringen Dracula.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 14 01 2007)

– Exklamativaussagen, Interjektionen, Vokative, kolloquiale Anredemittel:

Hör mal, Gogule!Könnte vielleicht Herr Ulianov der Verfasser des "Manifestes der Kommunistischen Partei" sein? ich befürchte, es geht um Monsieur Sarla Marx, begleitet vom ewigen Vormund Engels...

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 15 01 2007)

– Kolliquialformeln und -ausdrücke:

Na, und warum nicht zwei Silvesterpartys in Bukarest. Warum soll der Rumäne nicht eine Auswahlmöglichkeit haben? Die zwei Silvesterpartys sind eine seltene Gelegenheiten gewesen, bei der die Rumänen beobachten konnten, wofür das Geld ausgegeben wird. *Wie auch das rumänische Sprichwort in wörtlicher Űbersetzung sagt: "Wenn es um feiern geht, dann wollen wir richtig feiern!"*

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 5 01 2007)

Ich habe über das typisch rumänische Enthusiasmus geschrieben, über diese typisch rumänische "He ruck!"-Haltung. *Ich kann wetten,* dass die *Euro-Hoffnung* zum zerstörerischen *Skeptizismus* wird.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 14 01 2007)

Ich beziehe mich nicht auf die frechen Nostalgiker der "Goldenen Epoche". Für sie kann man nichts mehr machen. *Sich den Mund fusslig reden, um die Dummheiten* eines Niculescu-Mizil oder Stefan Andrei zu bekämpfen, ist ein Zeichen von unheilbarer Naivität.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 15 01 2007)

Neben Kollegen, *die über dich und dein Zigeunerland stets gespottet haben*? *Ich habe keine Ahnung,* bin aber sicher, dass die PRM-Europarlamentarier (n.b. Mitglieder der populistischen, rechtsorientierten Partei Groβrumänien) sich schon gewöhnt sind, als *Schuhteppich* betrachtet zu werden, wenn sie es bisher in der Partei ausgehalten haben.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 15 01 2007)

– Die 2. Person beim Verb mit allgemeiner Bedeutung:

Wieso hältst *du dich wie ein ungeschickter Spieler* mit Leuten zusammen, die *dir Hörner aufsetzen* und die Nase wegen des Geruchs der minderwertigen Rasse rümpfen, wenn du an ihnen *vorbeigehst; und warum tust du* so, als ob es in Ordnung wäre und es *dir* gefallen würde.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 15 01 2007)

– Kollektivplural:

Nun, da wir Europäer *sind,* lernen wir vielleicht etwas über die Zivilisation.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 6 01 2007)

– Mahnende Interjektionen

Rumänien tappt im Dunkeln, wenn es um die langfristige Planung geht.
Sagen wir mal, so ist es ist bis vor kuzem, bis zum Beitritt passiert.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 9 01 2007)

Die Journalisten bemerken, dass *die neue europäische Propagandasprache* die kommunistische Diskursivform, die früher durch das Syntagma "*Überzeugungs-arbeit"* bezeichnet wurde, ersetzt:

"Wenn ein alter Landwirt, der noch zehn Jahre vor sich hat, bis er in die Rente geht, sein Geschäft seinem Sohn oder einer jüngeren Person überträgt, so kann er jährlich den Betrag von maximal 18.000 Euro bis zur Persionierung bekommen", *führte der Űberzeugungsmakler unter andren Lockungsmittel an....*

(Agonia, 05 01 2007)

Im Norden des Kreises Arges, sind die Bewohner der Ortschaft Bailesti vor allem mit Baumgärten oder mit kleinen Farmen beschäftigt. Im *Sitzungsraum* der Kommunal-behörden *wurden die Leute aufgeklärt*, dass das Schwein umsonst hin und her im Hof vor dem Schlachten getrieben wird, nur weil die Tradition besagt, dass das Fleisch dadurch leckerer werde. "Ganz im Gegenteil, das Fleisch schmeckt schlechter, *erzählte* der Tierarzt. Da das Schwein hin und her gelaufen ist, bricht die Milchsäure in seinem Kärper au. Das führt zu einem höheren Giftstoffenniveau im Fleisch. *Es stimmt nicht*, dass Ihr es nicht mehr mit dem Messer schlachten könnt; nur ihr könnt es nicht mehr verkaufen. Das zu verkaufende Schwein muss ins Schlachthaus gebracht werden ".
(Agonia, 05 01 2007)

Laut alten Kommunikationsgewohnheiten, werden zuerst *Gerüchte* in die Welt gesetzt und erst später kommen die sicheren Nachrichten. Somit wird Angst und Verwirrung geschaffen:

"Wenn Sie zusammenhängen und eine Gruppe von Produzenten bilden, können Sie den Verkaufspreis für die Milch verhandeln", äußerte sich der Direktor Povarna, *und seine Aussagen wurden mit Grimassen und Mißtrauen empfangen*. Die Leute auf dem Land hatten seit Wochen den Ausdruck "*Milch*anteil" *gehört*, der auch *in der Zeit der Landwirtschaftgenossenschaft Mode* war, und da *hatten die Bauern schon Angst*. Sie *hatten nicht erfahren*, dass "Anteil" nun was anders bedeutet: Man muss nicht dem Staat einen Teil der Produktion abgeben. Es ght um die Quantität, die man produzieren und verkaufen darf.

(Agonia, 05 01 2007)

Beim Zitieren der Informationsquellen[13] verwenden die rumänischen Medien die Sprachmittel des *Unbestimmten und der Ungenauigkeit* als Ausdruck der vorsichtigen Distanz zum Inhalt. Die Hervorhebungselemente (zur Anführung der externen Informationsquellen, Übernahme einer anderen Stimme und einer anderen Prespektive) gehören meistens zu dieser Kategorie (Distanzierungs- und Zweifelredemittel, Konditionalformen, Futur II).

> Sorin Ionita: "Vor einigen Tagen ist *von der Presse die Nachricht gekommen*, dass die Rechtsextremisten im Europäischen Parlament endlich eine eigene Parlamentsgruppe bilden können...
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 16 01 2007)
>
> Die Aufnahme in die Europäischen Union wurde von vielen Rumänen als ein Geschenk *wahrgenommen*, *als ob* sie am nächsten Tag *plötzlich* noch ein zusätzliches Zimmer in ihrer Wohnung *hätten,* das Brot *kostenlos wäre*, und die Rente dreimal so groß und in Euro ausgedrückt sei.
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 14 01 2007)
>
> Leider *ist der Diskurs in der zukünftigen Kampagne für die Europawahlen voraussehbar* (*ich würde* um einige Themen *wetten*, *sie schweben in der Luft*): der Erfolg der Integration, die Regierungsstrategie für Integration, die Verschlechterung des Lebensniveaus, die Einschränkungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt...
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 9 01 2007)
>
> Nicht zufällig ist nun die Diskussion über die Strategie nach dem Beitritt modisch. Warum jetzt und nicht vor sechs Monaten, das hängt mit dem zusammen, was ich früher gesagt habe. Die PNL-*Strategie* (n.b.PNL = Nationalliberale Partei, mitregierend), angenommen größtenteils von der Regierung, *ist reich an Aussagen*, dabei mangelt es aber an konkreten Details.
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 9 01 2007)

Termini, die sich auf Veralhandlungen beziehen, gehören meistens dem Kolloquialregister an:

> Tariceanus Strategie hat den Verdienst die erste zu sein. Jede Partei hat verstanden, dass *die Diskurse gut ankommen* und hat etwas vorbereitet. PSD sieht erst langfristig Entwicklung, PRM *beharrt* auf die Aufbewahrung der Nationalidentität, UDMR (n.b. Die mitregierende Demokratische Union der Ungarn in Rumänien) auf Dezentralisierung und kulturelle Autonomie, PD (n.n. Die mitregierende Demokratische Partei) *hält ihre Strategie geheim*, PLD (n.b. die Liberaldemokratische Partei) *will* europäische Lebensstandards in maximal 30 Jahren erreichen. *Geschwätz!*
>
> (Evenimentul Zilei Online, 6 01 2007)

[13] Für die Behandlung der "Hervorhebung" (Markierung im Diskurs der Quellenarten, aus denen der Sender seine in seiner Aussage verwertete Information erhalten hat) in der zeitgenössischen rumänischen Sprache, siehe Zafiu 2002a, 2002b, 2006.

Alle haben nur Floskeln und feierliche Ausdrücke verwendet, nationalismustypische Reden und die gewöhnlichen Dummheiten vorgetragen, unabhängig von der Rangposition.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 6 01 2007)

Am ersten Tag des Jahres *sind die Fernsehsender zum Gespött aller geworden*. "Spieglein, Spieglein an der Wand, wer ist der Geschimpfteste im ganzen Land?" war die Frage, die *die Neurone der Reporter*, Moderatoren und Kommentatoren *erhitzt hat. Diese wurden in den TV-Studios eingeladen, um den Rumänen die Geheimnisse der EU-Integration zu "enthüllen"*.

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 5 01 2007)

Es gab Analysten - wahrscheinlich in einem fortgeschrittenen Zustand der Bachus- oder Neuronalkaterstimmung - , die das Verhalten der in öffentlichen Plätzen s*chimpfenden* Rumänen *angeschwärzt haben. Diese wollen die Integration zunichte nachen und das Image Rumäniens vor den europäischen Schwesterländern entwürdigen.*

(Evenimentul Zilei Online, 5 01 2007)

6. Schlussfolgerungen

Die metakommunikativen Strategien in den rumänischen Leitartikel, die sich mit dem Thema der Europäischen Integration befassen, befolgen die allgemeinen Regeln des aktuellen rumänischen Journalismusdiskurses.

Nicht die berichteten Ereignisse stehen im Vordergrund, sondern vielmehr die Auswirkungen verschiedener Rethorik- oder Stilmittel.

Der öffentliche Charakter des Diskurses wird von der Neigung der Verfasser zur *Personalisierung*, philosophischer Reflektierung und Selbstausdruck beeinflusst (siehe Şerbănescu 2002:393).

Der Text basiert auf *Emotionen, auf logische und empirische Argumente,* auf das Verhältnis zwischen Verfasser und Leser, und, implizite, auf die kontextuell von der Kommunikationspartnern gestaltete Bedeutung – viel weniger auf die genaue Information aus glaubwürdigen Quellen.

Das strategische Muster des "*meridionalen*" Diskurses in den Medienkanälen zeigt eine spezifische Vision des Sprechers auf dem Balkan im Verhältnis zum Kommunikativverhalten[14], und eine *Vorliebe* zur verbalen "Mitschuld", als

[14] Die Überprüfung der Sprachrealität führt zu folgenden Feststellungen bezüglich des Kommunikationsverhaltens: a. Die Sprachgemeinschaften unterscheiden sich nach Hierrarchie. Demzufolge werden auch die Kulturwerte unterschiedlich zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. B. Der typologische Sprachraum überlappt sich nicht mit dem typologischen pragmatischen Raum.
In der *interkulturellen Pragmatik* verwendet man die Konzepte der *Kultur- oder Pragmatikwerte* und *Äquivalenz oder pragmatische Synonymie.* Die Voraussetzung ist, dass jede Sprache (oder Sprachvariante) ihre eigenen Illokutivquellen hat. Das genaue Bestimmungsniveau muss auf empirischer Basis festgelegt werden. Die interkulturelle Pragmatik bekommt dann die Aufgabe, die Unterschiede beim Ausdrucken der verschiedenen Kultur- oder Pragmatikwerte zu erklären,

Ausdruck des Vertrauens zum Gesprächspartner. “Die Schwatzhaftigkeit und die gewisse polemische Bereitschaft mit rethorischem Charakter” (siehe Pană-Boroianu 1992) sind typische Merkmale für das *Verbalverhalten in Südosteuropa.*

Die verschiedenen Muster, die die Forscher bisher zur Erklärung der Beziehungen zwischen der West- und Südostkultur in Betracht gezogen haben, haben noch keine klare Antwort auf die Frage nach der Entstehung der Identitäten und Alteritäten in den besprochenen Kulturäumen angeboten.

In diesem Zusammenhang dient die vorliegende Analyse zum Entwurf einiger *pragmatischer Voraussetzungen der Kommunikation in den mehrsprachigen Geeinschaften*.

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wie: *“der direkte / indirekte Manifestierungscharakter”, “Solidarität”, “Spontanetät”, “Aufrichtigkeit”, “Sozialharmoinie”, “Freundlichkeit”, “Selbstbehauptung”, “Intimität”* etc

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Identifying Kim Jong-il's Rhetorical Styles and National Values in a North Korean Textbook

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This study discusses North Korean values communicated through a fourth-grade textbook, titled "Kim Jong-il's Childhood." All the lessons translated into Japanese were analyzed using grounded theory approach. Understanding the greatness of Kim Jong-il is not the only purpose of North Korean thought education. A number of North Korean national and cultural values are developed and uniquely theorized through classroom stories, the historical background, and Kim Jong-il's actions. The dialogue between Kim Jong-il and his friends, a teacher, a cook, an officer, and his father, Kim Il-song, are effectively used both to bring the interactants closer by interpersonally exchanging conversation and to differentiate Kim Jong-il from civilians due to his rare ideas and utterances. Hatred for Japan and America, the highest regard for Kim Il-song, and the will to fight against Americans are also communicated along with Confucian values.

1. Introduction

No one can deny that any textbook is political to some extent. However, it might be difficult to find textbooks that are more political, controlled, programmed, fictionalized, and filled with violent language than those in North Korea. It is normally believed that North Korean citizens are educated under the North Korean regime, reformed and reshaped in accordance with the ideology called "Juche" originated by Kim Il-sung and later refined by Kim Jong-il. "Juche" literally means a human with self-reliance, self-identity, or subjectivity. Simply stated, Juche's view of life is collectivistic in which individual fate is considered the social group's fate, and living an autonomous and creative social-political life is regarded as valuable and humanistic (Han 1998). However, the elements of Juche are difficult to grasp as pure communist ideology because they are combined with various sources from foreign (especially Russian and Chinese) philosophy and with Kim Il-sung's personal experiences, and the ideology has evolved over time under the control of Kim Jong-il. Kim and Kim (2005) maintain that "Juche ideology is a philosophy that guides and directs not only the North Korean regime and the Korean Workers' Party in their administration of government and party organization, but also instructs North Korean citizens how to behave in their everyday life" (2005:10). Educational content and practices in North Korea include values, beliefs, information, and knowledge that are all

directed to create a socialist citizen through ideological reform. All North Korean citizens are transformed into functional members of a socialist society with communist beliefs, values, and attitudes that are essential to sustain Kim's hereditary system and his kingdom through education (Kim & Kim 2005).

This paper examines and discusses how an elementary school North Korean textbook transmits values, beliefs, and attitudes. In particular, I will focus on how messages are constructed and manipulated in order for pupils to learn what is important as North Koreans. In what follows, I briefly outline how language is treated in North Korea. Then I examine Kim Jong-il's rhetorical styles and how values and beliefs are indoctrinated in the fourth-grade textbook. More specifically, I pay attention to dialogue between Kim Jong-il and other personae and identify his ways of communicating or using persuasive values and attitudes that are specifically emphasized in the stories.

2. Language in North Korea

As mentioned in the introduction, there seems no doubt that what pupils learn in school in North Korea is politically controlled based on Juche ideology. Juche ideology can form an extensive study by itself. However, revealing its ideology is not the purpose of this study; rather, this paper aims to explore how the ideology is communicated through language. In this section, I focus on how language is believed to function in North Korea. Yano (2006) summarizes in Japanese a book entitled "Juche's Linguistic Theory" that published in North Korea in 2005. This book is believed to be used as a textbook in higher education, meaning that people who are chosen to be elites study and follow its instructions. In this book, there is a section called "Essential Elements and Functions of Language." Here, language is described as a weapon to attain citizen's autonomy as follows:

> In order to protect and achieve our citizens' autonomy, we must actively strive to reform society, nature, and human beings. Language can fully liberate our citizens from old views and cultural predicaments and turn into a weapon to produce creative social men possessing autonomous views and high cultural standards; namely, language is a weapon for human reformation. Projects of human reformation aim to remodel our citizens' views and improve their level of cultural knowledge. It is most important in human reformation to educate and train people to become Juche-type citizens. This becomes possible only through the use of language. Language improves the conscious level of people's views and becomes a method to arm them with revolutionary worldviews. This is achieved by both spoken and written language. This is called "Functions of the Philosophical Educator." In order to educate and train people to the Juche type, we must arm them with Juche ideology. In order for our people to arm ourselves with Juche ideology, we must study and scrutinize writings by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and

> acquire their theories in our flesh and bones. The passages are written in Korean.[1] Education in Juche ideology, evolution, class, etc. is conducted in Korean.[2]

This passage shows how language should be used in the process of transformation of North Korean citizens into the Juche type. In contrast to alternative methods such as threats or punishments, language is a peaceful weapon that can reform citizens to become the type of people North Korea must possess. Juche-type citizens are portrayed as those with autonomy, creativity, high-cultural standards, and revolutionary worldviews. However, what is meant by autonomy, creativity, high-cultural standards, and revolutionary worldviews as mentioned in the passage cannot be understood as their dictionary definitions. These terms are culturally and politically defined by the North Korean regime; therefore, it is impossible to appreciate their true meanings at this moment. It is also mentioned that acquiring Juche ideology requires extensive study of and research regarding literature written by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. More importantly, just being familiar with their literature is not enough. "Acquiring Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's theories into flesh and bones" suggests that people not only follow and act upon the leaders' theories but also convert themselves into them. Elites who are chosen and given an opportunity to enter higher education and learn Juche ideology now have a mission to make the most of language as a weapon to reform others. Furthermore, the emphasis on the Korean language as a method for human reformation in the passage should be pointed out. Since the Korean War, the Korean language used in North and South Korea has shown dramatic differences in style, word use, and intonation. Even though the language is the same in North and South Korea, due to changes in the last fifty years, Juche ideology can be understood only through the Korean language used in North Korea, not in South Korea.

The notion of power in language is not new. Language is more than an informing instrument; language has the ability to enact, recreate, and subvert power. For instance, influence tactics are actualized through language. Ng and Bradac (1993) argue that the use of language contributes to the realization of goals because language provides a conventional resource for generating influence over people's attitudes and behavior. Through a variety of forms of language, including persuasion, argumentation, use of threats and promises, requests, or demands, the authors propose that language creates power, reflects power, and obscures or depoliticizes power.

The language used in North Korea is not for influence but for reformation. It is openly stated that language in North Korea is intentionally used to shape people based on politically dominant interests and expectations. It can be said that the

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[1] Korean here means the Korean language used in North Korea.

[2] This passage was originally written on pages 23-24 in "주체의 언어리론" written by Choe Jong-hu and published by Social Science Publications in 2005. This part was translated into Japanese by Professor Kenichi Yano and from Japanese into English by the author.

spoken as well as written language in North Korean education is programmed to construct social realities and orderliness and create the type of people who universally possess and fit into Juche ideology.

The understanding of language use in North Korea leads to the current study of how one textbook reforms students to become Juche-type citizens. In particular, this study investigates how Kim Jong-il's spoken words are stated and treated in an elementary school textbook in order for pupils to learn ideal behaviors and ways of thinking in North Korea.

3. Method

A fourth-grade textbook is the only primary source used for this paper. The original textbook, "The Childhood of the Great Leader Kim Jong-il," published in 2005, was translated from Korean into Japanese by my colleague, Kenichi Yano, as part of a larger project in which we are planning to identify rhetorical methods of human reformation in North Korea. This textbook was an initiator for developing our study. The textbook contains 30 units (see the titles in the appendix) and is taught once a week, a total of 38 hours a year for students in the fourth grade (Kim 2005).

To analyze the textbook, discourse analysis was employed in combination with grounded theory approach. Since few studies are available on the use of language in North Korean textbooks, I assume that grounded theory, in which theory is derived or emerges from data rather than from a preconceived theory, experience, or speculation in mind, is useful for my examination (Strauss & Corbin 1998). First, I labeled all of the text based on phrase(s) and sentence(s) following the open coding system. Instead of performing axial coding immediately as prescribed by grounded theory methodology, I went back through the text and extracted the passage structure, organization, sentences, vocabulary, story background, and personae characteristics in each unit. The purpose of this activity is to keep track of the flow of the narrated story and to examine the use of vocabulary and characters in a specific context. Through this activity, common and coherent features were generated, which are dialogue between Kim Jong-il and other personae and nonverbal as well as emotional descriptions of the personae. In this paper, all labels relating to dialogue and nonverbal illustrations were retrieved from open-coded incidents and then moved onto axial coding. Axial coding allows a researcher to "form more precise and complete explanations about phenomena" (Strauss & Corbin 1998:124). In axial coding, I first processed similar labels from fractured data during open coding and categorized them into related subcategories. I will explain the results next.

4. Analysis

4.1 Kim Jong-il's rhetorical styles and meanings

One of the main features in the fourth-grade textbook is the dialogue between Kim Jong-il and other personae. Kim Jong-il's direct (with quotation marks) and indirect orations take up approximately one fifth of the text material (in the Japanese version).

Through selective coding (the process of integrating and refining categories), two roles of Kim Jong-il's utterances are identified. First, they tend to expose to the readers the distinguished nature and characteristics that he has displayed since childhood. Such characteristics are shown in his oratory styles: being informative, suggesting, giving discipline, encouraging as well as praising, and identifying problems. These styles are hardly used by other personae and, if used, are described as failed. The styles are particular to the main character, Kim Jong-il, throughout the textbook. Second, these styles are likely to be used to construct reality, cultural values, meaning of life, and national pride, which can be related to North Korean political ideology. In this section, I introduce the usage of these five rhetorical styles in context and their purposes.

4.1.1 Being informative

Being knowledgeable is probably an essential trait of a reliable person recognized in any culture, and this can be said to be true of North Korea as well. One of the dialogue styles between Kim Jong-il and his classmates is characterized as a question-and-answer format, through which his classmates are portrayed as being innocent; whereas Kim Jong-il is illustrated as the opposite: mature and intelligent. The following example shows one interaction consisting of questions and answers:

> One day in January, Juche 42 (1953), it was snowing very hard with large flakes. The Children's Union was going to have a meeting early in the morning [...]. The members thought that the Great General[3] who had gone out the day before due to sudden business might not come. The meeting would not be fun without him […]. So they were hoping he would come soon. The pupils looked out of the window and worried about whether he would find his way back [...]. The union decided to begin the meeting and tell the Great General about their discussion later. Then [...] the Great General came into the classroom, taking off his hat, which was covered by white snow [...]. The Great General said that he had hurried, trying to be on time for the meeting, but because of the heavy snow he couldn't walk smoothly and he was a bit late. One of the pupils asked him why he came in such difficulty in which the roads were blocked by snow. The Great General, looking around at the pupils, asked if it would be OK if he came only when he wanted and not when he couldn't. They were the body of the organization since they pledged to get involved in the union. They had to think about the organization first and then about

[3] In all the extracts, Kim Jong-il is referred to as the Great General while Kim Il-sung is called the (respectable) Great Marshal. All actions and behaviors relating to Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung are narrated using honorific language in Korean and in the Japanese translated version. However, they are not always reflected in the English version.

> themselves. Having heard this, the group members couldn't help reflecting on their behavior in the union. (extracted from unit 3)

Kim Jong-il shows up at the meeting despite the heavy snow. One of his classmates who are worrying about him innocently asks him, in line 11, why he came all the way in such bad weather. Clearly, this is not criticism but out of concern about Kim Jong-il. However, Kim Jong-il's response in lines 12-15 indicates that not attending the meeting for a personal reason is a serious crime and indoctrinates the students that the union's activity comes first as long as they belong to it. The classmates come to realize through his action and response that he puts the union higher than his safety, and so should they. This episode shows that a simple question asked by an innocent friend leads to an unexpected but valuable precept about how to lead an organizational life from Kim Jong-il.

Kim Jong-il's knowledge is also shown when he is the only one who can answer a question:

> It was February 2, Juche 42 (1953). Pupils at Mangyongdae Revolutionary School heard the great news. Our respectable leader Marshal Kim Il-sung was awarded the title the Great Generalissimo of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea […]. One of his friends asked why the Great Marshal received the title of Great Generalissimo, but none of the pupils could answer. Everyone looked at the Great General. The Great General said, looking around at them, that the Great Marshal received the title because he had chopped down Americans' haughty noses who bragged that America was the most powerful country in the world and continued […]. Having heard the Great General's comment, the pupils felt deeply proud to have the respectable Marshal as their leader. (extracted from unit 6)

All the pupils are happy to hear the news about Kim Il-sung being awarded the title of Generalissimo and know that he is a great leader. However, they are not exactly sure why he received the title. Here Kim Jong-il is depicted as the only person who can answer the question. "Everyone looked at the Great General" in lines 5 to 6 shows that the classmates count on him and expect him to answer when they find out that no one can. The reason Kim Il-sung received the title is stated in a concrete but merciless and hateful way. However, it is simple enough for the pupils to understand that Kim Il-sung took the correct action and America deserved such treatment. Kim Jong-il's response to his friend's question does not stop at just being informative. It creates negative feelings against Americans and makes the pupils feel proud and privileged to have the Great Marshal as their national leader.

Sometimes, the classmates are depicted as pretending to know something important, yet none of the information that they provide is detailed or precise enough compared to what Kim Jong-il knows. This is seen when the classmates and Kim Jong-il are looking at a North Korean heroes' album containing each hero's photograph and several sentences explaining what he (or she) did:

> When they turned the page to the hero Li Su-pok, the classmates pretended to know his accomplishments, saying that Great Hero Li Su-pok blocked the muzzle of the enemy's

> gun against his chest. The Great General, who was listening to them, explained about Li Su-pok: "Great Hero Li Su-pok is a true son of Korea who dedicated his youth to the party, the father Marshal, and our fatherland. Before liberation, he lived poorly, but after liberation, he was able to live happily thanks to the Great Marshal; therefore, he knew how to hate the enemy and how to dedicate his life to our country." (extracted from unit 5)

The classmates here are illustrated as false believers or imperfect. What they tell about the hero Li Su-pok is legendary, but it does not provide what truly made him a great hero of North Korea. In contrast, Kim Jong-il is knowledgeable about Li Su-pok's past and how he sacrificed his life for the Great General and his country. Just being tough and strong like iron and blocking the enemy against one's own body will not make a person a great hero in North Korea. The person has to appreciate Kim Il-sung's thoughtfulness and contribution and be hateful enough about the enemy to put his own life aside and fight for Kim Il-sung. This paragraph indicates that even though some might think that they know something, what they know is far less than what Kim Jong-il does, all while teaching what makes a hero in North Korea.

What Kim Jong-il tells his friends is treated as absolute. Absolute information is fact and should be considered common sense. One of the methods to convey Kim Jong-il's knowledge to readers is via his words. He can inform people through writing, but his spoken language tends to give people a deeper feeling of closeness. A quick way of demonstrating his knowledge is through a question-and-answer interaction. The principles of organizational life, the greatness of Kim Il-sung, adverse conceptualization of Americans, and loyalty to Kim Il-sung are exposed in Kim Jong-il's answers, and the questions asked by the students can be formulated to derive what readers should keep in mind.

4.1.2 Making suggestions

The second feature of Kim Jong-il's remarks is classified as suggestion. Suggestion implies one's ability and willingness to make a difference and make things better. Kim Jong-il makes various suggestions, such as setting up a new method of snowball play or objectives for the Children's Union activity plans. These suggestions bring new perspectives to his classmates. The following extract shows a suggestion made by Kim Jong-il for adults:

> The first winter after the Korean War was exceptionally cold. Koreans were trying to get through this cold winter. A classroom in the Pyongyang Fourth People's School where the Great General was studying was also very cold […]. The Great General, who saw his friends shivering with cold, decided to warm up the classroom […]. The Great General placed thin boards in the doorways and windows and sealed holes in the window panes with pieces of paper to block the wind […]. The next morning, the pupils who entered the classroom hunching their shoulders with cold were surprised at how warm it was […]. The Great General said that it was nothing for him to warm the room. He also said that since their teacher was trying very hard to tend the stove every day, they should take turns putting charcoal into the stove. Everyone supported his idea. The Great General proposed this plan to his teacher. (extracted from unit 24)

One may say that Kim Jong-il's sympathy and consideration for his friends and his teacher generated such a suggestion. He first wants to do something for his classmates who are disturbed from being cold, so he tries to fix the gaps in the doors and windows in a simple but efficient way in lines 5 to 6. He also knows that it is hard work for the teacher to watch and take care of the stove every day. Kim Jong-il's proposal that the students take turns taking care of the stove in lines 9 to 10 solves the problem for the students and allows them to study in a warmer room. More importantly, it lessens their teacher's everyday workload and broadens the students' autonomy and responsibility. This paragraph shows his benevolence and ability to be creative and make a suggestion that works for both the students and their teacher. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il can propose a bigger plan:

> It was a spring day, Juche 43 (1954). Pyongyang Street was alive with reconstruction from the war damage. The Great General wanted to be helpful in restoring buildings. One day, the Great General said to the respectable Great Marshal, "Father, we would like to help the adults build a school building." The respectable Great Marshal was glad to hear his words and said he had come up with a great idea. "How about a slogan 'Build our school by ourselves'?" (the Great General continued) […] he would ask his classmates to collect all the bricks needed to build one classroom, said the Great General. The respectable Great Marshal told the Great General to try collecting bricks with students without neglecting his studies. (extracted from unit 28)

Kim Jong-il's proposal goes beyond classroom matters and concerns school reconstruction. In lines 5 to 6, Kim Il-sung supports Kim Jong-il's idea, which is realistic and feasible enough for fourth graders. How they help may not be important, but the idea that elementary school children can be involved in the country's reconstruction process excites attention. Namely, his suggestion indicates his willingness and positive, voluntary attitude to be useful and helpful for his country. The slogan he puts forward—*Build our school by ourselves*—also implies independence and unity in which people, even children, have the will and power to aid in their country's reconstruction.

People usually make suggestions for improvement. Kim Jong-il's proposals demonstrate his sensitivity, creativity, generosity, and dedication to betterment within a given context. His suggestions are always supported by others and never fail. They are valuable for everyone and the country. In the paragraphs, Kim Jong-il is illustrated as the only child who contributes to solving a problem and improving a troubled or difficult situation. Few people make proposals, and even if some do, they are not good or thoughtful enough. This tendency might create a belief that whatever Kim Jong-il tells people to do will bring a better situation and future for everyone.

4.1.3 Disciplining

The most frequent style Kim Jong-il uses is related to discipline to correct classmates' behaviors and attitudes. His strict utterances are targeted at students who violate the values of diligence, war-fighting, respect for the elderly, and

frugality. In a sense, he is a teacher and father in and out of school. For example, Kim Jong-il conveys one of Kim Il-sung's expectations of students in this passage:

> It was after class in Juche 43 (1954). A student who had been scolded by a teacher because he hadn't done his homework in Korean class was called on by the Great Leader Kim Jong-il. The Great General asked the student in a kind but strict voice why he came to school without doing his homework. The student answered, fidgeting, that he didn't have a notebook, so he couldn't do his homework. He had brought some money to buy it that day. The Great General lightly reproved him, saying that he should have prepared a notebook (and asked) if he thought it would be OK to come to school without doing his homework. (extracted from 29)

The importance of learning is mentioned in unit 1, "Learn, Learn, and Learn," as Kim Il-sung's hope for children, and is repeatedly stressed throughout the textbook. The above interaction contributes to this them through an event that is likely to happen in daily life. Kim Jong-il, who is usually calm and generous, cannot leave people who do not meet Kim Il-sung's expectations alone. Kim Jong-il calls on the student and makes him realize that his reason for not having a notebook is not acceptable as an excuse for failing to do his homework. Thus, Kim Jong-il promotes Kim Il-sung's desires as a faithful follower. Kim Jong-il acts in a brotherly or fatherly role toward his friend as a model of a responsible, reliable son of Kim Il-sung.

Furthermore, his disciplinary utterance to be warlike is seen during a war game:

> It was in the spring, Juche 42 (1953). One day, the Great Leader Kim Jong-il was playing a war game with his friends on a hill. When the Great General with a wooden pistol gave them the order "Charge and go!," they ran up to the hill screaming, knocked the enemy down behind the bushes and trees, and performed hand-to-hand fighting by wrestling […]. While they were merrily running around pretending to shoot each other or to be shot, one student took the war game as play and did not act seriously. "What the hell is this fighting? Don't always think the war game is play. If you don't think it's real, you won't be able to become a brave soldier of the People's Republic," insisted the Great General. (extracted from unit 13)

Two out of the 30 units in the textbook set the main theme based on a war game. In the battles, Kim Jong-il performs as a captain and commands the students what to do. His militaristic orders, strategies, and actions are demonstrated powerfully with dignity. The above story tells the pupils that they are not supposed to consider a fighting game as play. They are always expected to fight as seriously as they can; otherwise, they cannot be great soldiers. A war game is no longer mere play for pupils but a rehearsal for war. Kim Jong-il pulls up the slack and teaches children to get ready for a battle and take it seriously anytime.

Discipline with regard to respect for elders is also emphasized. This is realized through Kim Jong-il's resentment and advice in this passage:

> It was when the Great General went outside after lunch. Several friends were mimicking the old cook in the school cafeteria [...]. Having looked around at them, the Great General angrily asked why they were copying an elder person in such a foolish way. Suddenly, they realized their wrongdoing and stood still shrugging their shoulders. After looking at them quietly for a while, the Great General said that they had lost their parents because of American rogues, and the old cook didn't have children like them because of wicked landowners and capitalists. So he adored the students as if they were his real sons. When he sees them mimicking him like this, imagine how sad he feels! (extracted from unit 11)

Respect for the elderly is one of the core Confucian values. Younger people are supposed to be polite, pay respect to, and care for elders. Making fun of the cook who makes delicious lunches for the pupils every day is absolutely unacceptable and intolerable, especially in a Confucian sense. Kim Jong-il properly makes his friends realize their improper behavior. They can see how angry he is from his furious voice and silent treatment in lines 3 and 5. However, their attention is switched to the real enemies, when Kim Jong-il explains the cook's tragic past reflecting his friends' loss of their parents. This implies that both the cook and Kim Jong-il's friends are all victims of Americans, landowners, and capitalists. By mentioning the cook's tragic past and that he regards the pupils as his children in lines 7 to 8, Kim Jong-il makes his friends feel guilty about their demeanor and at the same time become resentful against Americans, landowners, and capitalists. Thus, loathing toward them is stirred up among the students while communicating a Confucian value.

Lastly, seven out of the 30 units are dedicated to ingraining frugality through Kim Jong-il's utterances. For example:

> One day in March, Juche 43 (1954), the Great Leader Kim Jong-il was cleaning a classroom with the other pupils. When one student who collected trash was about to dump it into a garbage can, the Great General said "Wait!" and went to him holding a dust cloth in his hand. The Great General picked up all the small pencils from the trash [...]. The Great General said they could still use the pencils and wiped each pencil covered with dust. The pupils said that they could throw the pencils away since they were used up to a point where they were no longer of any use. The Great General said that just because they had new pencils, would it be OK to discard things they could still use and told them to cherish everything [...]. The next morning, the pupils found some small pencils perfectly fitted into bamboo sticks on the desks [...]. The Great General looked at the pupils compassionately and said that even though a piece of paper or a short pencil may look small, they should not forget that treasuring it means loving their country and will help rapidly construct an affluent and strong country. (extracted from unit 27)

It is common for a country to suffer from a shortage of essential commodities during and after war. The episode is set after the Korean War when people especially suffered from a lack of food and daily necessities. Under such distressing circumstances, Kim Il-sung, who encourages pupils to study, provides them with plentiful school supplies. Kim Jong-il, however, admonishes his friends not to be wasteful with anything even if they think it is useless and shows them

how short pencils can be used by putting them into bamboo sticks. Furthermore, he points out that being thrifty means more than appreciating everything they receive from Kim Il-sung. It also means that they care for their country, and such feelings will help the country advance quickly and be successful in the future. In other words, those who are extravagant can be regarded as traitors. This way, Kim Jong-il teaches his friends to value small things highly and shows a way for them to prove their love, care, and loyalty to Korea.

Thus, students' improper demeanor is corrected through Kim Jong-il's utterances. The emphasis of his discipline is placed on loyalty to Kim Il-sung and the country, not on individual morality. Children are persuaded to develop serious fighting attitudes in a game under the pretext of becoming a great hero. Americans, landowners, and capitalists are used for rationalizing respect for elders. Further, thriftiness is emphasized not only for the nation's development but also for distinguishing between patriots and traitors.

4.1.4 Praise and encouragement

Encouraging someone to do something and speaking highly of people and their work show the speaker's attention and care. Kim Jong-il is illustrated as a motivator for his classmates who tend to lack confidence. For instance, in unit 10, Kim Jong-il encourages a student who likes music to play the piano. The story goes as follows. The student who first objected to trying to play the piano was kindly instructed to play Kim Jong-il's song about the Great Marshal Kim Il-sung. Whenever the student told Kim Jong-il it was difficult, he cheered the student up: "You can play other songs if you learn the song about the Great Marshal Kim Il-sung." When the student was finally able to play the song, Kim Jong-il was so pleased and said, "Look, since you were determined to learn and tried so hard, you can already play the song about the Great Marshal Kim Il-sung. Now, you can play other songs with no trouble." Despite the title of the unit, "The First Song Kim Jong-il Learned," the episode demonstrates how his support and kind instructions improve the student's skill on the piano. More significantly, the unit shows that the student will surely be able to achieve his goal or make his dream come true as long as he follows what Kim Jong-il says.

In a similar way, Kim Jong-il tries to bring out his friend's artistic skills as well as his national pride:

> One student in the Children's Union was assigned to publish a wall newspaper for March […]. He found a picture in which a young elementary student was studying industriously at the desk from a foreign magazine, […] and without any thought, he began drawing it by looking at the picture […]. (But) He could not draw the hand holding a pencil on the picture well […]. He didn't like what he had drawn and pondered. Then the Great Leader Kim Jong-il came into the classroom and asked what he was doing alone. The student told him that he was drawing a picture, but he couldn't do it well […]. The Great General said, "The teacher spoke highly of your painting in the art class the other day. You should have drawn it looking at your own hand like last time." […] The student carefully examined his own hand and redrew it. After the student

> completed the picture, the Great General praised him, "See, it got so much better because you drew your own hand!" (extracted from unit 9)

In the 1950s, one of Kim Il-sung's concerns was the loss of national pride among North Korean people, when they tended to respect foreign-made products more than Korean ones. Therefore, during the 1960s educational reforms, the inculcation of self-reliance, pride, and national cultural identity toward students was the ultimate goal in North Korea (Kim 1969). The above excerpt shows the tendency of one student to be attracted to foreign items. However, the hand he drew by looking at the one in a foreign magazine looks unnatural to him. Although it is omitted in the quoted excerpt, Kim Jong-il advises his friend not to emulate a foreign picture even if it looks good because a Korean's hand and the foreigner's hand are not the same. When the student realizes the big mistake he has made, Kim Jong-il reminds the student of a compliment their teacher paid in the art class and encourages him to paint his own hand. Here Kim Jong-il attempts to release the student's apprehension and inspires him to try it again. In the end, Kim Jong-il's praise of the student's painting not only recovers his artistic confidence but also emphasizes differences between North Korea and other countries and shifts his attention from a foreign country to his own.

People feel special when they are supported and receive compliments. It is very honorable for students to be encouraged and praised by Kim Jong-il, who is admired by all citizens in North Korea. The above examples suggest how students can receive compliments from Kim Jong-il. In short, playing the song about Kim Il-sung and not copying foreign-made products are at least worthy of being praised by the main character, one of the most admirable, competent leaders in North Korea.

4.1.5 Identification of problems

Insightfulness is shown as another of Kim Jong-il's amazing qualities from his childhood. One unit, "I Don't Like That Poem," reveals Kim Jong-il's perceptiveness through his identification of dangerous thoughts:

> Pupils in Mangyongdae Revolutionary School were preparing for the art circle performance just before the Respectable General's 42nd birthday […]. One day, the Great General heard a female student reciting a poem in a classroom in the junior high school. Her voice sounded very sorrowful as if she were weeping. The poem was about a mother who sent her loving daughter to the battlefront and worried about her going missing […]. The Great General told his friends that he did not like that poem […] and that the poem involved something poisonous. He went to see his teacher […] and divulged problems in the poem one after another. Several days later, it was revealed that the poet was a spy for America, and the poem was composed in order to propagate evil ideas. (extracted from unit 12)

The purpose of this episode can be twofold. One is to indoctrinate how a Korean mother should be, and the other is to demonstrate Kim Jong-il's wisdom. His identification of the problem with the poem is constructed upon patriotism. The

ideal image of a Korean mother is not like the one recited in the poem, who worries about her missing child in the battle, but the one who hopes her child will come back as a hero after eliminating Americans. After Kim Jong-il explains to his friends about why he is not fond of the poem, he goes to see his teacher and discloses its inappropriate content. The point is that Kim Jong-il, a fourth-grade student, notices something detrimental for North Korea that even teachers or adults cannot identify. His spectacular ability is shown through his acute views and keen observations as a child, and they possibly contribute to leaving an impression on readers as to how ingenious Kim Jong-il is.

One can suggest that the combination of his speech styles and what is conveyed with them facilitates not only teaching about Kim Jong-il as the nation's leader *per se*. It also insinuates why Kim Jong-il has to stand where he is now, why he should be respected, worshiped, and modeled, and how students should think and behave according to his utterances. However, to reform readers' ideas and behaviors in a complete way, the speech styles that typify greatness may not be enough. Kim Jong-il's utterances need to be supported and reinforced in combination with another method.

4.2 Enlightenment and its function

The other major feature of the text involves descriptions of nonverbal behaviors and feelings. Some display both speakers' and listeners' emotions and reactions to the speakers' verbal messages. Investigation of such nonverbal descriptions will show how personae receive and feel about a message. In addition, it will call into question why they need to be narrated frequently and explicitly, in addition to their fundamental functions of making a story vivid and visual for readers. This section attempts to explore the effects and meanings of the reactions to Kim Jong-il's utterances.

In the textbook, Kim Jong-il's utterances leave a great impression on his classmates as well as adults, including his teacher and attending officer. In other words, not only are Kim Jong-il's utterances identified as wise, informative, and disciplinary, but they also serve as enlightenment for other personae. The expression "Wow!" indicates how students are impressed with the preceding remarks, for example. Upon listening to Kim Jong-il's comment on his future ("After I grow up, I will be a captain who protects our sky, sea, and land, and who stands up for my father"), his classmates cheered, "Wow!" and looked up at him. This suggests that Kim Jong-il's dream is far beyond their imagination and shows how strongly it impresses the pupils. The other moment of enlightenment occurs during a visit to a new school in unit 2. Despite the nice building, Kim Jong-il did not look pleased. "Without a bronze statue of our father Marshal, it is not like Mangyongdae Revolutionary School. It will be nice if we can have our Father Marshal's bronze statue here," he said. Then the story continues: the students who were already happy to see the new building are moved even more by his remarks because they are too young to think of having his bronze statue in such a remote

location. A fourth-grader, Kim Jong-il further impresses adults in unit 23. A few days before the new semester starts, an attendant officer bought a brand-new leather schoolbag, notebooks, and a fountain pen for Kim Jong-il. However, he had already prepared what he needed by himself and refused to take them, insisting he would rather carry stationery in a cloth wrapper, saying, "So many children go to school with a cloth wrapper, how come only I can take a bag?" The officer was moved by this unexpected reply, but he asked once more. Then Kim Jong-il articulated, "If I go to school with this nice bag, how envious will my friends be? I cannot do that." The officer was greatly touched and left the room quietly.

In this manner, upon hearing his striking, respectful, and considerate opinions, the story explains the personae's emotional movements in which Kim Jong-il's remarks impress people of all ages. The descriptions of nonverbal behaviors not only reveal the personae's enlightenment but also inculcate appropriate reactions that innocent students as learners should take toward Kim Jong-il's messages. More specifically, the nonverbal descriptions suggest to the students that Kim Jong-il's utterances are worth paying attention to and keeping in mind. As a result, they could reinforce his uncommon quality and make them more sure how special Kim Jong-il is. This might also influence some students who cannot find Kim Jong-il's utterances significant by implicitly controlling them to alter their attitudes in accordance with the nonverbal narrations and to believe what Kim Jong-il says is valuable. In other words, the personae's nonverbal and emotional statements could back up Kim Jong-il's remarks and guide slow or problem students to the same destination in order to shape the same type of feelings and people North Korea needs.

5. Conclusion

Language is used as an effective and essential method for human reformation in North Korea. To explore the use of language, I investigated a textbook, "The Childhood of Kim Jong-il," taught in the fourth grade. The text contains numerous conversations between Kim Jong-il and other personae (mainly his friends) and the personae's nonverbal as well as emotional descriptions. Several styles identified in Kim Jong-il's discourse are used to demonstrate and emphasize his exceptionality and rareness as a fourth grader. Through his remarks, not only his intelligence but also some values and beliefs in North Korea are communicated: how to lead an organizational life, loyalty to Kim Il-sung, autonomy, national pride, anti-Americanism, and frugality, for example. The personae's emotions and nonverbal behaviors toward Kim Jong-il's orations are illustrated in order to convey their astonishment, enlightenment, and inspiration, which may then control readers to believe in the narrator's desired goals.

Kim Jong-il's rhetorical styles as discussed in this paper may not be unusual in describing how great a person is. Even though the honorifics used in the

original language to illustrate a fourth-grade Kim Jong-il and descriptions of his demeanor that involve not so much wisdom but childlike abandon, militaristic views, and complete submission to his father may appear bizarre to people in other countries, they are appropriate and logical in the eyes of North Koreans or at least fourth-graders. Since not all North Korean values are communicated through Kim Jong-il's remarks here, additional study of other educational materials is required to fully determine the rhetorical methods for communicating North Korean values and understand their way of theorization. Putting this aside, I hope this study was able to highlight some of the communication practices used in a sample North Korean textbook.

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Appendix

The Childhood of the Great Leader Kim Jong-il

1. Learn, learn, and learn
2. We must have a bronze statue of the Great Marshal
3. We are an organizational body
4. "Not only adults should study the Great Marshal's speech"
5. Be a captain who protects our sky, sea, and land
6. At the portrait of the respectable Great Marshal
7. A quiz resolved at once
8. A war game on a snowy day
9. Looking at a picture drawn in a wall newspaper
10. A song learned for the first time
11. Respect for elders
12. "I don't like that poem"
13. "We must practice adjusting a gun's sight many times in order to be good at firing"
14. Pursuing the Great Marshal's ambition
15. A letter written for Father
16. "The most important duty for elementary students is getting good grades"
17. "Please accept this photograph"
18. On the day of victory
19. Asking for millet rice

20. Under hazel trees
21. Cherishing trees
22. On the model of “a problem child”
23. With a wrapped cloth
24. Taking turns at the stove
25. A bundle of wood Father helped carry
26. Cherishing a sheet of window glass
27. Short pencils are not small
28. Our school constructed with our hands
29. Newly bound notebooks
30. Preparing grapes

The original textbook in Korean was translated into Japanese by Professor Kenichi Yano at Kumamoto Gakuen University and from Japanese into English by the author. I greatly appreciate Professor Yano sharing his materials and opinions.

Chapter 6:

Related Topics

Kommunikativer Vorgang der Unzufriedenheit
Von der alltäglichen Gattung zur Rhetorik

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In diesem Aufsatz wird die sprachanalytische Methode kommunikativer Gattungen für die Untersuchung von Unzufriedenheitsäußerungen appliziert. Dies ermöglicht, die Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung als eine funktionale kommunikative Praktik aufzufassen, mittels derer die Handelnden bestimmte Aufgaben lösen können. Solch eine analytische Herangehensweise rückt die Symbolizität einzelner Unzufriedenheitsdarstellungen ins Licht. Denn die Handelnden benennen ihr Unzufriedenheitsgefühl sehr selten direkt. Vielmehr inszenieren sie dieses mit Hilfe bestimmter kommunikativer Mittel, als kontextualisierten, im Hier und Jetzt auftretenden und in einer bestimmten Kommunikationsform verpackten Interaktionsprozess. Einer der interessantesten Beweise, dass die Handelnden ihre Unzufriedenheit stets in Form von relativ verfestigten Kommunikationsgattungen darstellen, ist die Tatsache, dass sie diese als rhetorische Mittel in ihren Diskursen einsetzen und sie technisch aufführen können. Anhand einer Unzufriedenheitsinszenierung in einer Fernsehsendung wird exemplifiziert, wie sich eine kommunikative Gattung durch ihre bewusste Aufführung vor dem Publikum zur Rhetorik verwandelt.

1. Einleitung

Es ist für uns selbstverständlich und nicht problematisch, Unzufriedenheit im Alltag zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Jeder kann sie sowohl äußern als auch das unzufriedene Gesicht einer anderen Person wie auch die Stimme erkennen, mit der sie ihrer Unzufriedenheit Ausdruck verleiht. Um Unzufriedenheit darzustellen, sind weder besondere Schauspieltechniken noch Talent erforderlich. Es ist auch nicht unbedingt notwendig, das Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit zu empfinden. Die Tatsache, dass es möglich ist, eine Emotion zu imitieren, ohne tatsächlich von ihr betroffen zu sein, bedeutet, dass wir in der Lage sind, Unzufriedenheit rational in verschiedenen Situationen darzustellen, um bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen.

Diese Beobachtung erlaubt zu behaupten, dass die Konstruktion von Unzufriedenheit spezifische Kommunikationsaufgaben lösen kann, welche die Kommunikationspartner/-teilnehmer bewältigen müssen. Diese Aufgaben können von den Interagierenden mittels spezifischer kommunikativer Verfahren gelöst werden, die sich als Muster der Kommunikation von Emotion beschreiben

lassen (Fiehler 1990). Dieser Aufsatz soll jenes Muster für die Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung beschreiben.

2. Analyse kommunikativer Gattungen als methodisches Verfahren für die Untersuchung von Unzufriedenheitsäußerungen

Für die Analyse dieser alltäglichen Unzufriedenheitsrealisierungen steht die Gattungsanalyse mit ihrem konversationsanalytischen Verfahren zur Verfügung. Analyse kommunikativer Gattungen entwickelt sich aus der Theorie von Mikhail Bachtin über die Redegattungen. Diese definiert er als relativ feste und dauerhafte Äußerungen, welche bestimmten Bereichen der Sprachanwendung angehören (Bakhtin 1997:159). Mikhail Bakhtin schlägt vor, die Kommunikationsgattungen auf ihre Bedeutung, Adressiertheit, Formen der Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Interagierenden, Stilisierung und besonderes an Expressivität hin zu untersuchen.

Während Bachtin ein sprachphilosophisches Konzept diskutiert, entwickelt Thomas Luckmann eine sprachsoziologische Theorie der Redegattungen. Er definiert kommunikative Gattungen als historisch und kulturell spezifische, gesellschaftlich verfestigte und formalisierte Lösungen kommunikativer Probleme, deren (von Gattung zu Gattung unterschiedlich ausgeprägte) Funktion in der Bewältigung, Vermittlung und Tradierung intersubjektiver Erfahrungen der Lebenswelt besteht (Günthner & Knoblauch 1994: 699).

Ohne diese Definitionen von Kommunikationsgattungen hier diskutieren, kritisieren, erweitern oder reduzieren zu wollen, und mich auf eine bestimmte zu begrenzen, sollen beide Konzepte ineinander als sich gegenseitig ergänzend verwoben werden, denn sie können als komplementär angesehen werden. Dabei soll aber die von Bachtin angesprochene Bedeutung der Expressivität der kommunikativen Gattungen für die soziologische Analyse besonderes hervorgehoben werden. Denn die Tatsache, dass die kommunikativen Gattungen helfen, den persönlichen emotionalen Bezug eines Redners zum Ausdruck zu bringen und die Expressivitätsmarkierungen in bestimmte Richtungen zu lenken, erläutert den Mechanismus, wie wir unsere Emotionen nach Außen vermitteln und sie für die anderen erkennbar machen.

In der Terminologie der Konversationsanalyse oder Gattungsanalyse verkleidet sich also die Unzufriedenheit in den *expressiven Formen der kommunikativen Gattungen.* Die Handelnden, welche ihre Unzufriedenheit zum Ausdruck bringen, wählen intuitiv diejenige Expressionsform aus ihrem subjektiven Wissensvorrat aus, die in der jeweiligen Situation angemessen erscheint. Die bekannten Formen Klagen, Kritisieren, Jammern, Lamentieren und Meckern usw. werden als eine Methodologie der Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung im Prozess der Alltagskommunikation entwickelt und rekonstruiert. Auf diese Methoden beziehen und verlassen sich die Handelnden und erzeugen diese wiederum in ihrem Handeln (Bergmann 1987, 1996).

Der Aufmerksamkeitsgewinn mittels der Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung verläuft mehr oder weniger nach Regeln. Die verwendeten Regeln können Phonologie und Prosodie, Semantik und Syntax, Register und Stilform einer Sprache betreffen, aber auch mimische, gestische und paralinguistische kommunikative Formen einschließen. Das Muster umfasst somit recht unterschiedliche Elemente: Wörter und Phrasen, Gesamtregister, rhetorische Figuren und Stilmittel wie Metrik, Lautmelodien, Handbewegungen, Körperhaltungen, Mienen (Günthner 2000).

3. Alltägliche Unzufriedenheitsdarstellungen in verschiedenen Gattungsformaten

Anhand eines Beispiels soll hier geschildert werden, wie die Handelnden verschieden Kommunikationsgattungen von Unzufriedenheit einsetzen und wie sie im Laufe eines Gesprächs ausgehend von verschiedenen kommunikativen Aufgaben jeweils von einer zu der anderen Gattung wechseln können.

Die Datenauswahl für die vorliegende Analyse stützt sich auf die folgende Definition von Unzufriedenheit: „Ein Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit entsteht dann, wenn Menschen eine negative Diskrepanz empfinden zwischen von ihnen als legitim betrachteten Erwartungen und der augenblicklichen Realität“ (Aberle 1962). Ausgehend von dieser Definition werden im Folgenden Interaktionen ausgesucht, in denen eine solche negative Diskrepanz kommunikativ rekonstruiert wird. Ausgehend von dieser Definition lässt sich die Gegebenheit eines Unzufriedenheitsgefühls im folgenden Beispiel identifizieren.

(1) Beispiel „Das Parkverbot“
26.09.2005 ca. 23Uhr (Bielefeld)
M und H stehen auf der Parkstraße

1 M: gibt=s paragrapf_ verkehrt in fahrtrichtung parken dann bekommst
2 du halt auch die strafe zahlen weil vakehrte parkrichtung gibt=s da ehm_
3 (2.0) siehst du da⁻ (0.2)
4 H: ja: dann stehe ich ja jetzt FALSCH_
5 M: ja_ genau_ aber weiß ich nicht_(3.0)
6 H: ich habe schlechte laune_
7 (*0.8 steigen aus dem Auto*)
8 M: man darf nicht in fahrtrichtung parken_ manchmal habt ihr das sogar
9 vor da kannst du abgeschleppt werden_ siehs du ⁻ oh da links ist was
10 frei_ da parken ja alle so rum nja⁻ dann schiebt man da so rein_ da habe
11 ich schon nen zettel gekriegt_
12 H: ist das hier eine einbahnstrasse⁻
13 M: nee |also|⁻
14 H: |nee also_|
15 M: also theoretisch ist ne parkrichtung so wie er da parkt_ also
16 theoretisch⁻
17 H: JA GU:T MEINE FAHRTRICHTUNG KANN ABER

18 WOANDERES SEIN⁻ ich darf aber auf der anderen strasse auch
19 RÜCKWÄRTS fahren_ ich darf rückwärts auch in FAHRTRICHTUNG
20 fahren |obwohll⁻
21 M: | neja_ ja⁻ |
22 (...)
39 H: |alsol fahr ich jetzt ganz wo anders hin_
40 M: also auf behindert_ ehh da wird man mit sicherheit abgeschleppt_
41 das ist kla_ da die mussen nahea die ganze rae abschleppen nja⁻ weil_
42 H: ja DAS machen DIE aba auch_ da⁻ haben die KEIN
43 PROBLEM mit_ das KOMPLETE strassenzuege ABGESCHLEPT
44 werden⁻
45 (...)

In diesem Mitschnitt wird das Wissen über legitime Regeln thematisiert (Z.: 1-2, 8), deren Einhaltung erwartet wird und deren Befolgen aufgrund dieser Regeln selbstverständlich ist. Die Gesprächspartner stellen aber fest, dass ihre Handlungen in Diskrepanz zu diesen Regeln sind. Nachdem diese Diskrepanz festgestellt wurde, wurde diese nicht etwa als Missverhältnis, eine Abweichung, als Fehler oder irgendwie anderes thematisiert. Die oben genannte Diskrepanz kommt durch die folgende Äußerung von H zum Ausdruck *„ich habe schlechte laune“*.

Es scheint so zu sein, dass diese Äußerung aus dem thematischen Rahmen des folgenden Gesprächs heraus fällt. Außerdem ist sie auch prosodisch und lexikalisch anderes gestaltet. Nämlich ist sie durch fallende Intonation und Darbringung von negativen Bewertungen markiert. Allerdings erregt diese auffallende Art und Weise dieser Äußerung von H keine Irritation bei seinem Gesprächspartner. Diese Gestaltung einer Äußerung scheint für ihn normal und angemessen.

Hier ist also nicht das Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit selbst interessant, sondern die Art und Weise, auf die Unzufriedenheit mit angemessenen und relevanten kommunikativen Mitteln „Jammern“ als eine Gattung zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Die Spezifik dieser Gattung besteht darin, dass sie sich auf kein Unzufriedenheitsobjekt richtet, sondern den Unzufriedenheitsträger und seine unmittelbare Betroffenheit hervorhebt und seinen Gesprächspartner zu Mitleid und Reziprozität bewegt. Diese Konstellation exemplifiziert, dass sich Unzufriedenheit als kontextualisierter, im Hier und Jetzt auftretender und in einer bestimmte Kommunikationsform verpackter Interaktionsprozess beobachtbar macht, durch welchen die Handelnden bestimmte Aufgaben ausführen können.

Anhand dieser oben analysierten Sequenz war zu sehen, dass das Subjekt der Unzufriedenheit sich im Alltag als Unzufriedenheitsträger mittels einer erkennbaren Methodologie darstellt. Zuerst zwingt es die kommunikative Situation, seine Unzufriedenheit erwartbar und angemessen zu äußern. Das heißt, dass der Unzufriedene selbst oder die kommunikative Situation unmittelbar die Erklärung liefern, warum und in welchem Zusammenhang Unzufriedenheit geäußert wird. (Wenn dies nicht der Fall ist, zwingen ihn die anderen Teilnehmer

am Kommunikationsgeschehen zur Erklärung oder zur Reparatur seines Verhaltens.)

Außerdem kann der Unzufriedenheitsträger sich auf die Erkenntnis der Zuhörer beziehen. Es geht um die kleinen Bausteine des Unzufriedenheitsvorganges – Schlüsselworte (*Mist*, *doof*), mittlere Zusammenhänge von Satzstrukturen (zum Beispiel die Sätze mit *wie*, *ist schon wieder*, *warum machen sie das*, *das geht nicht*, *es ist unverschämt, dass*, usw.) und größere Sequenzen. Das sind explizite Sprachformen für die Darstellung negativer Bewertung, zu welchen der Redner H auch greift (*„schlechte laune“*).

Die Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung verlangt die Aufmerksamkeit vom Zuhörer. Deswegen braucht sie immer einen Rezipienten. Als Beispiel dafür kann hierbei etwa ein Kutscher in der Geschichte „Pferd“ von Anton Ĉechov genannt werden, der keinen Zuhörer hatte, welchem er seine alltägliche Unzufriedenheit anvertrauen könnte. Deshalb musste er von seinen Sorgen einem Pferd erzählen, welches ein geduldiger Rezipient war.

Um den Rezipienten im Gespräch beibehalten zu können und sich nicht als bloßer Meckerer und Jammerer darzustellen, was der Situation moralisch nicht angemessen wäre, sucht der Unzufriedene nach der angemessenen Darstellungsweise für die Situation, die er emotional und expressiv beschreibt. Die Darstellung der emotionalen Betroffenheit hilft dabei, überzeugend und authentisch zu wirken.

Es gibt auch eine andere Methode, die Angemessenheit von Unzufriedenheitsäußerungen im Alltag zu beweisen. Dies vollzieht sich unter Berufung auf moralische Normen (*man soll nicht*, *man darf nicht*). Diese Praktik der Unzufriedenheit, die oftmals aufgrund moralischer Normen missbilligt und verurteilt wurde, verdeutlicht ihre Angemessenheit paradoxerweise durch den Rekurs auf ebendiese Normen. Dieses Ordnungsprinzip des kommunikativen Vorgangs wird von Unzufriedenen häufig dadurch ausgenutzt, dass sie während der Rechtfertigung ihrer Unzufriedenheit Themen zum Gespräch bringen, die für sie in einem bestimmten Moment relevant und für die Erreichung ihrer Ziele günstig erscheinen. Hier erfüllt der kommunikative Vorgang der Unzufriedenheit eine Funktion des Kanalisierens von relevanten Themen. In der oben analysierten Sequenz thematisiert der Redner H zum Beispiel seine Betroffenheit, um seinen Gesprächspartner zu Unterstützung und Hilfe zu bewegen.

Jedoch verweigert der andere Redner M, den H irgendwie zu beruhigen. Im Gegensatz zur Erwartung von H thematisiert er verständnislos und hartnäckig die Regelverletzung und reaktualisiert die problematische Diskrepanz zwischen den Handlungen von H und den legitimen Parkregelungen. Als Reaktion auf diese Unkooperativität von M in der für H unangenehmen Situation setzt er weitere Äußerungen in die Interaktion ein, welche er durch eine hohe Stimmlautstärke hervorhebt. Diese expressive und affektaufgeladene Handlung, durch welche der Redner H seine Unzufriedenheit zum Ausdruck bringt, ist als Entrüstung zu definieren. Genau wie beim Jammern ist hier das Objekt der Unzufriedenheit nicht klar definiert. Im Vergleich aber zu dieser Art und Weise der Unzu-

friedenheits-äußerung ist diese Kommunikationsgattung der Unzufriedenheit viel expressiver. Der hohe Expressivitätsgrad dieser Gattung lässt sie an Beschimpfung grenzen (Christmann 1999). Der Redner H greift in diesem Kommunikationsabschnitt zu einer Entrüstung und nicht zum Jammern, weil er nicht das Mitleid erwartet, sondern die Deutung von seinem Gesprächspartner außer Geltung zu bringen versucht.

Auch wenn die Gattungen Jammern und Entrüstung nicht immer eine explizite Objektbezogenheit demonstrieren, muss dem Kommunikationsteilnehmer immer klar sein, warum der Redner unzufrieden ist. Daher sind Unzufriedenheitsäußerungen nicht nur situations-, sondern auch objektbezogen; so ist derjenige, der unzufrieden mit sich selbst ist, zugleich Subjekt und Objekt der Unzufriedenheit.

Diese Qualität der Intentionalität kommt der Unzufriedenheit wiederum aufgrund ihrer Emotionalität zu, denn Emotionen sind immer objektbezogen. Dies wird auch durch den Alltagsgebrauch des Worts ‚Unzufriedenheit' deutlich, welches nur in Verbindung mit einem indirekten Objekt auftritt. Man kann nicht einfach sagen, dass man unzufrieden ist, da Unzufriedenheit immer nur als „Unzufriedenheit mit etwas" auftaucht. Dabei geht es nicht nur um einen Sachverhalt oder Gegenstand, sondern auch um eine Person. Das heißt, dass der Unzufriedene auf diejenigen hinweist, die daran schuld sind, dass er sich unangenehm fühlen muss. Mit dem Hinweis auf das Objekt der Unzufriedenheit bestimmt der Unzufriedene seine Identität und Position in einer sozialen Beziehung. Genauer gesagt betont der Unzufriedenheitsträger seine in eine Beziehung eingebaute Identität während des kommunikativen Vorgangs der Unzufriedenheit.

Die Beziehung von Unzufriedenheitsträger zum Objekt seiner Unzufriedenheit lässt sich daraus rekonstruieren, welche Gattung er in der Interaktion einsetzt. Markiert er einen deutlichen Bezug zum Objekt der Unzufriedenheit, kann er zum Beispiel die Gattungen ‚Sich Beschweren' oder ‚Kritisieren' in Gang setzen.

Im hier dargestellten Gesprächsabschnitt zum Beispiel beschwert sich der Redner H über die Straßenkontrolleure, die sich seiner Meinung nach unakzeptabel verhalten. Er bringt seine Unzufriedenheit durch folgende Äußerung zum Ausdruck: „*ja DAS machen DIE aba auch_ da⁻ haben die KEIN PROBLEM mit_ das KOMPLETE strassenzuege ABGESCHLEPT werden⁻*".

Diese Äußerung ist deshalb als Beschwerde und nicht etwa als Kritik zu identifizieren, weil der Handelnde damit nicht bewirken will, dass die Straßenkontrolleure ihre Arbeit verbessern. Vielmehr thematisiert er ihr Verhalten als für ihn unakzeptabel.

Außer Unzufriedenheitsgefühl vermittelt diese Äußerung allerdings noch eine Bedeutung, welche der Unzufriedenheit semantisch nah steht, nämlich Angst. Die Sinnbereiche von Angst und Unzufriedenheit treffen zusammen, wenn es um eine schlechte Prophezeiung geht (Galanova 2009). Daher ist es manchmal schwierig, den kommunikativen Unzufriedenheitsbereich von anderen semantisch ähnlichen

Konstruktionen tadellos abzutrennen. Auch die Gattungen von Unzufriedenheit sind nicht immer klar voneinander zu unterscheiden. Es liegt an ihren Fähigkeiten, sich strukturell umzuformen und sich immer neu an anderen Kontexten und an jeweilige Funktionen anzupassen. Darin besteht die Polyfunktionalität von Unzufriedenheitsgattungen.

Bei der Verpackung der Unzufriedenheit in einem Beschwerdeformat kommt der Unzufriedenheit eine gemeinschaftsstiftende Funktion zu. Dieser verdankt sie der Beziehungskonstellation, welche sich aus dieser Gattung rekonstruieren lässt. Das Objekt der Unzufriedenheit übernimmt hier die Rolle des Dritten, der die Ausdifferenzierung *Wir* und *Sie* ins Spiel bringt und den Unzufriedenheitsträger mit seinem Kommunikationspartner vereint dem Dritten gegenüberstellt. In dieser Beziehungskonstellation deckt letzterer eine bestimmte Methodik oder ein Verfahren auf, auf die Unzufriedenheit des anderen zu reagieren.

Das Ordnungsprinzip der Ausdifferenzierung *Wir* und *Sie* bleibt auch dann bestehen, wenn in der Beziehungskonstellation Subjekt – Objekt – Rezipient Objekt und Rezipient übereinstimmen (das ist zugleich ein Schema für Vorwürfe, vgl. Günthner 2000). Dabei stellen sich die an der Kommunikation Beteiligten als Träger von Meinungen und Identitäten der verschiedenen Gruppen oder Institutionen dar.

4. Rhetorik der Unzufriedenheit in Fernsehkommunikationen

Ausgehend von der Feststellung, dass es eine relativ geregelte Methodologie gibt, die Unzufriedenheit im Alltag angemessen zum Ausdruck zu bringen, stellt sich die folgende Frage: Wie universal ist diese Methodologie der Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung für die anderen institutionellen Räume und Kommunikationsmedien? Um auf diese Frage zu antworten, werden im Folgenden Unzufriedenheitsdarstellungen in einem dafür institutionalisierten televisuellen Raum analysiert.

Einen solchen Raum schafft zum Beispiel die bayrische Sendung „Jetzt red i“, die unzufriedenen Bürger eine mediale Plattform bietet, auf der sie ihre Kritik und Beschwerden über die regionale Politik und Politiker äußern können. Die Bürger kommen zu Wort und sprechen ihre Probleme an. Während der Sendung sehen die Zuschauer zwei Räume: einen, in dem die bayrischen Bürger sitzen, die sich über etwas aufregen, einen weiteren, in dem die schon vorher zu den Fragen vorbereiteten Politiker sitzen und die angesprochenen Probleme kompetent erklären. Nach dem gleichen Prinzip werden einige Internetforen organisiert. Ihre Funktion ist es, eine Plattform zu kreieren, auf der politische Probleme und Vorschläge diskutiert werden können. Die Funktion dieser medialen Orte ist deutlich vorgegeben: Es geht vor allem darum, den Ausdruck von Unzufriedenheit in diversen Manifestationen zu inszenieren.

Hier definiert sich die Unzufriedenheit als eine kommunikative Praktik, die eine Infragestellung der Legitimation bestimmter institutioneller Ordnungen zum Ausdruck bringt. Denn diese mediale Kanalisierung der Unzufriedenheit zeichnet

sich dadurch aus, dass sie auf einer gewissermaßen inter-institutionellen Ebene – so etwa das Aufeinandertreffen der Institutionen ‚Gesundheitswesen' bzw. ‚Landwirtschaft' und ‚Politik' – stattfindet. Die einzelnen Akteure – Bauern, Ärzte, Politiker – stehen somit nicht als Individuen, sondern als Institutionsträger bzw. Repräsentanten ihrer jeweiligen Institution da.

(2) Beispiel aus BR Sendung „Jetzt red i"
9.01.2007 20.15 Uhr (Oberstdorf)
R- Redner
M- Moderator Tilmann Schöbel
P- Publikum im Studio
(20.47.20)

1 R: seit jahrzeiten(.) a-apellieren die tierschutzorganisationen immer
2 wieder ehh an die poalitiker(.)¯ ehh sie soallt nohmal entlea etwas TUN_
3 gegen die tierschändung¯ und es ischt eine(.) absolüte ehh hoaror¯ dass
4 es sisch oinfach nischt meah getoan wiord(.)¯ deon es wiord enthoarnt_ es
5 wiord geozüchtet_ es wiord transportiert_ das ob es stoine ode
6 handelswoare ischt_
7 M: enthoarnt hoißt es wiord die hoarne den tioren entfernt¯ damit es
8 besse in stoin roin poasst¯ oda woarum moacht man dies_
9 R: jo die enthoarnung kann hauptsächlich ¯ ehh durh die
10 blüteexportförderung_ weil wenn die kuhe expoartiert werden_ (.) ehh
11 daon werden die horne gefährlich und dadurh man=s weg moachte aber
12 für mich ist der hoarnlose kuh wie die raddio¯ ohne antenne¯ |weil|
13 P: |Applaus|
14 B: beu der kühe die keine horne hat¯ doa ischt die milschschtruktur
15 gestört¯ und wenn die schtruktur geschtört ischt¯ dann eha_ deshalb
16 wiord die immunsystem schwächche und wiord von genaration zur
17 generation schwächche und wenn wio dasch sagen könne dann sage
18 wio |JA WASCH ISCHT DASCH¯ SCHON WIEDO_|
19 P: |Applaus|

Vor dem großen Publikum versucht ein bayrischer Bürger aus diesem Beispiel, Hochdeutsch zu sprechen und sachlich sein Problem darzustellen (Z.: 1-10). Was er dabei empfindet, ist keine Unzufriedenheit, sondern Aufregung (Stottern in Z. 1; häufige Pausen und Ausatmungen in Z.: 1-10). Dabei vergisst er manchmal, die wichtigen Punkte seines Problems zu schildern und dem Publikum vieles detailliert zu erklären, (Z.: 6, 7). Dabei versteht er es aber noch, seine *Kompetenz*, Unzufriedenheit äußern zu können (Z.: 3, 4, 5, 16, 20).

Seine Unzufriedenheitsäußerungen gestalten sich in feste Muster, denen man in einer ungewöhnlichen Situation vom Publikum technisch vertrauen kann und von denen man sich sogar wieder bewusst distanzieren muss, um nicht übertreibend zu wirken. Diese Vorschriften werden mit Hilfe des Moderators geschaffen, der ein professioneller Redner ist. Mit seinen Kommentaren (Z.: 6, 7, 23) hilft er die aufregendsten Punkte zum Ausdruck zu bringen und die

Aufmerksamkeit vom Publikum zu erhalten. Die rhetorische Gestaltung des Unzufriedenheitsausdrucks des Redners sorgt zusätzlich dank der Handlungen des Moderators für sein gutes Auftreten auf der Bühne der Sendung.

Die kommunikative Gattung von Unzufriedenheitsvermittlung trägt hier zur Involvierung des Publikums ins Gespräch bei. Die Zuschauer sollen den Redner nicht nur verstehen, sondern seine Situation nacherleben können. Als Resultat bekommt Unzufriedenheitsdarstellung eine zusätzliche Funktion. Sie wird zur technischen Strategie der Unzufriedenheitsansteckung des Publikums.

Der ästhetisierte und auf das Publikum gerichtete Unzufriedenheitsausdruck verliert dabei an seiner Polyfunktionalität und kommunikativen Verflüssigung. Er erstarrt zu einem rhetorischen Muster im Medium technisch vermittelter Kommunikation des Fernsehers, welches durch die interaktiven Handlungen von Moderator und Redner zustande kommt. Die kontextuelle, funktionelle und strukturelle Verfestigung einer Gattung alltäglicher Kommunikation kann daher dazu führen, dass diese sich in eine rhetorische Figur verwandelt, welche zur Inklusion des Publikums in den Interaktionsprozess beitragen soll.

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Neurolinguistisches Programmieren: Hält es, was es verspricht?

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Neurolinguistisches Programmieren wird heutzutage in der freien Wirtschaft u.a. als eine universelle Technik von Manipulation der Interaktionspartner erfolgreich vermarktet, wobei ihrer sprachlich-rhetorischen Komponente eine wichtige Rolle in dem Gesamtkonzept zukommt. Der Artikel untersucht die zentralen Thesen der NLP, die sich auf sprachliches Handeln beziehen und somit den Untersuchungsgegenstand der Linguistik betreffen. Mittels empirischer Korpusanalyse von spontansprachlichen Dialogen aus dem Frankfurter Korpus des Institut der Deutschen Sprache wird überprüft, inwieweit die Anweisungen der NLP in der Praxis, d.h. in authentischer sprachlicher Interaktion, sich als anwendbar erweisen. Die Unterteilung der Sprecher in verschiedene Typen nach den Klassifikationsprinzipien von NLP wird durch diese Analyse als unbrauchbar eingeschätzt. Des weiteren wird überlegt, wie man die Irrtümer in den Grundannahmen der rhetorischen Lehre von NLP einem Sprachwissenschaftslaien verständlich machen kann.

1. Einleitung

Neurolinguistisches Programmieren, abgekürzt NLP, ist eine in den USA aufgekommene und seit etwa einem Jahrzehnt auch in Deutschland sehr verbreitete Art von Kommunikations- und Motivationstraining, deren Anhänger mittlerweile eigene Ausbildungszentren betreiben und Trainer-Zertifikate ausstellen. NLP setzt verschiedene Erkenntnisse der Psychologie zu einem praktischen Zweck um; ursprünglich zur psychologischen Therapie, immer öfter auch zur allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsentwicklung im Verkaufstraining und generell zum Verbessern der zwischenmenschlichen Kommunikation. Von seinen Lehrern und Anhängern wird NLP als Instrument für ein "besseres Leben" und mehr Effektivität in der sozialen Interaktion angepriesen. Die Inhalte der NLP-Lehre werden breit rezipiert und haben inzwischen in verschiedene Kommunikationstrainings für die freie Wirtschaft Eingang gefunden. Aufgrund ihres praktischen Erfolgs, gemessen in Umsatzzahlen, ist sie ernst zu nehmen und einer Analyse wert.

Da die Linguistik im Namen dieses Methodenbündels auftritt und da der Sprache generell in der zwischenmenschlichen Kommunikation, die durch die Anwendung von NLP verbessert werden soll, eine zentrale Rolle zukommt, würde man nebst der Psychologie auch fundierte sprachwissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse als Grundlagen dieses praxisorientierten Gebildes erwarten dürfen. Zu der

kognitionspsychologischen Seite der NLP-Lehre möchte sich die Autorin keineswegs äußern, da die dafür nötigen Kenntnisse einem Psychologen und Kognitionstheoretiker vorbehalten sind. Es ist die relativ knappe sprachbezogene Komponente der NLP-Lehre, die hier einer Untersuchung unterzogen wird. Ein Urteil darüber, ob daraus weitere Schlüsse auf die Gesamtqualität dieser praxisorientierten "Lebenstechnik" gezogen werden können, wird nicht angestrebt (siehe dazu jedoch www.boerdlein.gmxhome.de).

Der Kern der hier präsentierten Reflexion ist die Überlegung, mit welchen konzeptuellen und sprachlichen Mitteln eine zielgemäße Debatte über NLP geführt werden soll. Unter diesem Ziel wird hier die Befähigung potentieller und tatsächlicher Adepten von NLP verstanden, zu einer wissensfundierte Beurteilung seiner Grundlagen zu gelangen (bezogen auf den sprachlichen Aspekt). Für eine solche Debatte soll der vorliegende Artikel anhand einer Korpusstudie, mit der die Anwendbarkeit der NLP anhand von authentischem Sprachmaterial getestet wird, Argumente und weitere Denkanstöße liefern.

2. Sprachlehre von NLP am Beispiel von Krusche (2002)

Die Untersuchung verfolgt den Hauptgedanken der NLP im Bereich der rhetorischen Kommunikation. Laut Krusche (2002:83), einem NLP-Trainer und Buchautor, zeigen Menschen "durch die Sprache, welche Sinneskanäle sie bevorzugen". Dies bezieht sich auf die fünf Sinne, welche dem Menschen Informationen über seine Umwelt liefern und die – so NLP – zugleich die fünf 'Kanäle' für die Weiterverarbeitung dieser Informationen sind, da eine in einem 'Kanal' aufgenommene Information durch Synästhesien für die Verarbeitung in anderen Kanälen zur Verfügung steht. "<<Wie es uns auf den ersten Blick erscheinen mag>> zum Beispiel deutet darauf hin, dass ich bei der Formulierung dieses Satzes das visuelle System bevorzugt habe. Ebenso hätte ich formulieren können: <<Die Aufgabe ist keineswegs so schwierig, wie sie sich zuerst anhört>>, also auditiv" (ibid.) Hier wird also eine mögliche Auswahl zwischen den gleichbedeutenden sprachlichen Formulierungen nach persönlichen Präferenzen postuliert. Die Situation der Teilnehmer der sprachlichen Interaktion (im weiteren: Sprecher) beschreibt Krusche in Übereinstimmung mit der NLP-Lehre folgendermaßen:

> Was sie erleben, worauf sie in der ersten Linie achten, das drücken sie mit bestimmten Wörtern aus, die ihren Erfahrungen am besten entsprechen. Für die einen steht das Sehen im Vordergrund, für andere das Hören oder Fühlen, seltener das Riechen oder Schmecken (ibid.).

Durch die Anwendung des quantifizierenden Adverbs "selten" wird zugestanden, das es auch 'kognitive Typen' gibt, für welche das Riechen oder Schmecken "im Vordergrund steht".

Nun geht an den Sprecher die folgende Empfehlung:

> Achten Sie auf die Prädikate, die in den Sätzen vorkommen. Prädikate, nämlich Verben, Adjektive und Adverbien, beschreiben bestimmte Prozesse. Sie machen deutlich, welchen Kanal der Sprecher im Augenblick benutzt. Einige Beispiele sollen es verdeutlichen (ibid.).

Was folgt, ist eine Liste von Wörtern, die neben Verben, Adverbien und Adjektiven auch phraseologische Verbindungen und Redewendungen enthält und in der unter anderen die folgenden Ausdrücke verzeichnet sind:

Visuell – sehen, ansehen, schauen, sich ein Bild machen, ich sehe das so, sichtbar, sich vorstellen, mir scheint, zeigen, Aussicht, Perspektive haben, gewinnen, hell, dunkel, im dunkeln tappen, Farbe bekennen, ein langes Gesicht machen, mal den Teufel nicht an die Wand, sich ins rechte Licht rucken, und so weiter und so fort;

Auditiv – sagen, fragen, hören, ich höre, was du sagst, das klingt überzeugend, das verstehe ich, mit halbem Ohr zuhören, das lässt sich hören, ich bin ganz Ohr, daher pfeift also der Wind usw;

Kinästhetisch – spüren, merken, füllen, warm, kalt, jemandem Beine machen, jemandem den Daumen drücken, wo mich der Schuh drückt, ich bin müde, wie ein rohes Ei behandeln, mir fällt ein Stein vom Herzen usw.;

Olfaktorisch/gustativ – riechen, eine Nase dafür haben, das konnte ich nicht riechen, es stinkt mir; saftig, trocken, köstlich, herb, süß, sauer, lecker, in den sauren Apfel beißen, eine bittere Pille schlucken, sauer reagieren ... (ibid. 83-84)

Insgesamt enthält die Auflistung 160 verschiedene Wörter und Wortverbindungen und erstreckt sich über anderthalb gedruckte Buchseiten. Sie erweckt somit durchaus den Eindruck der Ausführlichkeit und Sachlichkeit. Nun wird der Schluss gezogen:

> Die Sprache zeigt also, welche Sinne Menschen bevorzugen, wenn sie Informationen aus der äußeren Welt aufnehmen, und wie sie diese innerlich in Form von Bildern, Stimmen, Klängen, Geräuschen, manchmal auch Gerüchen oder Geschmack verarbeiten (ibid. 85).

Da die sprachlichen Äußerungen darauf hinweisen, in welchem geistigen Zustand sich der jeweilige Sprecher befindet, d.h. in welcher Art und Weise er oder sie sich das gerade Besprochene vergegenwärtigt, soll auf sie geachtet werden; sie gehören zu den ‘Zugangshinweisen’, die es dem Hörer ermöglichen, sich auf die Wellenlänge des Partners, oder anders ausgedrückt, auf sein Wahrnehmungssystem einzustellen. “Wenn sie die Sprache anderer Menschen sprechen, haben Sie eine gemeinsame Sprache. Achten Sie auf die Prädikate, die häufig gebraucht werden, beobachten Sie die Augenbewegungen, und Sie werden das bevorzugte Wahrnehmungssystem erkennen. Mit etwas Übung wird es Ihnen leicht fallen, sich den Prädikaten anzugleichen, also mehr in Bildern zu sprechen, das Auditive zu betonen oder gefühlsmäßige Ausdrücke (damit ist wohl das ‘Kinästhetische’ zu verstehen, Anm. HP) zu verwenden. Angleichen oder Spiegeln ist kein Wert an sich. Es ist einfach ein wirksames Instrumentarium, um guten Rapport aufzubauen

und dann zum Führen überzugehen" (ibid.). Unter 'Führen' ist die Beeinflussung des Gegenübers und seine Lenkung in die erwünschte Richtung zu verstehen.

3. Kritische Hinterfragung der sprachbezogenen Techniken von NLP am Beispiel von Krusche (2002)

Zu allererst stellt sich die Frage, ob die oben zitierten Listen überhaupt schlüssig und in sich konsistent sind, d.h., warum z. B. die Aussage "ich bin müde" etwas anderes oder mehr als die Müdigkeit des Sprechers signalisieren sollte: geht es um die Inhalte des Gesagten, oder um die Wahl der Form? Zählt die Neigung eines Sprechers, über Landschaften oder aber Musikstücke zu reden, oder die Auswahl der Metaphorik bei der Formulierung 'sinnesneutraler' Informationen, wie es Krusches Beschreibung suggeriert? Eindeutig problematisch wird es bei den Worten "sagen", "fragen" und "hören", welche der oben aufgeführten Beispielliste zufolge wohl auch in einer wörtlichen Verwendung als 'Zugangshinweise' fungieren dürften. Ebenfalls ist unklar, wieso der Ausdruck "es liegt klar auf der Hand" etwa in den Bereich der Kinästhetik und nicht in den visuellen Bereich fallen sollte, wo das Lexem "klar" doch vorher als ein 'visuelles Prädikat' eingestuft wurde, und wieso wiederum "ein langes Gesicht machen" visuell und nicht kinästhetisch interpretierbar sein sollte. Dies ist ein prinzipielles Problem, da die Gestik und Mimik zwar vom Gestikulierenden kinästhetisch, vom Zuschauer hingegen visuell empfunden wird; die Zuordnung hängt also von der Perspektive ab. Während die Verwendung der ersten oder zweiten Person einen Hinweis auf die anzunehmende Perspektive gibt, bleibt diese bei Verwendung der dritten Person in der Schwebe. (Also wenn sich z.B. im Datum FR183 aus dem Freiburger Korpus des gesprochenen Deutsch die Katze in den Schwanz beißt, ist es nicht klar, ob man den Ausdruck aus der Sicht der Katze – kinästhetisch – oder des Zuschauers – visuell – klassifizieren soll...)

Aus der Liste der 'Prädikate', die auch z. B. die Wendungen "Aussicht, Perspektive haben, im Bilde sein" enthält, geht im Gegensatz zu Krusches Definition des Prädikats als Verb, Adverb und Adjektiv klar hervor, dass auch die Verbindung eines sinnesneutralen Verbs mit einem sinnbildlichen Objekt bei der Diagnose der Präferenzen berücksichtigt werden soll. Zu Adjektiven in attributiver Funktion schweigt sich die Definition aus. Es stellt sich auch die Frage, warum ausgerechnet das Prädikat für die Klassifizierung der Sprechertypen ausschlaggebend sein sollte und nicht auch das Subjekt. So könnte etwa der Ausdruck "Sie haben gute Aussichten" zu typdiagnostischen Zwecken herangezogen werden, nicht aber die Aussage *Ihre Aussichten sind gut*.

Viel mehr als solche Detailfragen interessiert hier allerdings der zentrale Punkt, nämlich, die ausgesprochene Anweisung an den Leser, sich auf die Ausdrucksweise des Gesprächspartners einzustellen. Während im Prinzip nichts gegen die Empfehlung spricht, mit Personen, die sich gerne metaphorisch ausdrücken, ebenfalls in Metaphern zu sprechen und im Umgang mit

gefühlsbetonten Menschen auf deren Gefühle und die eigenen einzugehen, wird dieser Empfehlung hier durch die Angabe langer Ausdruckslisten und ihre Unterteilung in einzelne 'Sinneskanäle' der Anstrich einer echten *techné* gegeben, verbunden mit der Verheißung einer Technik des Zuhörens, die systematisch die uneigentliche Verwendung auf die Sinneseindrücke bezogener Prädikate (wohl zuzüglich einzelner wörtlich verwendeter Ausdrücke wie *sehen*, *fragen*, *sagen*, *hören*) durch den Gesprächspartner berücksichtigt. Die dadurch gewonnenen Erkenntnisse sollen dann die eigene Wortwahl präzise steuern.

Von der Absicherung der Prämissen fürs erste einmal abgesehen, ist diese Technik logischerweise überhaupt nur dann anwendbar, wenn die signalgebenden Ausdrücke (sprachliche 'Zugangshinweise') mit ausreichender Häufigkeit im Gespräch vorkommen. Es geht ja darum, z. B. während eines Beratungsgesprächs oder einer Reihe von Verkaufsgesprächen so viele 'Prädikate' herauszuhören, dass eine Diagnose der Präferenzen des Gesprächspartners möglich wird, und mit ihr die eigene Anpassung. Ein Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung musste es folglich sein, die Häufigkeit zu untersuchen, mit der solche Ausdrucke in natürlichen Gesprächen auftreten. Im Anschluss werden individuelle Unterschiede der Präferenzen thematisiert.

4. Die korpusbasierte Studie

Die Häufigkeit der uneigentlich verwendeten Ausdrücke aus verschiedenen Sinnesbereichen wurde von mir an einem Auszug aus dem Freiburger Korpus der gesprochenen deutschen Sprache untersucht. Die mir vorliegenden Texte im Umfang von ca. 125000 Wörtern haben eines gemeinsam: sie waren alle im Jahre 2002 vom Institut für Deutsche Sprache kostenlos erhältlich[1]. Es handelt es sich um eine zufällige Auswahl aus dem Gesamtkorpus. Tabelle 1 führt die in dieser Probe vorkommenden Gesprächssorten und die Zahl der Wörter in jeder Kategorie auf.

Die Klassifikation der Gesprächssorten basiert hauptsächlich auf den funktionellen Differenzierungskriterien, die im Freiburger Korpus mitgegeben sind. Eine Ausnahme innerhalb der hauptsächlich funktionellen Klassifikation ist die Kommunikationsgattung 'Telefonat', welche von den übrigen Gesprächssorten aufgrund des Kontextmerkmals 'Kommunikationsmedium' differenziert wird. Bei allen anderen Gesprächen handelt es sich um direkte (*face-to-face*) Kommunikation. Eine funktionelle Differenzierung der Kommunikationsgattung 'Telefonat' wurde nicht vorgenommen, da diese Kategorie in meinem Korpus nur wenige Gespräche enthält.

[1] Der Grund dafür war möglicherweise, dass die dazugehörigen Tonaufnahmen fehlten, weshalb die Texte nicht auf die Website des Instituts für Deutsche Sprache gestellt wurden, wo man heute andere Transkripte aus dem Freiburger Korpus samt den Tonaufnahmen gegen Gebühr beziehen kann.

Gesprächssorte	Wörter	Ereignisse aus FR
Erzählung	161	034
Diskussion	43.273	016, 027, 030, 054, 119, 183, 196, 199, 209
Besprechung	17.484	067, 068, 113, 120, 198
Beratung	3.625	032, 109, 143, 214, 216
Unterhaltung	29.313	019, 022, 025, 064, 105, 106, 117, 118, 122, 124, 126, 176, 186, 187
Interview	20.990	011, 015, 031, 046, 052, 076, 088, 090, 102, 114, 130, 172, 188
Telefonat	9.629	141, 145, 176, 066, 115, 142, 144, 146
Summe	124475	54

Tabelle 1: *Kategorien der Gespräche in dem verwendeten Datenkorpus und ihr Umfang*

Nur für einige dieser Sprechereignisse waren Angaben über die Dauer der Sprachaufnahme erhältlich. Aufgrund von acht Ereignissen von bekannter Dauer[2] (insgesamt ca. 45 Minuten) wurde das durchschnittliche Sprechtempo errechnet, welches bei annähernd 2.5 Wörtern pro Sekunde lag, und auf die gesamte Probe extrapoliert. Dies ergab für die 54 in der Probe enthaltenen Ereignisse die Gesamtdauer von ca. 14 Stunden.

Nun wurden die Daten manuell untersucht und die uneigentlich verwendeten Ausdrücke aus der Sphäre von Sehen, Hören, Riechen, Schmecken und Tasten/Fühlen registriert[3].

[2] Es handelt sich hier um die Gespräche, die in gedruckter Form in den Schriften des IDS vorliegen.

[3] Bei der Zählung wurde der von Krusche (2002) zum visuellen Bereich gezählte Ausdruck „sich vorstellen“ nicht berücksichtig, da es schwer nachvollziehbar war, warum die räumliche Metapher des ‘Sich-Vorstellens’, in der man sich etwas vergegenwärtigt, indem man es „vor sich stellt“, um es besser wahrnehmen zu können, ausgerechnet in den Bereich der visuellen Reize fallen soll. Sätze wie „Stell dir bloß den Krach vor“ oder „Stell dir [mal] diesen Geruch vor“ sind weder widersprüchlich noch benötigen sie Synästhese als Erklärung. Aus denselben Gründen wurde die Zuordnung des Ausdrucks „das verstehe ich“ in den auditiven Bereich von mir nicht übernommen, da Verständnis eine höhere und allgemeine kognitive Leistung und keinen Akt der Wahrnehmung, ob auditiver oder sonstiger Natur, darstellt; so sehen es auch die NLP-Gründer und einige anderen NLP-Autoren.

Gesprächssorte	Zeit (min.)	visuell	auditiv	kinästhetisch	olfaktorisch/ gustativ	Summe	Sagen
Diskussion	286	161	41	35	5	242	283
	-	67%	17%	14%	2%	-	-
Besprechung	116	83	10	11	2	106	129
	-	79%	9%	9%	2%	-	-
Beratung	24	6	1	4	-	11	19
	-	55%	9%	21%	-	-	-
Interview	139	59	8	17	2	88	175
	-	67%	9%	19%	2%		-
Unterhaltung	193	55	15	23	8	101	175
	-	56%	15%	13%	8%	-	-
Telefonat	64	14	5	7	-	26	-
		54%	19%	27%	-	-	-
Erzählung	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

Tabelle 2. *Die Anzahl uneigentlich verwendeter Ausdrücke aus verschiedenen Sinnesbereichen in verschiedenen Kategorien der Gespräche*

In verschiedenen Gesprächsgattungen betrug der Anteil der Ausdrücke aus dem visuellen Bereich zwischen 54% und 79%, aus dem auditiven Bereich zwischen 9% und 17% und der kinästhetischen Ausdrucke zwischen 10% und 27%, abgesehen von der spärlich vertretenen Gattung 'Beratung', wo es unter den elf 'Prädikaten' mit figurativen Sinnesbezügen vier kinästhetische Ausdrücke gab. Drastische Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Gattungen waren nicht feststellbar, was die Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse aus verschiedenen Gesprächssorten in der folgenden Übersicht (Tabelle 3) rechtfertigt.

Dauer in Minuten	visuell	auditiv	kinästhetisch	olig./gust.	alle Sinne	sagen
823	378	80	97	19	574	828
% der sinnesbezog. Ausdrücke	63%	13%	20%	3%	100%	-

Tabelle 3. *Anzahl der Ausdrücke aus den jeweiligen Sinnesbereichen in übertragener Bedeutung und der Vorkommen von* sagen *in wörtlicher Bedeutung im Gesamtkorpus von 54 Gesprächen (ca. 125000 Wörter)*

Das metasprachlich fungierende Wort *sagen*, von Krusche zu der Kategorie der auditiven Zugangshinweise gezählt, wurde getrennt ausgewertet, außer wenn es metaphorisch verwendet wurde (wie in "Was will uns dieses Bild sagen"). Das Wort dient der metasprachlichen Bezugnahme auf das Sprechen selbst, entweder bei der Wiedergabe früherer Interaktionen ("Ich weiß es sicher, er hat es mir selber gesagt") oder zur Diskurssteuerung, etwa in Formeln des Typs "wie ich schon früher gesagt habe" (signalisiert eine Wiederholung oder Reformulierung)

oder “ich wollte noch sagen” (ein sogenannter ‘Starter’ für einen sanften Gesprächseinsteig bzw. ein Mittel zur Bewahrung des Rederechts). Somit können die ‘kognitiven Präferenzen’ des Sprechers hinsichtlich der Informationsverarbeitung aus seiner Verwendung keineswegs ablesbar sein. Aus der Tabelle ist ersichtlich, dass die Kategorisierung von ‘”sagen” unter den ‘auditiven Ausdrücken’ die ‘Gesamtpräferenz’ aller Sprecher radikal zugunsten des auditiven Bereichs umkippen würde, wobei aber das Wort “sagen” etwa 91% der Ausdrücke aus dem ‘auditiven Bereich’ ausmachen würde.[4]

Für die Prädikate und Adjektive aus dem visuellen Bereich ergibt sich je nach Gesprächsgattung eine Frequenz zwischen einem Vorkommen pro ca. anderthalb Minuten und einem Vorkommen in vier Minuten, so dass in einem fünfzehnminütigen Dialog zwischen zwei Personen jeder Gesprächspartner im Schnitt mit etwa zwei bis fünf Ausdrücken dieser Sorte seitens des Gegenübers konfrontiert wurde. Innerhalb derselben Zeitspanne tritt ungefähr ein kinästhetischer und ein auditiver Ausdruck auf; gustativ-olfaktorische Ausdrücke sind noch seltener. Ob dies für praktisch-diagnostische Zwecke ausreicht, hängt von dem Interaktionszweck und der gesamten Interaktionsdauer ab: in einem kurzen Beratungsgespräch wäre die Methode, selbst wenn wir unterstellen, dass sie überhaupt funktioniert, kaum anwendbar, erst in längeren und wiederholten Interaktionen könnte man ihre Anwendung aufgrund der Frequenz der ‘Zugangssignale’ als plausibel betrachten

Ein weiterer Schritt in der Untersuchung war die Auszählung der Häufigkeit für individuelle Sprecher. Aus dem Pool wurden alle 41 Sprecher mit mindestens vier Minuten Redezeit, d.h. 600 Worten, herausgesucht; davon wurden alle aussortiert, die weniger als vier Ausdrücke mit Sinnesbezug verwendeten, so dass letztendlich 21 Sprecher für die Untersuchung übrigblieben, die zwischen etwa vier und etwa siebenundfünfzig Minuten lang zu Wort kamen. Die Anzahl der Wörter in dieser Probe beträgt ca. 48000; dies entspricht etwa fünfeinhalb Stunden Redezeit.

Tabelle 4 verdeutlicht die Ergebnisse. Alle SprecherInnen bis auf eine wählten mindestens 50% der relevanten Prädikate aus dem visuellen Bereich und deutlich unter 50% aus jedem einzelnen der anderen Bereiche. Bei der (grau markierten) Ausnahmesprecherin hielten sich die Ausdrücke aus dem visuellen (6) und dem kinästhetischen (8) Bereich etwa die Waage; es traten hier auch fünf auditive Ausdrücke auf. Dieses Ergebnis zwänge nach der Logik des NLP zu dem Schluss, dass es sich in allen Fällen – bis auf den einen, wo keine klare Tendenz für irgendeinen Bereich auftrat – um ‘visuelle Typen’ handelte. Es stellt sich die Frage, warum man sich überhaupt die Mühe machen sollte, “auf Prädikate zu achten”, wenn das Ergebnis von vorn herein festzustehen scheint.

[4] Die wörtliche Verwendung von *sagen, fragen* und *sehen* ist in der Zählung nicht berücksichtigt.

Wort-anzahl	Dauer ca. (min)	Episode FR	Sprecher	riechen/ schmecken	hören	fühlen	sehen	sehen %	sagen
3127	21	25	-3	1	0	6	9	56%	15
2760	18	30	-2	0	0	2	6	75%	16
2392	16	54	-1	0	0	2	8	80%	7
8532	57	54	-2	2	7	7	50	76%	38
1514	10	66	-2	0	3	0	4	57%	13
4104	27	64	-2	1	0	6	10	59%	17
990	7	64	-3	1	3	2	6	50%	10
765	5	68	-1	0	0	2	4	67%	6
916	6	88	-2	0	1	3	5	56%	6
717	5	90	-1	0	0	0	5	100%	8
1030	7	102	-2	0	0	1	3	75%	7
1590	11	106	-2	0	1	1	5	71%	16
1599	11	113	-1	1	0	1	7	78%	20
1147	8	113	-2	1	0	2	6	67%	17
1162	8	114	-2	0	0	2	6	75%	5
4887	33	120	-2	0	6	3	18	67%	39
2701	18	120	-4	0	1		10	91%	14
1665	11	141	-1	0	5	8	7	35%	9
752	5	143	-2	0	0	0	4	100%	4
2127	14	188	-1	0	0	4	12	75%	24
3813	25	188	-2	0	2	1	11	79%	38
48290	322			7	29	53	196	71%	329

Tabelle 4. *Uneigentliche Verwendung der Ausdrücke aus den jeweiligen Sinnesbereichen in den Beiträgen einzelner Sprecher*

Die Auszählung des metasprachlichen Lexems “sagen” in seiner wörtlichen Bedeutung zeigt, dass es viel öfter verwendet wird als die Prädikate der anderen untersuchten Typen (siehe Tabelle 4). Würde man nun “sagen” und andere metasprachliche Verben wie “sprechen” und “erzählen” dem ‘auditiven Kanal’ zuordnen, so würde die generelle Präferenz für das Gesamtkorpus ebenso wie für einzelne Sprecher deutlich in den auditiven Bereich fallen. Freilich würden diese drei Worte etwa 95% der Prädikate dieses Typus ausmachen, so dass dieses Ergebnis gar nichts brächte außer der banalen Erkenntnis, dass Menschen in Gesprächen oft die sprachliche Interaktion an sich thematisieren.

5. Momentane Verfassung des Gesprächspartners

In einer alternativen Beschreibung der linguistischen Komponente von NLP (siehe z.B. Stahl 1992) geht es nicht nur um die Feststellung der generellen Präferenzen des Gegenübers, sondern auch um die Momentaufnahme, d.h. die

Feststellung, in welchem ‘Sinneskanal’ seine Informationsverarbeitung gerade vor sich geht, und eine entsprechende Anpassung der eigenen Gesprächsbeiträge:

> Ein geschulter NLP-Therapeut erkennt die *momentane oder generelle* (Hervorhebung HP) Bevorzugung von Sinnen in der Sprache des Klienten und gleicht sich ihm in seiner eigenen Sprache entsprechend an. Auf diese Weise holt er seinen Klienten in der (Sinnes-)Welt ab, in der er sich gerade befindet (Stahl 1992).

Im Sinne eines solchen Versuchs, den Gesprächspartner in seiner Sinneswelt ‘abzuholen’, wäre es mithin falsch, in einem Gespräch über die Malerei der Renaissance ein gestern besuchtes Konzert mit Renaissancemusik zu erwähnen oder in eine Unterhaltung über österreichische Berglandschaften eine Anmerkung übers Jodeln einzuflechten[5]. Stahls Empfehlung läßt sich weder empirisch überprüfen noch bewerten. Sie betrifft jedoch die Inhalte des Gesprächs, und die Beachtung der dabei verwendeten sprachlichen Form, etwa der figurativen Rede, fügt nichts Wesentliches mehr hinzu. Für solche Annäherungsversuche sind die Anfangs zitierten Metaphernlisten unnötig. In den seltenen Fällen, wo “uneigentliche” Formulierungen überhaupt in einer gewissen Häufung innerhalb einer kurzen Zeitspanne bei demselben Sprecher auftreten (fünfmal in etwa einer Minute eigener Redezeit in FR143-2, sechsmal in zweieinhalb Minuten eigener Redezeit in FR054-2), sind es ausnahmslos wieder die auf das Visuelle bezogenen Ausdrücke. Da die Formulierung ‘gewisse Häufung’ eher vage bleibt, sei noch hinzugefügt, dass in den Quellentexten jede Angabe über die Beobachtungsdauer, die zur Erstellung der “Diagnose” der momentanen geistigen Verfassung nötig ist, sowie darüber, wie schnell sich der Gesprächspartner von einem in den anderen ‘Kanal’ versetzen kann, ebenfalls fehlt.

6. Sprachwissenschaftliches Wissen für den Laien

Für einen Linguisten klingt alles bisher Gesagte trivial. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass jede Sprache ein historisch gewachsenes Phänomen ist, das uns ein etabliertes Repertoire an nicht beliebig austauschbaren Metaphern und Phraseologismen zur Verfügung stellt. Aus diesem müssen wir unsere Formulierungen zwangsweise schöpfen, nicht nur um unserer Ausdrucksweise das eine oder andere stilistische Merkmal hinzuzufügen, sondern schlichtweg um bestimmte Inhalte überhaupt zur Sprache bringen zu können, da oft eine nichtmetaphorische Formulierung fehlt oder in der mündlichen Kommunikation nicht gebräuchlich ist. Der Zugang zu Einträgen im mentalen Lexikon hängt auch von der Häufigkeit ab, mit der wir eine bestimmte Formulierung, sei es ein Wort oder ein Phraseologismus, aufnehmen, so dass etwa die häufige Verwendung eines Ausdrucks durch frühere Interaktionspartner oder in beobachteten Kommunikationsereignissen selbstverständlich auch unseren Redestil beeinflusst. Denken wir hier als Beispiel an die heutzutage fast unvermeidliche Verwendung von

[5] Die Beispiele stammen von der Autorin.

Anglizismen auch durch Sprecher, die Fremdwörtern grundsätzlich kritisch gegenüber stehen, denen aber gar nichts anderes übrig bleibt. Wegen der Vormachtstellung des Sehens unter den Sinnen, welche die Spezies Homo sapiens mit ihrer Umwelt verbinden (abgesehen von der Sprache selbst), ist es zu erwarten, dass sich – neben der Verwendung diskurssteuernder Verben wie *sagen* und *fragen* – mehr Phraseologismen und Metaphern aus dem visuellen Bereich im Deutschen, und möglicherweise in allen anderen natürlichen Sprachen, etabliert haben als aus den anderen Bereichen. Diese Situation bietet wenig Raum für abweichende individuelle Präferenzen der jeweiligen Sprecher (auch wenn sie tatsächlich einmal das Riechen und Schmecken ins Zentrum ihrer Erlebniswelt stellen würden, wobei die Existenz eines solchen 'kognitiven Typus' von den Erfindern des NLP nicht angenommen wird).

Über diese Grundkenntnisse scheinen die potentiellen und tatsächlichen Adepten von NLP allerdings nicht zu verfügen – anders sind die von dieser 'praktischen Lehre' gefeierten wirtschaftlichen Erfolge nicht zu erklären. Für uns stellt sich die Frage: wie viel sprachwissenschaftliches Wissen benötigt ein Laie, um für eine Aufklärung über die methodischen Mängel und die Willkürlichkeit ihrer Grundprinzipien empfänglich zu werden? Da nicht anzunehmen ist, dass sich ein jeder Interessent zunächst umfangreiche sprachwissenschaftliche Kenntnisse aneignen möchte, um selbständig einen kritischen Blick auf die Empfehlungen und Versprechen dieses Methodenbündels werfen zu können, sehe ich es als eine gesellschaftliche Verantwortung der Sprachwissenschaft, einige praktische Überlegungen darüber anzustellen, wie das in diesem Zusammenhang relevante Wissen leicht begreiflich, d.h. für die Bedürfnisse eines allgemein gebildeten Laien, vermittelt werden könnte. Ein Ausgangspunkt könnten die Ergebnisse der oben dargestellten Korpusstudie sein. Zwei andere Vorschläge sollen im Folgenden präsentiert werden. Der erste bezieht sich auf das Rapport-Prinzip und zielt darauf ab, die zugrundeliegende Unterteilung der Menschheit in einige wenige kognitive Typen zu verspotten. Der zweite betrifft die Grundannahme der beliebigen Austauschbarkeit sprachlicher Ausdrücke, d.h. der vermeintlichen "Wahlfreiheit" zwischen mehreren gleichbedeutenden Alternativen gemäß den kognitiven Präferenzen des jeweiligen Sprechers (oder seiner angestrebten Strategie).

7. Das Rapport-Prinzip

Das Rapport-Prinzip gehört zu den Grundbausteinen der NLP-Methode und erscheint psychologisch zunächst einmal plausibel: aus der Ähnlichkeit der verwendeten sprachlichen Mittel erwächst das Gefühl kognitiver Nähe und der Eindruck einer erfolgreichen Verständigung. Aufgrund seiner Plausibilität soll dieses Prinzip an sich nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Stattdessen seien einige bewusst banale Alternativvorschläge aufgelistet, die den besagten 'Rapport' durch

die Verwendung sprachlicher Stilmittel herstellen, die den Präferenzen des Gesprächspartners entsprechen:

> Sei gewitzt mit Witzigen und ernst mit Ernsten
>
> Verwende Metaphern und Metonymien mit solchen, die sie verwenden; stelle Vergleiche an mit solchen, die Vergleiche anstellen.
>
> Übertreibe mit solchen, die gerne Übertreibungen in den Mund nehmen.
>
> Fluche mit den Fluchenden.
>
> Benutze Euphemismen mit solchen, die sie ebenfalls verwenden.
>
> Bilde kurze Sätze, wenn der Gesprächspartner es auch tut; verwende viele Nebensätze, wenn sie dein Gesprächspartner verwendet.
>
> Drücke dich abstrakt aus mit Abstrakten und konkret mit Konkreten; verwende wissenschaftliche Termini, Fachausdrücke und ausgefallene Wörter, wenn der Gesprächspartner es tut; sprich umgangssprachlich mit solchen, die dasselbe tun.
>
> Sei direkt mit Direkten, indirekt mit Indirekten und konventionell Indirekt mit solchen, die konventionelle Indirektheit praktizieren.
>
> Verwende Fremdwörter, z.B. Anglizismen, wenn der Gesprächspartner es tut.
>
> Verwende Nominalstil mit Nominalstilisten, Verbalstil mit Verbalstilisten, Narratives mit Erzählfreudigen, Passivsätze und Impersonalpronomen unter entsprechenden Voraussetzungen.

Während einige dieser Empfehlungen für den Laien vorerst unverständliche Fachtermini enthalten, sind andere allgemeinverständlich. Auch ist die Aneignung von Begriffen wie ‘konventionelle Indirektheit’ oder ‘Metonymie’ keine Aufgabe, welche übertriebene Ansprüche an den Lernenden stellt; gehören sie doch zum Inhalt akademischer Veranstaltungen auf dem Grundlagenniveau und werden innerhalb von kurzer Zeit erlernt. Deshalb erscheint eine derartige Auflistung geeignet, sprachwissenschaftlich besser fundierte Alternativen zu den ‘kognitiven Präferenzen’ des NLP aufzuzeigen, und zwar unter der Beibehaltung dessen Ziels der Rapportherstellung.

Obgleich jede dieser Empfehlungen für sich genommen sinnvoll klingt, haben sie alle zusammengenommen ein schwerwiegendes Manko: ihre gezielte Verwendung setzt enorme sprachanalytische Fähigkeiten voraus, die manche als Gabe mitbringen mögen, andere sich jedoch nur mühsam oder gar nicht aneignen könnten. Ihre gesamte Komplexität entspricht der Komplexität der stilistischen Merkmale natürlichsprachlicher Kommunikation. Allein die oben aufgelisteten Merkmale – und man könnte diese Liste natürlich fast beliebig verlängern – ergeben 6144 mögliche Kombinationen. Die Leistung ihrer intuitiven Einordnung und des adäquaten eigenen sprachlichen Handelns würde der gewöhnlichen Leistung der Menschen entsprechen, denen man kommunikatives Talent und

sprachliches Einfühlungsvermögen bescheinigt. Als Leitfaden für solche, welche weder dieses Talent besitzen noch die Zeit haben, sich näher mit der linguistischen Terminologie zu befassen, sind die zitierten Empfehlungen in dieser Form wenig brauchbar. Eine Einteilung in vier Sprechertypen, die obendrein bei genauerer Betrachtung immer auf das gleiche Ergebnis, d.h. den gleichen Sprechertyp ausläuft, ist nicht nur bequemer, sondern geradezu auffällig simpel. Dass sie jeder sprachwissenschaftlichen und sprachpsychologischen Grundlage entbehrt, zu dieser Erkenntnis könnte ihre Kontrastierung mit dem zugegebenermaßen komplexeren, aber insgesamt doch nachvollziehbaren Repertoire tatsächlicher sprachstilistischer Mittel und Unterschiede hinführen.

8. Äquivalenz sprachlicher Ausdrücke

Die Empfehlung an den NLP-Anwender, sich bei der Vermittlung der gewünschten Inhalte in der eigenen Äußerungsform an dem ‘bevorzugten Sinneskanal’ des Gesprächspartners zu orientieren, setzt voraus, dass uns gleichbedeutende oder auch nur annährend gleichbedeutende Formulierungen aus mindestens drei Sinnesbereichen in ausreichender Zahl zur Verfügung stehen. NLP lehrt denn auch, dass solche Äquivalenzen vorhanden sind, und zwar anhand sorgfältig ausgesuchter Beispielfälle. Einige davon werden im folgenden aus internen Schulungsmaterialien eines weltweit agierenden Konzerns zitiert; das Verb “verstehen” ist hier im Gegensatz zu Krusche (2002) als ‘allgemein’, d.h. sinnesneutral, und nicht als auditiv klassifiziert.

allgemein	ich verstehe dich	ich weiß, dass es wahr ist
visuell	ich sehe, was du meinst	es gibt nicht den Schatten eines Zweifels
auditiv	das klingt vernünftig	stimmt Wort für Wort
kinästhetisch	ich habe das Gefühl, zu wissen, was du meinst	da gibt es nichts daran zu rütteln

Tabelle 5: *Eine Gegenüberstellung “äquivalenter” Ausdrucke aus verschiedenen Sinnesbereichen und ihrer sinnesneutralen Varianten*

Selbst in diesen Musterbeispielen besteht nur eine annähernde Äquivalenz der Bedeutung und eine partielle Überschneidung der möglichen Funktionen, so dass die Umsetzbarkeit des Postulats der “freien Auswahl” in authentischer sprachlicher Interaktion als äußerst fraglich erscheint, wo doch die Nuancen des Ko-Textes über die Anwendbarkeit einer Formulierung mitbestimmen. Um dem Laien vor Augen zu führen, dass die semantische oder pragmatische Äquivalenz eine Illusion ist, können konstruierte Dialoge herangezogen werden. Hier seien bloß zwei exemplarisch vorgestellt:

(1) A: Ich möchte, dass die Skizze bis Freitag fertig ist.
B: Ich habe das Gefühl, zu wissen, was Sie meinen.

Da doch A ihre Position eindeutig ausgesprochen hatte, wirkt die Entgegnung von B in diesem Zusammenhang ironisch beziehungsweise absurd, im Gegensatz zu den folgenden Formulierungen, von denen die erste als 'neutral', das zweite als 'auditiv' eingestuft werden kann:

(2) A: Ich möchte, dass die Skizze bis Freitag fertig ist.
B: Ich verstehe Sie.
C: Das klingt vernünftig.

Oder:

(3) B: Er ist also verreist?
A: Ja, stimmt Wort für Wort.

"Stimmt Wort für Wort" wirkt hier unangemessen, da es nur für längere Aussagen gebraucht werden kann. Im Gegensatz dazu ist gegen die folgende 'visuelle' und die 'neutrale' Bestätigung nichts einzuwenden:

(4) B: Er ist also verreist?
A: Ja, es gibt nicht den Schatten eines Zweifels.
C: Ja, ich weiß, dass es wahr/dass es so ist.

9. Schlussbemerkungen

In diesem Aufsatz wurden einige praktische Vorschläge für einen diskursiven [kritischen] Umgang mit NLP dargestellt. Dem eventuell entstehenden Eindruck, dass man dem NLP durch eine fachwissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung zuviel Ehre erweise und gleichsam mit Kanonen auf Spatzen schieße, möchte ich die Resultate einer kurzen, leicht reproduzierbaren Internetrecherche entgegenhalten: die Verbreitung des Phänomens NLP geht so weit, dass studierte, promovierte und mit anderen Titeln versehene Sprecherzieher und Rhetoriktrainer mit dem Hinweis auf ihre NLP-Zusatzausbildung für ihre Schulungen werben. Ich sehe einen wichtigen Teil des gesellschaftlichen Auftrags der Sprachwissenschaft und der Geisteswissenschaften insgesamt darin, eine wirksame Aufklärung und Enttarnung von Un- oder Halbwahrheiten dort zu betreiben, wo ihr Territorium betreten wird. Wie dieses Postulat tatsächlich organisatorisch und medientechnisch umgesetzt werden könnte, ist ein Thema für eine gesonderte, eher handlungs- als wissensorientierte Überlegung, an deren Ende die Ausarbeitung eines konkreten Handlungskonzepts stehen sollte.

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The Collaborative Construction of Tropes in Conversation

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We analyze the pragmatic use of figures of words (tropes) and figures of thought in conversation, and we claim that there might be cases of a collaborative construction of these sequences. In other words, we deal with rhetorical constructions as if they belonged to people and not to the text as such. We set out to identify the pragmatic parameters that facilitate this collaboration and to briefly describe how they over-determine the semantic mechanisms of such tropes and figures.

1. The localist perspective on tropes

There is a preconception of tropes as adornment – and its pervasiveness cannot be denied, in spite of a great many voices that have 'demasked' it, coming as they do from various fields such as poetics, stilistics, rhetorics and argumentation, literary criticism, literary and linguistic pragmatics, etc. Such a preconception, according to Constantinescu(1977), has its origins in 'the progressive literaturization of rhetorics', where the trope is taken out of its context so as to be described separately, *per se*, and analyzed as adornment, as well as to be contained within taxonomies. From the very beginning, starting with the age of classical rhetorics, emphasis has been laid mostly on how to constitute the tropologic sense. Closer to our era, when structuralism and generativism came of age, studies on the generation mechanisms of tropologic senses clearly laid bare the difference between non-figurative, catacretic tropes on the one hand – which sprang out of an objective need to compensate for certain lexical or conceptual voids – and the tropes as such on the other, whose sense is in itself creative, innovative and aesthetic.

The catacretic sense was described as deriving from a primitive lexical sense, whereas the tropologic one was understood as a deliberate deviation from literal language. The greater the gap, the more enriched the sense. Another perspective on the mechanism triggering the tropologic sense – one that Fontanier was familiar with and that his predecessors mostly intuitvely guessed – is substitution. Substitution operates either at the level of the signified, provided that the signifier is kept unadjusted in the case of tropes, or at the level of the signifier, provided the signified pervades, in the case of tropes/figures of thought.

Regardless, however, of whether we choose to understand the tropologic sense as derivation, deviation or substitution, the perspective on tropes is

essentially a localist one, within the boundaries of which these figurative constituents are intrinsically bound to the text as a product that they adorn, render unique or more persuasive. The localist point of view is a quite static one. Figures of speech are especially created by the author of the text so as to obtain as many effects (perlocutionary) as possible on the reader. In other words, the tropologic significance moves unidirectionally from the text and its author towards the reader. What we have set out to do is actually describe a few aspects of trope behaviour in verbal interaction. As such, the localist and quasi-static perspective loses ground in favour of a globalist and more dynamic one.

2. The contextualization of tropes

Quite frequently in spontaneous every-day conversations there are instances when the (inter)locutor echoes a trope, assesses it, comments upon it, alters it out of the desire to enhance its relevance via contextualization, customization or deconstruction[1], suggests to the author an improved figurative construction, rejects it if s/he perceives the trope as inadequate, stores it to memory and makes use of it in a subsequent verbal exchange, or answers a trope-based utterance by means of laughter or fatic markers (*no way!, yes, no, right on!, that's a fact, well ...yes, indeed*, a.s.o). Taking into account such interlocutor reactions to the tropologic significance, we could say that – at least at the oral communication level – rhetorical constructions are collaborative, as discourse as a whole is or as the argumentation strategies our verbal exchanges contain. The `parenthood` of the figurative sense is shared by both participants in the conversation. The movement undertaken by the trope or figure of rhetoric is thus not unidirectional. It displays a 'return' trajectory, a lot less predictable and hence context-bound.

[1] There are differences at discourse level that account for the distinction between contextualization, customization and deconstruction of tropes. The present paper shall touch on the concept of contextualization in what follows, but too little is mentioned here about customization and deconstruction. For this reason, and without entering in too much detail, we shall provide below several examples that due to length constraints feature a simplified version of the transcripts in *I.V.*, and where the"//" symbol marks the transition from one line to the other. A trope's customization occurs provided that its selection is either irrelevant or merely accidental, perhaps by way of the freudian "slip of the tongue": (B asks the interlocutor if s/he didn't feel the urge to tell the referent –whom they are both talking about behind his/her back – what s/he really thought about him/her) "A: Sure I did.// B: And?// A: Well, I'm kissing up to him, kinda scratching his back.// B: Scratching his back...not exactly the word I had in mind for our discussion here.// A: With the floor/wire brush, I mean.// B: The floor brush! Scrubbin' his face, or wha'?" (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 61). The clash of two *endoxa* often engenders a trope's deconstruction, as it happens in the next example, where the marriage-out-of-love *endoxon* comes to grips with the pre-arranged marriage *endoxon*: (B tells A s/he has too small a salary to afford buying a house) "A: Maybe it's best that you wait a while and do the thing properly. // B: Yeah, or I could just as well wait for Prince Charming to show up with...// A: Oh, yeah!// B: [wait for] Prince Charming to show up with the dough!" (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 181).

2.1 The pragmatic parameters for contextualization of the tropes

A series of such pragmatic parameters which allow – or which are believed to be responsible for - the so-called 'collaboration' between the tropologic sense and a given spontaneous piece of conversation are as follows: first and foremost, the reflexive nature of communicative intentions, as discussed by Grice in his studies, alongside other post-gricean theorists; the way in which participants in the conversation relate themselves to the communicative maxims; the shared knowledge of the locutors – with special emphasis on the *ethos* that they themselves share, or that of the people they talk about, as well as on the *endoxon* they adhere to. The *endoxon* designates the common wisdom unanimously agreed upon by all the members of a social group. It is superior to any commonplace or opinion, and pre-determinates argumentation. Stereotyped phrases, key words or figurative catacreses are indicators of a discourse subjacent *endoxon*. Last but not least, other pragmatic parameters are: the argumentative purpose; the politeness strategies the speakers make use of; the extent to which they feel comfortable risking their public image by the selection of figurative language over literal, neuter expressions; the attitude of agreeing or disagreeing as to the content and implicature of utterances; the polyphonic relations the discourse voices lend themselves to, as well as maintaining or modifying the utterance's deictic center.

A semantic factor that facilitates the trope's surfacing into the flux of conversation is the density of previous and subsequent semantic cohesions to the given trope. This factor is only mentioned here because it has otherwise been studied at length by theoreticians of semantic isotopies.

3. The addressability of tropes

A frequent manner of interactively constituting the trope in current conversation is progressively, in stages. The excerpt below features at a given point the catacretic metaphor of love as war, or envisaged in terms of *conquests*. From a conversational point of view, this catacresis – figurative when it surfaces into speech – is not fully asserted in this first utterance within the discourse (according to 2A). It thus needs a second `phase` or stage, when it receives the interlocutor's acceptance (see 3B). The given metaphor narrows down its scope/sense in the direction set by the euphemism ('be on the make') in the interlocutor's cue, but later on the trope becomes contextualized by the author of the *conquests* catacresis, either hyperbolically (see 4A), or simply increasingly (see 5A).

(1) 1B: I saw him briefly↓ it was quite in a hurry⊥ I didn't get to see him too well. v*** is cool `bout it, **he**: **# is on the make**↓ ((laughter))
2A: ((laughter)) ha ha ha ↓ yeah↓ he's counting his **conquests**
3B: #well, what else is new
4A: yes↓ he's set on blowing away/**conquering** the whole of Bucharest// he's crushing hearts throughout Bucharest

[...]
5A: how about YOU↑ what **conquests** do you have to show off?

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 174-175)

The euphemism and its corresponding catacretic trope are indicators of an endoxon guaranteeing approval among speakers, who indirectly signal that within this particular conversational exchange the idea of disapproval is refuted. We maintain this as a counter-example for those conversations clearly indicating from the onset that they will evolve towards verbal disapproval, or even conflict. However, it is not the case with the cited example. The endoxon can sometimes make up for a shortage in the shared contextual knowledge, as it happens here. The trope's evolution is also of significance. First, the figurative catacresis is derived from a euphemism. At the beginning it has an attributive referentiality, indicating a certain characteristic of the referent. Upon its contextual re-surfacing in 4A, the metaphor undergoes a semantic change (it acquires generic referentiality) and grammatical changes (the corresponding verb is used). In rhetorical taxonomy, there is a noble alternative to this instance of grammatical recategorization, perfected at the generic level of the expression, known as *polyptoton*. Finally, in the last occurrence of *conquests* (5A above), the catacresis is used almost non-figuratively, due to several factors, such as: its transgression from one referent to the other, the successive changes in referentiality (factual referentiality with denotative valences), and last but not least the change in grammatical function (here, again, a noun). The trope's grammatical recategorization and its transformations at semantic level – first attributive referentiality, then generic and finally factual – determines a great mobility in the discursive universe, characteristic of reporting as well as narrative pieces.

The two stages that authorize the trope in the discursive universe – first its launching into the exchange, then its enhanced approval or acceptance – are complementary. The `conquests` metaphor occurs after the euphemism, as a sequel for the latter, which is brought up into the conversation by the speaker who possesses the bulk of information on the referent. The deliberate pause preceeding the euphemism and the subsequent outburst of laughter are paraverbal elements suggesting that the locutor has given serious thought before flouting the quality (informativity) maxim and that s/he is aware of all the contextual effects (implicatures) that the `weaker` utterances he formulated have. The metaphor surfaces in a support line, the very next one actually, indicating that we are dealing here with a participative allocutor, who `reads the other one's mind'. It emphasizes, supports and boldly expands the meaning inferred in B's utterance. The metaphor's utterer understands the interlocutor's communicative intent (hereafter referred to as *intentions*$_{c}$), and *s/he re-lexicalizes them at a higher figurative level*. He cannot be seen as the sole `parent` of the trope, nor be fully accountable for its surfacing, given that the metaphor is triggered by a previous euphemism and, most importantly, that the trope's utterer merely echoes the

intentions$_c$ of some other speaker. He does, however, incur a certain conversational risk, by launching a more informative alternative as compared to the previous euphemism – knowing as we all do that the higher the informativity, the more likely to be refuted.

In other words, the `conquests` metaphor has little autonomy as utterance. It belongs to both participants in the conversation, and its role is that of expressing the implicatures of the prior euphemism and of generating in turn other implicatures, more particularized and displaying stronger contextual effects than its semantic antecedent. At the same time, it becomes obvious that it aquires full addressability only when validated by the initiator of this semantic movement, i.e. the euphemism's locutor. The notion of addressability, closely connected to that of polyphony, was first coined by Bakhtin. By the same token, analysing the *speakability* and *unspeakability* of a discursive sequence, Mey emphasizes the idea that polyphony - and hence addressability – is pre-determined by the contextual collaboration between speaker and reader. Here, the concept of addressability is to be understood within these lines of thought, bearing in mind that it depends on the extent to which the locutor takes responsibility for his/her utterance, either in terms of its truthfulness or relevance, or of both.

A similar case is the one under (2), where the *ogre* metaphor functions as a lexical anticipation of a possible intention of the interlocutor, whose validation occurs only subsequently, at 6A:

(2) (A has just finished describing his/her step mother)

1B:	[maybe: this suffering has softened her a bit↓ she's not so:: tough↓ any more and so stern↓ and maybe she's trying # to reach out to you and make peace↑ knowing: she's all alone now↑
2A:	no: (xx)
3B:	things haven't changed
4A:	no: [no: no:
5B:	she's the same:: old ogre
6A:	no_no_no↓ she hasn't changed a bit.

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 50)

The moment it is launched into the discourse (5B above), the metaphor lacks addressability: it is neither addressed by somebody, nor is it addressed to somebody. It merely signals a potential significance that will or will not be licensed by the speaker possessing the authority to do so. Most frequently, such empowering is dictated by the speaker's superior knowledge over the addressee. Paraphrasing J. Mey, at this stage of its launching into the conversation the given trope is a kind of *unspeakable metaphor,* one that belongs to neither participant, nor to the locutors or referents they happen to introduce in the exchange.

Many of the communication sequences anticipated or imagined by the speaker in relation to either the addressee or some other referent in the discursive universe contain figurative language. For that very reason, such *unspeakable*

tropes or, in other words, tropes that lack addressability due to their uncertain affiliation have quite a high occurrence. There are likely to be several classes of conversational situations that ought to be thoroughly described following the selection of examples and their subsequent analysis, where the discourse voices and the polyphonic games they lend themselves to play a major part. Two such classes appear as symptomatic, each with its own variables, the multitude of which we can mostly assume rather than assert. The first is the one already described above, namely that of anticipated discursive sequences containing tropes which are structured according to the communicative intentions of one of the participants in the conversation, most often the intentions$_{_c}$ of the locutor who holds the bulk of information, thus being superior to the others. Reported imaginary discourse sequences represent the second instance that facilitates the occurence of unspeakable tropes. The conversational contexts encountered here depend on the notion of *communicative expectation,* hereafter referred to as *expectation*$_{\_c}$, which has a high occurrence in such situations, corresponding to the intention$_{_c}$. An example in point is one where, hypothetically speaking, the locutor wants or expects the speaker to say (or to have said) something and thus guides the latter towards verbalizing it. The interlocutor thus auto-lexicalizes his/her alledged intentions$_{_c}$ along the lines of the expectations$_{_c}$ of the one who initializes this discursive movement. In other words, s/he plays along with the speaker, engendering a fictional, self-reported discourse, as shown in the excerpt below:

(3) (A and B are talking about Dan, who's living it up, partying on night in and night out, and who didn't use to be such a partyboy.)

1B:	and and nobody⊥ I mean you NEVER erm... never seem to have the slightest urge to tell him ⊥ Danny boy # you used to be so handsome: [you haven't told him (that)
2A:	[you've got **dark rings around your eyes**.
3B:	exactly. you've got dark rings around your eyes, rings of (xxxxx)↓ NO. now lemme ask you. as far as I can see, I've got <$_F$ other needs># to confront people with my image of them.↓ first to see if I was right about them in the first place, and then to see if: <$_R$ they themselves have any clue>. m: about you. I mean you didn't :⊥ NO↑ no.

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 60)

The line in 2A displays characteristics of free indirect discourse (a bracketed *dicendi* sequence – *you've never told him*), keeping at the same time the original intonation, as well as person and time of the alledged utterance. It is however over-determined by the fictional trait, which gives it the status of a non-addressable sentence. It belongs in fact to neither of the voices nor to any conversational instance, thus being an echoic statement of the interlocutor's expectations$_{_c}$. Rather small in size, it goes beyond the very conversational

strategy that generated it via a metonimy revolving around the idea of weariness and fatigue.

Another form of figurative language based on textual polyphonic relations - one that may go unnoticed – is the interjectional trope:

(4) 1B: [and THEN at least take the other road↓ just so you know you've confronted him and his stupid pride ↓ don't you ever feel the need to: just stick the knife in and tell him dan↓ **vu:m vu:m**
2A: <$_J$ (sure i do)>.

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 60)

The pro-narrative interjection *vum!, vum!* appears in a brief sequence of imaginary direct discourse, hence in a communicative situation featuring two deictic centres, one belonging to speaker B within the actual communicative context, the other to his/her interlocutor in a previous conversation. It thus relies on the same trope-triggering mechanism, which basically means that the literal sense of the noise imitating heavy blows moves to the background, while the metaphoric sense is foregrounded, here suggesting rough language, words that 'bump' or 'thump'.

This use of interjections as metaphors mostly pertains to imitative ones. Within a trope taxonomy they would fall under either *onomatopoeia* (or *nominatio*), or an instance of *sermocinatio*, the figure of speech by means of which the voice of a character is assigned according to his nature or way of being.

By making use of such interjectional metaphors, the speaker expresses his/her own hypotheses on the interlocutor's communicative intentions. At first, it is by no means addressable, but due to its subsequent acknowledgement it immediately becomes a sequence that either was or will be addressed to the referent in question (here, the guy named Dan). As in previous cases, the trope has double allegiance: it is B's concoction, but its `parenthood` lies with A, on account of the two deictic centres in the answer line.

There are instances when a trope is only partially allowed to take shape into language, without reaching its cultivated or literary form. Such is the case of some colloquial comparative constructions, attributed in Romanian to a 2nd person singular subject, of the type *you would say* [2]*. . . (zici că-i...*):

(5) (looking at some photos)
A: just look at this:: ⊥ you/ (one) can see the clouds↓
B: yeah. you / one would say that a storm is about to break

[2] In English, the form with *you* (i.e. second person singular) is rather uncommon, and constructions of the type mentioned are most frequently encountered with the impersonal third person subject *one*. It is also possible for such constructions in Romanian to be translated with the English construction *look like*, as shown in example (5), i.e. "It looks like a fortress", or „One would say it's a fortress".

A: and the town here↑ you/one would say it's a FORTRESS↓ // looks like a FORTRESS
B: yes it does.

(personal recording and transcription)

(6) (looking at some photos)
B: WHAT are these, mate[3]↑ what the heck are these↓ these lil'statues here↓
A: it's that one: dude::↓ from:: from Sighişoara. From the citadel↓
B: you/one would say they're Turks // they look like Turks
A: yeah.

(personal recording and transcription)

Formally speaking, the second person subject or the impersonal pronoun *one* (5) and the corresponding verb form transfers the comparative construction to some other person, who cannot be identified with the allocutor – as the subsequent lines clearly show -, but with another co-locutor, an `invisible` one. Regardless of whether the deictic *you* in this comparative construction is to be equated with a *generic you* or an *invisible one* whose voice is nonetheless heard, the outcome is an increase in the deictic centres of the utterance. This construction is a strategy on the part of the speaker, allowing him to escape full responsibility for the expressed comparison. Perhaps it would be worth mentioning here that such comparative constructions are triggered by the presence of a visual stimulus. The compared might at times not be directly perceived, in which case the comparer is introduced via the particle *like/as*. A trope relying on similitude would be more abstract than the comparative construction referred to, determining an increased tension between the two terms (Robrieux 2000: 48-49).

Ethopoeia is the figure of thought by means of which a very lively and vivid image of a person or character can be constructed. Switching from one register to the other and not just echoing the voices of the person described, but imitating them (in a kind of *pesudo-sermocinatio*) are the characteristics of *ethopoeia*. A little earlier, in the same conversation we can identify a fictional and hardly faithful imitation of the referent's voice – the one who is being talked about. It is ironically pathetic, bordering on some kind of aping of the referent by the very speaker who receives the information, and not by the holder, as we would have expected.

(7) A: he told me about it [(xxxxx)
B: <$_F$ WHAT he did>. WHAT he's doing.
A: ((whimpering)) <$_{IM}$ o:h my↓ I've stayed up 'till about five-ish or so ↓>

[3] The *mă* interjection in Romanian, which in (6) functions as a kind of marker of affection, was rendered in English via the noun *mate* or *dude,* displaying somewhat similar valences.

B: <$_F$ u-hum↑>
A: and told him that I myself stayed up to do my homework↓ you know
B: at which I bet he jumped at you right away <$_R$ **gimme gimme gimme**>.
A: ah, no, no way

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 62).

As far as we are concernerd, the above *gimme gimme gimme* is a *locutionary* metaphor on account of its non-literal and fictional features.

The *poor sods* and *mentor* metaphors below, at (8) – typical of an initiation scenario – where the speakers' intentions all merge into building up an *ethopoeia*, hold quite a different relation to the notion of addressability: the first has consistent addressability, given its surfacing in a reported speech sequence, while the second lacks addressability altogether, being the same type of unspeakable metaphor, pertaining to neither of the discursive voices in the conversation. The *mentor* metaphor lexicalizes the implicatures aimed at by the character who is being described and who merely hints at his `mentoring` qualities without actually verbalizing them, thus hypocritically feigning modesty. On the other hand, the locutor uses the trope ironically, obviously not adherring to it and hence disclaiming any responsibility for its utterance.

(8) 1B: ah no. it's more⊥ it's obvious <$_R$ he knows exactly what he's doing↓>
2A: he's been up all night and he did NOT hand in his homework.
3B: (but I still ⊥) coming back to my senses # WHATever for did he stay up all night?
4A: he didn't get a wink of sleep to explain to the **poor sods**# [
5B: [so↓ dinu↓ who graduated with straight As↓ WHAT on earth could he have explained to Dinu?
6A: something like: they'd better solve the problem nice and esay, and today he was telling me (that)# <$_{IM}$ geez↓ I doubt whether someone did a better job with the homework>.
7B: how disgusting#
8A: i mean [not the homework
9B: [TO:R.
10A: that he himself did and handed in↓ the homework he: erm ⊥ ooh, so he was the **mentor** for all those who did their homework last night
12B: **MENtor_aka agitaTOR**.
13A: yep **aka agitator**.

(Ionescu-Ruxănoiu 2002: 62)

The third metaphor, the one featuring the word *agitator* and which receives the locutors' adhesion *in presentia,* - but which will surely be rejected by the person it is used to describe, the locutor *in absentia* who in being evoked here – does not

amend the initial metaphor, but re-interprets it via the *aka*[4] expression. The answer line in 12B is a proof of what Mey (1999) calls *a clash of voices*; more precisely, the clash here is between the mute, presumed, and later on re-built voice of the character with that of the locutor *in presentia* and the echoing of his co-locutor. From the point of view of argumentation the three voices are antagonistic: the locutors' voices are opposed to that of the character in question. We are dealing here with the same figurative lexicalization of the communicative intentions of the dominant or empowered speaker, the one who holds most of the information when the metaphor is being uttered. S/he is the one who will authorize it in the very next line, the stage at which the metaphor finally becomes fully addressable and its paternity is shared by both participants in the conversation.

Beyond doubt, whether proved and/or intuitively guessed, the linguistic expression in the utterance is incomparably poorer and under-determined as to the multitude of conversational phenomena it indicates or represents. This has long since been observed, and has thus become a commonplace of pragmatic language analysis. It therefore comes as no surprise that such a small sequence as the one in (7, 12B) is connected to phenomena such as polyphony, echoing or meta-representation, at different levels in terms of significance or argumentative values.

Cases of inter-textuality and code-switching are also to be interpreted by assuming polyphony phenomena, and it is often the case that their linguistic accomplishment favours the figurative level of significance. The figurative expressions in the example below are all samples of colloquial language, even though the previous conversation was carried out in standard Romanian and - according to the recording on tape – both speakers are working as nurses in a hospital in Bucharest.

(9) 1A: she probably had a fight outside with the kids and she was bored↓ and felt like paying a visit to her mum's working place and found the perfect cover – poor babyis sick↓ so she feigned a lil' tummy ache to come and see her mother on the job (xxx)
2B: a↑ **that DEVIL of /a child/ the things they come up with**
3A: **just look at her↑ look at her↑** don't you just feel like smacking her silly?
4B: yeah **they can give you quite a scare, they can**
5A: <ị you betcha **she did give me one>**

(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2002: 86)

The use of these expressions points to a code-switching. The two locutors play for a short while a new conversational role: they are playing a part of a simple, peasant women, whose characteristic language as well as vivacity they temporar-

[4] The English *aka* (`also known as`), a translation of the Romanian *adică*, to keep the explanatory function in the translated quote.

ily assume. What we are faced with here is a sort of gliding from a real discursive universe into a rural, imaginary one. The story that A recounts in 1A and which is clearly set in reality stimulates the two speakers to steadily glide towards assuming the role of brisk, loquacious peasant women. Thus the code-switching perceived at the level of comments on the recounted event moves towards a sort of pseudo-sermocinatio.

In examples (10) and (11), the intertextuality attained via quoting a certain verse or advertising slogans can lead to a major departure from the propositional content of communication, even to textual slidings where the referential function is blocked and allogenic textual sequences cannot be linked to original textual sequences at denotative sense level, having no addressability.

(10) A: This was taken somewhere up a road↓ we've climbed higher and_higher_and higher↑#
B: yes.
A: I've got some pictures here:: that we've taken::
B: [<$_R$ this one looks like one of those taken at the university >
A: I do NOT know where they were taken exactly↓ # ah:::: somewhere they've been by cable car ↓ **up up in the hills↓ there's a place↓ where my sweetheart dwells[5].**

(personal recording)

and

(11) (upon decorating the Christmas tree; B works as general manager with a company dealing in heating and cooling systems)
A: boy oh boy' look at all these globes . . .you've got quite a stock here ↓ wow::::
B: **yep we're HYPER-stocked↓ # HIPER-ventilated↓**
C: **we are the best**.(*orig. in engl*)
A: But::: all of 'em quite red↓ # # any particular reason↑
B: weeell↑
A: There comes a time↓ in your life↑
B: **red meat. big warrior.** (*orig. in engl*) not. these↑

(personal recording)

[5] In Romanian the quoted verse is reminiscent of a popular song in vogue, talking about a hill where the poet's beloved resides (*Sus în deal/E-o casă/Şi acolo-i mândra mea*). To English speakers not familiar with the song, the translation of the verses might not stand for much. Keeping a sense of proportion and bearing in mind the given context, the song could perhaps be likened to the much older 'Home on the range', in that we are dealing here with the idyllic image of a house in the middle of unspoilt nature.

We dare say that such gratuitous language games or linguistic jokes could be viewed as pragmatic tropes, by drawing on Kerbrat-Orrechioni's *presuppositional tropes* or *illocutionary tropes* – bearing in mind that we are not dealing here with such tropes. The syntagmatic deviation, the referential block, as well as lack of addressability differentiate these language gags from the pragmatic tropes discussed by the aforementioned author. Notwithstanding the loss of many components that help to coherently enscribe a particular linguistic sequence within the text or discourse, it is precisely their function of (ironically) alluding – though the allusion may be difficult to identify on the one hand and easy to overlook on the other – that gives them such a high occurrence in conversation. Obviously there are speakers who frequently use intertextual pragmatic tropes of the kind, a futher proof that they rely heavily on their own idiolect and all the psycho-linguistic variables derived thereupon. It becomes clear nonetheless that they can help build a stereotyped image the speaker wants to identify with or a particular *endoxon*, as it is the case in (10), where the idea of power, force, battle and victory transgresses from the slogans' isotopies, often enhanced by contextual or encyclopaedic information.

The interactive construction of many tropes relies primarily on the concept of polyphony, which in turn licenses addressability, as well as on that of responsibility on the part of a (real or virtual) locutor for his/her utterances into a given exchange. Taking responsibility for the uttered linguistic sequence presupposes – as Grice has shown – specific attitudes towards communication maxims. There are however situations – such as those discussed here – when a speaker's attitude towards a maxim is not genuine, simply because it does not belong to the utterer in question, but to a different voice that s/he takes on.

It often happens that whenever one of the locutors 'reads the other's mind', imitates somebody else's speech or his/her own for that matter, wants to flatter or plays a part pretending to be someone else, s/he complicates each time the way the maxims are exploited and - according to our findings – they tend to choose figurative language over literal expressions which furthermore lose ground in favour of implicatural readings.

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